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This thesis explores how and why gender wage inequality persisted in Australia 
during the period 1990 to 2003. A review of the wage data indicated that Australian 
inequality persisted during this period and even increased in Western Australia. 
An analysis of the literature and published tribunal decisions showed that the focus 
of action relating to gender wage equality was on the formal industrial relations 
system, through legislation and tribunal decisions. As the literature also indicated 
that these measures had failed to assist many female-dominated occupations, it was 
felt useful to examine the views of key stakeholders in the formal industrial relations 
system. 
Given the mainly quantitative and aggregate data analysis of previous empirical 
literature and the theoretical literature’s growing focus on less quantifiable social 
factors, it was felt that qualitative research would add to the analysis of gender wage 
determination. This thesis uses in-depth interviews with stakeholders in the federal 
and Western Australian industrial relations systems to examine the period 1990 to 
2003. Their perceptions and observations are triangulated with published wage data 
from selected occupations.  
Interviewees felt that the persistence of gender wage inequality was a complex 
artifact. An artifact of economic, industrial relations, social and cultural factors, 
combined with the biological and psychological attributes of all involved in decisions 
before and in the workplace. While much of the gender wage gap literature has been 
focused on the economic, industrial relations, or legal aspects of wage inequality, this 
thesis uniquely demonstrates why and how social and cultural influences also act to 
create persistent gender wage inequality. As much as action is taken in the legal and 
political arena to create equality, the players in the industrial relations system, 
consciously or not, both male and female, say that they have helped to (re)construct 
the gender wage gap.  
The implications are that in order to achieve gender wage equality, action cannot be 
left only to legislation and activity in the courts, but is also needed at the social and 
cultural level. Such action could be taken within the enterprise as well as in the 
school, community and home. 
 xii
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines why and how women working full-time in Australia between 
1990 and 2003 were still paid less than their male counterparts. Female earnings are 
important because of the influence of wages and salaries on income for both women 
and men. Employment income makes up the bulk of total income in Australia, with 
58 per cent of households having wages and salaries as their principle source of 
disposable average income and 28 per cent of households having government 
pensions and allowances as their principal source of income in 2002/3 (ABS 2004).  
With an ageing population, income on retirement is increasingly an issue for all 
Australians and their governments (DCITA 2004:18). Income on retirement is also 
increasingly likely to be influenced by previous employment income as occupational 
superannuation has now become the Australian Government’s preferred method of 
financing retirement (Atkinson, Creedy & Knox 1995:24). Women are more likely 
than men to be in low and medium wage employment (King, Rimmer & Rimmer 
1992).  
It has long been acknowledged that there has been a wage gap between men and 
women in Australia (Ryan & Conlon 1975) and this continued into the 21st century 
(ABS 2005). Thus the original objective of this thesis was to answer the question: 
Why does the Australian industrial relations system deliver different pay outcomes to 
equivalent women and men who are working full-time?  
It follows that this thesis must demonstrate if equivalent (in terms of productive 
characteristics such as education and experience) women and men, working full-time 
ordinary hours in Australia, are paid differently. This is done during the literature 
review in Chapter 3 where the econometric evidence is analysed. Here only 
indicative raw data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) on female award 
rates and average weekly ordinary time earnings (AWOTE) relative to male award 
rates and AWOTE is given, showing how that has changed over time. This chapter 
then goes on to explain how this thesis is organised, to discuss the research question, 
to define some parameters and then, very briefly to give the major findings. 
 1
1.1 FEMALE PAY 1914 TO 2003 – THE RAW DATA 
1914 was the first time a sample of both male and female award rates became 
available (ABS Labour Report 1915). Table 1 shows how relative female compared 
to male award rates changed over the time period 1914 to 1984.  
It shows that in 1914 Australian women were earning nearly 50 per cent of male 
minimum award rates. At this time the industrial tribunals, the Commonwealth Court 
of Conciliation and Arbitration (CCCA) and the Western Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission (WAIRC), (as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2) were 
awarding women in women’s jobs at least 50 per cent of male wages and women in 
men’s jobs 100 per cent. 
By 1955, women were receiving an average of 70 per cent of male award rates, 
despite the 1949/50 Basic Wage inquiry (68 CAR 759) that set award rates for 
women’s jobs at a minimum of 75 per cent of male award rates (with women in 
men’s jobs still sometimes being awarded 100 per cent). In 1972, when the principle 
of equal pay for work of equal value was adopted by the CCAC (147 CAR 172), 
women were earning an average of 77.4 per cent of male award rates. This relativity 
climbed rapidly as the 1972 decision took effect, with women’s average minimum 
weekly award rates relative to men’s rates rising to 79.5 per cent in 1973 and 91 per 
cent in 1975.  
Advances in women’s award rates relative to those of men began to slow in the 
1980s. By 1980, female award rates rose to 91.9 per cent of male minimum award 
rates and by 1984, 94 per cent. It is clear that the major pay equity advances were 
made in the early 1970s and slowed in the 1980s.  
The full-time adult average weekly ordinary time earnings (AWOTE) figures used in 
Figure 1 are a more reliable measure of actual earnings than the weighted average 
minimum award figures given in Table 1. Minimum award rates do not include over-
award pay or extra loadings1. 
                                                 
1 The award rates of pay only include base minimum rates – not pay above minimum rates (over-
award pay) that would be included in earnings figures. Research (DIR 1992) has shown that men are 
more likely to receive over-award pay than women. The award rate series (ABS Labour Report 1915; 
ABS cat. no.s: 6.17 1939-1964;  6.21 1965-1967;  6.16 1972-1983;  6312.0 1974-1984) also involves 
a weighted sample of selected awards – not the whole range available. The sample and/or weighting 
may be biased towards male award rates. Hence the full-time average weekly ordinary time earnings 
series (ABS 63020) more accurately reflects what both men and women are earning. This is 




Table 1 - Weighted Average Minimum Weekly Award Rates -  
Female as a Percentage of Male 


























(Source: ABS Labour Report 1915; ABS 6.17 1939-1964; ABS 6.21 1965-1967; ABS 6.16 1972-1983; ABS 6312.0 1974-
1984 quarterly/12 monthly average for wage earners. Figures after 1982 calculated on 1982 wage rates, adjusted by post-1982 
index changes. Quoted in Short (1986:321)) 
                                                                                                                                          
women (DIR 1992) and this is not reflected in Figure 1 which considers only “ordinary time” 
earnings. The ordinary time earnings data was not available for women prior to November 1983. ABS 
award data also has a break in the series in May 1985 (ABS 6343.0) thus not enabling the two series 
to be run in parallel.
 
Figure 1 - Female as a Percentage of Male Full-Time Average Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings 





















































































































When the award rate index (ABS cat. no. 6312.0) was showing female award rates at 
94 per cent of male award rates in 1984, Figure 1 and Table 2 show that, using full-
time ordinary time earnings data, the relativity of female AWOTE compared to male 
AWOTE was considerably lower at 81 to 82 per cent2 (ABS 2005).  
Figure 1 indicates that female full-time AWOTE rose from 80.8 per cent of male 
earnings to 84.5 per cent over the period November 1983 to November 2003. 
Table 2 also demonstrates that, after 1984, the change in relativities of both award 
rates and full-time AWOTE slowed to annual averages of less than 0.4 per cent, 
becoming negative for the first time in 2003.3 Thus, looking at the period under thick 
study in the thesis, 1990 to 2003, progress on wage inequality had slowed greatly; 
wage inequality was persistent.  
In February 1990, Australian women working full-time ordinary hours earned, on 
average, 16.8 per cent less than men working full-time ordinary hours (ABS 2005). 
By the November quarter of 2003, women working full-time in Australia still earned 
15.5 per cent less than their male counterparts (ABS 2005). 
Within Australia there was considerable variation between male and female full-time 
earnings. In Western Australia, women not only had the lowest level of pay relative 
to men of all the states, but the gender wage gap between men and women widened 
during the 1990s.  
As can be seen in Figure A-1 in Appendix 1, in February 1990 Western Australian 
women working full-time ordinary hours earned 19 percent less than their male 
counterparts and in November 2003 they earned 23.1 per cent less than their male 
counterparts (ABS 2005).  From 1992 to the end of 2003 Western Australia had the 
largest gender wage gap of all the Australian states and territories. 
As will be shown in Chapter 2, this persistence (and worsening) of the gender wage 
gap was in the face of a stream of legislative changes aimed at ensuring equal pay for 
equal work and equal pay for work of equal value between men and women, in one 
of the world’s (previously) most centralised industrial relations systems. 
                                                 
2 According to Preston (2001:172) “data from the ABS show that over the period May 1985 to May 
1996 award wages as a proportion of total earnings were equal to 87 per cent in the case of males and 
96 per cent in the case of females (Cat. No. 6306).”  
3 However, in 2004 the average annual rate of change went up to 0.5 per cent and the relativity rose 
again to 84.9 per cent so this was a temporary change. 
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of Change of 
















1914   49.30  
1939   55.20 0.48 
1945   60.00 1.45 
1950   65.70 1.90 
1955   69.40 1.13 
1964   72.00 0.42 
1970   73.20 0.88 
1975   91.00 4.86 
1980   91.90 0.20 
1984 81.40  94.40 0.68 
1990 83.00 0.33   
1995 83.30 0.07   
2000 84.00 0.17   
2002 84.60 0.36   
2003 84.46 -0.14   
(Sources: a – ABS 2005: cat. no. 6302.0, quarterly average, seasonally adjusted November 1983-2004; b – ABS Labour 
Report 1915; ABS cat. no. 6.17 1939-1964; ABS cat. no. 6.21 1965-1967; ABS cat. no. 6.16 1972-1983; ABS cat.no. 6312.0 
1974-1984 quarterly/12 monthly average. Figures after 1982 calculated on 1982 wage rates, adjusted by post-1982 index 
changes.) 
1.2 HOW THE THESIS IS ORGANISED 
The thesis is organised into seven chapters. This chapter, Chapter 1, introduces the 
problem under study, explains how the thesis is structured, details the research 
question and briefly explains the findings. Chapter 2 explores the history of equal 
pay in Australia, using the literature and legislative developments. Chapter 3 reports 
relevant theoretical literature and some supporting empirical literature.  
Chapter 4 discusses the choice of qualitative research methodology and describes the 
research design. A study (Short 2001) suggested that, as well as differing legal 
provisions, key industrial actors and processes appeared to have a role in creating a 
                                                 
4 Different series are used as the ABS only recorded average weekly ordinary time earnings for 
females from November 1983. However, the inclusion of both series illustrates the rate of change 
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wage gap between men and women. The review of the literature reported in Chapter 
3, Section 3.2.1, found real or raw wage gaps of between 12 and 20 per cent in the 
1990s in Australia.  
Regression analysis (adjusting for productivity-influencing factors such as education 
as well as other factors) in the studies reviewed was able to explain between 21 and 
40 per cent of this gap. All studies had an unexplained component to the gap after 
adjusting for the variables used to account for possible differences between men and 
women. The unexplained gender wage gap remaining ranged from 10 to 16 per cent. 
It was felt that qualitative research exploring the realities of key actors within the 
formal industrial relations system would help to unpack the economists’ 
‘unexplained’ portion of the gap and add to the analysis of gender wage 
determination; hence the rationale for this thesis and methodology.  
Chapter 5 reports the results of 43 in-depth interviews with 39 industrial relations 
stakeholders that were gathered and analysed using grounded research techniques. 
The majority of interviewees (all those after the first round of interviews with 
national figures) had been involved in the determination of wages and conditions in 
nine different employment areas dominated by either men or women.5  
From this analysis interviewees’ explanations of why and how the gender wage gap 
occurred begin to emerge. This emergence is reported in Chapter 6 that further 
examines the principal findings against the related theoretical literature first 
discussed in Chapter 3, with the objective of finding an emergent framework for 
discussing the gender wage gap in Australia. The “how” is also illustrated in 
Chapters 5 and 6 with wages decisions made by both Western Australian and federal 
industrial relations commissions during the period 1990 to 2003. Chapter 7 
summarises and makes conclusions. First, however, the research question must be 
explained in some detail. 
                                                                                                                                          
over a longer period. 
5 Female and male-dominated occupations were chosen for thick study because this is where the 
literature (Short 1986; Rafferty 1994; Bennett 1988; 1994; Hall 1999; Pocock & Alexander 1999) 
says inequality persists. 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The original6 research question was: Why did the Australian industrial relations 
system deliver different pay outcomes to equivalent women and men who were 
working full-time between 1990 and 2003? 
From this question flowed the objectives for the thesis detailed below. These are, 
within the system of Australian industrial relations, to explore: 
• the possibility of developing theoretical constructs (building on previous 
theory) for better (than current qualitative work) analysing gender wage 
determination; 
• gender-related differences between male and female pay; and 
• how the gender wage gap between women and men is subject to variation; 
by examining the perceptions of industrial relations stakeholders and data from 
published documents. 
During the course of the research a new question emerged from the interviewees’ 
responses to the original question. Interviewees were explaining the persistence of 
gender wage inequality rather than just its existence. Hence the final question was: 
Why and how did gender wage inequality (for full-time workers) persist in 
Australia between 1990 and 2003? 
1.4 DEFINITIONS 
Thus, the initial focus of the study was “Why did the Australian industrial relations 
system deliver different pay outcomes to equivalent women and men who were 
working full-time between 1990 and 2003? This immediately begged for definition 
and explanation.  
Firstly, what does the Australian industrial relations system encompass? This 
thesis takes the widest possible definition of an industrial relations system. This is an 
expansion of Dunlop’s (1958) definition of an industrial system along the lines of 
Hyman (1975) and Dufty and Fells (1989). The industrial relations system’s 
framework brings in Dufty and Fells’ (1989) societal sub-systems – legal, social and 
economic – as well as Dunlop’s (1958) actors, rules, processes and outcomes. Dufty 
and Fells (1989: 323-5) explain this approach by explicitly including the 
                                                 
6 Consistent with the qualitative research method used the final question answered emerged during 
the course of the research. 
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employment relationship within their model. As they define it, the employment 
relationship not only includes external industrial relations processes such as 
tribunals, but also human resources practices in the enterprise.  
While the scope of this thesis thus encompasses interviewees’ comments on wage 
setting at the most informal level of unwritten individual contracts, the main focus is 
on the formal industrial relations system within the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission and its state counterparts. This is due to ease of access to written 
information and relevant stakeholders as well as the formal system’s pervasive 
influence on Australian wages (Chapter 2, Section 2.2.10; ABS 1991; Wooden 
2001).  
Australia had a unique system of industrial relations with independent tribunals or 
industrial relations commissions both assisting employers and employees to reach 
agreement through conciliation (a form of mediation) and using compulsory 
arbitration powers to bring down a compromise decision for the parties if an impasse 
is reached (Sykes 1980). In Australia the commission’s arbitration powers are said to 
overshadow conciliation proceedings and penalties can be applied if orders of the 
commission are breached (Sykes 1980:302). Wages and conditions are laid out in 
commission orders called awards or agreements. 
As explained in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.8, agreements and awards registered within 
the formal legal framework of the state and federal industrial tribunals still 
dominated the Australian scene in 2003, although to a lesser degree than in 1990. In 
1990, 23 per cent of the Australian workforce and 25 per cent of the Western 
Australian workforce had some type of unregistered agreement (outside the formal 
system) with their employer (ABS 1991).  
By 2002, estimates were that unregistered agreements in Australia had increased to 
cover 39 per cent of employees and in Western Australia, 41.2 per cent (ABS 
2003a). However, as explained in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.8, this data underestimated 
the influence of the formal system as many employers used the award rate as a base 
and then added a little. This type of wage was then recorded, by the ABS, as an 
unregistered agreement (Wooden 2001; Interview with employer representative B).  
 9
Due to a legislated move away from the previously very centralised system of setting 
wage rates at National Wage Cases7, most bargaining on agreements now occurs 
directly between employers and employees and their representatives at the workplace 
level without the intervention of the industrial relations commissions (Ronfeld & 
McCallum 1995:xix). However, as was made evident in interviews conducted for 
this thesis, the results of workplace bargaining are still registered with industrial 
relations commissions and the same employers and union representatives that 
negotiate awards normally negotiate agreements. 
Secondly, what are pay outcomes? In this thesis, pay will be defined as actual 
documented pay rates per hour/week/year, plus any allowances that are paid to all 
workers in the relevant occupation, e.g. industry and special allowances. The only 
over-award payments included will be those emanating from formal (rather than 
informal) enterprise bargaining and workplace agreements. Penalty and shift rates 
and other payments such as superannuation, which differ according to the individual 
paid, will not be included as pay outcomes. 
Thirdly, why concentrate on men and women working full-time? This limitation is 
applied to the wage data used because of the need to compare like with like. Women 
are much more likely than men to work part-time and any comparison of total pay 
without taking into account the different hours worked could be misleading. The data 
on part-time wages is also less reliable as the sample size is smaller.  
As a result, most previous studies of the gender wage gap (e.g. Chapman & Mulvey 
1986; Wooden 1999) have concentrated on those working full-time. It is felt that a 
concentration on wage data from the full-time labour market will be more convincing 
when examining reasons for pay differences between men and women. Nevertheless, 
interviewees’ views on part-time work and its interaction with the full-time labour 
market for women in the areas under study are reported later. 
Finally, what is meant by equivalent men and women? This is covered in more 
detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1, but means equivalent in terms of human capital 
characteristics or characteristics likely to have an influence on productivity at work.  
Human capital theory suggests wages are affected by investment in the form of 
education and training (Becker 1957) and this is due to the greater individual 
                                                 
7 As explained in Chapter 2, the different state industrial relations systems mostly just adopted these 
National Wage Case decisions in their own State Wage Cases.
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productivity created by this type of investment. Many of the studies reviewed in 
Chapter 3 also adjust for other differences between men and women that affect 
wages, such as geographic location and union membership, in order to study 
equivalent men and women. 
1.5 FINDINGS 
The principal finding of this thesis is that key actors interviewed believe the 
persistence of the gender wage gap is socially constructed. This is underlined by the 
fact that, even when Australia’s legislation and the decisions of its industrial 
relations tribunals are designed to achieve gender wage equality, key actors 
interviewed perceive that their activity within the system has been affected by their 
own and society’s views about the ‘proper’ place for women in Australian society.  
The result of this, coupled with the decentralisation of the industrial relations system, 
appears to have been the increasing gap observed over the study period 1990 to 2003 
between the wage rates of female-dominated occupations and male-dominated 
occupations studied. Interviewees showed that they believe that gender, or the social 
bundle of expectations around the biological fact of sex, is constructed daily, not just 
in the home, but in the workplace and in the industrial relations commissions in 
Australia. The main implication is that much more needs to happen than changes to 
legislation and decisions in the formal industrial relations system. Cultural and social 
change is also required to combat the persistence of gender wage inequality. 
1.6 SUMMARY 
In summary, the evidence is clear that wages have a very important effect on income 
both before and on retirement. The Australian gender wage gap is persistent, and the 
Western Australian gender wage gap has widened considerably since 1992. As 
reported in Chapter 3 many econometric studies have analysed the extent of the 
gender wage gap and shown that productivity-related variables cannot explain all the 
variance between male and female wages in (different parts of) Australia. This study 
aims to explain some more of that variance.  
The principle finding is that the key actors of the industrial relations system 
interviewed feel that much of this unexplained gap and in particular the persistence 
of the gender wage gap is socially and culturally constructed. They perceive that 
society’s views about women affect those operating within the system and thus also 
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the system’s processes and outcomes. Interviewees felt that cultural, legal and 
economic differences between different locations affected the experience of wage 
inequality, with women covered by awards or agreements from the federal tribunal, 
faring better than those in Western Australia during the study period 1990 to 2003. 
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CHAPTER 2 – THE HISTORY OF PAY EQUALITY IN 
FEDERAL AND WA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONS 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The historical and legal context to the Australian industrial relations system provides 
important reference points for the information gathered in the interviews and from 
decisions of the Western Australian and Australian Industrial Relations Commissions 
reported in Chapter 5. Against this background the terminology and references used 
by interviewees can be explained. Accordingly, this chapter describes the historical 
origins of gender wage inequality in the formal industrial relations system and the 
different approaches made over time to diminish this. The chapter is divided into 
three parts. The first part is a table providing a timeline of significant historical legal 
events relevant to the gender wage gap. The second part is a brief examination of the 
historic and legislative development of women’s wages from 1904 to 1986 with 
reference to the relevant legislation, academic literature and reported decisions. 
The third part of this chapter explains in more detail how the legal system 
underpinning the Western Australian and federal industrial relations systems has 
evolved up to (1987 to 1989) and during the period under study (1990 to 2003). This 
period is characterised by incremental change to a decentralised and deregulated 
system.  While many changes to the federal system were reflected in Western 
Australia, there were also changes in Western Australia that did not occur in the 
federal system. These aspects are also referred to by the interviewees. Thus this 
second section is further divided into sections for the federal and Western Australian 
legal systems.  
2.1 HISTORICAL TIMELINE 
Table 3 provides a timeline reference of industrial relations tribunal decisions and 
legislation of significance to the gender wage gap in Australia and Western Australia 
from 1904 to 2003. This is then explained in more detail in the sections below.  
Changes to the title of the federal industrial relations tribunal through legislation are 
also noted for future reference. 
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Table 3 - Key Industrial Relations Legislation and Decisions 
Timeline 
Year Act/Decision Comment 
1904 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
1904 (Cth) 
Beginning of arbitration; founding of 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation & Arbitration 
(CCCA). 
1907 Ex parte H.V. McKay (1907) 2 
CAR 1 (the Harvester Case) 
Basic male wage set on needs basis: 7s/day. 
1912 Rural Workers’ Union and South 
Australian United Labourers’ 
Union v Mildura Branch of the 
Australian Dried Fruits Association 
and Others (1912) (6 CAR 61) (the 
Fruitpickers case) 
Basic female wage set lower than male wage on 
needs basis (50-70 per cent of male rate). 
1949/ 
1950 
Basic Wage Inquiry (1949/50) 68 
CAR 698 
Set female basic wages at 75 per cent of male 
wages. 
1956 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
No. 44 of 1956 (Cth) s.7 
Court becomes Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission (CCAC). 
1969 1969 Equal Pay Case (1969) 127 
CAR 1142 
Where work was not inherently female, equal pay 
was granted. 
1972 1972 Equal Pay Case (1972) 147 
CAR 172 
Equal pay for work of equal value decision applied 
to all jobs even female-dominated.  
1973 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
No. 138 of 1973 (Cth) Section 4(a) 
Name changed to Australian Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission (ACAC). 
1979 Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) Western Australian Act relevant for study period 
comes into force. 
1986 Nurses Case (In the matter of 
Applications by R.A.N.F. and 
H.E.F.) (1986) 300 CAR 185 
ACAC refused the RANF’s and ACTU’s 
application to apply comparable worth principles to 
nurses’ pay. 
1987 National Wage Case March 1987 
(17 IR 65) 
2 Tier Wage system introduced, second tier 
involves bargaining at workplace level on 
restructuring. 
1988 Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) Provisions of Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) to 
be taken into account by commission; tribunal name 
now Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
(AIRC). 
1988 National Wage Case August 1988 
(1988) 25 IR 170 
Structural Efficiency Principle – introduced multi-
skilling and skill-based career paths. 
1989 1989 National Wage Case (AIRC 
Print H9100:11-13) 
Safety net of minimum rates awards to be created 
through the Minimum Rates Adjustment process  to 
underpin workplace bargaining. 
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Year Act/Decision Comment 
1991 National Wage Case October 1991 
(1991) 39 IR 127 
Enterprise bargaining introduced, options are to 
bargain at workplace level for more or receive 
safety net payment set by commission. 
1993 Industrial Relations Reform Act 
1993 (Cth) 
Enterprise (bargaining) agreements (EBAs) 
introduced and made central to wage fixing. 
Includes requirement for equal remuneration for 
women and Section 150A safety net award reviews. 
1993 Workplace Agreements Act 1993 
(WA); Minimum Conditions of 
Employment Act 1993 (WA); 
Industrial Relations Amendment 
Act 1993 (WA) 
Western Australian legislation to allow for WA 
Workplace Agreements (WAWAs) – no safety net 
for awards or agreements. Minimum conditions 
instead. Minimum wages set by Minister for those 
on WAWAs and not covered by formal registered 
awards or agreements. 
1996 Workplace Relations Act 1996 
(Cth) 
Introduced certified agreements with unions 
(ss.170LJ, 170LO, 170LP); certified agreements 
with a majority of employees (s.170LK); and 
Australian Workplace Agreements (s.170VF). 
Section 170BD provides for equal remuneration 
orders. 
2001 Labour Relations Reform Act 2001 
(WA) 
Introduced s.6(ac) objective on equal remuneration; 
abolished WAWAs, created Employer – Employee 
Agreements with strict test against awards; tied 
minimum to federal minimum; allowed agreements 
to be incorporated in awards (if parties all 
agree)(s.40A); gave WAIRC powers to change 
awards on own motion (s.40B). 
2.2 1907 TO 1986 IN BRIEF 
Until 1987, Australia had a very centralised formal industrial relations system, 
founded in 1904 by the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), where legal 
documents called awards (with some agreements for individual companies) set 
wages by industry and occupation at both federal and state levels. These awards and 
agreements were the result of arbitration (a decision by the tribunal or industrial 
relations commission) or conciliation (mediation with the assistance of a tribunal).   
The federal tribunal, when first setting a minimum or basic wage for the federal 
system, set “fair and reasonable” wages for a male unskilled labourer in Ex parte 
H.V. McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1 (the Harvester case), primarily on the basis of needs, 
but also to some extent on a market basis.  Higgins said: 
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…surely the state, in stipulating for fair and reasonable remuneration 
for the employees, means that the wages shall be sufficient to provide 
these things, and clothing, and a condition of frugal comfort estimated 
by current human standards. This, then, is the primary test, the test 
which I shall apply in ascertaining the minimum wage that can be 
treated as ‘fair and reasonable’ in the case of unskilled labourers. (2 
CAR 1 at 4) 
The President, Higgins, J. then examined the needs of a man with a wife and three 
children, but also considered the rates commonly paid to unskilled labourers by 
civic/municipal authorities (2 CAR 1; Plowman 1995). 
When women’s basic wages were first considered in the federal system Higgins 
again applied the principles of needs and also considered competition in the 
marketplace between men and women. In the Rural Workers’ Union and South 
Australian United Labourers’ Union v Mildura Branch of the Australian Dried 
Fruits Association and Others (1912) (6 CAR 61) (the Fruitpickers case) Higgins J. 
set two more significant principles. Firstly, when women worked alongside men, in 
the same jobs and were likely to compete with them for those jobs, they were to be 
awarded equal pay for equal work. (Thus female fruitpickers were awarded equal 
pay with male fruitpickers (6 CAR 61 at 72).) 
Secondly, women were to be paid less than men when they worked in “women’s” 
jobs where the danger of displacing men’s employment did not exist. Jobs became 
women’s jobs because of women’s “inherent suitability” for the work being 
performed. In the Fruitpickers’ judgment, fruitpitters were given 75 per cent of the 
men’s rate. Fruitpitting was seen as a task requiring superior dexterity and was 
therefore inherently a woman’s job (6 CAR 61 at 73). 
Higgins J. (6 CAR 61 at 71) rationalised paying women less by stating that men were 
obliged to support a wife and children and women were not: 
Now in fixing the minimum wage for a man, I have been forced to fix 
it by considerations other than those of mere earning power. I have 
based it… on ‘the normal needs of the average employee regarded as a 
human being living in a civilised community’. If [a man] has a wife 
and children, he is under an obligation…to maintain them. [A woman] 
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is not, unless perhaps in very exceptional circumstances, under any 
such obligation. 
Yet, if women were the main wage earners, for example, widows with children, they 
did not get paid more.  
Little changed until the National Basic Wage Inquiry (1949/50) (68 CAR 759) when 
the federal tribunal decided to raise the proportion of the male basic wage and the 
margins paid to women from about 60 to 75 per cent. This was, to some extent, a 
reflection of market forces as women’s wages increased relative to men’s wages 
during the war (as can be seen in Table 1 in Chapter 1), partly because of the actions 
of the government-appointed Women’s Employment Board, but also because market 
forces dictated that, with men involved in World War II, women were needed in and 
attracted to the workforce by better wages (Ryan & Conlon 1975).  
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) passed its Convention 100 in 1951 on 
‘Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value’. This 
Convention referred “to rates of remuneration established without discrimination 
based on sex” and required “objective appraisal of jobs on the basis of work to be 
performed”. Using this convention as an eventual aim, unions and the women’s 
movement began to apply pressure on state governments to legislate for equal pay 
for equal work. 
New South Wales was first to change its Industrial Arbitration Act in 1958, followed 
by Queensland in 1964, Tasmania (for public servants only) in 1966, South Australia 
in 1967 and Western Australia in 1968. Victoria did not specifically introduce any 
equal pay legislation before 1969, but some wages boards did so, in effect, by 
prescribing male wage rates only. This allowed women who were covered by that 
particular wages board determination to be paid at the male rate (Short 1986:318).  
In 1969 the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (ACAC) adopted 
the principle of equal pay for equal work to be phased in over three years, bringing 
women covered by federally-registered awards into line with those covered by state 
awards (127 CAR 1142).  
This decision restored the original Higgins’ principle of equal pay for equal work 
when women performed the same job as men, as the decision specifically excluded 
women working in women’s jobs from its effect. The federal tribunal said: 
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…notwithstanding the above, equal pay should not be provided by 
application of the above principles where the work in question is 
essentially or usually performed by females but is work upon which 
male employees may also be employed. (127 CAR 1142 at 1158)  
Occupations in which some women worked with men, such as tailoress and process 
worker, obtained equal pay under this decision. However female-dominated 
occupations, such as nurses and secretaries or typists, could not. (Short 1986:333) 
In 1972 the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the National Pay 
Equity Coalition (NPEC) made an application to the federal commission in relation 
to pay equality (149 CAR 172). The ACTU and the NPEC pointed out that only 
18 per cent of the female workforce had obtained equal pay for equal work since the 
1969 decision and accordingly they asked the ACAC to award the full ILO 
standard’s version of “equal pay for work of equal value”. The ACAC concluded:  
In our view the concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is too narrow in 
today’s world and we think the time has come to enlarge the concept to 
‘equal pay for work of equal value’. This means that award rates for all 
work should be considered without regard to the sex of the employee. 
(149 CAR 172 at 178) 
The ACAC also said: 
Work value considerations should, where possible, be made between 
female and male classifications within the award under consideration. 
But where comparisons are unavailable or inconclusive, as may be the 
case where the work is performed exclusively by females, it may be 
necessary to take into account comparisons of work value between 
female classifications within the award and or comparisons of work 
between female classifications in different awards. In some cases 
comparisons with male classifications in other awards may be 
necessary. (149 CAR 172 at 180) 
Thus the ACAC foreshadowed the difficulties of assessing work value in female-
dominated industries such as nursing and secretarial work. However, a study (Short 
1986) of implementation of this decision involving 54 references to equal pay in the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Reports between 1973 and 1981 showed that: 
 18
• the ACAC’s deadline for implementation of equal pay by the end of 1975 
was not followed, as over half of the 54 references were listed after 1975; 
• the ACAC did no work value assessments (usually involving inspections 
and assessment of training and conditions) in any major equal pay case 
between 1973 and 1981; and, 
• predominantly female work areas such as nursing and secretarial work were 
never assessed under the 1972 decision.  
Reasons given (Short 1986, Bennett 1988, Rafferty 1989) for this failure to fully 
implement equal pay for work of equal value were: 
• the ACAC’s initial reluctance to compare dissimilar work (possibly opening 
up new vistas for leapfrogging work value claims) (Short 1986); and, 
• the failure of unions to take cases to the ACAC (Short 1986) (probably due 
to the expensive and time-consuming nature of such cases and/or lack of 
strong female union membership (Bennett 1988:540-1)); and,  
• the wholehearted resistance of employers (Rafferty 1989).  
The problem with equal pay for work of equal value for female-dominated jobs was 
what (male-dominated) jobs could these be compared to and how? 
Job evaluation promised a solution to this problem. Thus in the 1980s relevant 
commission decisions involved the way women’s skills or competencies and training 
was valued in the Australian Public Service in its job classification and evaluation 
systems. The ACAC (now the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC)), 
in a series of cases, allowed physiotherapists, occupational therapists and speech 
pathologists to become part of the Science Group (Rafferty 1989, 1991 & 1994) - a 
job classification and evaluation group that covered male-dominated scientific 
occupations such as engineering. This allowed women to be paid equally with men 
on the basis of their qualifications, skills and responsibility as assessed in the job 
evaluation scheme.  
Also, in 1985-86, the ACTU made a direct attempt to gain American-style 
comparable worth8 (in the US and Canada this involved comparing different male 
and female jobs using job evaluation techniques) in a test case involving Australian 
Capital Territory nurses. The commission said, in its decision: 
                                                 
8 In the early 1980s women had begun to win comparable worth cases in the U.S. (England 1992:232-
241)  
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Such an approach would strike at the heart of long accepted methods of 
wage fixation in this country and would be particularly destructive of the 
present Wage Fixing Principles. (ACAC Print G2250 1986:9)  
The ACAC was worried about the possibility of a 1970s style9 economy-wide round 
of leap-frogging wage claims of increased job value (involving male-dominated 
occupations, as well as female-dominated occupations) which the wage fixing 
principles were designed to prevent.  
As shown by Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter 1, many of the equal pay decisions had a 
small or delayed effect on the actual earnings gap between men and women as 
measured by award wage data. However, this data showed that the 1969 and 1972 
decisions had a major effect on the gap with this closing by around 20 percentage 
points between 1969 and 1979. The industrial relations commissions around 
Australia had responded to both international standards and community pressure for 
equal pay. It had clearly had an effect on the difference between men’s and women’s 
wages. Nonetheless, the evidence (Short 1986), on nurses for example, indicated that 
the impact of these decisions was uneven, particularly for female-dominated 
occupations.   
The next part of Chapter 2 describes how the industrial relations system became 
decentralised, with the focus gradually moving away from National Wage Cases and 
centralised bargaining, to bargaining for wages at the organisational or enterprise 
level. As is shown here and in Chapter 6, achieving wage equality became even more 
difficult. As Figure 1 showed in Chapter 1, progress on the still present earnings gap 
began to slow over this period as the AIRC’s influence over wages was reduced. 
2.3 1987 TO 2003 - DECENTRALISATION 
This second section gives more detail on changes to legislation in the Australian and 
Western Australian jurisdictions during the period 1987 to 2003 covering the period 
of interest for this thesis (1990 to 2003). Other developments in the approach to 
achieving gender wage equality during the 1990s from various Australian 
jurisdictions are also described. Differences between the federal and Western 
Australia industrial relations systems in the 1990s are analysed, showing that these 
may have contributed to greater inequality in Western Australia. 
                                                 
9 During the early 1970s inflation became out of control as unions achieved over-award wage 
increases outside the AIRC well above consumer price increases (Isaac 1984:131-2). 
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2.3.1 Decentralisation Begins – 1987 to 1989 
The federal industrial relations system began to change towards decentralised, or 
workplace bargaining, with the 1987 National Wage Decision (National Wage Case 
March 1987 (1987) 17 IR 65). This decision produced a two-tier wage rise, with a 
first tier of $10 awarded to all employees and a second tier of up to 4 per cent 
available to those negotiating on an industry-by-industry, or award-by-award basis. 
Negotiation was to be over work practices and was aimed at improving productivity 
under the Restructuring and Efficiency Principle. The 4 per cent pay rise would be 
achieved through award restructuring. Award restructuring included creating skill-
based classification structures that could have assisted women “which had been 
notably absent from women’s jobs in the past” (Hunter 2000:12).  
In 1988 the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) was repealed and s.28 of 
that Act was replaced by s.112 (consent awards) and s.115-7 (certified agreements) 
of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth). In August 1988 the AIRC introduced a 
revised set of guidelines known as the Structural Efficiency Principle (National 
Wage Case August 1988 (1988) 25 IR 170) which extended the previous principle. 
Ronfeldt and McCallum (1995:10) noted: 
[a]lthough neither the 1987 decision nor the 1988 and 1989 Structural 
Efficiency Principle decisions required that negotiations be devolved to 
a workplace level, a great many of these industry-wide restructuring 
agreements involved negotiating the implementation of changes at a 
workplace level.  
Of relevance to pay equality, the new Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), under 
s.93, required the federal tribunal, in the performance of its functions, to take account 
of the principles, embodied in the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), relating to 
discrimination in employment.  
During the 1988 National Wage Case, in response to the move to award 
restructuring, the ACTU pressed for a national ‘blueprint’ involving the restructuring 
of all awards to provide “consistent, coherent award structures, based on training and 
skills acquired and which bear clear and appropriate work value relationships one to 
another” (AIRC Print H8200:6). As Plowman (1995:282) observed, the ACTU was 
seeking:  
 21
…a threefold comparative wage exercise. It sought to relate minimum 
rates awards to paid rates awards by way of the provision of 
supplementary payments. It sought to relate awards in one industry to 
those in others. It sought to relate wage rates within awards. 
This blueprint, shown in Table 4 below, would form the restructured award safety 
net to enterprise bargaining. The process was called Minimum Rates Adjustment 
(MRA) and was only available for minimum rates awards and not paid rates awards.  
Table 4 - Minimum Rates and Supplementary Payments Requested 







Building industry tradesperson 356.30 50.70 (100%) 
Metal industry tradesperson 356.30 50.70 (100%) 
Metal industry worker (grade 4) 341.90 48.80 (95.9%) 
Metal industry worker (grade 3) 320.50 45.80 (90.0%) 
Metal industry worker grade 2) 302.90 43.10 (85.0%) 
Metal industry worker grade 1 285.00 40.60 (69.5%) 
Storeperson 325.50 46.50 (94.4%) 

































(Source: AIRC Print H9100:11) 
Minimum award rates prescribed minimum wages that employers were able to 
supplement. Base rates in these awards were to be standardised in proportion to the 
metal tradesperson's rate and adjusted up through a supplementary payment to reflect 
‘paid rates awards’ (or awards that contained the pay rates actually to be paid rather 
than minimum rates that could be supplemented). Any over-award payments added 
to minimum rates had to be absorbed into the supplementary payment.  
The jobs involved in paid rates awards were seen by the ACTU to be high-paying 
jobs that did not need a safety net adjustment or comparison with the metal trades 
(Interview with union official K). This was despite the fact that these paid rates 
awards included public sector awards which the Professional Officers’ Association 
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(later Community and Public Sector Union) continued to try to adjust for pay equity 
(Rafferty 1991, 1994).  
Despite, as Plowman (1995:282) put it, “the fact that the Commission had repeatedly 
set its face against comparative wage justice claims over nearly two decades”, the 
AIRC substantially adopted MRA in the 1989 National Wage Case (AIRC Print 
H9100:11-13). As can be seen in Table 5, the AIRC did not set any minimum rates 
for clerks and gave a larger range or relativity band for the other key classifications 
contained in the ACTU submission.  
Table 5 - Relativities Established by the Commission in 1989 
 % of tradesperson rate 
Metal industry worker, grade 4 90-93 
Metal industry worker, grade 3 84-88 
Metal industry worker, grade 2 78-82 
Metal industry worker, grade 1 72-76 
Storeman/packer 88-92 
Driver, 3-6 tonnes 88-92 
(Source: AIRC Print H9100:13) 
MRA was comparable worth (discussed in Section 2.2) by stealth as it allowed for 
female-dominated jobs such as clerical and retail jobs to be directly compared with 
male-dominated metal trades jobs for the first time. Normally, awards had to be 
restructured before MRA was applied. As a result, the historical bias against female-
dominated jobs could possibly have been corrected within the Australian industrial 
relations system. Nevertheless, as will be seen in Chapter 5, not all awards were 
adjusted through award restructuring and MRA, even in the private sector. This was 
particularly so with female-dominated awards. However, some successes were 
available from award restructuring. 
For example, in 1990 ACT community-based childcare workers had their 
qualifications upgraded and recognised in pay terms (AIRC Print J4316; Bennett 
1991). In 1990/91, the ACTU and the Victorian branch of the Federated Clerks 
Union were also successful in gaining a new restructured skills-based award that 
involved MRA against the metal tradesperson (Probert 1992:441-2).  
Likewise, the Professional Officers Association continued its pay equity campaign 
within the Commonwealth Public Service. A series of cases in the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission (Radiographers Inequities Case 1984 Anomaly no. 
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129; APS Therapists Anomalies Case 1985 (Print G1499); Social Workers Inequities 
Case 1987, Anomaly no. 302) allowed the comparison of these occupations with 
male-dominated professions such as engineers, counsellors and psychologists.  
The Commonwealth Government, as the employer, resisted each of these cases, even 
when it was a Labor Government that professed to support equal pay for work of 
equal value. By 1992, however, the main Australian Public Service Agreement 
contained fully restructured wage classifications which included all these female-
dominated public service professions, allowing direct comparison through job 
evaluation with their male counterparts in the wage structure (Rafferty 1991:15).  
2.3.2 Pay Equality Erodes Under Decentralised Bargaining 
Evidence was already beginning to emerge that equal pay for work of equal value 
could be eroded under the new decentralised industrial relations system where 
bargaining now occurred at the enterprise, as well as at the National/State Wage 
Case level. Rafferty (1994:459) noted that, by 1992, female public service 
professionals were having their wage structures compressed down into the lowest 
levels of the now integrated professional officer classification system.  
Similarly, at the end of the same year, the Victorian Industrial Relations Commission 
had downgraded the classification structure won for clerical staff from seven to six 
levels and shattered the Federated Clerks Union’s dreams of an integrated clerical 
and administrative structure from filing clerk and typist to manager (Probert 
1992:454). 
2.3.3 Enterprise Bargaining 
From 1991, employers, unions and the government began to promote an even more 
decentralised approach to bargaining – enterprise bargaining. After some debate, the 
Enterprise Bargaining Principle was set out by the AIRC in October 1991 (National 
Wage Case October 1991 (1991) AIRC Print K0300).  
This principle required the parties to show a “broad agenda” for change (AIRC Print 
K0300:16). Agreements had to be in addition to or instead of an award. Agreements 
had to be for a fixed term during which there would be no further pay increases. No 
reductions in ordinary time earnings or standard conditions were to be allowed. 
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2.3.4 Amendments to the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)  
in 1992  
In 1992, ss.112 and 115-7 were repealed and replaced by s.111(1)(b) of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) for consent awards and Division 3A of Part VI of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) for certified agreements (comprising 
ss.134A-134N). These changes were made in order to better facilitate the spread of 
enterprise bargaining agreements and to allow for agreements to be tested, ensuring 
no disadvantage to workers covered by them.  
Creighton, Ford and Mitchell (1993:360) considered that certified agreements and 
consent awards (the products of conciliation) had a much more central role in the 
statutory “scheme of dispute resolution” after the changes to the Act. Arbitration, or 
a decision imposed by the AIRC, was entered into only after the parties were unable 
to make an agreement themselves..  
2.3.5 The Safety Net for Wages 
By 1993 the AIRC could claim that it had created “a national framework of 
minimum award rates in order to protect employees and particularly lower paid 
employees, as and when, the community moved to a more flexible, decentralised 
wage system” (Plowman 1995:284). The AIRC believed it had reviewed minimum 
awards and ensured that these were properly related to each other and properly 
valued (AIRC Print K9700:21; O’Connor 1995:66). Awards could then be adjusted 
through safety net increases if enterprise bargaining was not sought or achieved.  
The AIRC apparently believed it had created a national award safety net for 
enterprise bargaining involving awards that had gone through the MRA process 
(AIRC Print K9700:21). The October 1993 National Wage Case (AIRC Print K9700) 
awarded a safety net increase of $8.00 to awards for employees not receiving 
increases under enterprise bargaining. Three safety net adjustments of $8.00 were to 
be made to awards by July 1996 (AIRC Print K9700).  
Applications had to be made to the AIRC for it to arbitrate for safety net adjustments 
to awards. The AIRC could not register certified agreements containing increases 
that were less than the safety net adjustment. However, the AIRC could register 
consent enterprise agreements above the safety net amount, provided that they were 
not contrary to the public interest.  
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Table 6 summarises the adjustments available to those being paid under awards and 
the timing of these for those subject to federal and Western Australian awards from 
1990 to 2003.  
Table 6 - Timing of Minimum Rates and Safety Net Adjustments 
Date Available at 
Award Level 
Federally 
Date Available at 
Award Level in WA 
Provision 
From October 1990 From October 1990 Minimum Rate Adjustments 
available - four payments over two 
years 
October 1993 October 1993 1st Safety Net Adjustment (SNA) - 
$8 (for those receiving 
supplementary payments only) 
22 September 1994 7 November 1994 1st SNA - $8 (for everyone without 
an enterprise bargaining increase). 
25 March 1995 25 March 1995 2nd SNA - $8 
22 March 1996 22 March 1996 3rd SNA - $8 
22 April 1997 14 November 1997 (by 
general order) 
4th SNA - $10 
29 April 1998 12 June 1998 5th SNA - $14 < $550; $12 $550-
700/week; $14 >$700. 
29 April 1999 1 August 1999 (by general 
order) 
6th SNA - $12 up to and including 
$510/week; $10 above $510. 
April 2000 1 August 2000 (by general 
order) 
7th SNA - $15/week 
April 2001 1 August 2001 (by general 
order) 
8th SNA - $13 up to and including 
$490/week; $15 up to and including 
$590; $17 above $590/week. 
April 2002 1 August 2002 (by general 
order) 
9th SNA - $18 
April 2003 1 August 2003 (by general 
order) 
10th SNA - $ 17 up to and including 
$731.80; $15 over $731.80/week 
(Source: various WAIGs; osiris.gov.au, WageNet.gov.au) 
2.3.6 Reform Act 1993 
In December 1993, the federal Act was again amended to further facilitate enterprise 
bargaining. The Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) made major changes to 
the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth). The principle changes of interest here were 
as follows (Ronfeldt & McCallum 1995:13): 
i) enterprise agreements were to become the primary means of 
settling industrial disputes and regulating terms and conditions 
of work; 
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iii)  establishment of a process of reviewing safety net award content 
and ensuring that they were free of discriminatory provisions; 
(iv) creation of a set of minimum statutory employment entitlements 
(for wages, termination of employment, equal remuneration for 
women, parental leave and family leave) which, with existing 
awards, served as a safety net for bargaining under the federal 
Act and provided the means of protecting these rights in relation 
to employees covered by state laws.  
The aim was to promote enterprise bargaining but also to create: 
…an award system better able to perform its function at the enterprise 
as a safety net delivering equality to the workplace, while underpinning 
and enhancing enterprise bargaining. (O’Connor 1995:66) 
The safety net review process in s.150A of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 
(Cth) required the AIRC to review awards forming the safety net every three years 
and adjust any deficiencies. In 1994, the AIRC conducted its first review.  
MacDermott (1995:110) said the federal tribunal “envisaged an ‘enhanced and 
evolved award system’ ensuing from the review process, which will make awards 
easier to understand, easier to adapt to the needs of the enterprise and non-
discriminatory in character”. Awards were to be maintained in order to be relevant. 
Modest increases to awards were to occur through arbitrated safety net adjustments, 
but bargaining and certified agreements were to be encouraged by the higher rates 
available through enterprise bargaining increases.  
By 1992-93, enterprise bargaining was becoming entrenched. As Rafferty 
(1994:466) warned: 
[i]t is possible that the provisions [of the Act]  will be of no more than 
limited value as enterprise bargaining increasingly ousts the award-
based system in favour of differential wage outcomes unique to the 
particular circumstances of individual enterprises. The implications are 
that differential rates of pay may apply to persons performing identical 
work under the same award and in the same industry, but with different 
employers. The resultant confusion could render even the narrow 1969 
equal pay for equal work principle unworkable! 
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2.3.7 The Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) 
In November 1996, the new Coalition Government increased emphasis on 
workplace-based industrial relations through the Workplace Relations Act 1996 
(Cth). The workplace focus was demonstrated in the new s.3(b) object of the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) which read: 
…ensuring that the primary responsibility for determining matters 
affecting the relationship between employers and employees rests with 
the employer and employees at the workplace or enterprise level; 
Other relevant objects were ss.3(i), (j) and (k) of Workplace Relations Act 1996 
(Cth): 
(i) assisting employees to balance their work and family 
responsibilities through the development of mutually 
beneficial work practices with employers; and 
(j) respecting and valuing the diversity of the work force by 
helping to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the basis of 
race, colour, sex, sexual preference, age, physical or mental 
disability, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, 
religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin; 
and 
(k) assisting in giving effect to Australia's international 
obligations in relation to labour standards. 
The previous s.150 award review (every three years) provision of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Cth) was replaced by s.143(1C) of the Workplace Relations Act 
1996 (Cth), which required the AIRC to ensure, when making an award or an order 
varying an award, that the award did not contain discriminatory provisions (on the 
same grounds as those detailed above). Section 143(1C) of the Workplace Relations 
Act 1996 (Cth) also required the AIRC to ensure awards had provisions for ‘regular’ 
or permanent part-time employees. Similarly, awards could be reviewed to ensure 
they did not contain details that were better dealt with at the workplace or enterprise 
level, or contained provisions that would hinder efficiency and productivity (Colvin 
& Watson 1998:49-50). 
Sections 170L to 170XF(3) of the Workplace Relations Act dealt with certified 
agreements. These were certified agreements with unions (ss.170LJ, 170LO, 170LP), 
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certified agreements with a majority of employees (rather than with unions) 
(s.170LK) and Australian Workplace Agreements (s.170VF). AWAs could be 
collective or individual agreements. They replaced both relevant state and federal 
awards and agreements for the period of the AWA. AWAs were subject, as were the 
other types of certified agreements, to a ‘no disadvantage’ test compared to the 
relevant award. AWAs were also required to include provisions on discrimination. 
Unions could be involved as bargaining agents for AWAs and s.170LK agreements, 
but could not insist on being consulted in the negotiation process, or be a party to 
agreements. 
Section 170B, relating to equal remuneration for work of equal value which was 
included in the 1993 Industrial Relations Reform Act, was also in the new Workplace 
Relations Act. Section 89A of the new Act limited the scope of industrial disputes to 
twenty ‘allowable matters’ that the commission could deal with by arbitration, 
issuing awards or orders to settle or prevent disputes. Paid rates awards could no 
longer be made by the commission. Of concern to women was the fact that casual 
and part-time work restrictions – hours, numbers of employees and types of 
classifications – were no longer allowable matters in awards. Pittard (1997:77) 
predicted (accurately given the current trend in casualisation (Campbell & Burgess 
2001)) that this change would encourage the further casualisation of the workforce 
“with accompanying disadvantages for employees requiring regular work and 
income and employment safeguards”. 
Pittard (1997) also raised concerns over the fact that the no-disadvantage test for 
agreements under ss.170XA(1) & (2) provided that the overall terms and conditions 
of employment must not be reduced, but a line by line comparison between award 
and agreement was not required. She said “[e]ven where there is a reduction in such 
conditions the agreement will pass the no-disadvantage test where it is not contrary 
to the public interest.” (1997:83). Pittard (1997:84) concluded: 
The disparity between male and female earnings and the ‘gender gap’ 
in terms and conditions of employment evidenced in collective 
agreements is likely to continue in certified agreements under the WR 
Act. 
In summary, by 2003, the federal industrial relations system under the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 was much more decentralised than in 1990. The centre of gravity 
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had moved to the workplace level; to gain anything more than safety net wage 
increases, workers and their unions now had to bargain directly with the employer. 
2.3.8 Approaches to Pay Equality in the 1990s 
In the mid to late 1990s, the ACTU and the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ 
Union pursued a series of cases seeking equal pay orders in mainly blue-collar areas 
such as white goods manufacturing (HPM) and newspaper production (The Age). 
Most of these cases were settled out of court. Hunter (2000:22) described these cases 
as having been: 
…bogged down in argument about whether the correct measures of 
work value are being used, or whether the correct comparator has been 
selected, or whether the occupation was supposedly awarded “equal 
pay” in the past.  
Hunter (2000:22) pointed out that very few cases had been brought under the federal 
Act provisions and none of these had “actually reached a final decision by the federal 
commission”. The chief advocate for the ACTU in these cases, Jenny Doran 
(Interview Melbourne 6 October 2000), agreed that none of the cases had been 
arbitrated, but pointed out that this was because all were settled out of court, or the 
employer ceased employing people under the category in question. Doran (Interview 
Melbourne 6 October 2000), unlike Hunter (2000), said that s.170BC (of the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)) equal remuneration orders were very useful as 
a vehicle for ensuring pay equality (particularly as they could be used for pay 
equality both within enterprise bargaining agreements and awards). She 
recommended that the states and territories seek a similar provision in their industrial 
relations legislation. 
The most recent (1998-2003) pay equality approach, apart from the ACTU cases, 
was through inquiries and then the institution of commission procedures to deal with 
pay equality. These took place firstly in New South Wales (Glynn 1998), then 
Tasmania and Queensland (Fisher 2001; Hunter 2000:27-31).  
Both the New South Wales (Re Equal Remuneration Principle [2000] NSWIR 
Comm. 113 at 143) and Tasmanian Industrial Relations Commissions (Tasmanian 
Trades and Labor Council (T8413 of 1999) Private Sector Awards, Tasmanian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry Limited (T8483 of 1999) Private and Public 
Sector Awards [Tasmanian Industrial Commission 6 July 2000]) adopted equal pay 
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principles that allowed a less fettered approach to reviewing pay inequality than the 
federal approach. However, both carried a flaw of only being able to affect awards 
and not enterprise agreements, unlike the federal equal remuneration orders. Yet, 
AIRC equal remuneration orders on agreements had a flaw in that they could only 
involve comparisons within the agreement area, or the enterprise. Sometimes 
comparisons with occupations outside the enterprise may have been more useful.  
The Queensland model (The Queensland Council of Unions and Queensland 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry Limited, Industrial Organisation of Employers 
and Others, QIRC, Statement of Policy B450 of 2002) offered more promise, with its 
pay equity principle able to affect enterprise bargaining agreements as well as 
awards and possibly allow more comparisons between these, not just rates within 
individual awards or enterprise agreements. The Queensland Government also 
funded unions to take on pay equity cases (The Queensland Council of Unions and 
Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Limited, Industrial Organisation of 
Employers and Others, QIRC, Statement of Policy B450 of 2002). 
All the approaches to combating gender wage equality reported above centred on the 
formal industrial relations system and changes to legislation to try and affect new 
ways of setting wages. Enterprise bargaining agreements were just the latest wage 
setting mechanism targeted. The average weekly earnings data in Figure 1, Chapter 
1, suggest that these changes had only a minor effect on the earnings gap between 
men and women, with this only closing by four percentage points during the 1990s.  
2.4 WESTERN AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATION AND 
COVERAGE 1990-2003 
The Western Australian industrial relations system, like those of most states in 
Australia, mirrored much of the activity in the Australian industrial relations system 
described above. However, as the federal system moved to decentralisation during 
the study period, 1990 to 2003, the Western Australian system moved much further 
into what was arguably the most radical decentralisation of industrial relations in 
Australia. With a change of government in 2001, much of this legislative change was 
reversed and by 2003, the Western Australian system again looked somewhat similar 
to the federal system, while retaining some essential differences. All this is reflected 
in the industrial relations legislation and decisions reported below.  
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2.4.1 Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) 
In 1990, the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) was the Act controlling the system 
in Western Australia. This Act was described by Cawley (1997:91) as, “probably the 
simplest most coherent legislation of its type in Australia at the time it came into 
effect”. The Act “sought to emphasise the prevention and settlement of industrial 
conflict by consensual means and cast a duty on the parties themselves to settle 
matters by agreement (s.42)” (Brown 1991:16). Section 41 provided for the making 
of agreements between employees or their representatives and employers or their 
representatives. Consent awards were deemed to be industrial agreements under the 
amended Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA). 
Section 114 of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA), which provided that each 
employee should be paid in accordance with a relevant award, industrial agreement 
and order, ensured that a safety net of award rates applied to agreements. This 
section was applied by the WAIRC Full Bench decision Minister for Labour v Como 
Investments Pty Ltd ((1990) 70 WAIG 3539) when it refused to register an industrial 
agreement because it gave lower rates of pay to some employees who were already 
covered by an award (Brown 1991:153). Sections such as s.41(2) ensured 
agreements would not be contrary to the Act, General Orders or principles from 
General Orders i.e. State Wage Case decisions. 
In determining the State Wage Case, s.51(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 
(WA) required the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission (WAIRC) in 
Court Session to consider national wage decisions and unless there were good 
reasons for not doing so, make a general order giving effect to the national wage 
decision. Thus the national wage decisions referred to above relating to award 
restructuring, structural efficiency and enterprise bargaining were adopted by the 
WAIRC throughout 1988-1991 with little or no change.  
2.4.2 Radical Legislative Change – 1993 
Major changes were made to the Western Australian industrial relations system with 
the introduction of the Workplace Agreements Act 1993 (WA), the Minimum 
Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA) and the Industrial Relations Amendment 
Act 1993 (WA) which all came into force at the beginning of December 1993.  
The Workplace Agreement Act 1993 (WA) also introduced workplace agreements, 
either collective (s.9) or individual (s.10), between employers and employees that 
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overrode pre-existing awards, agreements and orders (s.6). Western Australian 
workplace agreements (WAWAs) were subject to the Minimum Conditions of 
Employment Act 1993 (WA) (s.17). They could be made with the assistance of a 
union only if both parties agreed (s.15). The WAIRC had no jurisdiction over 
WAWAs. The Commissioner of Workplace Agreements was responsible for the 
registration of WAWAs and the Act provided that employees must understand the 
provisions of the agreement that they are signing. 
Likewise the industrial agreement sections of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 
(WA) were amended when workplace agreements were introduced to Western 
Australia. Section 41A was revised to provide that the WAIRC could not register an 
agreement applying to more than a single enterprise. As Brown (1999:7:9) says “it is 
implied that an agreement that applies to a single enterprise may override the wage 
or other principles handed down by the commission”. 
The Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA) provided minima for pay 
rates, annual leave, public holidays, bereavement leave, parental leave, sick leave 
and redundancy that became implied in all employment contracts. Minimum 
conditions applied to employees on WAWAs and employees not covered by any 
registered award or agreement. As with the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) at 
that time, there was no reference to discrimination or equal opportunity in the 
Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA). 
Western Australian workplace agreements under the Workplace Agreements Act 
1993 (WA) could only be registered after 1 December 1993 and therefore could not 
be a source of the initial (1992-93) drop in women’s relative earnings illustrated by 
Preston and Crockett (1999a) and shown in Figure A-1, Appendix 1. Workplace 
agreements were private documents and not publicly available except for those 
agreements which applied to public sector employees. Thus, detailed analyses of 
private sector workplace agreements are rare. However, one Western Australian 
mining firm was persuaded to reveal its workplace agreements rates for this thesis 
and they are discussed in Chapter 5. 
The Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission adopted the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission's wage fixing principles on enterprise bargaining 
and safety net adjustments in a series of reviews of these from December 1993 (74 
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WAIG 198). As a result, Western Australian awards were consistently adjusted for 
safety net increases from 1983 to 2003 (see Table 6 for details).  
2.4.3 Legislative Changes in Western Australia – 2001 
The Western Australian Labor Government (on coming to office in 2001) instituted 
changes to the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) aimed at reinstating the primacy 
of collective bargaining. These changes were also aimed at assisting lower paid 
workers in Western Australia (Interview with union official A; Interview with 
government representative A). As women were disproportionately represented 
amongst the lower paid, it was assumed these changes would assist pay equality.  
The Labor Government’s new Labour Relations Reform Act 2002 (WA):  
• abolished WAWAs (Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) Division 1, s.31);  
• introduced employer/employee agreements (replacing all WAWAs) with a 
strict no disadvantage test against awards (Industrial Relations Act 1979 
(WA) Division 6) (leading to a round of award updating and modernising 
which should have advantaged women who were disproportionately covered 
by awards rather than agreements); 
• tied the Adult Minimum Wage under the Minimum Conditions of 
Employment Act 1993 (WA) to the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission’s Minimum Adult Award Wage (Industrial Relations Act 1979 
(WA) Division 1, s.167); 
• included new objectives of equal remuneration and equity and efficiency 
(Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) s.6); 
• gave the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission power to 
change awards to achieve objectives on its own motion (Industrial Relations 
Act 1979 (WA) s.40B); and, 
• allowed enterprise agreement provisions to be incorporated into awards if all 
parties agree (Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) s.40A). 
In 2003 it was claimed that, to date, the WAIRC had shown itself unwilling to use 
the new s.40B (Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA)) powers to change awards on 
their own motion (Interview with union official A). The commissioner’s s.40B 
discussion paper released in 2003 (WAIRC 2003) also suggested only minor changes 
to awards may be made under this new power. There was, however, a suggestion 
(WAIRC 2003:8) that the WAIRC could revisit the Children’s Services (Private) 
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Award MRA case (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2 for details). This could be a 
significant pay equality case, should it occur. 
As is shown in Appendix 1, by the end of 2003 the new Western Australian Labor 
Government’s industrial relations legislation, introduced in 2001, appeared to have 
had little impact on the earnings gap between male and female full-time employees.  
The gap between male and female average weekly ordinary time earnings, which had 
been increasing since 2001 (when the Western Australian gap was at its lowest 
during the study period at 21 per cent), was continuing to widen to 23 per cent10. 
2.4.4 Coverage – Federal versus State 
It should be noted that, while some Western Australians were covered by federal 
awards and agreements and thus their wages were decided in the AIRC, in 1990 
Western Australian wages were decided predominantly within the Western 
Australian industrial relations system. This was different to other states such as 
Victoria. As McCallum (2000:29) says “Federal award coverage has always been 
wider in Victoria than in states like Queensland and New South Wales which operate 
industrial tribunal mechanisms...” This was also a reason for using Victorian-based 
awards in this study. 
As can be seen in Table 7, the 1990 award coverage survey (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) 1991) showed that employees in Western Australia and Queensland 
at that time shared the distinction of having the highest coverage (57.3 per cent) by 
state awards and agreements in Australia. Only 20.8 per cent of Western Australian 
employees were covered by federal awards and agreements and 21.3 per cent were 
not covered by any awards or agreements.  
More female employees (65.7 per cent) than male employees (50.2 per cent) were 
covered by state awards and agreements in Western Australia. Only 16.3 per cent of 
Western Australian female employees were covered by federal awards or agreements 
(men 24.7 per cent) and 17.5 per cent were not covered by any awards or agreements 
(men 24.5 per cent). In Victoria, 37.9 per cent of the workforce was covered by 
federal awards and agreements and 39.6 per cent by state awards (17.9 per cent were 
not covered at all). 
 
                                                 
10 By the end of 2004 the Western Australian gender wage gap had widened to 25 per cent. 
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Table 7 – Award Coverage May 1990 - Percentage of All Employees 
by States, Territories and Jurisdiction 
 Covered by awards, determinations 
and collective agreements 
Not covered by 
awards etc. 
State or Territory Federal State Total (a)  
Males 
New South Wales 32.8 40.6 74.1 25.9 
Victoria 45.7 28.1 78.2 21.8 
Queensland 28.9 48.6 79.4 20.6 
South Australia 41.4 36.5 79.6 20.4 
Western Australia 24.7 50.2 75.5 24.5 
Tasmania 49.7 35.3 86.3 13.7 
Northern Territory 84.9 *1.3 86.4 13.6 
Australian Capital Territory 83.2 *0.7 84.6 15.4 
Australia 38.0 37.3 77.3 22.7 
Females 
New South Wales 18.5 59.2 78.5 21.5 
Victoria 27.6 54.8 87.3 12.7 
Queensland 16.0 68.5 85.0 15.0 
South Australia 23.4 61.6 86.3 13.7 
Western Australia 16.3 65.7 82.5 17.5 
Tasmania 27.3 61.0 89.4 10.6 
Northern Territory 88.1 *1.3 89.6 10.4 
Australian Capital Territory 84.7 *2.2 87.7 12.3 
Australia 23.2 58.4 83.5 16.5 
Persons 
New South Wales 26.5 48.8 76.1 23.9 
Victoria 37.9 39.6 82.1 17.9 
Queensland 23.2 57.3 81.8 18.2 
South Australia 33.3 47.8 82.6 17.4 
Western Australia 20.8 57.3 78.7 21.3 
Tasmania 40.8 45.6 87.5 12.5 
Northern Territory 86.2 *1.3 87.7 12.3 
Australian Capital Territory 83.9 1.4 86.0 14.0 
Australia 31.5 46.5 80.0 20.0 
(Source: ABS 1991) 
In 2000, the Australian Bureau of Statistics surveyed employers on coverage or 
methods of setting pay (ABS 2001) and it continues to do so on a biennial basis 
(May quarter). Unfortunately the questions asked were different to those in the 1990 
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survey and thus results were not directly comparable. However, these are the only 
statistics available for all states and territories.  
The results shown in Table 8 indicate that, by 2002, 20.5 per cent of employees were 
covered by awards only. The same table indicates that Western Australian employees 
were the least likely, of all the states, to be covered by awards (15.0 per cent).  
Table 8 - Methods of Setting Pay, Jurisdiction - Percentage of 








New South Wales 21.3 35.3 43.3 100.0 
Victoria 17.2 38.3 44.4 100.0 
Queensland 24.6 41.0 34.4 100.0 
South Australia 25.1 39.2 35.8 100.0 
Western Australia 15.0 36.2 48.8 100.0 
Tasmania 21.5 49.3 29.3 100.0 
Northern Territory 16.3 45.1 38.6 100.0 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
20.2 49.3 30.4 100.0 
Australia 20.5 36.8 41.3 100.0 
(a) Includes registered and unregistered collective agreements. 
(b) Includes registered and unregistered individual agreements. 
 (Source: ABS 2003a: Table 26) 
The most common method of setting pay appeared to be individual (registered and 
unregistered) agreements. In Australia, 40 per cent of employees were covered in this 
way, while in Western Australia, 48.8 per cent were covered by this type of 
agreement (the highest of all states and territories). This move towards individual 
agreements was part of an increasing trend, as shown in the ABS surveys of methods 
of setting pay (ABS 2001; ABS 2003a) since 1999.  
However, there are concerns (Wooden 2001) as to whether these figures understate 
the influence of awards. Many small businesses referenced award rates and then paid 
a little over that rate for individuals. The ABS is understood (Wooden 2001) to have 
recorded this process as an unregistered individual agreement, yet the rate was 
clearly influenced by the award. The ABS did not publish coverage figures by gender 
and state. However, in Australia as a whole, women were still much more likely to 
be paid under an award (26.1 per cent compared to 15.1 per cent of men) (ABS 
2003a).  
Wage data collected for this study (and interview data reported in Chapter 5) show 
that, in Western Australia, agreements were increasingly more likely to be federally-
registered during the 1990s. As shown in Table 9, ABS data exhibits the same trend 
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with 19.2 per cent of Western Australian employees on some type of federally-
registered agreement by May 2002 (ABS 2003a).  













 Collective Individual Collective Individual Total Total 
 PROPORTION OF EMPLOYEES (%) 
New South Wales 15.5 1.0 17.9 . . 65.7 100.0 
Victoria 36.1 1.4 . . . . 62.5 100.0 
Queensland 16.9 0.8 21.7 . . 60.1 100.0 
South Australia 22.1 1.0 16.2 . . 60.7 100.0 
Western Australia 17.6 1.7 16.8 7.7 56.2 100.0 
Tasmania 26.2 *1.4 14.6 **0.4 57.4 100.0 
Northern Territory 40.2 *1.9 . . . . 55.8 100.0 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
47.9 3.7 . . . . 48.3 100.0 
Australia 23.0 1.2 13.1 0.8 61.9 100.0 
. . not applicable 
* estimate has a relative standard error of between 25% and 50% and should be used with 
caution 
** estimate has a relative standard error greater than 50% and is considered too unreliable for 
general use                                (Source: ABS 2003a:49) 
 
However, in 2002 Western Australia was the state most likely to have state-
registered agreements (24.5 per cent) and state-registered individual agreements (7.7 
per cent). Thus, while in 1990 Western Australian workers were more likely to be 
under state-registered awards than any other type of industrial arrangement, by 2002 
awards and their influence were waning and more agreements were being registered. 
It also appeared that individual agreements had become more common. 
2.4.5 Western Australian and Federal Legislation Compared for 
Pay Equality 
The first mention of equal remuneration in Australian industrial relations acts was 
the federal reference to the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) in the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Cth) (Walpole & Jost 1995). In 1993 two Industrial Relations 
Reform Act (Cth) changes, referring to the removal of discriminatory provisions from 
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awards and the creation of a minimum standard of equal remuneration for women, 
meant equal pay principles, became a standard feature of federal legislation.  
MacDermott (1994:92) noted that the requirement in the 1993 Industrial Relations 
Reform Act for the creation of minimum statutory employment entitlements on equal 
pay, family and parental leave was based on Australia's international obligations 
under the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions. MacDermott 
(1994:92) suggested that there was a real chance that awards forming the safety net 
to enterprise bargaining could be thoroughly reviewed for equal remuneration. 
However, evidence from stakeholders interviewed (Commissioners A and D) and 
AIRC decisions studied suggests this did not occur. 
O'Connor (1995:64) also indicated that the Reform Act gave a firm base for 
countering discrimination with six relevant provisions in the revised Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Cth) (ss.93, 93A, 150A, 170MD(5), 170ND(1) and Division 2 of 
part VIA). O'Connor (1995:65) noted that the enterprise bargaining principle of 
providing a safety net of awards was embodied in the Reform Act as follows: 
…the Commission has a specific obligation to ensure, as far as 
possible, that the award system provides for ‘secure, relevant and 
consistent wages and conditions of employment’ (section 90AA(2)) so 
that it is an effective safety net ‘underpinning direct bargaining’ 
(section 88A(b)).  
She goes on to say “[t]hese safety net provisions of the Act are designed to prevent 
inequity when applied to the industrially weak” (O'Connor 1995:64). These 
provisions for wage equality (including the ability to make equal remuneration 
orders) were retained in the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (under s.170B). 
It is possible that these provisions for equality in federal industrial law contributed to 
the comparatively stable position of female earnings relative to male earnings in 
Australia shown in Chapter 1, Figure 1, in contrast to the deteriorating picture for 
Western Australia shown in Appendix 1, Figure A-1. The equal remuneration 
principles in the federal Acts were a major difference between these Acts and the 
Western Australian legislation. There were no references to equal pay in the Western 
Australian Acts until the Labour Relations Reform Act 2001 (WA).  
Even the 2001 provisions went only a little way towards the federal provisions. An 
equal remuneration objective (s.6(ac)) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA)), 
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granting the power to the WAIRC to move on its own motion to change awards 
(s.40B of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA)) and the commission’s power to 
incorporate agreement provisions in awards (if the parties agree) (s.40A of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA)) contrasted poorly with the federal Act’s 
requirements for pay equality reviews with any variation to awards and equal 
remuneration orders for agreements and awards. The Equal Opportunity Act 1984 
(WA) was also not invoked in the Western Australian industrial relations legislation. 
2.5 SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter has examined the historical literature and industrial 
relations law relevant to pay equality from 1907 onwards. Legislation from the 
Commonwealth and Western Australian governments is outlined where appropriate. 
This indicated that, while pay equality had its advances since 1907, frequently these 
advances were lost over time.  
Thus, while from the beginning of the formal industrial relations system in Australia 
the federal tribunal (and its successors and counterparts in the Australian states) has 
tried to give women wage equality to men, this has not been achieved. The 
difficulties of finding comparators for female-dominated occupations and the high 
costs encountered in running equal pay cases appeared to have been compounded by 
the decentralisation of the system during the 1990s. The New South Wales, 
Queensland and Tasmanian Pay Equity Inquiries confirmed this conclusion (Glynn 
1998; Fisher 2001; Hunter 2000). In 2003, thirty years after the federal tribunal 
adopted the principle of equal pay for work of equal value; predominantly female 
work was still being undervalued and thus underpaid.  
A comparison with federal legislation shows that the Western Australian legislation 
was much weaker on pay equality and suggests that this could be one of the causes of 
Western Australia’s larger gender wage gap.  
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CHAPTER 3 – THE LITERATURE ON GENDER WAGE 
INEQUALITY 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews relevant theoretical literature on wage discrimination and then 
the empirical literature for evidence to support this. The material is mostly from the 
economic literature on the Australian gender wage gap between 1983 and 2003, but 
also includes that on industrial relations, feminist economics, feminist sociology and 
organisational behaviour literature on management. This literature is explored in 
order to explain the motivation of this thesis and the background to its methodology. 
The theories discussed also form part of the background knowledge of many of the 
actors in the Australian and Western Australian industrial relations tribunals whose 
comments are reported in later chapters. It is a necessary part of the thick description 
of this thesis, giving a framework for understanding the views of the actors 
interviewed. 
3.1 THEORIES OF WAGE DISCRIMINATION 
This section will only cover theories of wage discrimination and related theories of 
wage determination that were felt to be most relevant to this thesis11. Economists 
have long sought to explain the gap between the wages of men and women and have 
developed various economic theories on wage determination and discrimination. The 
theories range across the political spectrum from neo-classical to radical/Marxist 
theories.   
Industrial relations theory developed from economic and sociological theory and 
feminist theories about wages and discrimination have recently been applied to both, 
so these are all relevant to the study of why and how gender wage gaps occur. A 
timeline in Figure 3 depicts the seminal theoretical literature on gender wage 
discrimination and determination covered here and a more detailed explanation with 
some other, secondary, literature follows.
                                                 
11 A more thorough synopsis of wage determination theory can be found in Preston (2001:2-9) and of 
















































































3.1.1 Early Explanations  
One of the earliest explanations of wage discrimination in the industrial relations and 
economic literature was that of Webb (1891).  
He studied British wage data on manual and office work where wage differences 
existed, between men and women doing the same work. Webb (1891:661) felt that 
the differences in pay between men and women were caused by: 
• custom or public opinion;  
• employers expecting less from women, partly because of their standard of 
living “Might not women do more work and better, if they learned to eat 
more?”(Webb 1891:661) and partly because of women being supported 
economically by a husband or family; 
• lower productivity due to lack of physical strength, lack of training and 
institutional restrictions (of which Webb (1891:649) includes legislation, 
traditions, family structure and unions saying: “…where competition rates of 
wages prevail, and where the women are protected by strong Trade Unions, 
they often earn wages equal to those of men for equal work.”); 
• “…lack of protective power, through failure to combine want and 
adaptability, limited number of alternatives and greater immobility.” (Webb 
1891:661)  
These themes of: 
• taste or custom;  
• women’s tendency to rely on the income of others;  
• women’s lack of training/productivity; 
• women’s greater geographic and time constraints than men, providing 
monopsonistic employers an opportunity to pay lower wages; and, 
• institutional restrictions 
are common threads in the theoretical literature which follows. 
Pigou (War Cabinet Committee on Women in Industry 1919:176) also took up the 
theme of monopsonies and explained this as when: 
…women’s wages in certain occupations are depressed below the level 
which economic competition tends to bring about, owing to their 
strategic weakness, unscrupulous or unthinking employers are able to 
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pay them less than they are worth (in technical terms less than the value 
of their marginal net product).  
Robinson (1933) looked at the economics of imperfect competition in more detail 
and gave examples explaining differences between the wages of men and women 
where a firm had a monopsonistic advantage. In her examples this could occur where 
the men, but not the women, were organised into a trade union and had successfully 
negotiated a minimum wage, as well as when women and men had different supply 
elasticities caused by women’s need to work near their homes, or at particular times 
of the day. The union case is an early example of institutional explanations for wage 
discrimination, as was Webb’s. It should be noted that unions sometimes restricted 
membership to men at that point in time. 
3.1.2 Taste Discrimination 
Becker in his seminal work “The Economics of Discrimination” (1957) talked about 
tastes for discrimination against black people on the part of both employers and 
employees (this analysis was later applied to gender discrimination). He was mostly 
concerned with measuring this discrimination through econometric estimates. The 
theory was based on the neoclassical theory of wages which, very simply, is that 
wages are determined, like prices of goods by the equilibrium between demand and 
supply and involves, in its more pure forms, assumptions about perfect competition, 
homogenous products and fixed institutions. Demand is determined by marginal 
labour productivity theory and supply by individual choices between labour, leisure 
and human capital investments (Cain 1975:17).   
In Becker’s theory, demand for labour is acknowledged as imperfect, due to tastes 
for discrimination that affect it and create segregation in the workplace. Becker 
(1971:39) describes this behaviour as lacking “objectivity”; “in the market place, 
“objective” behaviour is based on considerations of productivity alone.” As 
employers’, employees’ or customers’ tastes for a particular group are catered for, 
the preferred group will become more homogenous.  
The problem with this model is that, where competition exists, in the long run, 
employers without a taste for discrimination must be able to drive out the 
discriminators. Employers of male-dominated workforces would have to pay a 
higher wage than they would have if their workforce had been more female-
dominated and would have to charge a higher fee for their goods and services. Non-
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discriminating employers thus can employ women on lower wages, produce cheaper 
goods and drive the discriminating firm out of the market. However, as Lundahl and 
Wadnesjo (1984:23) point out in their review and expansion of Becker’s theory “by 
definition, firms that have a monopoly in a commodity market do not run the risk of 
being driven out of the market if they discriminate.” This applies to many 
government services.   
3.1.3 Statistical Discrimination 
The next neo-classical explanation for discrimination was Arrow’s (1972) statistical 
discrimination. In this theory information on labour supply is acknowledged as 
imperfect and employers use gender or race as a screening device as they associate 
differences in reliability, ability or job stability with these personal characteristics.  
Employers lack the ability to test all new entrants for these characteristics 
accurately; they are reluctant to take on recruits that might not return the firm’s 
investment in their employees’ training, so use gender and race as a substitute. As 
Arrow (1972:97) puts it:  
The employer cannot know beforehand whether or not the employee is 
qualified. The employer does know the race of the individual, however, 
and he holds some subjective beliefs about the respective probabilities 
that white and black workers are qualified. 
Employers make decisions on their personal or society’s average expectations for 
women or black people rather than looking at the individual case. Arrow (1972:99) 
discusses the origin of discrimination, whether it is economic or social: 
Notice that the question at issue is not whether racist utility functions 
are socially conditioned. We accept that the tastes for material goods are 
affected by the surrounding culture; and how much more so tastes about 
status relations… I do not see how the process of racial discrimination 
can begin in the economic sphere or out of purely economic motives…. 
3.1.4 Institutional Explanations 
In many ways Arrow’s (1972) neo-classical theory shades into institutional theory as 
both are about group behaviour and assumptions rather than individual behaviour.  
The seminal institutional economists (Kerr 1954; Dunlop 1957) “were linked by a 
common appreciation of the role of institutions in shaping wage outcomes” (Preston 
2001:6).   
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Kerr (1954) argued that institutional labour markets existed with formal and 
informal rules creating insiders and outsiders: “Institutional labour markets create 
truly non-competing groups” (Kerr 1977:25). Dunlop (1957) characterized the 
labour market as having wages structures made up of job clusters (grouped due to 
technology, administrative organisation, or social custom) linked by product 
markets, skills, or unions to ‘wage contours’. According to Dunlop (1957:15): 
A distinction is to be made between the wage structure within a plant, 
firm, or other grouping in which wage differentials are set by the same 
authority and the complex of interfirm or group structures set by a 
number of different agencies. From the point of view of the individual 
decision makers, the first wage structure is internal while the second is 
external. 
Doeringer and Piore (1971) built on this early institutional work to create a theory of 
internal labour markets (ILMs). In this theory, the labour market contains many 
institutions that are ILMs – the most common being characterised by ports of entry 
mostly at the bottom of an internal career structure, the need for firm-specific skills 
and high investment in training. This creates insiders and outsiders who do not 
compete for wages. The internal labour market is less likely to be responsive to 
outside labour market conditions and more likely to adjust qualifications for entry 
rather than wages offered, because raising entry wages will cause all wages in the 
career structure to rise. The investment in training by ILMs means employers screen 
entrants (as in statistical discrimination), often using gender or race to do so in the 
absence of good information on reliability and turnover. As Doeringer and Piore 
(1971:192) point out: 
ILMs can provide a more efficient form of market organisation than 
competitive labor markets whenever fixed labor costs and economies of 
recruitment, screening, and training are present. 
Dunlop, the institutionalist economist, was also the first industrial relations theorist 
of note (in the 1950s the barriers between economics and industrial relations were 
far less distinct). Dunlop (1958:7), when defining an industrial system, said: 
An industrial-relations system at any one time in its development is 
regarded as comprised of certain actors, certain contexts, an ideology 
which binds the industrial-relations system together and a body of rules 
created to govern the actors at the work place and work community.  
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Dunlop (1958:7) has three main actors:  
(1) A hierarchy of managers and their representatives in supervision, (2) 
a hierarchy of workers (nonmanagerial) and any spokesmen and (3) 
specialized governmental agencies (and specialized private agencies 
created by the first two actors) concerned with workers, enterprises and 
their relationships. 
The equivalent government agencies in Australia are the industrial tribunals, for 
example, the WAIRC or AIRC. These actors and their interactions are then 
influenced by contexts external to the system that Dunlop (1958:9) sees as: 
(1) the technological characteristics of the workplace and work 
community, (2) the market or budgetary constraints which impinge on 
the actors and (3) the locus and distribution of power in the larger 
society. 
According to Dunlop (1958:16), the actors in the industrial relations system share an 
ideology, or “set of systems and beliefs” that holds the system together and rule 
making, or award and agreement making in the Australian context, is the main 
purpose of the system. As Dabschek and Niland (1981:26) point out, Dunlop’s 
expectation of a shared and binding ideology has been criticized. However, the idea 
that ideology and beliefs of the actors may help to shape outcomes remains of 
interest to research into gender wage determination.   
Consistent with Dunlop’s (1957) earlier theories on wage contours and Webb’s 
institutional constraints, craft or skilled occupational labour markets were noted by 
Doeringer and Piore (1971), who further developed Kerr’s internal labour market 
theory. These markets were for occupations requiring specific training. Note that the 
Webb’s main institution, the union, is also a part of this theory, as unions were said 
to assist the creation of guild or craft labour markets by restricting entry to their 
occupations. This again can tie into neo-classical taste theory, in this case the taste of 
insiders for those like themselves, as opposed to outsiders.  
3.1.5 Human Capital Theory 
Becker created a revival of neo-classical economic explanations for wages with his 
(1964) Human Capital Theory (as further adapted by Thurow (1975) and Mincer 
(1962)). This theory, as Preston (1997:51) puts it, remains “[t]he dominant economic 
paradigm to study wages”. Human capital can be characterised as the investment that 
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people make, through forgone earnings and associated costs, during education and 
training (on or off the job) to obtain higher future earnings. Human Capital Theory 
(HCT) posits that, in the long run, the more people invest in education and training, 
the higher the future return in terms of earnings or wages. This is because education 
and training is thought to make people more productive at work and thus more 
valuable to the employer. Women’s lower investment in training was seen by Becker 
(1964) as logical, as women did not receive as much return on their investment as 
men, due to their intermittent labour market participation caused by having children. 
The gender wage gap studies using HCT, as Le and Miller (2001:33) put it: 
“partition the difference in their [male and female] earnings into two components”. 
The first component is made up of ‘real’   differences between men and women: 
[f]or example, if women have, on average, one year of schooling less 
than men and each year of schooling is associated with 10 per cent 
higher earnings, then women would be expected to have earnings 10 per 
cent lower than men. (Le & Miller 2001:33) 
The second component, not explained by human capital variables, is assumed to 
relate to adverse treatment in the labour market. In other words, what economists 
define as adverse treatment effects, or discrimination, is where equally productive 
men and women workers receive “unequal treatment in terms and conditions in the 
labour market” (King 1990:101). Adverse treatment is where, for example, women 
and men might have the same amount of schooling, but women receive, for example, 
only a 5 per cent increase in earnings, while men receive a 15 per cent increase in 
earnings, for each extra year of schooling (Le & Miller 2001:34).  
According to Human Capital Theory, if the wage equation model is just trying to 
separate productivity effects from adverse treatment related to people’s individual 
abilities and characteristics, the key set of variables used would be education, 
experience and hours. However, the apparent discrimination-free nature of this key 
set of productivity-related variables has been debated, particularly by the feminist 
economists (Treiman & Hartmann 1981; England 1992:120-22; Blau & Ferber 1992) 
whose views will be dealt with in more detail later.  
3.1.6 Radical Economists 
Gordon, Edwards and Reich’s (1982) dual labour market theory is a further 
extension of the internal labour market theory in that this assumes national labour 
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markets are made up of primary and secondary sectors. The primary sector is made 
up of “good”, well paid, secure jobs requiring training; the secondary market is made 
up of “bad”, low paid, insecure jobs with little training. The two sectors have 
different wage determination processes: primary labour market jobs are mostly in 
internal and guild labour markets with entry through qualification, or at low ports of 
entry and wages mostly protected from market forces; secondary labour market jobs 
require little training and wages are subject to normal forces of supply and demand. 
The theory says there is little mobility between these sectors. Women are more often 
found in secondary labour market jobs that are also commonly part-time and/or 
casual.   
The radical economists (Gordon, Edwards & Reich 1982) see this as a conscious 
policy of segmentation by big business to divide and conquer the workforce and 
their representatives or unions. They describe the primary labour market sector as 
oligopolistic and the secondary as competitive. The radical economists say those in 
power divide the workforce into male and female jobs and jobs for white workers 
and black workers, so that the former can maintain their status over the latter.   
3.1.7  Feminist Economists and Sociologists/Economists 
Feminist scholars are concerned with recognising and countering the pervasive 
influence of patriarchy or male-dominant power in society – in the family and the 
workplace. As Macdonald (1995:163) puts it, in economics:  
A unifying theme of feminist work is to challenge the distinctions made 
between the formal and the informal economy, paid and unpaid work, 
market and non-market activities, productive and reproductive labour. 
Feminist economists point out that “the market” is not isolated from other parts of 
society, but is affected by it. For example, society’s views on women (or patriarchic 
attitudes) affect education before and experience and training in, the labour market.   
In the first contribution by feminist economists to the theory of wage discrimination, 
Bergmann (1974) suggested that women are systematically excluded from certain 
occupations by employers’ expectations of women’s roles; their expectations that 
women will be likely to leave to have children or will not be as fully committed to 
the workplace as men. This exclusion results in an artificially-expanded supply of 
labour and low wages in “crowded” occupations. “Attitudes concerning which 
occupations are ‘proper’ for women and blacks are part of the social system and are 
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learned, and most employers have learned pretty much the same thing” (Bergmann 
1974:313). 
Feminist economists note that human capital ‘choice’, for example women 
‘choosing’ to gain less education or to study a ‘soft’ subject which later affects wage 
levels, is as much a result of societal or pre-labour market discrimination, as of 
individual choice. Societal discrimination “denotes the multitude of social influences 
that cause women to make decisions that adversely influence their status in the labor 
market” (Blau & Ferber 1992:140). Treiman and Hartmann (1981:53) summarise 
these influences as being socialisation into ‘appropriate’ jobs, and ‘appropriate’ 
fields of study; lack of information; family obligations real or expected;  and finally: 
…women may be aware of alternative types of jobs but believe them to 
be available or unpleasant because of discrimination; their labor market 
preparation and behavior may be affected in many ways by this 
perception; the course of study they take, the time, money and effort 
invested in training; their willingness to accept promotion… 
Similarly, England (1992:18), a feminist sociologist seeking to integrate sociology 
and economics, claims the different job choices of men and women: 
… are sustained by lifelong socialization that leads men and women to 
find different jobs interesting, respectable, of value, or consistent with 
their gendered identities…Preferences for certain kinds of work entail 
preferences for exercising certain kinds of skills. The socialization that 
forms these proclivities begins in childhood and continues throughout 
adulthood. It operates through reinforcement patterns, role models, 
cognitive learning, sex-segregated networks of peers, and other 
processes.  
England (1992:108-9), in a similar way to Treiman and Hartmann (1981), talks 
about the feedback effects of discrimination within the market:  
Feedback effects are social-psychological consequences of 
discrimination that create new discrimination, or perpetuate groups’ 
disadvantages that originally resulted from discrimination. For example 
…if women are discriminatorily assigned to jobs demanding the social 
skills of nurturing rather than authoritative managing, this may cultivate 
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women’s preferences and habits toward nurturing work and men’s 
toward managerial work. 
This ‘nurturing’ work could also be described as involving ‘emotional labour’ a term 
introduced by sociologist Hochschild (1983). Essentially, emotional labour is 
relational work according to Guy and Newman (2004) and often found in public 
service jobs. Guy and Newman contend that relational or emotional labour is absent 
from the lists of knowledge, skills and abilities required in the descriptions for these 
jobs, except in the form of “interpersonal skills”. They (Guy & Newman 2004:293) 
claim that: 
[l]abour that generates perceptions of rapport, supportiveness, 
congeniality, nurturance, and empathy – in other words, “mom” 
behaviors – does not register on the wage meter. The discounted wage 
attached to women’s emotional labor reflects an assumption that care is 
a natural activity that neither deserves nor requires remuneration.  
In other words, these skills are too close to skills used in non-market, unpaid, 
situations to be recognised within the market and valued in money terms. These 
skills become invisible when they are possessed by women except when they are 
absent. Guy and Newman (2004: 293) explain this paradox in reference to 
paralegals.  
Female paralegals find themselves sanctioned if they fail to perform 
emotional labor. A woman who does not play mom, who is not friendly, 
pleasant, and nurturing, is regarded as uncooperative, may not receive 
raises, or may be terminated for “attitude problems”. Male paralegals 
are not similarly judged…women face a double bind: Institutional 
norms require them to play mom but do not reward them for it – 
nurturing is simultaneously required and devalued... 
How do firms manage to devalue these productive skills? Women are segregated 
into certain (usually caring) occupations and industries where their (caring) skills 
become invisible and not paid for as above (Guy & Newman 2004; Pierce 1999; & 
Fletcher 1999). England (1992) puts it slightly differently, describing this as jobs 
using caring skills suffering a wage penalty.  
The more mainstream economic literature does offer some explanations and 
acknowledges difficulties for economists in trying to separate out market forces from 
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non-market forces in the labour market. For example, Norris (1993:149-152) talked 
about discrimination before the market; he mentioned health, access to occupations 
being segregated by sex and parental status. Using quantitative data analysis, Preston 
(2001:169-192) looked at how social forces such as perceptions of fair wage 
relativities (which she called normative or equitable forces) may be affecting 
Australian wages. Preston (2001:190) concluded: 
Testing the importance of normative forces or, more specifically, 
fairness, is not easy. Unlike many economic forces, normative 
determinants are often difficult to quantify. However, using Australian 
wage award data as a handle, this chapter is able to offer new insight 
into the importance of equitable comparisons and spillover forces [in] 
wage determination. 
The results suggest that fairness is of more importance within 
bargaining units and within occupations (intra-occupational 
differentials) than across occupations (inter-occupational differentials). 
The results also show, consistent with other similar studies, that wage 
awards are only weakly related to market forces (specifically the price 
level, national productivity and the unemployment rate). In the period 
studied (1986 to 1997) spillover forces emerge as the dominant 
determinant of award wage adjustments. 
Phelps Brown (1977:322) noted: 
The numbers of workers potentially available to meet the requirements 
of particular jobs and the terms on which they will be so available, are 
influenced, before the market, by the structure and culture of each 
society. 
Phelps Brown then went on to explain that the socio-economic class of parents 
influences children’s cognitive development, as well as choice of schooling and 
career. He (Phelps Brown 1977:324) went further and stated “Access to employment 
may be restricted by prevailing attitudes.” 
In the (new) introduction to his second edition of “The Economics of 
Discrimination” Becker (1971:7; emphasis added) said: 
In addition to government and trade union discrimination, collusion in 
the non-union private sector is also stressed, though no one has shown 
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how thousands of firms and millions of workers are able to conspire 
successfully against minorities. Our ignorance of the scope and 
incidence of collective action against minorities is perhaps the most 
important remaining gap in the analysis of the economic position of 
minorities.  
3.1.8 Feminist Sociological Theorists  
Sociological feminist theory digs deeper into the explanations of how and why 
women and men are socialised into different roles and make different choices about 
their education and occupation.  The feminist literature points out the central role of 
gender in society.  In feminist research ‘gender’ is acknowledged as a word that does 
not just describe the biological fact of sex type, but the social bundle of expectations 
that surrounds those sex types. Gender is associated with “the social dimension of 
being male or female” (Santrock 1999:248). Gender (Hewitson 1999:9) 
… refers to a complex of social and familial assignations of sex roles to 
individuals. It is ‘the culturally and social shaped cluster of 
expectations, attributes and behaviours assigned to that category of 
human being in the society into which the child was born’.  
Santrock says gender is made up of gender identity and gender role. “Gender 
identity is the sense of being male or female” and is usually acquired by about the 
age of three. “Gender role is a set of expectations that prescribe how females and 
males should think, act and feel.” (Santrock 1999:248) 
There is an extensive (feminist) body of literature on how society builds gender 
stereotypes and constantly reinforces these in daily activities. In the quotation below, 
researchers West and Zimmerman (1987) put this in grounded theory or social 
constructionist terms as they talk about gender emerging from social situations. 
Rather than as a property of individuals, we conceive of gender as an 
emergent feature of social situations: both as an outcome of and a 
rationale for various social arrangements and as a means of legitimating 
one of the most fundamental divisions of society. (West & Zimmerman 
1987:126) 
Gender emerging as a rationale for social arrangements was explained using the 
example of male and female public toilets (Fenstermaker & West 2002:13). The 
argument is put that there is no real biological need for separate and different toilets, 
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but society uses biology as a rationale – men must have troughs – for maintaining 
what is really a social/cultural expectation, present only in public situations.  
Gender is self-regulating and self-replicating, in a continual social process.  
According to Fenstermaker and West (2002:18): 
... new members of society come to be involved in a self-regulating 
process as they begin to monitor their own and others’ conduct with 
regard to its gender implications. The “recruitment” process involves 
not only the appropriation of gender ideals (by the valuation of those 
ideals as proper ways of being and behaving) but also gender identities 
that are important to individuals and that they strive to maintain. Thus 
gender differences, or the sociocultural shaping of “essential female and 
male natures,” achieve the status of objective facts.  
Fenstermaker and West (2002:15-16) also provide examples of this process in the 
workplace. As they say “the heart of the matter is that … gender is still something 
one is accountable for.” They point out that a female doctor may be given respect for 
her skills but: 
[n]onetheless, she is subject to evaluation in terms of normative 
conceptions of appropriate attitudes and activities for her sex category 
and under pressure to prove that she is an “essentially” feminine being, 
despite appearances to the contrary.  
Fenstermaker and West (2002) go on to say that the fact that she is a woman is used 
to indicate that she is unsuitable for the more important clinical jobs such as surgeon 
and, at the same time, many of her colleagues consider her insufficiently committed 
to her responsibilities as mother and wife because she is a doctor. “Simultaneously, 
her exclusion from the physician colleague community is maintained and her 
accountability as a woman is ensured.” (Fenstermaker & West 2002:16) 
Women start off with different aspirations, because of their gender role. As Fels 
(2004:54-56) explains: 
It is difficult for women to confront and address the unspoken mandate 
that they subordinate needs for recognition to those of others – 
particularly men. The expectation is so deeply rooted in the culture’s 
ideals of femininity that it is largely unconscious.  
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It is these unconscious expectations of society that limit women’s choices and ensure 
that they do not work in more highly-paid jobs, such as management or traditional 
trades. 
Writers (Correll 2004; Hakim 2002, 2003; McRae 2003a and b) on occupational 
choice also believe women are socialised into certain types of jobs, although there is 
some level of disagreement as to how strong an effect there is. In Hakim’s (2002) 
theory, personal preferences about combinations of work and family decide whether 
a woman will choose to work full-time, work part-time or stay in the home. Hakim’s 
(2002:430) preference theory gives “a central role to life style preferences and 
values as determinants of women’s and men’s employment decisions.”  
Hakim (2002:454) feels “Women’s motivations and aspirations are independent 
factors with causal powers”. She says these motivations are independent from social, 
economic and institutional factors. Gender, as a bundle of social expectations, thus 
appears, in this theory, not to affect employment motivations and aspirations, or at 
least not as much as personal preferences for family or work. However, Hakim 
(2002:450) makes it clear that preference theory is really only about hours of work, 
not occupational choice. She finds that occupational choice is not (significantly) 
related to women’s preferences over the work and family mix. Hakim thus leaves 
open the possibility that gender or social expectations affect occupational choice. 
McRae (2003a) takes issue with Hakim’s preference theory, finding that women 
with similar preferences for labour market work/family presence (but with different 
capacities for overcoming constraints) experience very different labour market 
careers. McRae (2003a:317) concludes that: 
…a complete explanation of women’s labour market choices after 
childbirth, and of the outcomes of those choices, depends as much on 
understanding the constraints that differentially affect women as it does 
on understanding their personal preferences. 
However, Hakim (2003), responding to McRae’s (2003a) article critical of her 
theory, says constraints such as lack of child care still affect preference theory’s 
“adaptive” woman’s choices. “Adaptive” women are not career orientated, but wish 
to combine family and work. 
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3.1.9 Summarising the Literature on Wage Discrimination Theory 
Summarising the theories and literature referred to above, theoretical explanations 
for differences in wages between men and women begin with the complex influences 
observed by Webb (1891). Then, over time, most of the seminal articles reviewed 
appear to concentrate on one or other of the influences mentioned by Webb.  
Robinson (1933) looked at what happens when the market is imperfect and 
employers can exploit women’s “lack of protective power” (Webb 1891:661). 
Becker (1957) saw discrimination as caused by the tastes of employers, employees 
and clients and more easily maintained in circumstances where markets are 
imperfect. Webb (1891) mentioned custom and taste as reasons for the wage 
differences he observed.  
Webb (1891) did not mention statistical discrimination (Arrow 1972), or imperfect 
information. Institutional explanations such as unions and training institutions were 
first mentioned by Webb (1891:649), but explored in much more detail in the 
industrial relations and institutional economics theories of Dunlop (1957, 1958), 
Kerr (1954) and Doeringer and Piore (1971).   
The radical economists Gordon and Reich (1982) added on to this institutional base 
to talk about dual labour market theory. The feminist theoreticians concentrated on 
institutions too, but primarily on taste or custom which was raised as Webb’s first 
explanation for men and women being paid unequal wages for the same work in 18th 
century Britain. ‘Crowding’ (Bergmann 1974) is caused by employers’ tastes or 
society’s tastes for where women should work. Gender theory (Fenstermaker and 
West 2002) explains how these tastes are created. 
The other obvious trend, when analysing the theoretical literature above and looking 
at the timeline of the seminal literature in Figure 3, is the acknowledgment of non-
economic causes for discrimination and the consequent increasing concentration on 
taste or social explanations for wage differences. 
3.2 THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE – THE EVIDENCE 
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There is a wealth of literature giving empirical evidence of the gender wage gap and 
its causes. Some of this is reviewed below, beginning with the econometric evidence 
for the gender wage gap in Australia and then moving to the empirical literature 
supporting the economic and feminist theories covered above. 
3.2.1 The Adjusted Wage Gap  
First, there are many papers on the quantum of the gender wage gap in Australia. 
This literature involves econometric studies that seek explanations for earnings 
differences in the labour market characteristics of women and men. These studies, 
consistent with Becker’s (1957) Human Capital Theory (HCT), control for 
differences between men and women that affect productivity, such as education and 
experience, in order to compare like with like. 
Table 10 gives details of the Australian studies most relevant to the thesis topic12. 
Since 1986, thirteen of these economic studies were published reporting on the wage 
gap between men and women working full-time. The principal variables used, the 
data source, estimation techniques and results are listed in Table 10 in publication 
date order. From these studies, the short answer to the question asked at the 
beginning of this chapter: “Are women and men in Australia paid differently?” is 
yes. As can be seen in Table 10, the raw13 or unadjusted and then explained and 
unexplained (by variables) wage gaps, differed over the years, but persisted. As 
further outlined above in Section 3.1.5, the explained gap is that explained when 
adjusting for differences in human capital variables between men and women. 
Both raw (before adjustments are made for differences) wage gaps and 
‘unexplained’, or gender wage gaps (after adjustment for human capital, 
demographic and industry variables) are identified for each study in Table 10. The 
unexplained, or gender wage gap is what is left of the raw difference between men 
and women once selected variables have been used to adjust for differences. The 
larger the unexplained gap “the greater is the contribution of differential employer 
                                                 
12 This excludes studies on part-time earnings (e.g. Preston 2003) which have been omitted as this 
thesis concentrates on full-time earnings. 
13 The raw wage gap is the gap measured as existing between male and female pay before 
adjustments are made for "real" differences that are known to affect individuals' productivity and are 
believed to be a matter of individual choice rather than the result of discrimination. Differences in 
education levels as shown above are such an example. However, feminist researchers would debate 
whether educational choices might be affected by discriminatory assumptions before entry into the 
labour market either by the individual or by his/her family. 
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treatment of men and women to an explanation of the wage gap between the sexes” 
(Chapman & Mulvey 1986:509). 
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The raw (before any adjustment) gaps varied between 46.9 per cent of female 
relative to male earnings in Miller’s (1994b) study using 1973 data, to 4.9 per cent in 
Miller and Rummery’s (1991) study using 1985 data. The unexplained gaps in the 
same studies varied from 40.7 per cent female relative to male earnings in Miller’s 
(1994b) study to 0 per cent in Miller and Rummery’s (1991) study.  
Miller and Rummery (1991) used data from the Australian Longitudinal Survey for 
18 to 26 year olds only. Of studies using data on all age groups 15-65, the raw gaps 
vary from the same 46.9 per cent to 14.4 per cent female relative to male earnings 
and from the same 40.7 per cent to 6.7 per cent for the after-adjustments gap, with 
the lower estimates being those of Kidd and Shannon (1996) using 1989 data and a 
different way of imputing experience (see Table 10). 
Most of this narrowing of the gap between men’s and women’s wages between 1973 
and 1989 is due to historical decisions on pay equity in the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission in 1969 and 1972 (Miller 1994b:358 and Spillane & Kidd 
1997:220)15. Studies using 1990s data suggested an Australian gender wage gap 
ranging from 12 to 20 per cent and an unexplained component of the gender wage 
gap ranging from 10 to 16 per cent. 
Thus the studies in Table 10 vary according to the time frame of the data used, but 
there are other reasons for variation. These include the purpose of the study (beyond 
identifying the gender wage gap) and the type and number of variables used. There 
are also problems with the variables used. These are discussed in more detail below. 
3.2.1.1 Aims of studies 
Most studies had different aims and thus slightly different methodologies except 
Preston (1997) and Preston (2001). Data from two different Censuses (1991 and 
1996) were used by Preston in these studies to investigate the usefulness of HCT in 
the 1990s in Australia. Preston (1997:51) finds HCT “very useful except its inability 
to explain significant and persistent inter-industry, inter-occupational and gender 
wage differences”. The later publication (Preston 2001) still found this to be true.   
The purposes of the rest of the studies reviewed varied. Chapman and Mulvey 
(1986) was the first time the Oaxca (1973) and Blinder (1973) regression techniques 
for measuring the gender wage gap were used for the total Australian labour market. 
                                                 
15 See Chapter 2 for more on the Australian Industrial Relations Commission and pay equity. 
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Miller and Rummery (1991:62) pointed out that, due to the fact that the participation 
rate of young women is much lower than the near 100 per cent recorded for young 
men, a sample selection bias was occurring. They used the Cotton (1988) selectivity 
correction to show that the gender wage gap was understated in Australia if this 
correction was not made.  
Rummery (1992) was examining the effect of experience on the gender wage gap. 
This is discussed in more detail below under types and ranges of variables. Miller 
(1994b) was trying to examine whether changes made to Australian wages by 
institutions could be measured using the Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) 
decomposition techniques. He (Miller 1994b:347) concluded that they could: 
…data from surveys conducted in 1973 and 1989 show that the removal 
of this institutionalised discrimination [through the AIRC equal pay 
decisions] is captured …as a marked decline in the absolute value of the 
‘discrimination’ component of the gender wage gap.   
Langford (1995) was interested in the effect of greater detail on education, i.e. field 
of study and this is discussed below. Kidd and Shannon’s (1996) main aim was 
studying the reasons for the lower gender wage gap in Australia when compared to 
Canada. They use Juhn, Murphy and Pierce’s (1991) methodology to distinguish 
between gender specific effects and the role of labour market structure. Structural 
differences (particularly a lower level of return to education and experience and a 
lower level of wage inequality in Australia than in Canada) were found to be largely 
responsible for the smaller wage gap in Australia. 
Kidd and Meng (1997) were comparing data from 1981-2 and 1989-90 surveys in 
order to ascertain whether legislative reforms: the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 
or Affirmative Action Act 1986 (Cth), had any effect on the gender wage gap. Their 
results (Kidd & Meng 1997:31) 
…contrast the slow convergence in the gender wage gap during the 
1980s with much faster pace of the 1970s. The article concludes that 
despite the focus of the 1980s legislation on employment equity, 
changes in the male-female occupation distribution over the period are 
small and the associated impact on gender wage convergence is also 
small. 
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They also make the point that “although the gender wage gap narrowed over the 
decade, the proportion of the gap justified by gender differences in human capital 
endowments has fallen sharply” (Kidd & Meng 1997:39). This was mainly due to 
women’s increasing educational qualifications. 
Wooden’s (1999) study was aimed at estimating the contribution of gender-based 
occupational segmentation concluding that, like Kidd and Meng (1997), intra-
occupational differences, or barriers (the glass ceiling), were the main sources of the 
gender wage gap. Pocock and Alexander (1999) followed the method used by 
Wooden and Bora (1999:276) to examine the relative importance of individual and 
workplace characteristics for wages. Pocock and Alexander (1999:75) show that, 
even when using the very wide range of variables that Wooden and Bora (1999) 
suggest affects wages at the workplace, a large part of the gender wage gap is 
unexplained. They argue that the undervaluation of women’s work remains an 
important contributor to the gender wage gap.   
Preston and Crockett (1999a) examined the impact of different regulatory industrial 
relations systems on gender earnings inequality through a disaggregated state 
analysis. Only two econometric papers, both by Preston and Crockett (1999a & b) 
looked at the gender wage gap for the different states within Australia. Both initially 
reported the (raw) data on average weekly earnings over the period 1991 to 1999 and 
then a regression analysis using 1996 Australian Census data. The results of the 
regression analysis are given in Table 11. 
Table 11 – Decomposing Australian Gender Wage Gaps:  
National and State-based Estimates 1996 
 Australia NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS 
Explained Gap 0.051 0.050 0.041 0.063 0.013 0.085 0.006 
Human capital 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.018 0.004 0.022 0.018 
Demographics 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.009 
Overtime 0.033 0.034 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.038 0.026 
Public -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.011 -0.006 -0.008 
Metro -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 - 
Industry 0.023 0.024 0.008 0.030 0.012 0.042 0.015 
Occupation -0.019 -0.020 -0.009 -0.022 -0.029 -0.020 -0.055 
Unexplained gap 0.141 0.133 0.135 0.151 0.159 0.176 0.171 
Total Gap 0.192 0.183 0.176 0.214 0.172 0.261 0.178 
Note: the regression model controlled for one digit industry and occupation. 
(Source: Preston & Crockett 1999b:139) 
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Western Australia clearly had the largest total or raw wage gap at 26.1 per cent and 
the largest unexplained gender wage gap at 17.6 per cent16. This compared to raw 
wage gaps of 17.6 per cent for Victoria and 19.2 per cent for Australia and similarly, 
unexplained gender wage gaps of 13.5 per cent and 14.1 per cent. 
As Preston and Crockett (1999b:140) point out: 
…the main factors contributing to this explained portion were 
differences in the industry structure of employment (with more males 
employed in higher paying industries), differences in overtime work 
(more males working overtime) and differences in human capital (males 
more qualified and experienced than females).  
It also should be noted that the ‘productivity’ variables (particularly industry) used 
by Preston and Crockett (1999a & b) explained a larger portion of the gender pay 
gap in Western Australia than in any other state, or in Australia overall. This is not 
unexpected, given the importance of the mining industry in Western Australia and 
the high earnings of remote and offshore workforces within that industry. 
Finally Le and Miller (2001:33) examined the persistence of the gender wage gap in 
the 1990s to see if female wage disadvantage was a temporary or permanent 
phenomenon, concluding that the female wage disadvantaged state is generally not a 
temporary phenomenon. They (Le & Miller 2001:47) also found most disadvantage 
within large firms: “consistent with large workplaces having well-defined internal 
labour markets characterised by stable wage structures which offer women relatively 
little opportunity for rapid change in economic status.” Le and Miller (2001:48) 
point out that this is consistent with the studies that find intra-occupational 
disadvantage to be a significant source of the gender wage differential (e.g. Wooden 
1999). 
3.2.1.2 Variables used 
Above all, the studies vary when it comes to the number and type of variables used 
to adjust for sources of wage differentials between men and women. Age group had 
a significant effect on results. As noted above, the Miller and Rummery (1991) study 
                                                 
16 Note that the earnings figures in Appendix 1, Figure 2 actually show WA having only a 24 per cent 
raw gap at the highest in (February) 1996. The census figures used for the regression analysis above 
(Preston & Crockett 1999b) are from a household survey whereas the earnings figures (ABS 6302.0) 
are from a survey of employers. The latter are probably more accurate, as the records will be to hand 
for employers when answering and may not be for people in their own homes. Indeed, other members 
of the family may be reporting earnings.
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only used data for 19-26 year olds, resulting in a lower gender wage gap as 
differences (explained or unexplained) tend to compound over time and are worse in 
later age groups. The great majority of studies use data for 16 to 64 year olds and the 
publications that did not state their age group (e.g. Chapman & Mulvey 1986, 
Rummery 1992) were probably using this standard group too. Miller (1994b) used 
data for 30 to 64 year olds from the ‘1973 Social Mobility In Australia’ and ‘1989 
How Workers Get Their Training’ surveys as the first survey only had good data for 
this group.  
Another variation was using hourly wages (used in most studies and usually 
obtained by surveys of employers) or weekly earnings/income (Kidd & Meng 1997; 
Preston 1997; & Preston & Crockett 1999a – usually obtained from households). 
Data sources also varied considerably. Langford (1995), Kidd and Shannon (1996) 
and Kidd and Meng (1997) all used the ‘Australian Income and Distribution Survey’ 
for 1989/90. Preston (1997 and 2001) and Preston and Crockett (1999a) used a 
sample of the Census. Chapman and Mulvey (1986) and Rummery (1992) used the 
National Social Science Survey. Miller and Rummery (1991) used the ‘Australian 
Longitudinal Survey’ so that they could correct for selectivity bias for those outside 
the sample. This correction increased the gender wage gap from 0 to 11%. Wooden 
(1999) used the ‘Survey of Training and Education’ giving him a much wider range 
of variables (see below). Pocock and Alexander (1999) used the 1995 ‘Australian 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey’ of firms with more than 20 employees, 
which also provided a much wider range of variables. 
3.2.1.3 Issues with variables used 
It was noted above that even the basic variables in Human Capital Theory, education 
and experience, may be of doubtful use when measuring gender wage discrimination 
as these may be affected by discrimination before and in the market. The classic 
problem is measuring women’s experience in the labour market.  
Experience is the variable used by economists to try to measure on-the-job training. 
Mincer (1962) showed that on-the-job training was an even more important factor in 
increasing wages than education and suggested that, where actual experience is not 
available, this could be measured by age less years of schooling, less 5 (being the 
age on entering school). This calculation works fairly well for men, when compared 
to (rarely available) data on actual years of experience in the labour market. 
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However, it works less well for women because of their tendency to move in and out 
of the labour market, due to family responsibilities. Rummery (1992), using 1985 
data containing records of actual experience, illustrates this clearly when she showed 
that using the Mincer (1962) potential experience proxy for women resulted in 
explaining none of the wage gap between men and women, but when actual 
experience was used, 29 per cent was explained.  
In most of the studies reviewed here, adjustments were made to impute women’s 
work experience, by creating a new experience variable using age and presence of 
dependent children (Kidd & Shannon 1996), or just adding variables for marital 
status and children to the equation (Miller & Rummery 1991; Langford 1995; Kidd 
& Meng 1997; Preston 1997; Wooden 1999; Pocock & Alexander 1999; and Preston 
& Crockett 1999a & b). Miller (1994a & b) used a data set containing actual 
occupational experience and tenure measures and included marital status in his 
equation, but not children.  
Wooden (1999), using the same data set as Miller (1994a & b - 1989 data), 
employed the same tenure and occupational experience variables, but added into his 
equation marital status interacted with dependent children and age of youngest child. 
Wooden (1999:161) did not justify this treatment apart from to say that his 
specification “thus includes a more extensive array of controls than that used by 
Miller (1994).” This latter treatment may, in fact, result in not just productivity being 
‘explained’, but discrimination as well. Wage differences associated with marital 
status and dependent children and age of youngest child, when actual job tenure and 
occupational experience differences are already included, may reflect discrimination 
by the employer rather than any real differences in productivity of women with 
dependent children associated with time out from the labour market. However, as 
Wooden was trying to identify the effect of merely raising the award wage rather 
than the effect of eliminating all forms of discrimination, this approach removed 
some confusion caused by discrimination relating to family responsibilities. 
There are also problems with measuring education and trying to identify what is 
discrimination or adverse treatment and what is productivity. Chapman and Mulvey 
(1986:149) suggested that males in their sample might have undertaken “formal 
training that was of higher specific vocational value than was the case for females 
(for example, a law degree compared with a more broadly-based university 
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education)”. Data sets including detailed information on tertiary studies are rare, so 
most of the studies reviewed only used level of qualification.  
However, Langford’s (1995) study illustrated the effect of using tertiary field of 
study. It increased the explanatory power of the human capital equation. Langford 
was able to explain 39 per cent of the gap caused by differences shown in returns to 
education and experience between men and women. This contrasted with the more 
typical 20 to 30 per cent explained in the other studies listed in Table 10. However, 
Langford’s (1995) gap after adjustment is still 9.2 per cent, meaning that 61 per cent 
of the 15 per cent 1990 unadjusted or raw wage gap remained unexplained. Also, is 
educational choice not affected by discriminatory treatment?  
Langford’s inclusion of tertiary field of study may just be reflecting educational 
choice affected by perceptions of future discrimination. As discussed above, this is 
what England (1992:108-112) calls a feedback effect and King (1990:101) calls a 
“realistic expectation that… [women’s] human investments will be relatively poorly 
rewarded”. For this reason, using a more aggregate measure of education is probably 
preferable in a human capital equation trying to identify discrimination. In this way, 
the level of education can be compared, rather than the choice of course, which may 
be affected by discriminatory feedback effects. 
Researchers in the literature reviewed often added industry (all in Table 10 except: 
Miller & Rummery 1991; Rummery 1992; Miller 1994b; Kidd & Meng 1997; & Le 
& Miller 2001) or occupation (all in Table 10 except: Miller & Rummery 1991; 
Rummery 1992; Miller 1994b; & Le & Miller 2001) to the human capital variables 
set in their earnings equation. Both these variables are open to debate about whether 
the associated observed wage variation is productivity-related, or has some relation 
to other forces including union power, discrimination, educational choice and other 
imperfections in the labour market. As Preston (2001:32) points out, the inclusion of 
occupation “will also control for segregation [the division of women and men into 
different occupations] and discriminatory restrictions on entry to particular 
occupations”.  
Finally, there are problems around the sheer number of variables used.  If the focus 
of measurement is on identifying the contribution of all forms of discrimination in 
the labour market, including occupational segregation and unequal pay for equal 
productivity variables, “then clearly the wage equation should only control for 
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productivity-generating characteristics such as schooling and experience” (Preston 
2001:32). 
As a result, some of the studies listed in Table 10 understate the gender wage gap, if 
strictly defined as the gap found after adjustment for productivity-related variables. 
Studies such as Wooden (1999) and Pocock and Alexander (1999) added many more 
variables than those mentioned above. Wooden (1999:160-161) also added computer 
user, casual worker, union member, location of residence and industry, making a 
total of 20 variables. Pocock and Alexander have a set they term “human capital 
variables”: age, education, disability, country of origin, non-English speaking, 
Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islander and dependent children; and other sets for job 
characteristics and workplace characteristics. No claim is made that these sets are 
associated with productivity. Both Wooden (1999) and Pocock and Alexander 
(1999) included variables that may be associated with wage variations between men 
and women (and at least in the latter study, are clearly doing so to find these 
variables’ contribution to discrimination), but are not necessarily associated with 
productivity or human capital theory. However, both Wooden (1999) and Pocock 
and Alexander (1999) still find a substantial gender wage gap of 10 to 13 per cent. 
Nonetheless, using a large range of variables may result in double-counting and the 
use of variables that have no effect on productivity, contrary to Human Capital 
Theory. Thus Miller’s (1994b) more conservative use of variables is preferred when 
measuring the effect of differences in human capital acquisition on wages. This is 
particularly so when trying to measure real versus unexplained differences (which 
are potentially discrimination in labour market treatment) in the gender wage gap. 
3.2.2 Evidence for Economic Theories 
This section looks at the empirical literature relevant to the theoretical literature 
reviewed in Section 3.1. Some of Webb’s (1891) explanations for women’s lower 
wages: taste or custom, women’s tendency to rely on the income of others, their lack 
of training/productivity and barriers put up by institutional systems are evident in the 
historical treatment of women’s pay in Australia industrial relations tribunals as 
already outlined in Chapter 2 and discussed in more detail in Short (2002a).   
There is Australian evidence (Riach & Rich 2002; Neumark 1999; & Lewis 1979) to 
support the existence of statistical discrimination against women. Lewis (1979) 
showed that, when women and men have similar (low paid) jobs, tenure differences 
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are statistically insignificant, but are consistently over-estimated by employers. 
Riach and Rich (2002) showed that when employers believe applicants are female 
they overestimate their potential turnover rate and employ male applicants instead. 
As King (1990:106) points out, the experience of Australia in the 1970s around 
equal pay is consistent with institutional theory. The formal industrial relations 
system, in the shape of the AIRC, is seen as an institution that changed the shape of 
Australian women’s earnings without any economic imperative – rather a social 
imperative brought about by the submissions of governments and women’s groups 
(Gaudron & Bosworth 1979:164-7). Yet, as seen in Chapter 1, change within that 
system has had a dramatic effect on the gender wage gap only during the 1970s and 
early 1980s and the rate of change has now slowed. It was felt that a focus on this 
institution’s “set of systems and beliefs”, being those of the actors in the industrial 
relations tribunals, may help to explain this slowing in closing the gender wage gap. 
Australian research has shown internal labour markets existed in Australia during the 
1970s and ‘80s (Nowak 1979; Nowak & Crockett 1983) and that women were less 
likely to be employed within these internal labour markets where higher wages were 
paid. Examples of guild labour markets in Australia are the Australian Medical 
Association and law associations that still have some influence on places offered in 
Australian universities and can make their tastes evident to employers. Those inside 
the guild labour market first were men, so it is harder for women as outsiders to gain 
entry. Electricians are also a continuing example of a guild labour market in 
Australia, being a licenced occupation and an occupation dominated by men. 
There is certainly evidence that Australian occupations are segmented by gender 
(Watts & Rich 1992; Watts 2003) and part of that may be due to crowding 
(Bergmann 1974).  In Australia, Power (1975:230) hypothesised that:  
Market forces interact with the institutionalized discrimination which 
pervades economic and social institutions and with attitudes about the 
“proper” roles of men and women to create and perpetuate separate 
labour markets for women and men. 
Power (1975:228) pointed out that in 1971 crowding was evident in Australia:  
…more than one-third of women worked in just three occupations – 
clerk, saleswoman, and stenographer and typist – and over half of all 
women worked in only nine occupations.   
 74
However, evidence for dual labour markets with oligopoly and market segments is 
not clear (Flatau & Lewis 1991). 
Finally, there is some evidence on the processes that cause inter-occupational (and to 
some extent intra-occupational) differences between men and women employed by 
large firms that also tend to be internal labour markets and monopsony employers 
(e.g. the public service). Job evaluation has been an important feature within 
Australian firms, particularly in those that might be termed internal labour markets 
with monopsonistic features consistent with Doeringer and Piore’s (1971) theory. 
Job evaluation has become widely used in both the public and private sectors in 
Australia. As reported in Chapter 2, Sections 2.2 and 2.3.1, a series of AIRC cases 
was conducted in the late 1980s/early 1990s to bring women professionals into the 
previously solely male professional job evaluation and pay classifications structure 
(Rafferty 1989, 1991 & 1994) of the Australian Public Service.  
These pay systems were meant to lead to more equitable outcomes, as job evaluation 
allowed the comparison of similar jobs on the same ‘objective’ criteria involving 
such issues as responsibility, skills used and numbers of staff supervised (Figart 
2000). Unfortunately the literature (Equal Opportunities Commission not dated; 
Burton, Hag & Thompson 1987; Short 1992; Figart 2000; Cox & Leonard 1991) 
shows that job evaluation is affected by the perceptions of employers, employees 
and job raters, which can adversely affect women’s experiences and pay.  
This is evident in this comment from the UK Equal Opportunities Commission (not 
dated:1):  
Job evaluation is a system of comparing different jobs to provide a basis 
for a grading and pay structure. The aim is to evaluate the job, not the 
job holder, but it is recognised that to some extent any assessment of a 
job’s total demands relative to another will be subjective. Moreover, job 
evaluation is in large part a social mechanism which establishes agreed 
differentials within organisations.  
Figart (2000) examined the history of job evaluation and explained how in the 
1940s, due to labor shortages caused by war, job evaluation “evolved to erase 
explicitly separate pay scales by gender and yet, at the same time, reproduced 
gendered pay practices in new ways”.  
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According to the literature (Cox & Leonard 1991, England 1992; Guy & Newman 
2004) the biases built in to job evaluation systems start with the job descriptions 
used as the basis for evaluation. Job descriptions tend either not to record, or to 
downgrade, ‘female’ or ‘soft’ skills such as co-ordination, co-operation and caring. 
This can be connected to the earlier discussion in this chapter about emotional labour 
being invisible. Any correction of this problem depends on the training of the staff 
involved and of any independent raters used. It is their perceptions of skills used on 
the job that are recorded (Burton, Hag & Thompson 1987). 
There is also the tendency to double-count (or more) a job’s position in the 
hierarchy. For example, job evaluation systems typically include the position’s level 
to which responsible, number of staff supervised and responsibility for money. This 
type of loading makes it very difficult to value other skills equitably, or to change 
the position of a job in the hierarchy (Hastings 1990:12-14; Short 1992:15:16). 
The other main fault found by the research on job evaluation was the use of multiple 
job evaluation systems, or pay classification structures, within a public service or 
sector. The research (Risher 1984; Hastings 1990) says the greater the proliferation 
of salary structures and systems, the lower the equality of pay within and between 
these. This is also because most of these multiple systems actually use different 
systems for predominantly male, or female, work.  
As Armstrong and Cornish (1997) note, it is important for women working in what 
they term female ghettos (female-dominated jobs lacking a career ladder such as 
personal assistant/secretary) to be able to compare the wages with those outside 
these ghettos. Within a public sector, that can only be achieved by using job 
evaluation schemes that encompass the broadest range of jobs possible. Yet, around 
Australia, there are different job evaluation and/or pay structures for public sector 
executives, technicians and police (mainly male) and for teachers and nurses (mainly 
female).  
3.2.3 Evidence on Gender Theory 
England’s study of job or occupational characteristics in the US supports theories of 
gendered assumptions about male and female roles and undervaluation of women’s 
jobs. England is a feminist sociologist studying economics. England (1992:126) 
reports the results of a regression analysis she ran, controlling for “characteristics of 
occupations that influence their wages for reasons other than gender bias”, in order 
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to reveal wage discrimination in the US. England (1992) used a very large set of 
characteristics, or control factors. This included a job’s social complexity, influence, 
physical demands, amenities (e.g. creative work, self-determined work speed), 
disamenities (stress, hazards, noise) and effort, as well as the more conventional 
variables such as percentage self-employed or public sector, race, sex, experience 
and education. England also included variables for jobs requiring authority and jobs 
requiring ‘nurturance’. (England 1992: Chapter 3) 
In England’s (1992) model, jobs requiring authority were all jobs with manager or 
supervisor in their titles. Jobs requiring nurturance were defined as involving “an 
application of social skills to activities providing a service to customers or clients” 
on a face to face basis (England 1992:136). These latter jobs included health care 
workers, teachers, librarians, information clerks and receptionists, social workers, 
retail workers, nurses, hospitality workers, child care workers and personal service 
workers and thus all the female-dominated occupations under study for this thesis. 
England (1992: 183) found that: 
…being in a job requiring nurturing carries a net wage penalty of 
between 24 [US] cents/hour and [US] $1.71/hour, depending on the 
model…. This penalty cannot be explained by nurturant jobs requiring 
less cognitive or physical skill, by their lack of requirements for 
managerial authority, by their lack of disamenities or surplus of 
amenities, by the type of firm or industry in which such jobs occur, or 
even because the jobs are currently held largely by women, since all of 
these factors were controlled in the models assessing this penalty. I 
interpret this as evidence that nurturant work is devalued in markets 
because of its traditional link with women’s work in the home and in 
labour markets. 
Correll (2004) dug deeper into the occupational choice of women to show how 
cultural beliefs about gender affected emerging career aspirations in both high 
school and tertiary students in the United States. Using both a survey and an 
experimental model, Correll showed that, when male and female students are 
persuaded that gender is an important indicator of ability to do a certain task, they 
fulfill that expectation. When male and female students were told men were 
‘naturally’ better at a task, the male students over-estimated their scores and were 
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more lenient on rating themselves compared with the female students. Male students 
assessed their task competence as higher than that of the female students performing 
the same task. When the students were persuaded that gender made no difference to 
performance using the same task, there were no differences in self assessment 
between males and females. Correll (2004:93) then used a previous survey on 
mathematics performance to show that: 
 [m]en make higher assessments of their own mathematical ability than 
women, which contributes to their higher rates of persistence on paths to 
careers in science, math and engineering. 
This is the ultimate feedback model. Men, on being told that society thinks men are 
more competent in an area than women, will go on to ensure that this is so through 
inflated self-assessment. They will use this self-assessment to decide that they 
should undertake a certain career or job. 
3.2.4 Evidence on Intra-Occupational Constraints 
Finally, in support of the gender wage gap studies of earnings in Australia that 
pointed to intra-occupational discrimination as being the greatest source of wage 
discrimination (Kidd & Meng 1997; Wooden 1999; Pocock & Alexander 1999; Le 
& Miller 2001), there is a wealth of literature on discrimination and management, or 
the glass ceiling effect. 
As Burton (1997:3) explains, the glass ceiling preventing women’s progress in 
management is made up of: 
… artificial barriers based on attitudinal or organisational biases that 
prevent qualified women and minorities from advancing upward into 
management-level positions. The glass ceiling is comprised of day-to-
day practices, management and employee attitudes and internal systems 
that operate to the career disadvantage of women and minorities.  
Summarising the research on women and management, barriers to advancement 
making up the glass ceiling within firms tend to be:  
• social values and beliefs (as discussed in Section 3.1.8 under gender; 
Fenstermaker & West 2002); 
• men’s and women’s different perceptions of fair treatment (Russell 2003; 
Still 1997); 
• organisational climate or culture (Tharaneou 1997, Still 1997); 
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• recruitment and selection processes (Thomas, Porterfield, Hutcheson & 
Pierannunzi 1994; Burton 1997; Loughlin 2000; Powell 1988); 
• education, training and development (Langford 1995; Preston & Burgess 
2003; Tharenou 1995; Tharenou, Latimer & Conroy 1994; Wernick 1994); 
• family-friendly workplaces and family responsibilities (Tharenou 1995, 1997 
and 1998; Loughlin 2000); and, 
• job evaluation (Burton, Hag & Thompson 1987; Cox & Leonard 1991; Equal 
Opportunities Commission not dated; Figart 2000; Risher 1994; Short 1992;). 
Apart from social values, which have been dealt with extensively already under 
gender, each of these reasons is explained below in more detail.  
3.2.4.1   Different perceptions 
According to Russell (2003:2) there are significant differences between Australian 
women’s and men’s perceptions of how women are treated in the workplace. He 
(Russell 2003) reported that in his most recent surveys, when asked if men and 
women have the same chances for promotion in organisations, 68 per cent of male 
respondents agreed, but only 27 per cent of female respondents agreed. When asked 
if men and women are paid the same for doing similar work in their organisation, 81 
per cent of the men agreed, but only 39 per cent of women. 
A national attitude survey of 3,900 employees in three Australian banks (Still 
1997:5) revealed: 
…significant differences in perceptions between male and female 
employees with respect to recruitment, selection, promotion and 
transfer; conditions of service; and personal qualities [seen as relevant to 
decisions on promotions]. Overall, women felt ‘disadvantaged’ in 
comparison with men in these three areas. Men, on the other hand, felt 
women were given opportunities to progress, and that the organisational 
culture was supportive of their career aspirations. 
3.2.4.2 Organisational culture 
Interviewees felt organisational and occupational cultures could be hostile towards 
women. Much of this hostility would appear to be caused by a tendency for people, 
already inside an organisation, to hire in their own image. 
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Kanter coined the term ‘homosocial reproduction’ when insiders 
replicate themselves when filling jobs (Kanter, 1977), and homophily 
operates when selectors prefer to choose similar others and job seekers 
prefer to work with similar individuals (Ibarra, 1993)…Male managerial 
hierarchies are therefore more likely to result in selection and promotion 
of white men for managerial jobs. (Tharenou 1997:46) 
Tharenou (1997:47) reviewed the literature in this area and found that: 
[c]onsistent with homphily and homosocial reproduction processes, 
male managerial hierarchies reduce women’s managerial advancement, 
and increases in women in managerial jobs subsequently increase 
women’s representation in management 
In other words, male managerial hierarchies felt that women were too different to 
promote, but women managers identified with other women and increased women’s 
chances of promotion. Given that most managerial hierarchies are male this 
increases the difficulties for women entering and within the firm. 
Thomas et al (1994) also found evidence of conscious, or unconscious, bias in 
recruitment. They reviewed the literature and conducted their own audits of 
organisations for the US Glass Ceiling Commission and found that the majority of 
organisations still favoured the use of informal recruitment and selection processes 
such as using social networks and referrals from employees. Powell (1988:92) found 
that informal selection and recruitment processes were much more likely to result in 
biased selection, as people tended to determine job criteria on the basis of the current 
incumbent’s gender. Thus, potential job holders are assessed against these 
requirements and where these are perceived as being held more by one gender than 
another (e.g. leadership by men), then applicants of that sex are preferred. 
Even when processes are formal and human resource management (HRM) policies 
exist, this does not ensure merit-based practice (Burton 1997; Loughlin 2000). 
“There are many opportunities for errors to occur and for people to be unfairly 
disadvantaged at any stage of the HRM cycle” (Loughlin 2000:7). 
3.2.4.3 Education, training and development 
Issues around discrimination in education choices before the market and feedback 
effects were already discussed in Sections 3.1.7 and 3.2.1.3. There are also problems 
once within the firm with less formal training received on the job and with 
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developmental experiences such as being a line manager or working on special 
projects. Wernick (1994:25) found that:  
A major reason for the perceived lack of qualified women and minority 
males is the fact that they usually have not had access to the experiences 
and activities companies use to develop and prepare supervisors, 
managers and executives. 
The cause of this, Wernick (1994:25) said, was “the haphazard and inefficient 
developmental and advancement process within companies”. 
Tharenou (1995) and Tharenou, Latimer and Conroy (1994), following a review of 
the international literature and conducting their own Australian research, found that 
success as a manager was highly dependent on access to development opportunities, 
through being line managers in organisations and through higher profile activities, 
such as inquiries and special projects. Relatively early career experiences in these 
areas were found to be beneficial. Tharenou (1995 and 1998) found that women 
consistently were offered less of these experiences compared to men. Women were 
more likely to be segregated into staff (human resources, communications) than line 
(service delivery or production) jobs and thus to have limited access to high profile 
developmental opportunities.  
3.2.4.4 Family responsibilities and family-friendly policies 
Research studies (Tharenou 1995, 1997 and 1998) have examined whether the 
family roles of Australian senior female managers have affected their advancement 
and concluded that this is not strictly true. Tharenou conducted two quantitative 
studies (1995 and 1998). The first (1995) found that having a family and the 
employment interruptions associated with that did not affect advancement. The 
second study (Tharenou 1998) was a longitudinal cross level study and found that 
neither women’s, nor men’s, advancement was affected by marriage and children. 
Tharenou (1997:78) reviewed the international literature on effects of having a 
family and concluded “marriage and children do not decrease women’s managerial 
advancement but, consistent with a multiple role view, may reduce processes leading 
to it.” An example of the processes being referred to is provision of training or work 
experience.  
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With family and work/life balance issues now becoming important for both men and 
women, many organisations have family-friendly policies to help alleviate the 
problems involved. However, as Loughlin (2000:23) puts it: 
…employees can be reluctant to access such policies because of the 
possible impact on their career. Schwartz (1994) indicates that women 
perceive career penalties from using family-friendly policies, but she 
also concludes that actual use is career enhancing in that it provides a 
means for women to remain attached to the workforce. 
3.3 CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
This chapter has covered the seminal literature on theories of wage discrimination 
from economics, industrial relations, feminist literature and sociology and shown 
some of these in a time line from the 1890s to the end of the twentieth century 
demonstrating how these theories have moved from economic and industrial 
relations explanations to those offered by sociology. This is followed by an 
examination of supporting empirical literature.   
The empirical evidence demonstrates a persistent gender wage gap in the adjusted 
earnings results of Australian econometric studies. An examination of the variables 
used in these studies by feminist economists indicates that the literature possibly 
understates the gender wage gap caused by discrimination. The gap was found to 
have persisted at between 10 and 16 per cent during the 1990s. While the Australian 
gender wage gap is very gradually closing, it is shown to be widest in Western 
Australia and to be continuing to widen in that state over the period 1983 to 2003. 
The author was a resident of Western Australia until 2003 and the widening of that 
state’s gender wage gap was the primary stimulus for this thesis. 
From an examination of the literature, a range of theories seem to be applicable in 
Australia: those of social custom or taste; statistical discrimination; institutionalist 
theory; and women’s lesser choice in hours and geographic location leading to 
exploitation in monopsony situations. Monopsony is combined with imperfect 
internal labour markets, where job evaluation systems assist inter-occupational 
undervaluation and various glass ceiling barriers exist to intra-occupational 
movement for women.   
Occupational segmentation by gender is evident in Australia and clearly also an area 
for fertile research when looking at the gender wage gap; hence this thesis’ 
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concentration on investigating female- and male-dominated occupations. Feminist 
theories of gender being constructed from the bundle of social expectations around 
the fact of biological sex, combined with Dunlop’s (1957) theory of industrial 
relations, suggest that investigating the set or sets of beliefs possessed by the 
Australian system’s actors (those involved in determining wages in the formal 
system under the industrial relations tribunals) may assist in working out why and 
how equivalent women and men were paid differently under Australian awards and 
agreements in the 1990s. It may also help unpack the economists’ unexplained 
component of the gender wage gap. 
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CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the choice of methodology from a theoretical point of view. 
The research design or procedure is outlined and discussed in detail. Finally, this 
chapter shows how activities have been undertaken to ensure that the research is 
trustworthy and authentic. 
4.1 CHOICE OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
As is clear from the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, the Australian gender wage gap 
has mostly been subject to research that is both quantitative and aggregate, in that 
population averages are used. This approach is able to explain only some of the 
difference between female and male full-time average earnings. In a study based 
mainly on a sample of wage rates and an analysis of legislation and other literature, 
Short (2001) found only limited explanations for why Western Australian women 
were being paid less than Western Australian men and less than Australian women. 
The few interviews and the literature research conducted for that study suggested 
that explanations might lie in the perceptions, meanings and interpretations of 
industrial relations stakeholders, as well as the ‘facts’17 of legal provisions, 
educational attainment and experience highlighted by the economic literature.  
Further exploration of the literature during this current study indicated that an 
investigation of the industrial relations actors’ ideology, or “set of systems and 
beliefs” highlighted by Dunlop (1958:16), could assist in understanding why women 
are paid differently to men. It also suggested that some of the issues are located in 
social structures and experiences and therefore the focus of the proposed study 
should be on qualitative, rather than on further quantitative research. Schwandt 
(1994) argues that constructivist researchers hold the view that what is taken to be 
objective knowledge and truth is dependent on the perspectives of the individuals 
who view it. In this thesis, this knowledge or truth is dependent on the perceptions 
and interpretations (or as Dunlop (1958:16) termed “beliefs”) of industrial relations 
stakeholders; this research is dependent on the perspectives of those individuals 
                                                 
17 While the (average) educational attainments of women are absolute facts that can be obtained from 
ABS records, as Chapter 3, Section 3.2, points out, these facts may be affected by the perceptions of 
these women and of their families about the usefulness or value of certain types of education for 
women.
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operating within the industrial relations system. Accordingly it was deemed that the 
qualitative or constructivist approach was more appropriate than the positivist or 
quantitative one that posits objective knowledge. 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994:4) describe quantitative and positivist studies as 
emphasizing:  
…the measurement and analysis of causal relationships between 
variables, not processes. Inquiry is purported to be within a value-free 
framework. 
By contrast qualitative researchers (Denzin & Lincoln 1994:4): 
…emphasize the value-laden nature of inquiry... stress the socially 
constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the 
researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that 
shape inquiry... Qualitative researchers seek answers to questions that 
stress how social experience is created and given meaning.   
Qualitative researchers believe that truth is relative to the individual who perceives 
it, that only multiple descriptions can get close to describing a given situation 
(Checkland 1999). 
Consistent with this, the epistemology of this thesis or the branch of philosophy or 
logic dealing with the formalisation of “concepts, such as knowledge, certainty and 
ignorance” (Hanks 1981:493) is interpretivist rather than empirical. This is because 
the interpretivist approach interprets different perspectives on a topic according to 
context or subjective meaning (Guba & Lincoln 1994). 
When dealing with different (pay) outcomes for men and women, issues of gender 
must be explored. As already raised in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.8, according to 
Hewitson (1999:9) gender: 
… is ‘the culturally and social shaped cluster of expectations, 
attributes, and behaviours assigned to that category of human being in 
the society into which the child was born’.  
Thus, it is clear that understanding the role of gender in the marketplace and its 
effect on Australian wages involves a study of societal attitudes and influences on 
the industrial relations actors as well as economic issues. Understanding society is, in 
turn, now seen as best approached through qualitative study. As Checkland 
(1999:279) puts it: 
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…social reality is the ever-changing outcome of the social process in 
which human beings, the product of their genetic inheritance and 
previous experiences, continually negotiate and re-negotiate with 
others their perceptions and interpretations of the world outside 
themselves.  
The reasons why equally productive women and men are paid differently must 
include (but lie somewhere beyond) the quantitative facts of experience, industry and 
education. As seen in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1, after correction for differences in 
measurable characteristics, much of the difference in the earnings of men and women 
remains unexplained. The possibility that the reasons for this difference lie in the 
perceptions, meanings and interpretations of industrial actors who set male and 
female wages and in the processes used to set wages was a motivation for this thesis. 
4.1.1 Symbolic Interactionism 
The qualitative approach used in this study is symbolic interactionism. As Taylor and 
Bogdan (1998:11) put it, “symbolic interactionism places primary importance on the 
social meaning people attach to the world around them”. Meaning is held to be 
socially constructed. People react to things and people on the basis of the meaning 
these have for them. “The meaning of a thing for a person grows out of the ways in 
which other persons act toward the person with regard to the thing” (Blumer 1969). 
People are continually interpreting and defining “things’ as they move through 
different situations.  
Symbolic interactionism holds that the researcher cannot find an objective social 
truth that is directly observable and measurable in quantitative terms, because social 
reality is constructed by the observer and changes over time (Checkland 1999:278-
9). Thus, a methodological approach based on symbolic interactionism involves 
interaction with the problem and the actors involved to achieve understanding of the 
‘why’ and ‘how’ of complex social systems. This is achieved through a thorough 
grounding in, or thick description of, the subject area and protracted observation, or 
in-depth interviews (Guba & Lincoln 1989:236-243).  
Symbolic interactionism is especially appropriate to gender studies. For example, 
after replacing “thing” with “gender” in the above quotation, the sentence seems 
intuitively correct. It becomes: “The meaning of gender for a person grows out of the 
ways in which other people act toward the person with regard to their gender”. 
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The implications for research methodology in using a symbolic interactionism 
approach are firstly that “inquiry must be grounded in the empirical world under 
study” (Woods 1992:348). This means that the research must delve deeply into the 
area under study and the researcher needs to fully understand and if possible, observe 
real, lived experience. Researchers’ findings must be grounded and sourced in real 
observations or perceptions made by people involved with the study area. This 
implies, as Woods (1992:349) says:  
…that the entire research process, not just data collection, should keep 
faith with the empirical world under study. The research design, the 
problems formulated for study, the specification of categories, the 
relationships among the data, explanatory concepts and interpretative 
frameworks all must be tested for closeness of fit. 
Secondly, when using a symbolic interactionist research methodology and keeping 
faith with the real world, it is best to make as few assumptions in advance of the 
study as possible (Woods 1992: 349-350). Hence, a symbolic interactionist study 
uses research questions, rather than hypotheses and leaves open the possibility of 
changing the initial research question and methodology over the course of the 
research.  
Symbolic interactionism is associated with a number of theoretical perspectives and 
strategies that follow these principles such as ethnography (Patton 1990) and 
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967). Ethnography and ethnomethodology 
would be suitable if exploration of a culture and everyday life was involved, if this 
study was focusing “on the ordinary, the routine, the details of everyday life (Patton 
1990:74).  As we are examining a social phenomenon, low pay for women, which is 
at a higher level of complexity, grounded theory would be more suitable.  
4.1.2 Grounded Theory or Research 
As Kendall (1999:745) puts it: 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) developed grounded theory as both a 
research methodology derived from the assumptions and theoretical 
underpinning of symbolic interactionism and a method for 
systematically deriving empirically based theories of human behaviour 
and the social world through an ongoing process of comparative 
analysis. 
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Glaser (1992:16) explains that: 
The grounded theory approach is a general methodology of analysis 
linked with data collection that uses a systematically applied set of 
methods to generate an inductive theory about a substantive area. The 
research product constitutes a theoretical formulation or integrated set 
of conceptual hypotheses about the substantive area under study. 
Verification of these hypotheses is left to other researchers, more in the positivist or 
quantitative field of research. Glazer points out (1992:11) that both quantitative and 
qualitative data can be used to develop grounded theory. However grounded theory, 
in Glaser’s (1992:11) view, is always qualitative and inductive, not deductive or 
“arrived at by statistical methods”. Thus, the emphasis in grounded theory is on 
providing plausible theory, through fieldwork data collection. The data is then 
thoroughly analysed, coded, categorised and constantly compared to allow for the 
main problem and theoretical constructs to emerge. 
Glaser and Strauss (1967), the original authors of grounded theory, diverged in their 
approach to grounded theory after their original publication: “Discovery of Grounded 
Theory”. The current study was conducted in ways that are consistent with Glaser 
(1992), rather than Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) “Basics of Grounded Research”. 
This is mainly because the researcher was able to identify emergent theoretical 
constructs from the field data without resorting to Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) 
exhaustive line by line analysis of interview data criticized by Glaser (1992:40, 54-
56). Line by line analysis might be appropriate to a micro problem such as the study 
of the reactions of patients with fatal diseases, but was inappropriate to a macro 
problem such as wage inequality. Axial coding and thus a set coding paradigm 
(Strauss & Corbin 1998:127-137) with conditions, context, action or interaction 
strategies and consequences, was also found to be unnecessary and undesirable if 
wanting to induce emergent theory rather than force it into preset coding dimensions 
(Glaser 1992:61-64). 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) put a strong emphasis on conducting grounded theory 
research in a virgin playing field – without the presence of pre-existing theories 
unless these are relevant and also grounded. They suggest using existing literature on 
the problem area only after in-depth field study and interviews. The rationale for this 
is, as Glaser 1992:23) says “Grounded theory is for the discovery of concept and 
 87
hypotheses, not for testing or replicating them” so should be free to draw these from 
the field data, rather than the literature. 
Yet industrial relations systems, pay equality, wage differences and wage 
discrimination are situated within a well-defined institutional setting with defined 
institutional values, as the extensive research in the area demonstrates. Although 
they do not fully explain the phenomenon of different male and female pay 
outcomes, there is a wealth of existing theories in the area. Many of the industrial 
relations actors involved in this study are also ‘grounded’ in these theories. It would 
be counterproductive to try to approach the problem as if this research does not exist 
and cannot contribute to understanding the problem.  
Thus, the method of analysis being used in this study is an adaptation of grounded 
theory, like Whiteley’s (2000) grounded research and is consistent with Denzin and 
Lincoln (2005) and Kincheloe and MacLaren’s bricolage (2005:316-321) approach 
involving continuing adaptation of research methods to the task at hand. As Denzin 
and Lincoln (2005:4) explain: 
The qualitative researcher as bricoleur, or maker of quilts, uses the 
aesthetic and material tools of his or her craft deploying whatever 
strategies, methods and empirical materials are at hand… If the 
researcher needs to invent, or piece together, new tools or techniques, 
he or she will do so.   
Whiteley points out that business research is often conducted in organisations with 
pre-existing values and theories guiding their actions. A failure to recognise existing 
organisational/study area knowledge evident in the literature would be unwise. 
Whiteley (2000) indicates that while grounded research is grounded in talking to 
people about their perceptions of a given situation, it acknowledges pre-existing 
work on, and knowledge of, the situation being studied. Instead of starting the 
grounded research process with a blank slate, as grounded theory does, grounded 
research is permitted to acknowledge where the slate is partially coloured in. In this 
study, for example, it was clear that some interviewees had a background in 
economic theory and others in feminist theory. Their knowledge of these theories is 
obvious in the responses given. 
Finally, grounded research is used here as  
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…a specific mode of analysis…or a set of flexible analytic guidelines 
that enable researchers to focus their data collection and to build 
inductive middle-range theories through successive levels of data 
analysis and conceptual development. (Charmaz 2005:507).  
4.1.3  Wage Data 
In this thesis the main research method is the grounded research analysis of the 
qualitative interview data; however, quantitative data is used as triangulation within 
the research strategy and adds to the bricolage (Kincheloe & McLaren 2005:316-
321). Data from industrial relations tribunals’ decisions about the quantum of wage 
increases granted, ABS statistics on qualifications and JobOutlook section of 
JobSearch (2004) estimates of skills shortages and unemployment for selected 
occupations, are also used. These different data sources were thus able to triangulate 
the main grounded theory analysis of the interview data. Paraphrasing Morse and 
Richards (2002:76), the quantitative data is able to illuminate the main research by 
adding to it conceptually, as well as to verify it. 
The employment areas chosen for analysis and thus also the areas for which wage 
data were collected, were selected to be both similar (a number of occupations in 
similarly female-/male-dominated employment areas and occupations in the same 
jurisdictions) and different (very different female-dominated occupations were 
directly compared to male-dominated occupations and in different jurisdictions). 
(See Appendix 4, Table A-3 for details on employment by gender for these 
occupational areas.) The areas were chosen for study, not because they were 
representative samples of the general population or employment, but because it was 
felt that studying male- and female-dominated employment areas would lead to a 
better understanding of the gender wage gap and theorising of its causes.  
The wage rates of selected female- and male-dominated employment classifications 
were collected in two different jurisdictions or industrial tribunals (the Western 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (WAIRC) and Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission (AIRC)) so that comparisons could be made and possible 
differences related to location and legislative environment could be identified. Wage 
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rates for those employed under WAIRC awards and agreements were compared to 
wage rates for those employed under federal awards and agreements in Victoria18. 
Thus, the nature of the research question determined that the ontology of this 
research is constructivist and the epistomology is interpretivist. The qualitative 
methodology adopted is symbolic interactionism. The research strategy is to collect 
data from interviews and published documents using grounded research for analysis 
in order to develop further theory on the gender wage gap. This interview and 
documentary data was further triangulated with a series of wage data from a 
selection of female and male-dominated occupations. 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
A comprehensive research procedure was undertaken in order to ensure the research 
was fully grounded in the perceptions, meanings and interpretations of industrial 
actors involved with the processes of wage determination. The research was further 
informed by analysis of key documents and relevant literature from the disciplines of 
economics, industrial relations, sociology, psychology, biology and feminism, as 
seen in Chapter 3. The procedure is shown in outline in Figure 3. The research 
process began with a preliminary review of the literature. A preliminary interview 
was conducted to test the interview protocol and develop the interview schedule.  
The first round of interviews was then held with representatives from peak bodies 
within the federal and Western Australian industrial relations system. Employment 
areas likely to be most suitable for study were discussed with these interviewees. 
Collection of wages data from tribunal or commission decisions in these employment 
areas followed in order to give a context to the interviews and focus responses on a 
specific gender-dominated occupational classification over the period 1990 to 2003.   
Once the wage data collection was mostly complete, a second round of interviews 
was conducted with relevant union officials who were asked similar questions to 
those in the first round, as well as questions on issues revealed in the wage data. 
Interviewees’ responses in the second round led to adjustment of the wage data, for 
example, data was collected for a higher or different classification.  
                                                 
18 Wage rates for Victorians were illustrative of federal awards and agreements. Victoria has always 
had more workers under the federal system and in 1994/5 gave up its state system resulting in all 
Victorian workers being covered by the AIRC awards and agreements. 
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Round three consisted of interviews with employers and employers’ representatives 
who were also shown the wage data collected. Again, additional interviews were 
required where responses were not clear and more adjustments were made to the 
wage data. The interview data was analysed using the method of constant 
comparison as the interview process continued. This formed the bulk of the main 
analysis and body of this thesis.  
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The wage data was also analysed before writing began, comparisons were made 
between female and male-dominated occupations, between jurisdictions and over 
different time periods. The results of this wage analysis are reported where relevant 
in the body of the thesis, as well as being detailed in appendices, adding further 
insight to the main interview data. 
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Literature research and analysis was a continual process throughout analysis of the 
other data. Once theoretical constructs emerged from the interview data these were 
compared to the literature in order to contrast this with interviewees’ views and 
reach conclusions. The final products of the research are depicted in the ovals in 
Figure 3. This process is explained in more detail below. 
4.2.1 Preliminary Literature Analysis 
A preliminary review of the literature on the history of pay equality in Australia (as 
reported in Chapter 2) suggested that, while differing legal provisions, key industrial 
relations actors and processes appeared to have a role in the process leading to the 
gender wage gap, more research was needed into how there was gender wage gap 
variation in time and by geographical location in Australia and the role of industrial 
relations actors or stakeholders in that variation.  
The review of the literature, covered in more detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.1, briefly 
examined seminal theories of wage discrimination, demonstrating an increasing 
emphasis on sociological explanations for differences between men and women. A 
review of the gender wage gap literature (reported in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1) 
showed that econometric studies using 1990s data suggested an Australian gender 
wage gap ranging from 12 to 20 per cent and an unexplained gender wage gap 
ranging from 10 to 16 per cent.  
It was felt that perhaps qualitative research might help to unpack the economists’ 
“unexplained” portion of the male to female wage gap and add to the analysis of 
gender wage determination. Gender theory (Fenstermaker & West 2002) and 
industrial relations system theory also pointed to an examination of the industrial 
relations actors’ “set of systems and beliefs” (Dunlop 1958:16). 
4.2.2 Interview Process 
The interview process was one of iteration and development. Interview schedules 
were drawn up, tested and then applied with each interview schedule developing out 
of the last one. This is shown in outline in Figure 4 and discussed in detail below. 
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Figure 4 – Interview Process Details 
 
 
Prelimary interview Development of Round 1 
interview schedule 
Development of Round 2 
interview schedule 
Development of Round 3 
interview schedule 
Round 2 Interviews 
Round 3 Interviews 
Additional Interviews 
Development of 5 initial questions 
Round 1 Interviews 
4.2.2.1 Preparation  
Some questions (as shown in Figure 5) were drawn up before a preliminary interview 
was conducted with one of the study participants (a follow-up interview was 
conducted with the same person later). A chart showing ABS female full-time 
average weekly ordinary time earnings as a proportion of male full-time average 
weekly ordinary time earnings for each Australian state and territory, from 1983 to a 
date near time of interview, was also used in this initial and all following interviews 
to illustrate the difference between male and female earnings. 
Figure 5 – Initial Research Questions 
 
1.  What in your perception are the reasons for women, on general, being paid less than men, in 
general? [probe here – any other factors] 
 
2.  Have you been involved in a minimum rates adjustment or equal pay case? 
 
3.  If you were going to look at awards and agreements to explore the question of why there is a 
difference between what women and men are paid which ones would you use? 
 
4.  What do you think about the way the 1972 Equal Pay for Equal Value decision was 
implemented? 
 
5.  Do you think there are any other reasons, other than economic/industrial reasons, why women 
and men are paid differently? 
 
The interviewee was a key stakeholder with related personal experience and in-depth 
knowledge of the thesis topic at the macro level. The interview developed into a 
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broad discussion of the issues involved. This interview was carefully analysed using 
grounded theory techniques. Further questions were developed from the topics 
discussed.  
These questions and those in Figure 5 were put into a semi-structured interview 
schedule as shown in Figure 6. An access approval process was developed. The 
schedule and approval process were discussed with supervisors and some questions 
(Qs 14-17) were added to the schedule. The interview schedule was then used for the 
first group of ten (10) interviewees. This group was selected, in part due to their key 
positioning in the Western Australian and federal industrial relations systems and in 
part due to the researcher’s knowledge of industrial relations stakeholders19. 
As Cresswell (1994:118-119) says, choice of interviewees is uncertain and led by the 
research process itself in a process called theoretical sampling. For a grounded 
theory study, the investigator chooses participants based on their ability to contribute 
to an evolving theory. Using the terms of Miles and Huberman (1994), this process is 
“theory based”, but in grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967) the term is 
theoretical sampling, which means that the investigator examines individuals who 
can contribute to the evolving theory.  
This begins with selecting and studying a homogeneous sample of individuals (e.g. 
all women who have experienced childhood abuse) and then, after developing the 
theory, selecting and studying a heterogeneous sample (e.g. types of support groups 
other than women who have experienced childhood abuse). The rationale for 
studying this heterogeneous sample is to confirm or disconfirm the conditions, both 
contextual and intervening, under which the model holds. 
In the case of this study, the initial homogenous group of interviewees was of those 
who acted in the Western Australian and Australian Industrial Relations 
Commissions at a central level rather than an industry, individual occupation or 
organisational level. This also gave this initial set of interviews a macro, or whole 
industrial relations system perspective. The other, more heterogenous, groups (of 
union officials and employer representatives and managers) were those involved at 
the industry and/or enterprise level chosen for study. Inevitably, this group of 
                                                 
19 The researcher has extensive contacts with the industrial relations community in Australia through 
her 15 year membership of the Industrial Relations Society, including being the National President in 
2001. 
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interviewees had a more micro and less system-wide view of the workings of the 
industrial relations system. 




1. Employer: ______________________________________________________ 
2. Current Job Title: _____________________________________________ 
3. How long have you been with  _______? 
4. What is your background – what did you do before your present job? 
5. Are you aware that women and men are paid differently? i.e. that women are, in general, 
paid less than men? 
6. What in your perception are the reasons for women, in general being paid less than men, in 
general? (probe here – any other factors) 
7. Does your experience have a bearing on your perceptions of why women are paid less? 
8. Are you aware that for WA the difference between what women are paid and what men are 
paid is greater than in any other state and that this difference has increased in the early 
1990s? 
9. Why do you think this is so? 
10. If you were going to look at awards and agreements to explore the question of why there is 
a difference between what women and men are paid, which ones would you use? 
11. Have you been involved in a minimum rates adjustment, work value or equal pay case? 
12. When? With what occupation? 
13. While involved in a minimum rates adjustment/work value/equal pay case, what are the 
factors [different version depending on industrial party interviewed] going through your 
mind when trying to understand the value of an occupation [Commissioner]/that you used in 
presenting your argument for the value of an occupation [union/employer/government 
representative]? 
14. [Follow up for latter parties.] What factors do you think the Commissioner(s) used/on the 
parties agreed on in deciding the value of an occupation? 
15. Are these factors reflected in the written reasons of the Commission? 
16. If not, how/why do you say that the written reasons do not reflect the attitude of the 
Commission?  
17. What indications were given during the proceedings that might lead you to view that the 
reasons given in writing do not reflect the Commission’s real “attitude”? 
18. What do you think about the way the 1972 Equal Pay for Equal Value decision was 
implemented?  
19. Do you think that there are any other reasons, other than economic/industrial reasons, why 
women and men are paid differently? 
4.2.2.2 Interviewee approval 
An approval process was followed for all interviews. An initial contact was made by 
phone or email and then a letter or email explaining the research process and 
confidentiality provisions was sent to interviewees. At the interview, interviewees 
signed a consent form. They were assured of confidentiality according to their 
requirements and those of Curtin University’s Ethics Committee. All interviews were 
tape-recorded and (mostly) transcribed by the researcher. Transcripts were given to 
interviewees for information and any comment. Interviewees were promised that 
they would have an opportunity towards the end of the thesis to view their comments 
used in context and that permission for use could be withdrawn at that stage.   
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4.2.2.3 Analysis 
Consistent with grounded theory procedure (Glaser & Strauss 1967), open coding 
was applied to all interviews conducted. Data in the form of paragraphs and 
sentences were initially coded into free nodes using NVivo software. Names of codes 
were closely related to the interviewees’ descriptions, with some, termed ‘invivo’ 
codes, using their exact words. These nodes or codes were then constantly compared 
to eliminate redundant codes, to identify new ones and also linkages between nodes 
to create hierarchical trees or categories. These linkages and trees were then 
compared again, pruned of categories that did not fit, work or were irrelevant, until 
concepts began to emerge for exploration in later interviews. This is consistent with 
Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) grounded theory technique of constant comparison. 
The NVivo software used was a later version of the Nud-ist program developed by 
Richards and Richards (1998). As Cresswell (1994:157-162) describes it, Nud-ist 
helps researchers by providing a data management system for the following actions: 
• Storing and organising files. (These can be interview transcripts, reference 
material from the literature, or other system documents and can be filed by 
word, sentence or paragraph etc.) 
• Searching for themes. (Sections of text from all documents and files can be 
tagged as belonging to a particular theme and then retrieved as a group.) 
• Cross-referencing themes.  
• Diagramming. During the categorisation process, categories are identified 
and these are developed into a visual picture of the categories that displays 
their interconnectedness. “In NUD-IST, this is called a tree diagram, a 
hierarchical tree of categories based on a ‘root’ node at the top and parents 
and siblings to the tree.” (Creswell 1994:157-8) Thus a ‘picture’ is generated 
of the analysis, the major categories, the minor categories and how the 
information from the text is grouped. 
• Creating a template, basically a code book for organising information.  
• Assisting analysis and reporting. (Due to the ease of information retrieval.) 
From the interview data, employment areas were identified for further investigation. 
This was done to allow for comparison of male and female-dominated occupations, 
to identify where interviewees in the next two rounds would come from and which 
awards and agreements to study to allow for triangulation of the interviews.  
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4.2.2.4 Follow-up 
Follow-up phone calls, or interviews, were conducted where gaps were identified in 
the analysis of interview data or meaning was not clear. Data collected were 
recorded in written notes and analysed with the other interview material. Initial 
conclusions from this data were discussed with supervisors and colleagues likely to 
agree and disagree with them. This ensured better validation or trustworthiness (see 
Section 4.3 for a discussion of trustworthiness and authenticity) of data. 
4.2.2.5 Second interview round 
Fifteen (15) interviews were conducted with union officials in Victoria, Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory (a chance meeting with a federal public sector 
union official while in Darwin). The semi-structured interview schedule was again 
changed slightly (see Figure 7 below). Questions 1-9 were the same as those used in 
the first round interviews. Question 10 and 11 were added to obtain specific 
information relating to the awards and agreements in that occupational area. 
Interviewees were shown wage data already collected for a classification in the 
employment area that they covered. Question 12 on federal versus state coverage 
was added as it seemed an interesting difference that the women’s awards were all 
initially state-registered, while the male awards were more often federally-registered. 
Question 13 was used to gain any other information specific to the 
industry/occupational area. Questions 14 to 19 were from the first interview 
schedule. The first round question 10, on which employment area to study, was 
dropped, as employment areas were chosen after comments from the first round of 
interviewees. Questions 15-17 of the first schedule were dropped, as the initial 
analysis had shown answers made to these questions were not informative. 
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1. Employer: ______________________________________________________ 
2. Current Job Title: _____________________________________________ 
3. How long have you been with  _______ ? 
4. What is your background – what did you do before your present job? 
5. Are you aware that women and men are paid differently? i.e. that women are, in general, 
paid less than men? 
6. What in your perception are the reasons for women, in general being paid less than men, in 
general? (probe here – any other factors) 
7. Does your experience have a bearing on your perceptions of why women are paid less? 
8. Are you aware that for WA the difference between what women are paid and what men are 
paid is greater than in any other state and that this difference has increased in the early 
1990s? 
9. Why do you think this is so? 
10. Tell me about how your _____________________________ award went during the 1990s? 
(Prompt if necessary – What changes occurred during the period 1990 to end 1999? When 
did minimum rates adjustment occur for your award?) 
11. I am looking for enterprise bargaining agreements coming from your _________________ 
award. Preferably these agreements should be in a series starting in 1992-6 and continuing 
to the end of 1999. Which ones would you recommend using? 
12. In my sample of eight federal and eight WA awards (male and female) I notice that only the 
male awards are really national. The female federal awards cover only one state or territory. 
Why do you think this is so? 
13. (Extra questions specific to area if not already covered above.) e.g.Clerks: I notice you have 
one or two clerical awards that still use an age-based structure (like most clerical awards in 
WA) Why do you think this structure has not been replaced with the skills-based 
classification structure? 
e.g. LHMU: How come you maintained your award during the 1990s and didn’t end up with 
a minimum wage order?/Why are there no EBAs? 
e.g. SDA: Why did you have a minimum wage order during the 1990s and not an award? 
14. Have you been involved in a minimum rates adjustment, work value or equal pay case? 
15. When?, with what occupation? 
16. While involved in a minimum rates adjustment/work value/equal pay case, what are the 
factors that you used in presenting your argument for the value of an occupation [employer 
representative]? 
17. [Follow up for latter party.] What factors do you think the Commissioner(s) used/on the 
parties agreed on in deciding the value of an occupation? 
18. What do you think about the way the 1972 equal pay for equal value decision was 
implemented?  
19. Do you think that there are any other reasons, other than economic/industrial reasons, why 
women and men are paid differently? 
 
 
4.2.2.6 Third interview round 
Eleven (11) Western Australian employers, managers and employers’ representatives 
were interviewed. The semi-structured interview schedule was again changed 
slightly (see Figure 8 below).  
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1. Employer: ______________________________________________________ 
2. Current Job Title: _____________________________________________ 
3. How long have you been with  _______ ? 
4. What is your background – what did you do before your present job? 
5. Are you aware that women and men are paid differently? i.e. that women are, in general, 
paid less than men? 
6. What in your perception are the reasons for women, in general being paid less than men, in 
general? (probe here – any other factors) 
7. Does your experience have a bearing on your perceptions of why women are paid less? 
8. Are you aware that for WA the difference between what women are paid and what men are 
paid is greater than in any other state and that this difference has increased in the early 
1990s? 
9. Why do you think this is so? 
10. How do you pay your employees/how do employers pay employees in this occupational 
area – using an agreement (registered/unregistered, individual/collective) award wages or 
some other arrangement. 
11. Why did you decide to use this type of payment method/ why do employers in your industry 
use this type of payment? 
12. What do you think about the different agreements you negotiated? /the level of wages (you) 
paid? 
13. Tell me about your EBA/Were there any productivity tradeoffs? 
14a. [For employers’ representatives.]: In my sample of eight federal and eight WA awards 
(male and female) I notice that only the male awards are really national. The female federal 
awards cover only one state or territory. Why do you think this is so? 
14b. [For employers who use employers’ associations.]: Do you tell the CCI/AMMA what to do 
about wage matters or do they give you advice that you follow, or does something else 
happen? 
(Extra questions about the area if not covered above.) 
15. To your knowledge do other employers in your industry pay award/agreement/informal 
wages? 
16. [For employers’ representatives] Have you been involved in a minimum rates adjustment, 
work value or equal pay case? 
17. [For employers’ representatives] When?, with what occupation? 
16. [For employers’ representatives] While involved in a minimum rates adjustment/work 
value/equal pay case, what are the factors that you used in presenting your argument for the 
value of an occupation? 
17. [Follow up for latter party.] What factors do you think the Commissioner(s) used/the parties 
agreed on in deciding the value of an occupation? 
18. [For employers’ representatives] What do you think about the way the 1972 Equal Pay for 
Equal Value decision was implemented?  
19. Do you think there are any other reasons, other than economic/industrial reasons, why 
women and men are paid differently? 
 
Questions 1-9 remained the same for all interviews. Questions 10-13 were added in 
order to find out how employers paid their employees and why, what they thought 
about the agreement/award pay level and if using an enterprise bargaining agreement 
(EBA), any productivity tradeoffs. Different questions were asked of employers and 
employers’ representatives. Employers’ representatives and some managers were 
asked questions 14a and 16-18, but employers and managers could not answer these 
unless they had a background in industrial relations. Employers and managers were 
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asked question 14b on how they got advice, while employers’ representatives who 
give advice were not asked this question. Question 19 was the same final question 
used in each interview in order to allow interviewees to add anything else on the 
main topic.  
Necessary follow-up interviews were run face-to-face or by telephone. For example, 
extra interviews were run with a mining manager and union official when 
discrepancies were found between their views (Interviews with manager E and union 
official O).  
4.2.2.7 Choice of interviewees 
Table 12 below shows the numbers of people interviewed by category and gender. 
The primary motivation was to interview individuals, who had participated in the 
formal industrial relations system, with an understanding of the particular 
employment areas being studied and of issues relating to the gender wage gap. As 
employees appear only rarely as witnesses, rather than as regular participants, their 
views were not sought. 
Table 12 – Interviewees by Interview Stage 









Employee Reps WA 2 (1F) 10 (4F)  1 (F) 
Employee Reps 
VIC/Fed 
1 (F) 5 (3F)   
Employer Reps WA 1  4 (1F)  
Employer Reps Fed 1    
Public Sector managers 
WA 
1  2 (1F)  
Private Sector managers 
or employers WA 
  5 (4F)  
Government Rep WA 1    
Commissioners WA 2 (1F)    
Commissioners Fed. 2 (1F)    
 (F= female interviewees) 
As discussed above, the first round of interviews were with industrial relations 
practitioners from Western Australian and Australian peak bodies: the Western 
Australian and Australian Industrial Relations Commissions, the Australian Council 
of Trade Unions (ACTU) and UnionsWA, and the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (Western Australian and Australian). Only one organisation refused to be 
involved in the peak level interviews, the Commonwealth Government department 
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dealing with industrial relations. The aim was to interview the most senior person, 
but sometimes this was not useful or possible; for example, the person who dealt 
most with pay equality was not the most senior person.  
During the first round of interviews, the employment areas most likely to be suitable 
for further study (in the sense of being both likely to give information relevant to the 
study and representative of a gender-dominated employment area) were discussed 
with interviewees. The second interview round was with unions and the choice of 
interviewee depended on the employment areas selected. Contact was sought with 
the union relevant to the particular employment area identified, for example, the 
Australian Education Union for teaching. The person interviewed within each union 
was more a matter of chance, depending on who was available at the time with the 
necessary expertise. Personal contacts of the researcher were often used at each 
interview stage, as these were more likely to respond positively to a request for 
interview. Union representatives from only the female-dominated work areas studied 
were contacted in Victoria, due to limited time and funds. In Western Australia, 
union officials from both male- and female-dominated areas were interviewed. 
The third interview round involved contacting employers relevant to each 
employment area selected for study. The researcher had traveled to Victoria and 
Canberra to try to contact people for the first two rounds and had insufficient funds 
to do this again for the third round. Hence, only employers from the researcher’s 
resident state (Western Australia) were contacted. As explained above, the researcher 
began by trying to talk to employers and managers in the female-dominated work 
areas. While managers, usually personal contacts with wide experience in industrial 
relations, were useful, owner managers or employers contacted were not. The latter 
tended to know very little about the relative earnings of men and women, saying they 
had thought they were equal and had little or no involvement with wage setting 
processes. 
This led the researcher to realise that this macro-level issue was best discussed with 
employer representatives and the few managers with wider industrial relations 
experience. Generally two managers, or employers, were interviewed for each 
industry area, or one employer representative, but sometimes an employer 
representative covered more than one industry area. Employers were also 
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occasionally contacted for wage data when data from published sources was poor. 
Union officials were similarly used for this purpose. 
After 35 interviews had been completed, responses became somewhat similar. 
Insights were only gained into issues very specific to the work area of the 
interviewee. While these were sometimes useful, interviews continued only to ensure 
that at least one union and employer had been consulted within each employment 
area studied. 
Table 13 indicates the interviewees by gender. Eighteen (18) women and twenty-one 
(21) men were interviewed. In the first round of interviews a concerted effort was 
made to ensure equal numbers of women and men were interviewed to ensure a 
balanced picture of the macro industrial relations environment. In the second and 
third rounds, no special effort was made to ensure representation by gender. Hence 
the near balance achieved between the genders was a matter of chance. 
Table 13 – Interviewees by Gender 
Female Male Total 
18 21 39 
As explained above, there was a process of checking interview transcripts with 
interviewees. This is illustrated in Table 14 below.  
Table 14 – Interview Checking 
STAGE RESEARCHER INTERVIEWEE 
Initial interview Records and transcribes interview Transcript sent to interviewee 
for checking and record 
keeping. 
Follow up If anything not clear/more information 
needed researcher contacted interviewee 
by phone/email or another interview. 
Interviews recorded and transcribed. 
Checks additional transcript. 
Check on citation When intending to publish comments 
used are sent to each interviewee in 
context. 
Asked to respond if unhappy 
with comment. (Only minor 
changes made.) 
All interviews were taped and transcribed. Most transcriptions were made by the 
researcher and those by clerical services were personally checked. Transcripts were 
then sent to interviewees for their records and to check accuracy. In four cases it was 
felt that more information was needed and another interview was conducted. 
Transcripts were made of these second interviews and copies sent to interviewees.  
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A process of checking early drafts, to ensure interviewees were happy with the use of 
their comments, was followed for this document. As the thesis was written, 
interviewees were consulted at least twice about being quoted. Interviewees 
sometimes just made minor changes (e.g. removing “ums” from the comments used), 
sometimes corrected errors (e.g. references to Red Cross central office were changed 
to Australian Red Cross (Western Australian Branch)) and sometimes pointed out 
where the researcher had overstated issues or attributed them incorrectly.  
4.2.2.8  Final analysis of interview data 
Material collected from all interview rounds was analysed and re-analysed in the 
constant comparison process and linkages and hierarchies identified. Codes were 
grouped into categories. These categories were compared, as was the literature and 
memos were made on theoretical ideas.  
Codes and categories had to display the ability to fit to the field data, they had to 
work and be “relevant for integrating into a theory” (Glaser 1978:56). The interview 
analysis moved towards creating theoretical constructs through selective and 
theoretical coding – identifying a core category.  
Where the focus of the original interviews had been on “why are women and men 
paid differently”, on analysis of the reasons given by interviewees and the emergence 
of theoretical concepts, it was clear that their perceptions better explained the 
question why and how gender wage inequality persisted. A new core category had 
been created.  
Table 15 below summarises the full grounded research (Whitely 2000) analysis used 
for the thesis; this only differs from Glaser’s (1978, 1992) approach in that a more 
extensive literature review was conducted before all the field data were collected and 
analysed than in true grounded theory. A narrative description of the analysis 
accompanied by graphic representation is in Chapter 5. 
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Table 15 – Grounded Theory Analysis Process Used 
 
Stage Action Comment 
Literature review Preliminary review …followed by occasional review of the 
literature during the collection and 
analysis phase 
Data Collection Theoretical sampling …of the industrial relations system - a 
part of the broader social system… until 
no new codes or categories found. 
Data Analysis Coding: 
Invivo – using respondents’ 
words 
Open coding – researcher 
applies codes but very close to 
respondents’ words. 
Codes not yet grouped – open 
coding 
Unit of analysis is meaningful utterance, 
codes are utterances designated to a 
meaningful category. 
Posture tentative with a view to 
combining or dissembling codes through 
the process of constant comparison. 
 Constant comparison between codes and but also with 
literature to create theoretical 
categories – tree coding 
… simultaneous analysis and coding as 
the data develops. 
Theoretical memos written to 
conceptualize ideas and create 
categories. 
 Theoretical sensitivity … the central concept or theory emerges from existing literature and emerging 
data through constant comparison and 
selective and theoretical coding. 
 Concept development … central concept is confirmed and its properties better understood through 
repeated constant comparison. 
4.2.3 Collection of Wage Data and Analysis of Commission 
Decisions 
In order to give further context and meaning to the interviews held with stakeholders 
operating at the industry or occupational level, Western Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission (WAIRC) and Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
(AIRC) decisions (on WAIRC and AIRC awards and agreements identified as 
relevant [in Short 2001] and during round one interviews) were studied. This 
provided important triangulation with the interviews of those directly involved with 
the same awards and agreements. 
Some published decisions examined had useful information for the qualitative 
analysis. However, the majority of decisions, as with Short’s (1988) experience 
when looking at the history of youth wages in the federal tribunal, provided very 
little information.  This was particularly the case with decisions relating to 
agreements which tend to be negotiated before going to the Commission and thus the 
process of decision-making is not illustrated in the published decision. This meant 
that qualitative information from the published decisions was used only rarely.   
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Wage data from the decisions was normally useful as context for the interviews and 
was collected for each of the selected employment areas in both federal and Western 
Australian jurisdictions. Microsoft Office’s Excel software was used to store and 
analyse the wages data collected. In the last three chapters of analysis and 
conclusions, interviewees’ comments on industrial relations issues are linked to the 
relevant wage data in order to provide triangulation of the interview analysis. 
The employment pattern of Western Australians by gender, industry and occupation 
at least partially drove the choice of employment areas for study, as the large and 
growing gender wage gap in that state was a motivation for this study. The literature 
(Short 1986; Rafferty 1989; Glynn 1998; Fisher 2001) suggested comparison of 
female-dominated areas of employment with male-dominated areas, as it 
demonstrated that pay inequality persists in female-dominated Australian 
occupations where comparisons of ‘value’ have never been made with any male-
dominated occupation. The choice of which employment areas and then which 
awards and agreements to use evolved from the literature and first round 
interviewees’ suggestions. Federal awards and agreements were chosen to be directly 
comparable to Western Australian awards and agreements so that a jurisdictional 
comparison could also be made. 
In 1989/90, Western Australian women were most likely to be employed in the 
Retail, Community Services (including Health and Education) and Finance, Property 
and Business Services industries. They were most likely to be employed as shop 
assistants, clerks or typists and receptionists or telephonists (Western Australian 
Department of Employment and Training 1990). Dental assistants, physiotherapists, 
child-care workers and nurses were also known to be female intensive both near the 
beginning and at the end of the period under study (ABS 1993a & b; ABS 2003b).  
Western Australian men were most likely to be employed in Construction, Mining, 
Manufacturing and Transport industries in 1989/90 and to be tradespeople, 
professionals, managers and administrators and labourers (ABS 1993a & 1993b; 
Western Australian Department of Employment and Training 1990). Men were also 
known to dominate the occupations of machine operators and drivers (ABS 1993a & 
1993b). This picture remained similar by the end of the study period (ABS 2003b).  
A further driving force in selecting wage areas was to compare Western Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission (WAIRC) decisions with those of the Australian 
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Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC). This was because of the differences in 
legislation governing the Western Australian and Australian jurisdictions, 
particularly the differences in dealing with pay equality as outlined in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4.5. As a result, nurses were not used in the study, despite being an 
obvious area of choice. This was because Western Australian nurses moved to a 
federal award from a state award in the early 1990s, so the federal comparison would 
be not cover the study period.  
During an earlier study related to this thesis (Short 2001), interviewees mentioned 
that there had been a particular problem related to pay equality with the Children’s 
Services (Private) Award in Western Australia, so this predominantly female area 
was selected for study.  
After conducting some interviews in rounds one and two (Interviews with union 
representative O and employer representative G) it became obvious that the AWU 
gold mining award and enterprise bargaining agreements used in an earlier study 
(Short 2001) were not representative of the mining industry. This industry moved, in 
a very significant way, during the 1990s, into individual agreements (both Western 
Australian and Australian Workplace Agreements). To look only at an award that no 
longer really covered anyone employed in the industry and the very few enterprise 
bargaining agreements that came out of it, no longer seemed sensible. Instead, as 
suggested by employer representative G, a large mining employer was approached 
for data on the wages paid under its workplace agreements. This was then compared 
to the relevant award. The award and classification within each award studied for 
this thesis (except for the latter award as this would identify the company involved) 
are given in Table 16.   
Apart from mining (where awards have been infrequently used since the early 
1990s), awards from the employment areas identified were used as exemplar or test 
awards for National Wage Cases, or Safety Net Reviews during the period of study. 
This is illustrated by the 2003 Safety Net Review list of awards (AIRC Print 
PR002003). Most of the federal awards used here are listed and every employment 
area used here (apart from mining) is represented by at least one award in the Review 




Table 16 – Awards Used 
 
FEMALE-DOMINATED AWARDS OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY 
Shop and Warehouse (Wholesale & Retail 
Establishments) State [WA] 
Victorian General Shops Award/Shops, Distributive 
and Allied Employees Ass. (Victorian Shops) Interim 
Award 1994 S0583?Retail Trade Industry Sector 
Minimum Wage Order R0622/AW795238 [VIC/FED] 
Adult Shop Assistant/Salesperson 
Sales Assistant/Retail Worker Grade 
1/Level 6 Retail Service Worker 
 
Clerks' (Commercial, Social & Professional Services) 
Award [WA] 
Clerical and Administrative Employees Award 
(Victorian) 1995/C&AE Award (Victoria) 1999 
C1128/AW773032 [VIC/FED] 
Adult 21 years old 
General Clerk/Grade 1 Clerk (after 12 
months) 
 
Government School Teachers' Salaries Award 
1981/Teachers' (Public Sector Primary and Secondary 
Education) Award 1993 [WA] 
Actual Rates as supplied by Australian Education 
Union (Victorian Branch) – many rates over award 
payment in early 90s + 00s EBA AG804806 
[VIC/FED] 
 
4 Year Trained Entry Level (WA 1.5) 
& Classroom Teacher – top of range 
(WA 2.3) – for both WA and 
VIC/federal 
 
Children's Services (Private) Award [WA] 
Day Child Care Workers Award [VIRC] 
Children's Services (Victoria) Award 1995 /1998 
C0772/AW772675 [AIRC] 
Child Care Worker Level 3 
(Trained)/Qualified Child Care Giver 
Step 4 
Child care worker (trained)/Childrens 
Services Officer/Child Carer III B after 4 
yrs/Child Care Worker Level 3 
Subdivision 8 
MALE -DOMINATED AWARDS  
Transport Workers (General) Award 1961 [WA] 
Transport Workers (Mixed Industries) Award 
1984/2002 T0150/AW799512/AW813166 [FED] 
A Grade 2 Driver rigid vehicle to 4.5 
tonnes 
Grade 2 Driver less than 4.5 tonnes 
(3mths+service 90-91) 
Building Trades (Construction) Award 1987 [WA] 
National Building and Construction Industry Award 
1990 N0122/AW790741 
(b) (iii) Bricklayers Labourer 
Trades Labourer 
A Mineral Processing Award 
(no federal equivalent) 
Dump Truck Operator/Mine Production 
Employee Level 3 
Metal Trades (General) Award 1966 [WA] 
Metal Trades Industry Award 1984 M0039/Metals, 
Engineering and Associated Industries Award 1998 
M1913/AW789529 [FEDERAL] 
Tradesman/Class 10 Tradesperson/C10 
Group D 
Same 
MIXED AWARDS  
Public Service Salaries Agreement 1985/Public Service 
Award 1992 
Australian Public Service Awards A299, A1666 
Level 1 adult (more likely to be female) 
Level 6 adult (more likely to be male) 
(Sources: WAIGs; www.osiris.gov.au; www.wagenet.gov.au; Victorian Industrial Gazettes) 
The choice of classification20 to use for each award also evolved during the research. 
The main approach was to try to use an award classification that employed the most 
women or men in the award in question, e.g. C10 metal tradesperson, Grade 2 driver 
and shop assistant (as identified during interviews). Later interviews led to this 
choice being affected by the interviewees’ discussions on the classification being 
used as a comparator between states and by changes in salary scales. Classifications 
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often changed in enterprise or certified agreements coming out of these awards.  
Where they did they are listed in Table 17 on agreements used. For example, in CSR 
Readymix (Vic) Raw Materials Enterprise Agreements the classification became 
‘Grade 3 - skilled operator’, as no specific truck driver classification existed and 
drivers were covered by this general occupational classification or salary band. 
Table 17 gives the agreements that were studied and that relate to Table 16 awards 
because the workers covered by the agreement would previously have been covered 
by the award. Generally, two agreements were studied for each award covered unless 
agreements were rare, as for Western Australian clerks and shop assistants.   
In some cases less than two agreements were studied because the quality of the data 
was poor: some decisions were not published or were not available in the databases; 
or increases were published in percentage instead of money terms at the beginning of 
the series.  This was the case for Victorian metalworkers. 
Wage rates analysed are as close to the amount actually paid to individuals working 
in the classification as is possible from published materials. Supplementary payments 
(used in the early 1990s to bring minimum awards rates up closer to actual or paid 
rates in all jurisdictions) are included, as are allowances paid to all employed in the 
classification. However, wage-related payments such as superannuation and shift 
allowances that depend on individual circumstances are not included.  
Most wage rates were quoted to interviewees as weekly wage rates. Exceptions were 
in the public sector area where annual wage rates were used and in construction 
agreements where hourly rates were more often used. Data on standard weekly hours 
worked were collected for each award or agreement as well as wage rates. 
A decision was made to report wages in weekly terms rather than hours because of 
the more common usage of weekly wage rates in the group studied and the need to 
have a common comparison point when these were analysed. All interviewees in the 
second and third rounds (employers, employer associations and union 
representatives) were shown a table with a series (from 1990 to 2003) of wage rate 
changes for the relevant occupational classification chosen for study and asked about 
changes illustrated. 
                                                                                                                                          
20 A specific classification needed to be used as most awards have many classifications. 
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Table 17 – Agreements Studied 
Western Australian-based Victorian-based 
Female-dominated 
Shop Assistant 
Action Food Barns (WA) Pty Ltd and SDAEA 
Agreements: 1997 A2586, and 2000, AG807054 
(federal). 
Safeway Supermarkets (Victoria) Enterprise 
Agreements: 1995/6 not published S0498, 1998 
S2285 
Just Jeans Group Limited Retail Agreements: 
1997 S1540; 2000 AG804976; and 2003 
AG8304063. 
Clerk 
Australian Red Cross (Western Australian 
Branch) Enterprise Agreements: 1996 77 WAIG 
1665; 2003 AG820782 (federal). 
John Sands Enterprise Agreements: 1993 J0147; 
1995 J0430 not published; 1997 J0444; 2000 
J0687; 2002 AG825044. 
Government Teachers 
Government School Teachers Enterprise 
Agreement 1996 (WA); Certified Agreements: 
1998 G0844 and 2000-3 AG806074 (both 
federal). 
Actual over award rates supplied by AEU Vic 
1990-1999 and 2000-3 EBA AG804806. 
Male-dominated 
Metal Tradesperson 
Inghams Maintenance EBAs: 1995 76 WAIG 
1847; 1997 78 WAIG 906; 99-01 unregistered; 
2002 AG815760 (federal). 
Bradken Perth/ANI-Bradken WA EBAs: 1993 73 
WAIG 1795 not published; 1994 74 WAIG 
2097; 1996 76 WAIG 3847; 1998 78 WAIG 
4562; A6 of 2001 enterprise award - not 
published - figures from AMWU union delegate. 
Royal Automobile Club of Victoria (RACV) Ltd 
Certified Agreements: 1994 R0196; 1996 R0540; 
1998 R0931; 2000 R1215; 2003 AG831337. 
Truck Driver 
Pioneer Concrete EBAs Herne Hill/Red Hill 
EBAs: 1993 73 WAIG 2962; 1994 75 WAIG 
1892; 1996 77 WAIG 391; 1998 79 WAIG 788; 
2000 81 WAIG 167. Driver over 35 tonnes/Level 
2 Quarry Worker. 
Peters/PB Foods EBAs: 1994 74 WAIG 1518; 
1997 78 WAIG 1278, 2000 AG223 of 2001. 
Grade 2 Driver/Storeperson. 
Bonlac Foods Limited & Transport Workers 
Union Agreements: 1992 unpublished; 1994 
B0368; 1995 B0636; 1997 B1255; 1999 B2310; 
2002 AG819462. 
CSR Readymix (Vic) Raw Materials Enterprise 
Agreements – Transport: 1995  
C0737; 1996 C1495; C2846 1997; 1999 C5732; 
(2000 not published); 2002 AG819461; 2003 
AG831650. Grade 3 - skilled operator. 
Bricklayer’s Labourer/Assistant 
North Coast Concrete EBAs: 1995 76 WAIG 
2701; 1997 77 WAIG 3355; 1999 80 WAIG 
1255; 2002 not published or registered CFMEU; 
2003 AG 33 of 2003. Labourer Group 3. 
GN/G & N Conform/Con-form EBAs: 1995 76 
WAIG 2552; 1997 AG203 of 1977; 1980 80 
WAIG 1126; 2002 CFMEU not registered. 
Labourer Group 3. 
Baulderstone Hornibrook Victoria CFMEU State 
Enterprise Agreements: 1993 B0303; 1995 
B0684; 1997 B1360; 2000 B2880; 2003 
AG820094. 
Multiplex Constructions (Victoria) Pty Ltd 
Enterprise Agreements: 1994 unpublished; 1995 
M0648; M1125 not available; 1998 M1943; 2002 
AG809662. 
Miner/Dump Truck Operator: A Company’s WA 
Workplace Agreements 
 
Mixed – Public Sector Employees – Levels 2 and 6 
Health Dept. of WA EBAs: 1996 76 WAIG 
2202; 1999; 79 WAIG 3308;  
Main Roads EBAs: 1995 75 WAIG 586; 1996 77 
WAIG 1184; 1997 77 WAIG 1434;  
PSA AG24 of 2002 General Agreement both. 
Department of Health & Ageing EBAs: 1998 
P1142; 2000 P1742; 2002 AG819414. 
Department of Transport and Regional Services 
EBAs: 1999 PC5854; 2002 AG816335. 
(Sources: WA Industrial Gazettes; www.osiris.gov.au; www.wagenet.gov.au) 
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Interviewees were able to recognise and respond to changes in the rate (weekly, 
hourly, annually) they normally used. Only the mining industry and a Western 
Australian public sector agency had significantly increased their standard weekly 
hours worked by 2003. This is discussed again in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.5, with 
actual wage rates to illustrate that the effect on relative wages within the group 
studied is small when changing from weekly to hourly rates. 
Federally-registered awards and agreements covering Victorian workers were used. 
This was because these cover significant numbers of Australian workers and are 
therefore a better example of federal wage rates than those from federally-registered 
awards and agreements covering much smaller numbers of Australian workers in the 
Australian Capital Territory and/or the Northern Territory21. 
4.3 Validating or Auditing the Research 
When using qualitative research methodology it is very important to be able to 
justify results as representing some form of joint truth between the researcher and 
those who are the subjects of that research. The use of standards to audit the research 
adds to the authenticity and trustworthiness of qualitative research.  
Researchers (Schwandt & Halpern 1988; Guba & Lincoln 1989; Miles & Huberman 
1994) have identified standards for establishing the trustworthiness of qualitative 
inquiries. These roughly parallel the more traditional positivist standards of validity 
(internal and external), replication and objectivity. The standards involved in 
trustworthiness are credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. 
Realising that these standards (coming as they did from another research paradigm) 
did not fully address issues of quality and integrity in constructivist inquiries such as 
this one, standards for ‘authenticity’ were also developed. As Rodwell and Byers 
(1997:117) put it: 
[a]uthenticity is uniquely derivative of the constructivist perspective 
and is attentive to the nature and quality of the research process rather 
than the research product. By focusing on the integrity and quality of 
the inquiry process, authenticity assesses fairness, ontological 
authenticity, educative authenticity, catalytic authenticity and tactical 
authenticity. 
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As the research design process above demonstrated, the research took into account 
the need to demonstrate both trustworthiness and authenticity as detailed below. 
4.3.1 Trustworthiness 
The first criteria or standard for trustworthiness is credibility – how close is the 
match between the constructed reality of the interview participants and the realities 
that are represented by the researcher as attributed to the interview participants 
(Guba & Lincoln 1989:236-7)? Confidence in this match is achieved through 
techniques such as “prolonged engagement, persistent observation, triangulation, 
peer debriefings and member checks” (Rodwell & Byers 1997:116).  
This study has involved prolonged engagement with stakeholders in the number of 
stakeholders involved (39 interviewees were interviewed for at least an hour each) 
and in the iteration of the interview rounds, questions asked and feedback processes.  
Triangulation was very much part of the research design in that information was 
sought from three different types of stakeholders: employers and their 
representatives, union officials and industrial relations commissioners; from two 
different Australian states and jurisdictions. The ability to contrast the observations 
and perceptions of these diverse stakeholders from different states greatly increased 
trustworthiness. The data gathered from the interviews was further triangulated with 
data gathered from published decisions on wages and relevant employment statistics.  
Peer debriefings were part of the research process as discussed above. After 
interviews and collection of wage data and analysis of these, results were regularly 
discussed with colleagues conducting research and with supervisors. Notes were 
made of these discussions. Similarly, when the researcher gave talks on early results, 
they were discussed with industrial relations stakeholders and researchers. People 
likely to disagree with results were also consulted. There was (to some extent) a 
surprising degree of acceptance of the main theoretical construct. Colleagues and 
industrial relations stakeholders tended to see the results as naturally acceptable – as 
explaining something we had all really known, but had not yet articulated. 
Finally, credibility involves member checks. Here the interview data and conclusions 
drawn from these were checked with interviewees, as all transcripts were provided to 
                                                                                                                                          
21 Note that this was only really an issue for female-dominated wage areas, because male-dominated 
wage areas mostly had true federal awards – covering all states and territories – whereas female-
dominated areas had awards covering workers only in one state or territory. 
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interviewees and quotations were shown to interviewees, in context, before being 
used in publications and in this document. This process occurred at least twice for 
most interviewees and three times for some interviewees, as different versions of the 
thesis were written. 
Transferability is the next technique for establishing trustworthiness. 
Transferability is ensured by a very detailed description about the time, place, 
context and culture of the research. Here this is provided by the extensive 
background description given in Chapter 1 on statistics, Chapter 2 on history and 
law, and this chapter relating to the research methodology and design. Any 
researcher seeking to transfer the results of this study into another will be well aware 
of the context of the research. 
Dependability is “concerned with the stability of the data over time” (Guba & 
Lincoln 1989:242). As Guba and Lincoln (1989:242) assert, in positivist research 
evidence of shifts in research methodology and in hypotheses during the research 
process would be seen as evidence of unreliability.  
But methodological changes and shifts in constructions are expected 
products of an emergent design dedicated to increasingly sophisticated 
constructions. Far from being threats to dependability, such changes 
and shifts are hallmarks of a maturing – and successful – inquiry. 
The test with constructivist inquiries is that these changes and shifts are thoroughly 
documented and can be tracked back. Here the change from the original research 
question “why are women and men paid differently?” to the final “why and how does 
gender wage inequality persist?” is explained in this chapter and Chapter 5 onwards. 
Changes in interview questions, as issues were raised and discarded, are documented 
above. Throughout the research process the researcher made notes about changes in 
directions and main themes as they were identified. 
Confirmability, the last trustworthiness criteria, “is concerned with assuring that 
data, interpretations and outcomes of inquiries are rooted in contexts and persons 
apart from the evaluator and are not simply figments of the evaluator’s imagination” 
(Guba & Lincoln 1989:243). This is ensured by having the raw products and 
processes of research available to be inspected and confirmed by outside reviewers 
of this study. The raw products of the research – the interview transcripts, how these 
were processed, the NVivo file created and accompanying notes – are available both 
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at the researcher’s university and in her possession. Two university research 
colleagues carried out checks of the transcripts and NVivo file with notes to ensure 
there was consistency in data recording and analysis and reported both to the 
researcher and her supervisor (Appendix 2). An audit trail can be established through 
the documents provided.  
As these colleagues noted, the researcher’s role in this project is almost one of 
participant observer. While the researcher did not go so far as to always participate 
in the research subjects’ activities while observing them, her previous research on 
pay equality had been used by stakeholders (some of whom were interviewees for 
this study) in relevant commission cases, such as national wage cases where pay 
equality was being discussed. The researcher also knew many of the interviewees 
and understood and participated in activities within the industrial relations system, 
for example, appearing in the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
as an expert witness on job evaluation. In the symbolic interactionism research 
method, having a researcher who participates lends more reality and grounds the 
research activities more thoroughly in the real world.  
4.3.2 Authenticity 
As explained above, authenticity focuses more on the nature of the research process 
than on the research product. Related criteria include fairness, ontological 
authenticity, educative authenticity, catalytic authenticity and tactical authenticity. 
Fairness is about whether the participants’ views were fairly represented – was there 
an attempt at balance in the research report? (Rodwell & Byers 1997:117) In this 
research this was an issue from the beginning. In industrial relations there is always 
more than one side to a matter under dispute. Hence the selection of interviewees 
involved employers, employer representatives and union officials as well as 
industrial relations commissioners from different backgrounds. While more union 
officials were interviewed than employers or their representatives, a very careful 
attempt was made to balance the views of union representatives reported in the study 
with those of employers and their representatives. Interviewees also had an 
opportunity to check that their views were being fairly represented by checking 
original transcripts and confirming that these were accurate. When new ideas 
emerged, these were also checked, sometimes with the original interviewees, but also 
with other industrial relations stakeholders present at seminars and at conferences.  
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Ontological authenticity is about whether the participants’ involvement in the study 
led to any “increased awareness of the complexities of the phenomenon under study” 
(Rodwell & Byers 1997:117). While this process is more typical of action research 
and was not planned for in the research method chosen, it is an inevitable by-product 
that any exchange of information, such as a research interview, may affect the 
participants involved. This process was evident during interviews with a number of 
the interviewees. The process ranged in scale from employers who said they had not 
realised that there was still a gender pay gap and now did, to employer 
representatives, commissioners and union officials who were surprised and to some 
extent alarmed, at the extent of the Western Australian gender wage gap. Participants 
clearly had to think about the issue, often for the first time and after the interview 
they came away with a greater understanding of the complexities involved. This is 
evident from the interview transcripts and can be seen in the audit trail. 
Educative authenticity comes about when interview participants show a greater 
understanding (if not acceptance) of other’s perceptions and views. This is evident in 
the interview transcripts. For example, employer representatives began interviews 
saying that women are paid differently because they work part-time and finished 
indicating that on reflection this was one of a number of reasons and not necessarily 
a major reason. More than one interviewee began the interview not realising the size 
of the gap between average (full-time, ordinary time) female and male earnings, 
particularly in Western Australia. Each interviewee was shown a comparative graph 
created with ABS average weekly ordinary time earnings data.  
Catalytic authenticity is “the extent to which action is stimulated and facilitated” 
(Guba & Lincoln 1989:249) by the research process. While this research was not 
action research and thus was not aimed at directly causing action as a part of the 
research process, it is clear that conducting interviews and reporting early results led 
to action in the industrial relations community.  
The effects of this research project varied from micro to macro levels. For example, 
at the micro or personal level, Commissioner A, when interviewed, talked about the 
need to identify and acknowledge personal values and to try to restrict their influence 
on judgments. It appeared that this process may have occurred unconsciously in the 
past but, after explaining this perspective to the researcher, the process would 
probably be conscious in the future.  
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On a more macro or public scale, union officials interviewed talked about being 
stimulated to bring up the issue of the gender wage gap again with the government 
and of restarting a pay equity coalition in Western Australia (Interviews with union 
officials A & N). The researcher gave talks (to the National Convention of the 
Industrial Relations Society of Australia in 2001, the National Women in 
Management Conference in Sydney in 2002; to the Western Australian Pay Equity 
Coalition and the Western Australian Industrial Relations Society in 2003; and the 
Gender Pay Gap conference in Perth in 2005) and wrote articles (Short 2001, 2002a; 
2004) on early findings and made a submission to government (Short 2002b).  This, 
plus the iterative rounds with stakeholders interviewed and the process whereby they 
received copies of chapters including their comments twice if not three times, 
seemed to assist in raising awareness of the issue and action in Western Australia.  
It is important to realise that most of the stakeholders interviewed and many 
members of the audience for talks and articles were and remain influential within the 
Western Australian industrial relations system. Certainly the commissioning and 
publication of the review of the Western Australian gender wage inquiry review 
(Todd & Eveline 2004) occurred during the course of this awareness-raising process.  
That review led to the creation of a Gender Pay Unit within the Western Australian 
Department of Consumer and Employment Protection, Labour Relations Division in 
2005 which was announced at the Gender Wage Gap conference where the 
researcher was an invited speaker. 
Tactical authenticity is when meaningful action is undertaken by empowered 
participants (Rodwell & Byers 1997:118). Again, this research was not action 
research so this is a standard perhaps not best suited to the study. However, as the 
paragraphs immediately above indicate, this may still have some relevance. This 
research did not set out specifically to empower interviewees to take action. 
However, it is clear that the products of the research are being used and may be used 
further, to cause change. It is too early to say whether, in particular, this study will 
result in, say, legislative change in Western Australia or whether any of the other 
suggestions in Chapter 7 will be implemented.  
4.4 SUMMARY 
Consistent with the use of a symbolic interactionist approach, this thesis employed a 
rigorous research design grounded in the empirical world under study. This involved 
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not only thick background description, but also a well-triangulated method of data 
collection.  
Qualitative data from in-depth interviews with key industrial relations actors as well 
as more quantitative wage data for context were analysed using grounded research 
techniques. This was further strengthened by interviewees checking, not only 
comments, but also conclusions drawn from the wage data. An iterative process was 
used to develop interview schedules, identify suitable wage data and check meaning 
with interviewees.  
Again consistent with a symbolic interactionist approach, during the process of 
research the question evolved as the researcher found interviewees were explaining 
their thoughts on why and how gender wage inequality persisted, rather than why 
women and men are paid differently. As discussed, confidence can be felt in the 
results of this design process, due to the trustworthiness and authenticity built into 
the research design and research processes.  
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CHAPTER 5 – RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEWS 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the data collected for this thesis during in-depth interviews 
with the industrial parties: industrial relations commissioners, union officials, 
employers and their representatives and government officials; wage data are reported 
where relevant. The focus is on the interviewees’ answers to the original research 
question: “Why are women and men paid differently?” (The next chapter shows how 
a slightly different question emerged as the data was subjected to theoretical 
analysis.) Thus this chapter also gives an overall picture of the data gathered that 
showed why and how interviewees perceived the Australian industrial relations 
system, particularly in the formal system of the industrial relations commissions, 
worked to contribute to the persistence of wage inequality in the employment areas 
under thick study22.  
5.1 PAY INEQUALITY – A VERY COMPLEX ISSUE 
All interviewees were directly asked the question: “Why are women and men paid 
differently?” Interviewees from each major group of stakeholders: employers or 
managers, commissioners and union officials, noted the complexity and difficulty of 
explaining pay differences. 
[I]t’s a very complex and very difficult area to deal with and to be able 
to come back and say in one sentence this is why there’s such 
difference. You know there’s a million of them [reasons]. (Interview 
with manager A)23
Obviously in my job I deal with wages and conditions matters 
regularly. That men and women are paid differently is self evident in 
take home pay. The reasons for the difference in the pay levels are a 
complex issue. (Interview with Commissioner A) 
                                                 
22 The analysis of this data is undertaken to develop categories of meaning relating to the perceptions 
of key players in the industrial relations system on gender wage differences. The research question did 
not seek to determine whether women operating in the system had different perceptions compared 
with men. While that is an interesting question it is outside the objectives of this research. 
23 Note that all quotations or comments in italics are from the interview data. Quotations that are not 
in italics are from the literature. 
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Well I think there's a number of answers to that question. There's not 
just one issue. (Interview with union official A) 
 
Interviewees gave over 100 reasons for women and men being paid differently. 
These were coded, using the NVivo (Richards & Richards 1998) software package 
into four super categories with sub-sets of major categories as shown below and in 
Figure 9. The fourth category, on change, is shown at the bottom of Figure 9, as it is 
the background to the main reasons, providing the context within which the reasons 
unfold.  
1. ECONOMIC REASONS 
a. THE MARKET 
b. HUMAN CAPITAL 
c. IT’S THE INDUSTRY 
d. DIFFERENT LABOUR MARKET BEHAVIOUR 
e. UNABLE TO EXPLAIN 
2. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REASONS 
a. UNIONS 
b. EMPLOYERS 
c. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION 
d. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW 
e. POLITICS  
3. NATURE AND NURTURE REASONS 
a. SOCIAL AND/OR CULTURAL REASONS 
b. BIOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES 
c. PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES 
4. CHANGE 
a. FASTER CHANGE 
b. SLOWER CHANGE 
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5.1.1 Descriptor Conventions Used 
There are certain conventions used to describe different types of categories and codes 
in the figure above and the ones that follow. These are shown in the coding tree 
below in Figure 10. 
Figure 10 – Coding Tree 
SUPER CATEGORY
MAJOR CATEGORY MAJOR CATEGORY 
Category category Category category 
code code code 
Super categories are made up of major categories that are groups of categories made 
up of groups of codes. As shown above in lines three and four of Figure 10, 
categories with further codes underneath begin with capital letters, categories where 
codes have been collapsed into the one category are shown without capitals. Where 
each category or code is discussed in greatest detail within the text, the category 
titles are made bold. Categories or codes with connections to other categories or 
codes that are in a different super category have a dotted border around their text box 
within the diagram (as shown at the bottom right of Figure 10). These are also called 
connectors and are important in that they bring the different categories and codes 
together and provide an underlying analysis that becomes clear in the next chapter. 
These rules for coding will only be used in Chapter 5. Later chapters treat categories 
and their titles more conventionally as they evolve into concepts in the emerging 
theoretical model or construct. Quotation marks are used to separate category, or 
code titles from the main text outside the diagrams. Where the category, or code title 
used is actually a comment from an interviewee e.g. “It’s the occupations that they 
are in” this is put in double quotation marks, but where the category title was made 
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up by the researcher e.g. ‘education’ this is put in single quotation marks. Comments 
from interviewees are italicised and where comments are from more than one 
interviewee they are separated by …//….  
5.2 ECONOMIC REASONS 
As can be seen in Figure 11 below, many of the categories under the first super-
category ‘ECONOMIC REASONS’ correspond to the variables used in the 
econometric studies of the gender wage gap reviewed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1 (i.e. 
industry, occupation, training, experience, union membership and children). For 
example, in this super-category interviewees’ views have been coded to ‘education’, 
‘family responsibilities’, ‘experience’, ‘training’, “IT’S THE INDUSTRY” and “It’s 
the occupation they are in”. These were, in fact, reasons stated by large numbers of 
the interviewees. Only ‘experience’ and ‘education’ were listed as a reason for pay 
inequality by fewer than 25 per cent of the interviewees. ‘Family responsibilities’ 
were discussed by over half of the interviewees followed by “It’s the occupations 
that they are in”, “IT’S THE INDUSTRY”, ‘training’ and then, some distance 
behind, ‘education’.  
The econometric evidence reviewed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1, agrees that industry 
of employment and ‘HUMAN CAPITAL’ (‘education’, ‘training’ and ‘experience’ 
dealt with below in Section 5.2.2) are very important factors influencing why women 
and men are paid differently. However, the literature (e.g. Preston & Crockett 1999b; 
Chapman & Mulvey 1986; Langford 1995) found occupation to be less important. 
This could have been due to the type of data available on occupation used in 
analyses, which, being at a very aggregate level, tended to reflect level of education 
(e.g. professionals versus labourers), rather than differences between more detailed 
occupations. This was discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.1. 
Some of the econometric evidence (Preston & Crockett 1999b:140; Preston 2001) 
gives more emphasis to overtime, which only a few of the interviewees mentioned. 
This lack of discussion on overtime was probably also affected by the fact that all 
interviewees were shown graphs of female earnings relative to male earnings that 
were ‘ordinary time’, not including overtime, as part of the interview process. Thus, 
interviewees were aware that a wage gap existed, even without overtime being taken 
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Figure 11 - Economic Reasons 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 11, the super-category ‘ECONOMIC REASONS’ is further 
categorised into major categories: ‘THE MARKET’, “IT’S THE INDUSTRY”, 
‘HUMAN CAPITAL’, “DIFFERENT LABOUR MARKET BEHAVIOUR” and 
‘UNABLE TO EXPLAIN’.  
Of course interviewees’ comments do not always fit neatly into these categories as the 
explanation below of why women and men are paid differently illustrates. This comment 
combines a discussion of “IT’S THE INDUSTRY” and the code: ‘profitability’ 
categorised under major category: ‘THE MARKET’. These are related to each other as 
interviewees pointed out men and women are predominantly employed in industries with 
different market profitability. Thus, the comment below is used to demonstrate both 
categories and a two-way arrow is shown in Figure 11 between ‘THE MARKET’ and 
“IT’S THE INDUSTRY”.  
5.2.1 Economic Reasons: The Market 
An employer representative made a fairly strong economic point about the industries 
that women work in being different in having lower ‘profitability’ or profit margins. 
[M]y understanding of the difference between male and female rates has 
always been that, for whatever reason, females are in industries that are 
lower paying because of the fact that they are lower…profit margin, 
industries to other industries. For example the hospitality industry, where 
women may exist greater than men…is not an industry that can afford to 
pay higher wages, no matter what sex you are. Whereas if you are in, for 
example, the mining industry…they are a higher profit-generating 
industry…they can afford to pay higher wages. (Interview with employer 
representative D)  
Other, fairly standard, economic explanations given by interviewees centred on supply 
and demand and were thus coded under ‘THE MARKET’ – ‘jobs versus wages’, 
‘profitability’ of industries and “there’s only so much the market will bear”. ‘THE 
MARKET’ section of Figure 11 is shown in Figure 12 below. 
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Figure 12 – Economic Reasons: The Market 
THE 
MARKET 
profitability jobs vs 
wages 
“there’s only so much 




A union representative talked about the choice for employers (and to some extent for 
unions) of ‘jobs versus wages’. 
What both governments did was significantly…cut public expenditure and 
usually the first thing that they cut is education, public education 
expenditure. In Victoria the major cut…was to the number of teachers, 
8000 teachers were cut…conservative governments more often than not 
increase salaries but decrease numbers. Whereas other than conservative 
governments, or not quite so conservative governments, tend to increase 
public sector size but don’t increase salaries as much. (Interview with 
union official P) 
In a very similar way a number of interviewees talked about “there’s only so much the 
market will bear”, bringing in the argument about profitability and wages, the AIRC’s 
legislative requirement to consider economic impact of decisions and union members’ 
concern for their clients (the parents) not being able to afford their services. A major 
point made by interviewees was that in feminised industries, such as teaching or child 
care, labour costs are high relative to other production costs.  
//…I think, too, a lot of it is about the ability for the business to be able to 
respond to wage increases and how price-sensitive it is…//…The 
economics of child care and social work are fairly marginal aren’t they? 
You know, it’s hard to make a profit in child care…//…whilst trying to be 
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fair and making sure that they are valued correctly, the actual legislation 
requires the commission to do a bit more than that. They have to look at 
the economic impact of their decision…//…I am just saying reality has got 
to set in at some point and say well, there’s only so much the market will 
bear in terms of these rates… People will just get paid, price themselves 
out of the market…//…Oh but you can’t ask for more money and, yes we 
deserve more money and yes we’re worth more money. But that would put 
our centre in hardship. The parents will have to pay more fees…// 
As can be seen “there’s only so much the market can bear”, like ‘profitability’, is related 
to “IT’S THE INDUSTRY”. 
‘Finance market factors’ or how an occupation or industry is financed were perceived 
by interviewees to have an effect on wage and industrial relations outcomes in the 
employment areas studied. The construction market was particularly affected, with 
unions in the industrial/commercial building sector able to hold employers to ransom at 
key points in building construction, because the penalty clauses for completion would 
result in far greater costs than giving in to wage demands.  
An employer representative explained that if the building workers withdraw their labour 
at some crucial point near the contract date and, 
…you’re a builder, you have a problem. What do you do? It’s going to 
cost me $5,000/$10,000 to give in to this particular union demand or 
claim; or do I run the risk, have a protracted dispute, wind up bringing the 
job in late, I’m late by five weeks and suddenly I’m out half a million 
dollars. What would you do? I mean that’s called a commercial decision. 
(Interview with employer representative F) 
In a different way, finance also affects the public sector. Public sector wages come from 
funds mainly raised through taxation and politicians are concerned about how voters will 
react to the higher taxes needed to pay higher wages; whereas in the private sector 
consideration of sales volume or market share are critical issues. This resulted in 
conclusions, such as those of a public sector employer representative interviewed, that 
fixing pay inequality is unrealistic in the public sector. 
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You’ve also got to take into account that … [in] the public system where 
there are large numbers of females employed it’s unrealistic to consider 
that they are going to throw money at trying to fix the pay disparity 
between males and females…just one percent on some of these public 
areas is worth millions of dollars, given the size of the workforce. 
(Interview with employer representative E) 
Thus, in a gender-segmented labour market, unrelated issues such as financial factors 
may, nevertheless, have an impact on wage inequality. 
5.2.2 Economic Reasons: “It’s the Industry” 
“IT’S THE INDUSTRY” (Interview with employer representative B) was a common 
response from interviewees who viewed industry of employment as a major factor 
affecting wage inequality. They pointed out that industries (and indeed occupations) 
tend to be to be segregated or segmented on the basis of gender, with many men working 
in male-dominated occupational, or industry, areas and many women working in female-
dominated areas. Interviewees pointed out that women tended to be segmented into, or 
be predominant in, service industries and occupations with lower wages.  
//…the segmentation of the Australian workforce, the women tend to be in 
the service industries…//…The other reality is, of course, with the massive 
growth of women’s participation rate in the labour market you’ve also had 
a skewing in terms of segmentation of their involvement and where they 
actually get involved. That is the hours of work, the nature of the 
employment and the industries in which they engage…//…increasing 
service industry work has driven down wages and also the increased 
flexibility in wages through state workplace agreements have in my view 
led to an erosion of service sector jobs…Women tend to be…in service 
industry jobs and therefore there’s, in my view, a greater disparity in 
wages…//…the gender segmentation and the sort of narrow-minded 
attitudes to hiring that clearly keep women out of some, or reduce the 
incidence of women being in some areas. Perceptions of ability, all those 
sorts of things, but…they are slowly being overcome…// 
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Note that “IT’S THE INDUSTRY” is here dealt with from an economic point of view 
but is also related to ‘NATURE AND NURTURE REASONS’ given by interviewees 
for pay inequality. That side of “IT’S THE INDUSTRY” will be dealt with in Section 
5.4.3.)  
The “IT’S THE INDUSTRY” major category includes a number of categories: ‘resource 
sector in Western Australia’, ‘shops versus warehouses’, “it’s the occupations…”, 
‘public sector’ and ‘small businesses’. This is shown in Figure 13 below. 
























The ‘resource sector in Western Australia’ is an industry which interviewees 
identified as a major contributor to the relatively lower wages of Western Australian 
women compared to Western Australian men. The resource industry is male-dominated, 
has high profitability and is able to bear high wages.  
//…one other reason why I think that there is that differential is that many 
of the men in WA are employed in the resource sector and their earnings 
are disproportionately higher than a lot of males in other states…//… 
You’ve got a higher proportion of WA’s workforce in primary, mining or 
resource type industry work…and again it comes to where you see women 
in the workforce, I mean I don’t know of a underground miner who is a 
woman operating a jumbo…which is the highest paid…//…I suspect it is 
primarily men who are involved in those types of occupations that are 
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earning those type of dollars out in the remote areas, the Telfers and up 
north, out east and a lot of those remote mining type locations…// 
Coming out of interviewees’ comments under “IT’S THE INDUSTRY” (and related to 
“it’s the occupations…”) are those referring to wages in retail ‘shops versus 
warehouses’. Interviewees saw the problem in the retail and wholesale trade industry as 
being the segmentation of women into retail, as opposed to warehouse jobs and of 
women within retail into areas outside the more highly paid jobs of management or 
selling items such as white goods where commissions are paid.  
//…women tended to be employed in the retail industry and in straight 
customer service roles in the retail industry whereas men tended to be 
employed more in the warehouses.//…it’s really gender segmentation of 
women for particular… jobs within retail. So the strategies for equal pay 
in retail are about affirmative action I suspect…//…there is a low level of 
over-award payments in the retail industry and it tends to be on the basis 
of … either management or other specialised work. And … 5 years ago, 
there had traditionally been a larger number of men in those types of roles 
rather than women…// 
Interviewees also talked about women tending to work for ‘small businesses’, saying 
this adversely affected their propensity to ask for wage rises and/or to take action to 
achieve them. Small businesses were seen as more price-sensitive and less likely to look 
at returns versus initial costs. 
//…They have got awful problems, partly because of low unionisation rate, 
partly by having a whole host of small employers who are very difficult to 
deal with…//…With childcare it’s far more difficult when you’ve got a 
myriad of small employers and the large proportion of those employers 
are profit-based employers…//…a lot of it is about the ability for the 
business to be able to respond to wage increases and how price-sensitive it 
is. I worked with companies that every last cent is something that will 
either make a difference to them either staying in business or not. Very 
small businesses…really look at money in/money out, but perhaps not the 
bigger picture of what they get for their money…// 
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The other code under “IT’S THE INDUSTRY” is “it’s the occupations that they are 
in”. This is a similar argument to industry, in that people are saying the reason why 
women are paid differently is because of where they work, but the discussion goes 
further on occupations. Comments from interviewees relating to occupations varied as 
can be seen below. 
//…the industries and occupations in which men are concentrated relative 
to women are involved with higher over-award payments which may 
reflect union activity, or may simply reflect market forces…the two sexes 
don’t choose to distribute themselves across occupations in an identical 
way…//…there’s the fact of equal pay for equal work has not worked in 
the sense of improving women’s conditions up to the standards of men, 
because of women being concentrated in so many areas of occupations 
which, in many respects, men have abandoned. Education is a particular 
one I suppose…//…My primary view is it’s the occupations that they are 
in…//…women occupy, or tend to occupy positions that are not as well 
paid…//  
As shown in Appendix 4, Table A-3, the ‘public sector’ is an industry where more 
women are employed than men. As interviewees pointed out, women predominate in 
certain public sector occupations, particularly nursing and teaching, which interviewees 
perceived as being paid less relative to other, similarly qualified, occupations. 
Essentially interviewees were saying the public sector was different, that it was not a 
‘free’ market.  
//…by definition, you know, there often isn’t a market, or, a market is 
different…//…that’s a public funded industry and the government is just 
not going to pay higher wages…over and above the market rate. 
Researcher: Market rate? There’s a market rate in the public sector? 
Interviewee: Well, they’re going to pay the minimum they can get away 
with…// 
According to interviewees, normal forces of demand and supply are unlikely to operate 
(at least in the short term) to affect public sector wages. In an example of this a public 
sector employer representative interviewed claimed that pay equality will be difficult to 
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achieve in the public sector, because of the large numbers employed in occupational 
groups where women represent a large proportion of the workforce e.g. nurses and 
teachers. 
You’ve also got to take into account that… [in] the public system where 
there are large numbers of females employed it’s unrealistic to consider 
that they are going to throw money at trying to fix the pay disparity 
between males and females…just one percent on some of these public 
areas is worth millions of dollars, given the size of the workforce. 
(Interview with employer representative E) 
From an economic theory point of view this is probable evidence of monopsonistic 
power in the public sector. As discussed in Chapter 3, Sections 3.1 and 3.3, monopsonies 
exist where the potential employee has very little or no alternative in employer. The 
employer is a monopoly buyer of labour. The occupation the employee wants to enter is 
employed, or (in the case of child care) funded, mainly by one organisation (i.e. 
government) in the geographical area. The same would apply to teaching, with even 
non-government teachers’ wages being affected by the wages paid in the government 
sector. In the case of women, this is exacerbated by restrictions on their ability to move 
to gain employment because of their family responsibilities and the jobs of their 
partners. This means the employer has more power over the worker than normal and can 
set wages lower than the market rate would have been (Norris 1993:157-159). 
Wage data collected for this thesis (detailed in Appendix 4) indicate that the treatment of 
public sector wages over the period 1990 to 2003 possibly contributed to gender wage 
inequality and that this may be related to monopsony. The public sector clerical and 
administrative classifications had the worst wage outcomes of any of the occupations 
studied over the period 1990 to 2003. Public sector clerical and administrative 
classifications studied in Western Australia and in the Australian Public Service gained a 
31 per cent and a 39 per cent increase respectively in their wages between 1990 and 
2003. This compared to the male-dominated occupations studied that had increases 
closer to 100 per cent (detailed in Table A-4 in Appendix 4). Of the areas studied, it 
appeared that successive Western Australian and federal governments had been the most 
successful employers in restraining wage increases during the period 1990 to 2003.  
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This same government restraint may also have affected the wages of child care workers 
which were also influenced by government funding and policies. However, child care 
outcomes were better (a 43 per cent increase over the period 1990 to 2003 for 
Victorians, 51 percent for Western Australians). In the case of Western Australian 
qualified child care givers this was as a result of the minimum rate adjustment case 
which tied them to Western Australian government teachers after 1993. Female-
dominated government teachers in both Victoria and Western Australia achieved better 
increases in bargaining with the government than other public servants, but relatively 
poor outcomes (a 50 per cent increase over the period 1990 to 2003 for Western 
Australian, 59 per cent for Victorian teachers) when compared to private sector male-
dominated areas studied. 
Interviewees highlighted certain public sector occupations. A union official talked about 
the wages of nurses compared to police officers. 
[W]hen you compare an entry level nurse, following a degree course, with 
an entry level policeman, following a 12 months diploma at the Academy, 
the wages are significantly different. $31,000 versus…I think $37,000 the 
policeman gets. (Interview with union official A) 
As a union official pointed out there is another economic side to why nurses and 
teachers get less money, or are valued less, than other occupations, that it was voluntary 
work previously. 
I suppose in those traditional…female-dominated workforces like nursing, 
caring, education…traditionally a women’s role started off as a volunteer. 
Especially in school support…they actually formalised it in permanent 
positions but even as late as…the late ‘80s…those women workers in the 
Education Department were way behind other women workers in other 
parts of the public service…their contribution was always undervalued 
because they were considered volunteers in those areas I mentioned. 
(Interview with union official L) 
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An interviewee talked about how cut backs in the public service in Western Australia 
during the 1990s had led to little or no recruitment, so women had been unable to move 
into jobs within their department.  
I think it’s also happened across other industries and certainly 
government is that … during the nineties there has been …a lot of 
restructuring has happened in organisations so there hasn’t been a lot of 
recruitment. (Interview with manager C) 
Thus, according to this interviewee, gender segmentation in the public sector may have 
persisted due to lack of recruitment because of poor economic circumstances. 
5.2.3 Economic Reasons: Human Capital 
The classic ‘HUMAN CAPITAL’ factors of ‘education’, ‘training’ and ‘experience’ 
were raised by interviewees as contributing to the gender wage gap.  This is shown in 
Figure 14 below.  
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‘Education’ was seen both as an historical problem for women and possibly a 
continuing one. 
//…in many families it was seen as inappropriate to educate girls to the 
same level as boys…//…Access to qualifications is another one. Those 
people who can afford the time to go and undertake additional 
qualifications…will gain some advantage…And once again it’s probably 
true to say that men have a disproportionate access to that. Particularly in 
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relation to finance…and more importantly, had had a disproportion of 
access to it and had gained qualifications previous to the imposition of 
HECS…// 
One interviewee felt education was not paid for in the same way if acquired by women 
compared to men: “We have the same tertiary qualifications, we do the same work but 
we receive a lesser income.” (Interview with union official Q) 
On ‘training’ as a cause of pay inequality the comments are varied, but as can be seen 
in the comments below a common theme was that women missed out on training either: 
• because they had less time to do it in because of family responsibilities; or,  
• employers offered it to them less because of (perceived) family responsibilities.  
Economists call this last type of problem statistical discrimination. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3, this is where employers make decisions on average 
expectations for a group rather than looking at the individual case (Arrow 1972). 
However, as can be seen from the final comment below, at least one mining manager 
thought that this type of discrimination, on training at least, no longer existed in his firm. 
//…the focus by companies and management teams were on training and 
their recruitment processes, although maybe not consciously, but sub-
consciously, actually favoured one sex over the other…//…lack of, or 
restricted access, to either, family-friendly practices in the workplaces to 
allow access to training or reduced access to training, because of family 
commitments…//…I mean why don’t women get trained in the mining 
industry, other than truck driving? Because there is a perception that 
they’re not going to stay…//…We don’t see any evidence of that. Our mine 
operations training system is run by a female superintendent and working 
for her is one female training coordinator and three male training 
coordinators. So those systemic barriers in our case I don’t think exist…// 
‘Training’ is also a connector between different categories of reasons – to 
‘PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES’, specifically ‘Employers’ attitudes, beliefs and 
values’. As discussed earlier this connection is shown in Figure 14 by the box for 
‘training’ having a dotted border.  
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‘Experience’ is another area that the economists count as human capital and recognise 
as affecting wages. There is also a clear link into the economic “DIFFERENT LABOUR 
MARKET BEHAVIOUR” category: ‘family responsibilities’ discussed below. Family 
responsibilities limit the amount of women’s experience in the labour market and thus 
their economic value or wage.  
//…the experience factor is also important…//…If you’re around all the 
time though, you might have the opportunity to be promoted quicker and 
so forth. So though, where I’ve been…[here] ten years, they might have 
been here that length of period, but they’ve only actually worked six… Not 
necessarily lower work experience, but the fact that they go out of the 
workplace…and they miss the opportunities…//…it’s post-training 
experience as well…//…the types of work experience - periods in and out 
of work…//…I think the major one for me is the probable interruption to 
the career structure and the career stream for family responsibilities. I 
think that has a big impact. I think in Australia we still pay…a lot of 
payment is based on tenure and apparent experience rather than skills 
used and performance…//…women probably remove themselves out of the 
higher paid type of career path options going into family life and as a 
consequence, don’t have the same degree of experience to move higher up 
the corporate ladder…// 
A union official had an interesting point of view when he discussed what type of 
‘experience’ should be valued in ‘Promotion’ (see ‘NATURE AND NURTURE 
REASONS’ for more on ’Promotion’).  
[W]hen you are selecting a candidate, a component of that selection would 
be experience…[for] promotional positions…The question is the balance. 
In the information that we give out to selection panels or…members who 
might find themselves on selection panels we say that yes, experience is 
important but, you should value a broader range of experiences…So, 
whilst a person is out of the…[work] situation raising a family they may 
well be involved in…community programmes or whatever where they are 
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also gaining experience which would be valuable. (Interview with union 
official P) 
This also relates to one of the comments above when a manager said people tended to 
pay on apparent experience, rather than skill and performance (Interview with manager 
B). The type of experience valued affects women’s job and promotional prospects. 
Historically women’s experience was also reduced by the fact that ‘women started later’ 
as interviewees pointed out. 
//…it probably stems from, from history …women generally have hit the 
workforce later than men…//…there will be some time before they actually 
move through the organisation…//…the males were paid more but that 
was simply because the males had been there for 5, 10 to 15 years and the 
women had been there for 3 years or something…Fresh out of uni and 
things like that and so simply didn’t have that experience or ability to be 
up on that same level of pay, but that was just a question of timing…// 
A commissioner also pointed out that historically in ‘recessions women [were] laid off 
first’. He saw this as having been a natural choice when an employer contrasted the 
situation of a woman with a husband, or without children, with a married man with 
children, or even a single man. He said women were and perhaps continue to be: 
…more vulnerable, they’re the second wage earner, or they’re seen to be 
expendable. You know, let’s face it you’ve all got a second job. You can all 
get married! You know that! You know that’s the mentality that still, you 
know, I think, permeates a lot of society. (Interview with Commissioner B) 
First round interviewees were directly asked, when involved in work value cases, what 
‘Work value factors’ were used to compare wages. Similar themes of skills, education 
or qualifications, experience and responsibility were identified by interviewees. 
//…autonomy on the job, skills…//…length of training; responsibilities, 
like supervision; the hierarchy, who’s in charge of them; as they work 
what conditions they work under…//…the commission set that really itself 
…the primary focus was training and qualifications…skills has always 
been the most important thing…training was just another way of saying 
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skilled in an objective way…//…comparison with other occupations 
requiring similar formal qualifications, similar experience and similar 
responsibility…//  
Thus ‘Work value factors’ used by industrial relations commissions include ‘HUMAN 
CAPITAL’ factors as well as responsibility and working conditions. Later, in Section 
5.3.4, interviewees’ comments on ‘Work value factors’ are discussed in relation to 
‘INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REASONS’. Comments coded under ‘HUMAN 
CAPITAL’ indicate that interviewees believe human capital formation is also connected 
to ‘NATURE AND NURTURE REASONS’ and this is discussed in Section 5.4.1.  
5.2.4 Economic Reasons: “Different Labour Market Behaviour” 
The next major category under ‘ECONOMIC REASONS’ is “DIFFERENT 
LABOUR MARKET BEHAVIOUR” shown in Figure 15. An employer representative 
said that his organisation regularly used an economic paper (Nevile & Tran Nam 1992) 
in evidence in the AIRC that explained: 
…the different labour market behaviour of many women in relation to such 
things as the types of qualifications, the types of work experience, periods 
in and out of work, motivation of all kinds was the primary reason, 
overwhelmingly, for the different earnings. (Interview with employer 
representative B) 
Other interviewees agreed that there were differences between men and women in the 
labour market (in working ‘part-time and casually’, in ‘union density’, in ‘family 
responsibilities’ and in ‘overtime’). These were coded under “DIFFERENT LABOUR 
MARKET BEHAVIOUR” as shown in Figure 15. 
Interviewees said women were more likely to work part-time or casually because of 
‘family responsibilities’ and that the wage earned was likely to be the second household 
income. When asked why women and men are paid differently, this was part of their 
answer:  
//…there’s a great preponderance in terms of the total number of women 
who are part-time and casual than there are men who are part-time and 
casual…//…rate of women in casual and part-time jobs is higher than 
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male workers…//…women occupy, or tend to occupy positions that are not 
as well paid. And that are in female-dominated industries that can be 
predominantly casual, part time…// 












Interestingly the female and male-dominated occupations studied had different outcomes 
for their part-time and casual workforces. As demonstrated in Table 18, the selected 
female-dominated classifications were much more likely to have people working part-
time and (looking at the data in Appendix 4, Table A-4) the classifications where most 
people were likely to be working part-time were also relatively the least well paid. 
Table 18 – Proportion Working Full-time in Occupational Areas Studied 







Metal fitters 97.7 
Child care givers  49.3 Truck driver  91.6 
Shop assistants  34.6 Building trades labourer  82.1 
General clerks 65.2 Miner  96.9 
Public Service overall - Fed 






Health Dept. WA 
Health & Ageing Fed. 
50.0 
83.0 
Main Roads Dept. WA 
Transport Dept. Fed. 
98.0 
94.0 
(Sources: JobSearch 2004; Dept. of Premier & Cabinet 2003; Australian Public Service Commission 
2003) 
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However, the relationship was not perfect. For example, in the wage data studied, apart 
from public sector clerks, private clerks had the lowest rate of increase in wages over the 
period 1990-2003. However, the proportion of people working part-time as clerks was 
only 45 per cent in 2003 (Job Outlook section of Job Search 2004), whereas child care 
workers were much more likely to be part-time (60.4 per cent in 2003) and were paid 
better. However averaging may cause some of this difference. Interviewees said that the 
qualified child care givers were better paid than unqualified carers and more likely to 
work close to full-time, or full-time (Interviews with employers A & C). Unqualified 
child care workers were also more numerous than those qualified, probably skewing the 
data. Similarly, the ABS category of general clerk used by Job Search (2004) can 
include a large range of classifications. 
Women dominate both part-time and casual employment in Australia (ABS 2003b). So 
is it the part-time or casual nature of their employment that leads to lower wage 
outcomes, even for those working full-time in the same occupation, or is it because 
women work in these occupations that they are both less well paid and more likely to 
work part-time?  
When the male-dominated occupations are examined more closely, it becomes apparent 
that, while men might be working full-time in mining and construction, their 
employment is often casual, either through varying shifts, or through short contract jobs. 
Yet, in relative terms, these occupations were very well paid compared to other male-
dominated occupations, as well as female-dominated ones. In these industries employees 
were compensated for the casual nature of their employment. For example, in 
construction this involved extra allowances such as those for redundancy and portable 
entitlements for long service leave, not included in the wage case figures (Interview with 
employer representative F). In this and other male-dominated industries, employees 
were paid shift payments that were also omitted from the wage data (detailed in 
Appendix 4) as these varied according to the individual. Construction was the most 
extreme example in terms of extra entitlements and payments, as an employer explained: 
[L]oaded on top of the union EBA is superannuation payments in excess of 
$100 per week, redundancy payments in excess of $70 a week; site 
allowances which can add up anywhere between $150 to $250 a week per 
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man, so those site allowances alone can be just devastating in labour 
costs. Then you have trauma insurance, income protection which is about 
$10 per worker per week on top of all the other bits and pieces. Then you 
have to pay into the union training levy… (Interview with employer 
representative F) 
The question of choice also comes in here. While one interviewee (Commissioner A) 
said women want to work part-time, how much real choice is there? It would seem, 
however, that interviewees think it is because “it is still the case that women bear the 
vast bulk of the responsibilities in…” housework and caring for children. When they do 
paid work, it is perceived that women ‘choose’ to work part-time more often than full-
time (Interview with union official R). Another interviewee agreed. She talked about: 
… people’s opportunities sometimes dictating where they have to work. 
Researcher: Do you think that’s more for women than for men? 
Interviewee: I think so, because, you know, more often than not…women 
may be the primary care givers if they have children. Or if they have … 
elderly parents that they look after…and that may dictate where they can 
work, how many hours they can work and what sort of hours they can 
work. So…the choices are more difficult for many women who have to 
work. (Interview with union official F) 
As discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.3 under ‘personal choice in occupation’, 
women’s choice of where they can work and of working hours, was seen by most 
interviewees as a constrained choice, constrained by nature and nurture factors - social 
and cultural influences associated with biology and having children. The ‘part-time and 
casual’ nature of predominantly women’s work also affects ‘Union membership’ as 
discussed under ‘INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REASONS’ in Section 5.3.1.  
As shown above in Section 5.2.3, interviewees believed women’s ‘family 
responsibilities’ affect their ability to obtain ‘training’ and ‘experience’. They also 
commented on women’s ability to obtain ‘overtime’ and shift work at penalty rates. 
//…family and community responsibilities…It is still the case that women 
bear the vast bulk of the responsibilities in those areas. And therefore… 
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they are, by virtue of that, not as available, perhaps, as male employees, 
for access to overtime rates of pay, shift work, things of that sort, so there 
can be a skewing of actual rates of pay as a result …//…Hours are much 
more deregulated these days and women just don’t get the opportunity to 
do overtime when you’ve got childcare responsibilities. If it’s not children, 
it’s parents or other responsibilities …//…females are not as available as 
males to be able to work that overtime because of their preparedness to 
commit themselves at a higher level to their family responsibilities than the 
male partner does…//…if you’ve got two people working the same job but 
women getting less wages, it’s usually because of their family 
responsibilities: not having access to be able to work longer hours, the 
shifts, the overtime etc, in the same way that many men can…// 
‘Union density’ is discussed more fully under Section 5.3.1 on ‘Union membership’. 
5.2.5 Economic Reasons: Unable to Explain 
The final major category under ‘ECONOMIC REASONS’ is ‘unable to explain’. 
This, as shown in Figure 16, covers two categories where interviewees referred to 
‘statistics not [being] clear’ and what economists’ term the ‘unexplained gap’.  









In remarks coded under ‘statistics not clear’ an employer representative talked about 
the difficulties of separating out the influence of absorbing overtime and penalty, or 
weekend rates into ordinary time pay and differences in hours worked when comparing 
award and agreement rates.  
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I wouldn't be surprised to hear it [average weekly ordinary time earnings] 
was not distorted because of the mining or the remote industries where 
high average earnings for all the traditional penalties of condensed work, 
being away from home above 40 hours a week in most cases would distort 
any figure around ordinary time... (Interview with manager E) 
Under many agreements, particularly in the mining industry, penalty and overtime 
payments have been absorbed into an annual rate. This may lead to some over-counting 
of male ordinary time pay compared to previous award rates. When looking at the wage 
rates analysed for this study, hours were also collected. However, weekly rates were 
used when comparing wages rates of different classifications rather than hourly rates as 
the reader tends to relate more to a weekly than an hourly or annual rate.  
The only area where significant differences in hours affected the wage rates reported 
was in mining. In the company studied, miners worked an average of 42 hours per week 
for their pay. The great majority of other awards and most agreements had hours at 38 
per week or 37.5 per week. Table 19 compares hourly and weekly rates for key 
occupations in 2003. Beginning teachers were included as well as top of the range 
teachers to give a feeling for how skilled occupations compared to the relatively 
unskilled miner. 
Table 19 – Comparing Hourly Rates for Selected Classifications - December 2003 
Classification $ per hour % Metal Trades
hourly rate 




Grade 1 clerk 13.04 64.0 495.60 64.7 
Level 1.5 teacher 19.28 94.6 731.32 94.4 
Metal tradesperson 20.38 100.0 774.41 100.0 
Level 2.3 teacher 28.27 138.7 1074.10 138.7 
Public sector Level 6 30.44 149.4 1156.67 149.4 
Miner 32.25 158.2 1354.35 174.9 
(Source: Western Australian Industrial Gazettes; shading indicates use of agreements instead of awards) 
Clearly, when looking at hourly rates, the miner earned slightly less relative to other 
occupations than in the weekly rate comparison shown in the last two columns of the 
table. The miner’s relativity to the metal tradesperson dropped to 158.2 per cent from 
141 
174.9 per cent weekly relativity. However, miners were still paid more per hour than any 
other classification studied, with the closest being Level 6 public service employees at 
$30.44 per hour, compared to $32.25 per hour earned by miners in the company studied. 
On the ‘unexplained gap’ an interviewee said: 
I don’t think the economic variables do account for anything like 100 per 
cent of relative pay. I mean to suppose that they did is to turn your face on 
the experience of the 1970s with female pay increasing substantially, not 
because of any factors that people identified in the supply/demand 
situation, but because the commission said females have got to be paid 
more. (Interview with Commissioner C) 
Consistent with the influence of outside social and political forces, during the AIRC’s 
1972 equal pay for work of equal value decision (149 CAR 172) submissions in favour 
of equal pay for work of equal value were made by both the National Pay Equity 
Coalition and the federal government.  
5.2.6 Economic Reasons - Summary 
This section has shown that interviewees did have strongly held perceptions that 
economic reasons explain at least some (and for some interviewees nearly all) of the gap 
between men’s and women’s wages. The view that economic reasons explain some of 
the gap is certainly supported by the literature, as reviewed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1 
and the literature has, to some extent, quantified this contribution.  
However, it is clear that interviewees perceive some connections for economic variables 
(such as training, union density, work value factors and family responsibility) to less 
quantifiable industrial relations and social or cultural issues. These connections, it is felt, 
may contribute to why economic measures explain some of the wage difference – to 
why women are less available in the paid workforce, why statistical discrimination exists 
and why women and men experience different ‘treatments’ in awards, agreements and 
employer offers of training and experience. 
In other words interviewees perceive that women have less desirable qualifications and 
less training and experience because of social and cultural values about women’s role in 
society and the workplace. Thus the economic studies reported in Chapter 3, Section 3.3, 
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are also picking up manifestations of social and cultural, or non-economic variables 
when they analyse the aggregate quantifiable information. 
5.3 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REASONS 
Another super category of reasons given by interviewees for pay inequality was termed 
‘INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REASONS’. This is a very large grouping and was 
further divided into major categories: ‘UNIONS’, ‘EMPLOYERS’ STRATEGIES’, 
‘INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSIONS’, ‘INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW’ 
and ‘POLITICAL REASONS’ as shown in Figure 17.  

















Most of the ‘INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REASONS’ given are about the processes 
of the industrial relations system and thus how the values of society and individual 
participants in the industrial relations system were translated into unequal pay for 
women. They explain the processes by which these values are transmitted into wage 
outcomes and are thoroughly grounded within the mechanisms of award and agreement 
determination. Thus the wage data studied (and detailed in Appendix 4) provides much 
context for this section. 
5.3.1 Industrial Relations Reasons: Unions 
As shown in Figure 18, a number of different categories are grouped under ‘UNIONS’ and a 
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number of different codes are grouped under each category. These include comments coded 
under: ‘union strategies’, ‘Internal union processes’, ‘Union membership’ and ‘Union power’. 
Note that ‘Union membership’ is another variable used in the econometric studies reviewed in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1. 
‘Union strategies’ discussed by interviewees included ‘pattern bargaining’, or 
bargaining for the same enterprise bargaining agreement (EBA) in each enterprise. This 
is a feature of the construction industry. When asked about the fact that many Western 
Australian construction EBAs appeared to be exactly the same a union official said: 
…it’s pattern bargaining, there’s no question about that in the union and 
the union never resiles from that. In fact that was part of the code between 
employers and the union. I mean an employer would say why should I sign 
up if someone else is going to undercut me? So the onus is then on the 
union to ensure that people signed up so that there was a level playing 
field. (Interview with union official G) 
Similarly the transport and metal workers employment areas studied sought the same 
pay increases, if not identical clauses, across enterprises in their EBAs and this is 
evident in the wage data given in Appendix 4. 
‘Multi-union EBAs’ is a union strategy that was a feature of enterprise bargaining, 
particularly early on, in the male-dominated EBAs studied and a few EBAs for private 
clerks in Victoria. Where weak and strong unions worked together, more could be 
achieved for the former. 
Unions also sought ‘over-award pay’; created ‘national awards and unions’; increased 
‘minimum wages’; and initiated ‘union amalgamations’. This last strategy did not assist 
women in the clerical areas, particularly in Western Australia, as discussed by more than 








Figure 18 – Industrial Relations Reasons: Unions 
  
Union strategies Union power 













































//…I don’t think…the amalgamation process of the union worked…there 
was a perception from the old Clerks’ side of things that we were being 
starved and all those sorts of things…//… that used to be a separate union, 
merged with other unions …and there is still an ongoing major internal 
debate in that union about the allocation of resources between the 
different divisions…// 
As explained by these officials, the Federated Clerks Union was amalgamated with the 
Municipal Officers Association to form the Australian Services Union in the early 
1990s. This brought a female-dominated union into a union mainly looking after male-
dominated areas in local government and the air industry.  
‘Over-award’ pay (or payment in excess of the award, usually through unregistered 
informal agreements and more common before enterprise bargaining was introduced) 
was seen as a union strategy more likely to be found in male-dominated areas (Interview 
with union official F). 
Interviewees were asked about ‘national awards and unions’. Of the awards and 
agreements studied only the male-dominated areas were national, both in award 
coverage and in union practice. Female-dominated employment area awards and union 
branches all tended either to be specific to Western Australia or to Victoria. Interviewees 
sometimes felt a national approach to be useful as a bargaining tool and sometimes that a 
state approach was more valuable, so no conclusions could be drawn about effects on 
women’s wages. 
The last ‘Union strategy’, increasing ‘minimum wages’, was seen as useful by peak 
union bodies to ensure that women, who tend to work more in minimum wage jobs than 
men, receive at least enough for a living on minimum wages. A union official said “I 
think we can do more in the area of pay equity by moving issues across the board, than 
we can by just looking at single cases.” (Interview with union official A). ‘Minimum 
wages’ are discussed further under ‘POLITICAL REASONS’.  
‘Internal union processes’ were also seen to militate against pay equality. Interviewees 
talked about how ‘male dominance of unions’ had not helped in ensuring that women 
became members and that their needs were addressed when they were members. 
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//…in my union situation the union was dominated by men. I had some 
fairly significant fights…to get enough resources to get our…[female] 
membership up to a satisfactory level so they could actually participate in 
the union…They [the male members] absorbed a lot of our resources and 
in my view had had more than their fair share…//…the cultural tradition 
of this for the union movement, still, though changing, tends to be 
dominated by a WASP and add male to that…So you’ve got a tendency for 
well unionised workforces to be the ones that get the attention. Now, even 
within that I have my doubts that women’s interests have been accurately 
reflected…// 
Interviewees (union officials) agreed that their efforts tended to be mostly within the 
membership areas that were already well organised, active and vocal; in other words that 
unions are often “oiling a squeaky wheel”.  
//…I regret to say that enterprise bargaining has and did and still does, 
dominate in relatively well organised workplaces…//… I’d have to say 
when it was predominantly a male-dominated union, the squeaky door got 
the oil…//…it’s an issue of under-resourcing but I also think it’s a strong 
issue of oiling a squeaky wheel. We don’t have members, they won’t damn 
well go out on strike even if we do have members so we’re going to look 
after this bunch over here, these are really great blokes, they’ll go out on 
strike and they’ll take us down the pub…// 
‘Intra-union strife’ was said by officials from two unions to have distracted their unions 
from the business of gaining wage increases for their female members. 
//…At the end of the day it was just the politics of it all…[for] three or four 
years…it was just about [an] unworkable environment in terms of the 
organisation operating properly…//…There were internal union problems 
…which meant that they were slower in terms of…being able to access the 
federal arena or able to pursue things like that, so what that meant was 
that there was significant periods of wage stagnation…// 
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‘Timing of meetings’ (after working hours) was seen as a union process that could 
discourage women from being active union members.  
…there were norms within the structure, for instance, of our union office 
that actually didn’t encourage or make it easier for women to participate 
…its membership was predominantly female, the workforce of the…union 
was exclusively male, with the exception of the receptionist. The meetings 
were actually held on a weeknight at 8.00 at night…So I proceeded to 
investigate why we had that imbalance. And in speaking to what were 
quite active women at the workplace in union roles, they were physically 
prevented from coming to the meetings, because they had other 
responsibilities. (Interview with manager A) 
(See further discussion of this under ‘Cultural reasons’ in Section 5.4.1.)  
A union official explained that the skills of union officials in the early 1990s had been 
affected by having ‘long term Labor governments’. These governments had made deals 
with unions at peak levels, negating any need to bargain at the workplace or agency 
level and many union officials no longer possessed the necessary skills when enterprise 
bargaining began. A manager interviewed pointed out that one of the problems was: 
…the change of government to a Liberal National Party government. The 
union movement in my view generally didn’t handle that well. It had in 
many areas, certainly the government areas, become quite dependent on a 
Labor government for 10 years, where the deals were done between the 
Labor Council executive and the Minister of the day. And they therefore 
had lost some of the skills in these areas. (Interview with manager D) 
Related to all these categories is the issue of ‘Union membership’. Increasing ‘union 
density’ or membership in female-dominated areas of work was held to be a possible 
solution to pay inequality (Interview with government official A). However, high ‘union 
density’ did not necessarily result in high relative pay outcomes among the wages 
studied. The primary example of where this operated was in the public sector. While the 
public sector had the highest union membership of all Australian industries over the 13 
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year period (detailed in Appendix 4, Table A-7), observed public sector wage increases 
in the selected classifications were the lowest of all the wages studied.  
ABS figures on union membership by industry (Appendix 4, Table A-7) do indicate that 
union membership was low in some of the other female-dominated areas studied, for 
example the retail industry, but not in education where membership was second highest 
at 42.7 per cent in 2002. The union membership of clerical workers is much harder to 
estimate for, as employer representative B put it: “[a] clerk is not an industry in itself 
and there will be spatterings of clerical people across all industry groups.” This fact 
also makes them hard to organise. Child care workers work in the health and community 
service industry which, on the face of it, had a relatively high union membership of 30.7 
per cent in 2002 (see Appendix 4, Table A-7). However, it is very doubtful that this was 
reflected in (private sector) child care. The relatively high membership figure probably 
came from the public sector part of the health and community services industry.  
Conversely, in the male-dominated employment areas studied, only the transport and 
storage industry (covering drivers) had union membership rates comparable to health or 
to the education industry at 36.6 per cent in 2002. The construction and manufacturing 
industries (building and metal workers) were much lower at 27.3 and 27.7 per cent 
respectively. The mining industry had only 28.7 per cent ‘union density’, yet much 
higher wages. 
‘Family responsibilities’ (also discussed in ‘ECONOMIC REASONS’ – “DIFFERENT 
LABOUR MARKET BEHAVIOUR” as affecting training and experience) were seen by 
interviewees to affect active ‘Union membership’ such as participation in meetings:  
Women are harder to organise on one hand because they juggle so much … 
most of them still have primary responsibility for family. They’ve got the 
kids to pick up, they’ve got a hundred things to think about and they usually 
take all that on, plus their work…they have more difficulty in committing to 
coming to meetings etc. and what you need to do is structure your 
organisation around them having to do as little of that as possible…we do a 
lot of e-mail driven campaigns now. (Interview with union official N) 
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The ‘part-time and casual’ code is shown here as well as under ‘ECONOMIC 
REASONS’ because an interviewee saw this as affecting women’s ‘Union 
membership’ and the way they were looked after, if they were members. When workers 
are part-time or casual they are hard to organise as union members and if only a few are 
full-time, unions find themselves with less membership density and thus potentially less 
bargaining power unless jobs held by full-timers are strategic. 
An interviewee had worked for a union that: 
…had a lot of female membership. A lot of female, casual and predominantly 
part-time membership in sectors like hospitality, catering and that kind of sector 
… the labour-intensive service sector. I saw… the problems of organising that 
kind of labour force where you had very high levels of turn-over; a labour force 
that worked shifts. There were a whole range of institutional reasons which, 
with the best will in the world, it was very hard to overcome. (Interview with 
government official A)  
Interviewees also felt that part-time members were easier for unions to ignore: 
What I’m saying is that you can have a very unionised workforce but 
because of segmentation of women’s participation and their predominance 
in part-time and casual engagement in a well-unionised workplace, they 
might be union members, but it doesn’t mean their issues get picked up. 
(Interview with union official R) 
‘Small businesses’ and indeed, small occupations (already discussed under 
‘ECONOMIC REASONS’: “IT’S THE INDUSTRY”) appear here again, as the fact 
that women tend to work in these areas affects unions’ ability to organise women. 
//…A lot of the female professions for us, like podiatrists and others, were 
very small. So it actually cost us money to look after them in some 
ways…//…the old Miscellaneous Workers Liquor, Hospitality and … have 
got awful problems, partly because of low unionisation rate, partly by 
having a whole host of small employers who are very difficult to deal 
with…// 
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‘Bargaining power’, ‘militancy’ and ‘strategic jobs’ were grouped under ‘Union power’ 
as these factors were the main sources of union power mentioned by interviewees. It was 
felt that men were inclined to ‘militancy’, to hold ‘strategic jobs’ and thus to have more 
‘bargaining power’.  
‘Strategic jobs’ were jobs such as grano workers who work on concrete pours for large 
buildings. There is very little skill in the job; workers are easily recruited; yet this 
becomes a strategic job giving construction unions considerable power over the 
employer when a concrete pour is being conducted (Interview with employer 
representative F).  
Again, ‘Work value factors’ could have been brought in here and that is because at least 
one interviewee (Interview with union official A) felt that the commission’s work value 
assessment of members’ jobs had been affected by their ability to take strategic action. 
‘Militancy’ is shown as a connector in Figure 18 and discussed in most detail in Section 
5.4.3 under ‘PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES’. Bargaining power clearly also relates 
to ‘militancy’ and both relate to ‘union density’ discussed above.  
5.3.2 Industrial Relations Reasons: ‘Employers’ Strategies Prevent 
Equality’ 
Figure 19 below shows the categories grouped under ‘EMPLOYERS’ STRATEGIES 
PREVENT EQUALITY’ and their codes. These were ‘Specific wage case examples’, 
‘federal government opposed’, ‘Job evaluation’ and ‘Decentralisation’. 
Interviewees talked about the ‘federal government…’ as an employer, resisting pay 
equality for female public sector employees during the 1980s (as also detailed in Chapter 
2, Section 2.3.1). ‘Specific examples’ included the ‘WA clerical award’ restructuring 
case where the employer representatives were very effective in delaying increases 
leading to Western Australian private clerks being paid less than those elsewhere; and 
‘child care [in] WA’ where employers suggested linking child care to teaching instead of 
metal trades work which may have had the effect of decreasing possible wage increases.  
The child care example is detailed below in Section 5.3.4 under ‘INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS LAW’, ‘minimum rate adjustment’. It is also relevant to the code 
‘individuals’ personal values affect results’ in Section 5.4.1.2. 
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In the ‘WA clerical award’ case, after the Western Australian clerks’ main award, the 
Clerks (Commercial, Social and Professional) Award was restructured, the pay structure 
stopped at three grades. This was instead of adding another three grades to create the 
six-grade structure achieved in most other Australian states. An employer representative 
involved said “we didn’t like that structure and there were many counter-proposals and 
alternatives put. It ultimately ended up in arbitration…(Interview with employer 
representative B) 
The other concern the employer representative raised was that going to six grades 
extended the coverage of the then Federated Clerks Union into the managerial and 
administrative area and their constitution did not allow for that. According to employer 
representative B, it was because the Federated Clerks Union’s constitution in Western 
Australia did not cover the more highly skilled clerical workers: 
Our position is…for the Clerks Union to be maintained under their rules 
…not to go beyond that…under the federal rules they can cover the CEO, 
under state laws they cannot. So we certainly had an issue with the extent 
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to which they could in their current form pursue anything further. 
(Interview with employer representative B) 
‘Job evaluation’ was seen by interviewees as another technique used by employers and 
managers, particularly within the public sector, that had mixed value for women. This 
was discussed in detail with the literature in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.  
All the above categories were seen to connect to ‘Work value factors’. The specific 
examples and the federal government employment areas referred to above, involved 
assessing work value before assigning a wage. ‘Job evaluation’ is a method of assessing 
work value although, according to Short (1986), one that was rarely used by the 
commissions to set wages, but rather by employers within the firm or organisation.  
‘Decentralisation’ was something interviewees saw as affecting Western Australian 
women badly: 
//…We had moved away from CPI indexation in the mid-80s to award 
restructuring and enterprise bargaining. You can see it as a progressive 
decentralisation… people [who] tend to have less bargaining power…will 
tend to do less well in a decentralised than a centralised environment 
where the increase is automatic…//…It's decentralisation in Western 
Australia…// 
Analysis of the wage data that provided context to the interviews certainly confirms this 
view. The data in Table A-4, Appendix 4, shows a negative effect on the female-
dominated wages studied compared to male-dominated wages studied over the period 
beginning in 1990, when decentralisation began to take effect, to 2003 when 
decentralisation was evident. The use of EBAs was particularly symptomatic of that 
decentralisation. All male-dominated areas studied had EBAs or Western Australia 
Workplace Agreements by 2003 (indicated by shading of relevant data cells in the 
Tables A-4 to A-6 in Appendix 4). Only female-dominated occupations, child care 
workers and Western Australia clerical workers, were still on centralised awards. 
As shown in Table A-4, the Western Australian data (which are also the most complete 
and reliable) indicate that, over this period of decentralisation from 1990 to 2003, the 
female–dominated classifications studied had obtained a much lower increase (31 to 51 
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per cent) than most male-dominated classifications had received (90 to 228 per cent). 
The wage rates of the male-dominated classification, metal tradesperson, rose over the 
13 year period by 97.5 per cent; the driver classification rose by 93 per cent and the 
building trades labourer by 125 per cent. For one male-dominated classification, dump 
truck operator/miner, rates rose by 228 per cent. The Western Australian Health 
Department Level 6 male-majority classification increased by 34 per cent and the 
Western Australian Main Roads Level 6, by 37 per cent. 
In Western Australia, for female-dominated classifications, the highest increase was 52.5 
per cent for a sales assistant, then 51 per cent for a Level 2.5 teacher and a qualified 
child care giver; then 45 per cent for a Grade 1 clerk; and finally 39 and 31 per cent for 
the female-dominated lower level public sector employees. (Somewhat oddly and not 
explained in published decisions, the female-dominated federal public sector health 
ASO2 gained 65.0 per cent.) 
This outcome was really a success story for enterprise bargaining (which decentralised 
bargaining to the workplace) in the male-dominated classifications studied. As can be 
seen by comparing Table A-5 (giving wage rates for 1990 and 1993) and Table A-6 
(giving rates for 1994, 1996 and 2003), the male-dominated classifications moved from 
award wage rates to EBA rates earlier and obtained higher wage increases from EBAs, 
than any female-dominated area. The only exception to this rule was in the more mixed 
public sector areas which obtained very little from their EBAs, as discussed above in 
Section 5.2.2. 
Even when female-dominated classifications studied did have EBAs, these did not 
necessarily lead to higher outcomes. For example, teachers on EBAs still gained only a 
very little more (51 per cent) than private clerks (45 per cent) on awards, over the 
period 1990 to 2003. 
‘Individualisation’, or the move to individual rather than collective agreements, again 
more prevalent in Western Australia, as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4, was seen 
by unions as a push by employers against unionisation and as a source of pay inequality. 
For example, a Western Australian union representative felt that state’s lower relative 
pay for women was caused by individual contracts: 
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…that’s one of those consequences…of deregulated labour market or the 
workplace agreement, that whole bringing in of workplace agreements to 
get people off awards, to get people…out of any sort of centralised 
bargaining process. Because whereas I still think there are problems with 
the centralised bargaining process I think that women tend to do better 
under those processes than they do under…individual contracts. 
(Interview with union official S) 
An interviewee saw using enterprise bargaining collective agreements as a more 
convenient strategy than using individual workplace agreements. The manager said:  
It was a fair way to negotiate and the idea of actually going down that path 
and negotiating individually with 5 or 600 employees just well didn’t seem 
sensible or a cost-effective way to do things. (Interview with manager A) 
Another interviewee’s firm opted for the individual agreements because it gave them 
more management control and continuity of supply to clients. 
[I]ndividual contracts were originally used as a method for ensuring that 
we were able to guarantee our customers continuity of supply. While that 
in many areas has been interpreted as purely de-unionising that was 
certainly a side effect but the prime objective was to get back some 
management control and ensure continuity of supply. (Interview with 
manager E) 
5.3.3 Industrial Relations Reasons: Political Reasons 
Under the major category ‘POLITICAL REASONS’ interviewees’ remarks are coded into 
categories on: ‘federal government opposed’, ‘legislative differences WA’ and ‘minimum 
wages’ as shown in Figure 20. 
The low ‘minimum wages’ set by the Western Australian Coalition government from 
1992/3 to 2001 (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4) were claimed to have contributed to pay 
inequality, as women were disproportionately represented amongst those on minimum 
wages. Interviewees attributed Western Australia’s wider gender pay gap to the level at 
which minimum wages were set during this period and felt it could be reduced by 
increasing minimum wages when the Labor government came to power in 2001. 
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//…WA has this lower minimum wage than the rest of Australia …//… I 
think we can do more in the area of pay equity by moving issues across the 
board, than we can by just looking at single cases…//  










Similarly interviewees felt ‘legislative differences [between] WA’ and elsewhere in 
Australia were a source of the larger pay gap in Western Australia. This was covered in 
some detail in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.5, but was also discussed during interviews so 
interviewees’ comments are detailed here. (Clearly this code could have been grouped 
under the ‘Industrial relations law’ category, but governments make laws and the 
differences between the federal and state laws were seen by interviewees as reflecting 
political differences.) 
The AIRC and WAIRC operated under different legislation. As shown in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2.9, this difference mattered, as the Western Australian legislation had no pay 
equality provisions until the Industrial Relations Reform Act 2001 (WA).  
Federal commissioners’ views on the use of federal provisions to review awards for 
discrimination (i.e. s.143(1C) Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)) were sought. One 
federal commissioner claimed that these provisions were rarely used and felt they did 
not help (Short 2001:17). Another federal commissioner, who had more to do with 
award reviews, said that, while adjustment for indirect discrimination in awards was 
extremely unlikely during AIRC award reviews, at least this encouraged the commission 
and the parties to maintain awards and keep them up to date. Apparently changes related 
to equal opportunity were more likely to be about language and removing clauses with 
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references to age or infirmity, than pay equity (Interview with Commissioner A). The 
commissioner said: 
The [industrial relations] parties did look at direct discrimination in the 
Howev tralia, award reviews only started in 2001/2 and then only on 
C, 
o 
the federal legislation (s.150 which was first inserted by the Industrial Relations Reform 
form of language and provisions especially for women/people with 
disabilities; these [were] removed. Internal rates, relativities were not 
looked at. The test case discrimination clause was put into all awards. Age 
discrimination - rates of pay according to age were removed. There was 
no real examination of pay equity to my knowledge. (Interview with 
Commissioner A) 
er, in Western Aus
the request of the relevant Minister and through Western Australian government funding 
of unions to review awards, not through any legislative requirement (WAIRC 2003).  
Section 40B of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) gave the power for the WAIR
like the AIRC under s.143(1C) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), to review 
awards on its own motion. Western Australian awards beginning to be modernized in 
this process were, without exception, at least partially inconsistent with the Minimum 
Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA) and often contained pay rates below the 
minimum wage (Short 2002b). The WAIRC called for submissions from the parties on 
what it should do under s.40B and summarised these submissions into a discussion paper 
(WAIRC 2003). The type of s.40B changes to awards suggested in the discussion paper 
(WAIRC 2003) were somewhat similar to those described by the Commissioner A in the 
comment above. Only one suggestion in the paper (WAIRC 2003) went further than 
changing discriminatory language and outdated discriminatory clauses. This was to 
revisit the Children’s Services (Private) Award minimum rate adjustment, which may 
have been discriminatory, as discussed below in Section 5.3.4. Western Australian 
awards modernized under the new Act were also only going through the WAIRC very 
slowly, with many, at the time of writing, still bogged down in negotiation with 
employers (conversations with WAIRC officers and relevant unions: February 2005).  
Federally, award reviews began in 1993 with the insertion of the relevant provision int
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Act 1993 (Cth)) and continued to at least the end of 2003; and pay equity orders could be 
made for enterprise agreements under s.170BD of the current federal Act. In Western 
Australia, as at the end of 2004, there was no ability to adjust any type of agreement for 
pay equality under the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA). According to a union 
official, legal advice given to Western Australian unions stated that the state wage fixing 
guidelines would make any changes to awards for pay equality impossible, without 
further legislative change. 
…one of the issues that came up is that from our interpretation of the 
wage fixing principles and our questioning of counsel is that the state 
Intervi nder 
‘ECON S’ and are also discussed here. This is because governments 
g or moving on issues which, 
The co oney 
on fem her vote-gaining items, governments 
wage fixing principles as they currently stand, in fact stand nationally, do 
not allow or facilitate the running of a pay equity case. (Interview with 
union official A)  
ewees’ remarks coded under ‘federal government opposed’ were discussed u
OMIC REASON
are reluctant, according to a commissioner, to spend money on the status of women until 
votes are likely to be lost through failure to do so:  
History shows that too often the government of the day has declined to 
ruffle the comfortable majority by debatin
when viewed objectively, are issues which should be dealt with. The status 
of women, including the employment provisions which have operated to 
the detriment of women over many decades, is an example of one such 
issue. Until the voice of the community is so strong as to make an issue an 
electoral liability, governments will usually not allocate budgetary support 
to issues. (Interview with Commissioner A) 
ntrary case must also hold true – if votes are likely to be lost by spending m
ale public sector employees instead of on ot
will oppose this expenditure. In other words, as employer representative D said “it’s … 
going to come out of the public purse. You’ve got to take that public interest question 
into consideration as well.”  
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As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1, the federal (Labor) government opposed equal 
pay for its employees. When it was finally granted by the AIRC the federal government 
then allowed these advances to be eroded in the late 1980s and early 1990s during 
further restructuring (Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2). This was raised by a union official 
interviewed who pointed out that the federal government had always been “on the 
opposing side of every case” (Interview with union official F) in this process.  
5.3.4 Industrial Relations Reasons: Industrial Relations Law 
Codes grouped under the category ‘INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW’ are shown in Figure 
21 below. Basically these were the different legal approaches identified by interviewees as 
historically affecting Australian women’s pay, related processes and the main outcome: 
‘Women’s work undervalued’. 
 
Figure 21 – Industrial Relations Reasons: Industrial Relations Law 
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Interviewees felt that ‘Equal pay for work of equal value…’ had not been properly 
implemented, forming the context to the lower relative wages of women in 1990. When 
talking about implementing ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ a union official 
interviewed said: 
I think a major problem occurred in Western Australia and I don't know … 
how it happened in other states, but at the point at which we removed 
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female rates of pay from awards there is no doubt that there was a move 
on at that stage to shuffle women into the lowest category and men into the 
second lowest category. For example, you had plastic workers, lowest 
level, which was male and the males received the rate of pay and you had 
plastic worker female and they received a lower rate of pay. Well, what 
happened in the transition process was that the union agreed that there 
would be plastic worker Level 1 where all the men went and there would 
be plastic worker 'other', where all the women went. And, plastic worker 
'other' received a lower rate of pay. (Interview with union official A) 
Short (1986:325) shows that this type of shuffle occurred in the federal industrial 
relations system too, with female-dominated public service typists applying for equal 
pay for work of equal value being treated in a similar way. They were added on to the 
bottom of the (male) clerk range with no consideration of their skills in typing which 
were in addition to the other clerical skills needed for a lower level clerical job. On the 
record at least, no work value assessment was made and the public service union did not 
appear to object (53 Commonwealth Public Service Arbitration Report 235). 
Something similar happened with The Age newspaper. A union official claimed that 
some unions tried, as in this case, to achieve a more equitable outcome, but employers 
(or the AIRC) had prevented it. Thus this was seen by the interviewee as an ‘employer 
strategy affecting equitable outcomes’, at that time, or else it was related to the role of 
the commission. The union official said: 
… they did the same thing in The Age where we went through the history 
of wage rates payable to telesales employees who were women. After the 
1972 equal pay case the union claimed one particular male rate, but the 
employer refused to agree to it. The end result of difficult negotiations and 
ultimately, arbitration, was this women’s classification being put on the 
lowest male rate. So, I think in all of those cases of the application of the 
equal pay principle, various unions tried hard to get higher rates for their 
women members, but were knocked off by the commission or by hard 
negotiating employers. Other unions probably didn't try that hard. 
(Interview with union official K) 
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Failure to conduct any analysis of what women did in comparison to men, to assess the 
value of women’s work, is likely to have resulted in retention of historically unequal 
wage rates in predominantly female awards at the start of this study’s time period. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2, Australian women were paid less than men 
historically, on the basis that women did not support a family and needed less income. 
As shown above, interviewees consulted felt that the implementation of the 1972 case 
continued to permit a situation where predominantly ‘women’s work was undervalued’. 
‘Women’s work was also seen by large numbers of interviewees as being undervalued’ 
during ‘minimum rates adjustment’; a process mostly carried out between 1991 and 
1993. A union official talked about the problems of work value assessment in female-
dominated occupations, particularly in the male-dominated Western Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission. 
[W]henever we have a group of nurses who operate technology, who 
operate some visible system or procedure, then it is far easier to get a 
work value assessment done on that group of workers, than it is on the 
group of workers who work in a mental health institute and who, in fact, 
are required as part of their work, to demonstrate a high level of 
autonomy in a very dangerous area at times. But of course it's all soft 
options in terms of an interpretation and a placement of value on that in 
terms of worker worth. So, that comparison becomes a very difficult one 
for the Courts and… It's difficult to get that across to commissioners, 
especially in Western Australia where the commissioners are largely men. 
(Interview with union official A) 
(Note that ‘Women’s work undervalued’ is shown above as a connector. In the 
perception of interviewees, there are also ‘SOCIAL/CULTURAL REASONS’ for this 
undervaluation.)  
The ‘award restructuring’ process (mostly taking place between 1989 and 1992) along 
with the ‘Minimum rates adjustment process’ were seen to be aimed (at least partially) at 
removing inequities, but were found sometimes to entrench them. As Hall (1991:5) put 
it, award restructuring was seen, at the time, as  
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…a crisis for equal employment opportunities, a dangerous opportunity to 
break down barriers and open up careers – or to see the blinds fall on the 
missed window of opportunity for a long time. 
The Employment and Skills Formation Council (1989:vii) similarly said, “[f]or women 
the restructuring process will either reinforce the existing division of labour by sex or it 
will mean the revaluing of women’s traditionally undervalued skills.” 
By the year 2000, Hunter (2000:13), assessing award restructuring based on the New 
South Wales Pay Equity Inquiry findings, said: 
…the outcomes of award restructuring were less impressive than the 
aspirations. While gains were made in some areas, in others the 
establishment of award relativities once more tended to be based on 
entrenched assumptions about the lesser value of women’s work.  
Table 20 gives an indication of when award restructuring and structural efficiency began 
and ended for the awards selected for study. Relevant increases were identified from 
published commission decisions. Unfortunately the information used is not complete, as 
the relevant industrial relations commissions (Western Australian, Victorian and 
Australian) did not always record reasons for award variations.  
Generally, the eight female-dominated awards studied undertook award restructuring or 
structural efficiency processes later and had more problems with these processes than 
the eight male-dominated awards studied. As Table 20 shows, of the 17 awards studied, 
the only awards not to be restructured into a skills-based pay structure were the female-
dominated shops awards. It is also debatable whether the teachers’ awards or EBAs were 
skills-based. For the first eight years of employment the teacher’s pay rates rose through 
a classification structure based on years of experience and then, after that, there were 
senior teachers or expert teachers’ classifications based more on skill.  
The restructure of the main clerical workers award in Western Australia was problematic 
as mentioned above in Section 5.3.2. A new classification structure, containing three 
grades of skill, was introduced into the Clerks (Commercial and Social) Award in 
Western Australia, compared to six (involving three additional grades on top of the 
Western Australian levels) grades in major clerical awards in Victoria and most other 
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states. The wage rate for entry-level workers (Clerk Grade 1, 1st year) was also reduced 
slightly in the exercise. This was the only example of wage rates decreasing during 
restructuring in the awards studied. 





Some restructuring of awards: WA -1995; 
Victoria - 1994/5 qualifications bar removed, no structural efficiency payments in 
period. 
Childcare  WA - 1990 new skills-based restructured award introduced. 
Victoria – no details published on restructuring – possibly before 1990. 
Shops  WA & Victoria - No real restructuring occurred – award classifications not 
skills based 
Clerical WA – 3 grade classification structure granted June 1993. Grade 1, 1st year 
rate put down. 6 grade structure 2004. 
Victoria – 3 grade classification structure granted 1 February 1991, 6 grades, 8 
February 1991. 
Male-dominated Awards 
Metal WA – finished restructure January 1990. 
federal – finished restructure before 1990. 
Transport WA - finished restructure January 1992. 
Federal - finished restructure probably February 1992  
Building WA - finished restructure March 1990 or October 1991. Not clear in decisions. 
Federal- restructure finished July 1991 or December 1993. Not clear in decisions. 
Mining Award restructure finished April 1993 but bands restructured by company in ’95 
& ‘97 
Mixed Awards – female-dominated at lower levels, male-dominated at higher levels 
Public Service WA last structural efficiency payment December 1992, started before 1990. 
Federal restructure not really finished till 1998 but some restructuring 1991/2 and 
earlier than 1990. 
(Sources: WA Industrial Gazettes; www.osiris.gov.au; www.wagenet.gov.au; Victorian Industrial 
Gazettes) 
The Western Australian branch of the Australian Services Union finally succeeded in 
negotiations with the Western Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry when the 
top three classifications of the national structure were inserted on 1 July 2004 (84 WAIG 
2196). This was eleven years after the original restructuring of the award. Interviewees 
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explained that many factors contributed to this outcome including: problems in getting 
the WAIRC to recognise that Western Australian clerical workers used higher-level 
skills and union amalgamation between female-dominated and male unions leading to 
intra-union strife affecting resources available to use on the case. 
Of particular note is the evidence of ‘women’s work being undervalued’ in the process 
of restructuring the Western Australian clerks’ award. An employer representative who 
covered the clerical area implied that the commissioner, who presided over some of the 
case, saw clerical skills as having little or no value. Speaking of the union, the employer 
representative said: 
They didn’t want to arbitrate because quite frankly I believe one of the 
commissioners at the time just couldn’t even… what were his comments, 
“How technical it is to operate a photocopier.” It’s like…it was a 
condescending kind of remark to put down value of the work or he just 
actually couldn’t do a photocopy. (Interview with employer 
representative B) 
Similarly, the employer representative thought clerical work was undervalued and tied 
that to the length of time taken to establish its value in the Western Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission. 
Clerical work is not highly regarded or paid well in my view and it is also 
one of the awards that took a very long time, lots of argument, to establish 
that value or value of work. (Interview with employer representative B) 
‘Minimum rates adjustment’ (MRA) as discussed in Chapter 2, Sections 2.3.5 and 
2.3.6, was a commission process used to set a safety net of equitably aligned awards, 
before further decentralisation in the form of enterprise bargaining. It allowed the basic 
wage rates in women’s jobs such as clerical and retail jobs to be directly compared to 
those of male-dominated (metal trades) jobs for the first time. The historical bias against 
female-dominated jobs could possibly have been corrected within the Australian 
industrial relations system through this process. MRA, like award restructuring and 
structural efficiency, was a lengthy, difficult (and thus inevitably expensive) process for 
all concerned. A senior male union official explained: 
164 
…it was resource, reasonably resource-intensive. It required unions to 
divert resources away from areas which were relatively well-serviced, 
well-maintained, read for that code: high-skilled male, sectors of the 
membership, into relatively low-paid, poorly maintained award areas. 
(Interview with union official R) 
The awards studied demonstrate that the implementation of MRA was not without 
problems in the public sector clerical and administration and female-dominated awards 
studied, but was trouble-free in the other male-dominated awards. Three out of four 
public sector awards studied were never minimum rate adjusted. As illustrated in Table 
21, these were the government teachers’ awards for both Western Australia and Victoria 
and the award for Western Australian clerical and administrative public servants. This is 
because they were not minimum rates awards, but paid, or actual, rates awards that were 
excluded from MRA. The federal public service award was made into a minimum rate 
award in 1998 and its pay rates were reduced at that time, to reflect the fact that the rates 
were now minimums instead of actual pay rates. However, in Western Australia, the 
public sector awards retained their nominal status as paid rates awards.  
Female-dominated awards had later access to MRA, than the male-dominated awards 
studied. Most of the male-dominated awards studied (seven) and three female-dominated 
awards (the Victorian and Western Australian shops awards and the Victorian clerical 
award) included wage increases from MRA by 1991/2. The female-dominated Western 
Australian clerical award and male-dominated mining award were minimum rate 
adjusted by 1993. The Western Australian female-dominated child care award was fully 
adjusted finally in 1994. Given that MRAs were not backdated, the predominantly 
Western Australian female workers covered by these awards lost earnings that could 
have been available to them for the period of the delay involved. 
According to interviewees, the late date for MRA of the Western Australian clerical 
award was caused by the problems discussed above over restructuring the award 
(Interviews with union officials C & J). The commission required the award to be 
restructured before any MRA took place. However, this rule was relaxed on occasions 
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and this is how the shops awards in both Victoria and Western Australia were able to be 
minimum rates adjusted, without being restructured.  




WA & Victoria – no adjustment – paid rates award 
Professional rates review by Fed. Government 1991/2 – no comparison male-
dominated occupations. 
Childcare  WA began 1991, ended 1994 
Victoria – no details published. 
Shops  WA - began August 1990, ended October 1991. 
Victoria  - began November 1990, ended November 1991. 
Clerical WA - one MRA payment – June 1993. 
Victoria – not clear in decision if received MRA payments, probably adjusted 
within structural efficiency increases by 1992. 
Male-Dominated Awards 
Metals WA - began April 1990, ended April 1991. 
Federal - began March 1990, ended August 1991. 
Transport WA - began September 1990, ended January 1992. 
Federal – not clear in commission decisions, probably did within structural 
efficiency increases by 1992. 
Building WA - finished probably March 1990 or October 1991. 
Federal - finished July 1991 or December 1993. Not clear in decisions. 
Mining WA - finished November 1992. 
Mixed Award – female-dominated at lower levels, male at higher 
Public Service WA - no adjustment – paid rates award 
Federal - converted to minimum rates award 1998. 
(Sources: WA Industrial Gazettes; www.osiris.gov.au; www.wagenet.gov.au; Victorian Industrial 
Gazettes) 
The child care MRA case in Western Australia provides evidence of industrial relations 
commissioners and employers failing to recognise when they had (indirectly) 
discriminated against women. (This is further detailed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2.2.) By 
comparing child care workers to teaching, another female-dominated occupation and not 
metal tradesperson, a male-dominated occupation and the standard comparison, the case 
may have compounded indirect discrimination and provided an example of ‘women’s 
work being undervalued’. Employer representatives suggested this process to the 
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commissioner (73 WAIG 101 at 107-8) so this case is also mentioned under 
‘EMPLOYERS’ STRATEGIES PREVENT EQUALITY’, Section 5.3.1. 
Here, also, the researcher and a commissioner talk about the slow and difficult process 
of MRA and how, by 1994/6, it had mostly had its day as the focus changed: 
Interviewee: … I reckon the minimum rates adjustment was a bureaucratic 
nightmare. Researcher: Well you did need to have a restructured award, 
beforehand, usually. Interviewee: And then … the rules changed towards 
the end and it got slacker and that was that. I mean it was a grand 
scheme… it would have been great if it had been implemented and fast. 
…across Australia it was too slow and too complicated. It was a good 
idea. Then at the end of it we switched. (Interview with Commissioner D) 
The switch was to ‘Enterprise bargaining’ which was clearly seen by interviewees as 
“setting the cause back” and creating more pay inequality during the period 1993 to 
2003. As explained in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3, with enterprise bargaining the focus 
moved from the industry and awards, to enterprise-level agreements. All award 
classifications continued to have their wage rates increased through safety net 
adjustments arbitrated by the AIRC, which were also adopted by state tribunals, 
including the WAIRC. Higher wage increases were able to be achieved by bargaining 
between employers, employees and their representatives at the enterprise level for 
productivity improvements. As there were many more enterprises than awards for 
industries and occupations, interviewees noted that more resources were needed for 
agreements and fewer resources were available for changing awards (Interviews with 
union officials A & R).  
The experience of private sector clerks in Western Australia, detailed in Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2, demonstrates this problem. Their union was advised that there was little 
scope within the Western Australian Industrial Commission guidelines under enterprise 
bargaining for any changes to awards, other than safety net adjustments and that it was 
better to focus on achieving enterprise bargaining outcomes where these were possible. 
Two union representatives from the ASU explained the problems involved: 
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//…the difficulty of actually getting it through the commission and 
balancing up [spending] resources there [on the award] for a year 
compared to getting out and trying to strike reasonable agreements out in 
the field…//…the…further deregulation of the labour market with 
enterprise bargaining…makes it virtually impossible for you to start 
pursuing a work value case, in terms of resources. Because…you are now 
dealing with a broader base of people, most of those people are, you know, 
a large proportion of our membership…is in local government. We’ve 
pursued enterprise bargaining claims in those areas and really that’s 
where our resources go…// 
Thus, enterprise bargaining agreements were very rare amongst Western Australian 
clerks covered by the award investigated and more likely to occur for workers in other 
areas covered by the same union, where membership density was higher, members 
participated in union affairs and were more likely to be male. In the perception of a 
clerical union official, the union leadership’s point of view, when comparing 
membership in their local government and air industry areas with the clerical area, was: 
We’re not going to put resources in that [clerical] area because in this 
area the members are working together, take some action, achieve things, 
whereas this group of people just see it more as an insurance…(Interview 
with union official J) 
The effects of enterprise bargaining on the occupational classifications studied give 
some context to interviewees’ views. The data in Tables A-4 to A-6 in Appendix 4 show 
clearly that by December 2003 the female-dominated classifications selected for study 
lagged behind the male-dominated classifications selected. As can be seen in Table A-6, 
only public sector employees in more male-dominated (higher level) classifications and 
drivers had increases over the period 1994 (when EBAs began to occur) to 2003 that are 
similar to (if still higher than) the female-dominated classifications. Female-dominated 
classification increases ranged from a low of 19 per cent for Western Australian 
qualified child care givers to a high of 42 per cent for APS Health Department 
administrative service officers Level 2 (ASO2s). Most increases were in the range 25 to 
30 per cent. The male-dominated classifications, by contrast, received a range of 
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increases from 30 per cent, for Western Australian Main Roads Level 6s, to 85 per cent, 
for Western Australian building trades labourers. The increase for other male-dominated 
classifications ranged (except for the public servants) from 40 to 80 per cent, or about 
twice as much as for the female-dominated classifications. 
Providing some rationale for these results, interviewees made comments about 
‘productivity trade-offs’ related to ‘Award restructuring’ and ‘Enterprise bargaining’. In 
particular, interviewees talked about non-service organisations having more to trade-off. 
A public sector union official said: 
…the service delivery agencies had always been quite streamlined. They 
didn’t have a lot to restructure…you’ve got some agencies which…don’t 
offer a service to the community in a sense, they’re policy for government 
and they’re policy for industry etc. And they have…they had a lot more 
beef and so they had a lot more opportunity to offer wage increases by 
normal restructuring, where those others had no opportunity to do that. 
(Interview with union official N) 
Related to this were comments about women’s industries and occupations ‘starting from 
a low base’ when coming into enterprise bargaining. Most awards were restructured into 
skills-based classifications before enterprise bargaining, yet many female-dominated 
awards were not, as was shown in the female-dominated award data collected for this 
study and discussed by this interviewee:  
I mean the problem that we have with a lot of our awards if we go back to 
the Food Preservers award was that it was at a very low base before we 
even started enterprise negotiating, much lower…if I use the example of 
the Cleaners and Caretakers Award, that award has never been 
restructured. It does not have a skills based [wage structure]. So if you go 
and look at those rates of pay they’re quite horrific… (Interview with 
manager A) 
‘Work value factors’ again show up as a connector in Figure 21, as these are factors used 
to set wages during commission processes for ‘Equal pay for work of equal value’ and 
for ‘Minimum rate adjustment’. 
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5.3.5 Industrial Relations Reasons: Industrial Relations Commissions 
This major category brings together comments made about industrial relations 
commissions during interviews and is depicted in Figure 22. Categories and codes 
included are: ‘structures don’t change as fast” ‘Role of commission’ (with codes 
“industrial relations is not a science” and ‘Work value factors’) and ‘male dominance of 
WAIRC’. 

















In comments coded under ‘INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSIONS’ interviewees 
pointed to the ‘male dominance of the Western Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission’ (discussed as a connector in SOCIAL/CULTURAL REASONS in Section 
5.4.1.2) and indicated that the ‘role of the commission’ is mainly restricted to reflecting 
the views of the parties:  
//…it is also reliant on the parties, what the parties gave them to make 
their decision. A lot of …these adjustments were done by consent in which 
case there wouldn’t have been much of a decision by the tribunal…Where 
there is an arbitration they look at all the evidence put to them…//…I am 
very much for a more inquisitorial method in the commission instead of 
sitting back and waiting for the adversarial process, where both sides put 
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up an argument. But I didn’t actually persuade any of my colleagues to 
that point of view…// 
Interviewees also said that the commissions were ‘structures that did not change as 
fast as society’.  
I think we have institutions that take time to change and we have a very 
structured IR system. That has a lot of benefits for workers but what it also 
has is structural impediments, or periods of time it takes to get the debate 
in the industrial commissions up to speed with the debate in the community 
about the worth of those things. And…if you run reclassification 
arguments based on gender equity issues etc, most of the commissioners 
wouldn’t probably know what you were talking about. So it’s about re-
educating the people also making the decisions about how the structure 
fits into place. (Interview with union official N) 
In comments relating to “industrial relations is not a science”, commissioners and other 
industrial parties made it clear that in many cases, particularly those involving any 
assessment of the value of an occupation, value judgements and inexact estimates were 
used. (This code also links to the categories discussed below in ‘NATURE AND 
NURTURE REASONS’ connecting with ‘individuals’ personal values affect results’ 
and will be covered in more detail there.) Interviewees also noted the subjective nature 
of commissioners’ assessment of ‘Work value factors’ such as responsibility. 
Judgements became a result of personal perceptions as well as arguments put by the 
parties, as this comment from a commissioner shows, when asked how he assessed the 
work value of nurses. 
…it was comparison with other occupations requiring similar formal 
qualifications, similar experience and similar responsibility. (Researcher: 
What … did you see as similar responsibility?)…[S]chool teachers having 
responsibility for children and nurses having responsibility for patients, 
it’s very, very subjective. (Researcher: So you’re saying that the process of 
working out the work value for that occupation at least was a subjective 
process?) Yes, yes. (Interview with Commissioner C) 
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5.3.6 Industrial Relations Reasons: Summary  
Some of the economic regression studies on the gender wage gap reviewed in Chapter 2, 
Section) attempted to quantify industrial relations and legal factors. Chapman and 
Mulvey (1984), Wooden (1999) and Pocock and Alexander (1999) used union 
membership as a variable. Miller (1994b) used different time periods to conclude that 
AIRC equal pay decisions were the source of a dramatic narrowing of the gender wage 
gap from 1973 to 1989; but Kidd and Meng (1997) found legislative change on equal 
opportunity and affirmative action had not affected the gender wage gap in the period 
from 1981/2 to 1989/90.  
However, again, the perceptions of interviewees analysed in this section showed the 
deep connections between how the industrial relations system works and less 
quantifiable factors (relating to social and cultural issues) that may supply reasons for 
the way the industrial relations system works to maintain lower wages for women. This 
is evident, above all, when interviewees talk about “industrial relations is not a 
science”, but also when they comment on ‘Internal union processes’ and factors 
influencing union membership and union strategy. The social/cultural nature of 
commissioners’ views and interviewees’ perceptions about how these have impacted on 
decisions such as those about work value of female-dominated occupations during award 
restructuring and minimum rate adjustment was also beginning to emerge. 
5.4  NATURE AND NURTURE REASONS 
There was a range of reasons for gender pay inequality given by interviewees that were 
not measured by variables in the econometric studies reviewed in Chapter 3, or at least 
only very indirectly, as with the union membership variable discussed above. Even when 
interviewees commented on economic and industrial factors above, it is evident that 
something else, apart from economic and industrial relations explanations, was felt to be 
important to gender wage inequality. The interviewees proposed that other, non-
economic and non-industrial, factors contribute to gender wage inequality. When 
employer representative D talked about women being in different industries to men “for 
whatever reason”; when Commissioner C said women chose different occupations “for 
reasons that lie outside the realms of economics” and found assessing the responsibility 
172 
Figure 24 below shows categories grouped under ‘SOCIAL/CULTURAL REASONS’.  
5.4.1 Nature and Nurture Reasons: Social/Cultural Reasons 
Many of the categories and codes used under this super category are also coded under 
the earlier economic and industrial relations super categories, but comments reported 
here brought out the ‘NATURE AND NURTURE REASONS’ side of the issue. 
‘ECONOMIC REASONS’ such as ‘training’ and ‘IT’S THE INDUSTRY’ have their 
social and cultural side as well. ‘Work value factors’ used by the commissions and how 
these are assessed are affected by social and cultural issues or values, as will be shown 
below; and ‘personal choice in occupation’, a ‘NATURE AND NURTURE’ code, is 
clearly connected to the economic categories of “IT’S THE INDUSTRY” and “It’s the 
occupations…” 
The super category ‘NATURE AND NURTURE REASONS’ covers these issues and 
is made up of major categories named ‘SOCIAL/CULTURAL REASONS’, 
‘PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES’ and ‘BIOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES’ as shown in 
Figure 23.  
of nurses to be subjective; and when Commissioner D said “industrial relations is not a 
science” these issues were emerging.  
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Figure 24 – Nature and Nurture Reasons: Social/Cultural Reasons 
 
 
Some general comments from interviewees on ‘SOCIAL/CULTURAL REASONS’ are 
considered and then more specific social and cultural issues will be discussed. First, a 
manager’s comment: 
I mean on the surface if one was to look at industrial awards it actually 
suggests that everybody’s paid the same and certainly the move towards 
equal pay some decades ago was to in fact achieve that. I think the reality 
of achieving that lays in other things such as…social and cultural norms. 
(Interview with manager A) 
An industrial relations commissioner concluded as follows. 
Discrimination in wage outcomes still exists decades after the right to 
equal pay was achieved in 1969. The discrimination is covert, to the extent 
that it is not based on numerical outcomes of a wage rate which can be 
easily identified, but arises from a range of other factors which are based 
on cultural or societal values and responsibilities which are not easily 
overcome. (Interview with Commissioner A) 
Another commissioner agreed: 
I think it’s more a sociological phenomenon than an industrial one, you 
know, we’ve just been caught up in the same society that everyone exists 
in. (Interview with Commissioner B) 
Interviewees pointed out that historically, social and cultural values had ensured that 
women were paid less than men in Australia. They talked about the ‘bad old days’ when 
women and men were paid separate male and female rates under Australian awards.  
//… it was socially accepted, you know 100 years ago that women didn’t 
have rights…//…there is a history of men and women being paid 
differently as teachers…which continued until the end of the 1960s… there 
were actual differences in rates of pay for people doing the same job up 
until the end of the 1960s and that had always been the case…//…going 
back I would have thought 40 or 50 years, then there may well have been 
…discrimination [in terms of pay], but I would think that that mentality is 
probably changed or gone at this stage…//…some of it is historic in terms 
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of views about roles and that roles that women have traditionally 
undertaken more than men …// 
In Chapter 2, Section 2.2, it was noted that women were characterised, in early industrial 
tribunal decisions, as supported by a husband or father and thus as needing less income, 
so were paid less.  
Similarly, it is a matter of historical fact that Australian society used to hold the cultural 
value that women’s place was in the home. Interviewees talked about: 
//…the old archaic ideas that we should be home caring for our 
children…// … the concept that women’s place was in the home and so 
that … in many families it was seen as inappropriate to educate girls to 
the same level as boys…// 
Interviewees acknowledged that these historical cultural values about the place of 
women in society might still be affecting women’s pay rates today. Others felt this had 
all been removed. 
The more specific ‘Cultural reasons’ that were raised by interviewees had to do with 
historical organisational culture, ethnic culture and social culture. Interviewees talked 
about organisational cultures not being friendly towards women in certain “male’ jobs 
such as management, or mining, or construction. This even extended into working in 
industrial relations itself. A union official previously employed in large statutory 
corporations said: 
…when I used to work for [X Corp] and [Y Corp], it was the case that … 
certain classifications which afforded … better career advancement were 
generally male-dominated and not that open to women. For example, 
industrial relations has been traditionally something of…a boys’ club. And 
it has afforded, certainly when I was at [X Corp]… a more lucrative 
career path…. (Interview with union official C) 
There is clearly a link here with comments from a previously described category: “It’s 
the occupations”. 
More than one interviewee talked about how their cultural background gave them a 
different insight into why women and men are paid differently. For example, a manager 
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explained below, that different waves of migration to Australia (and particularly to 
Western Australia) brought in cultural values than may have led to persisting pay 
inequality. 
…what you tend to have is a lot of economic migrants to Australia. But 
people who are coming to us for economic reasons are actually coming to 
us from countries that are not as developed as…Australia…And so 
therefore, with each wave of economic migration to this country, you are 
finding that people are coming to us whose social and cultural norms are 
different to what we would view western norms as being…so therefore the 
role of the woman in the family…is viewed differently to…the standard 
western norm… (Interview with manager A) 
‘Timing of union meetings’ was seen as an ‘INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REASON’ 
(discussed above in Section 5.3.1), but comments about the same issue were coded 
under ‘cultural reasons’. It was said that a union’s meetings being organised for after 
5pm did not fit into the cultural norms of the ethnically-dominated workforce involved, 
who felt women should be home straight after work to look after the husband and 
children. The interviewee said he/she had come into contact with: 
…large numbers of women who were employed in…manufacturing with a 
range of cultural backgrounds. There were lots of social norms that 
provided barriers to them to actually participate in particular 
activities…they had husbands and family members who were concerned 
about their welfare if they went out alone at night. (Interview with 
manager A) 
The next grouping of comments is under the category entitled: “It’s the occupations they 
are in”. The economic side to interviewees’ comments on occupations has already been 
discussed but it was also interviewees’ perception that women’s occupational choices 
are affected by social and cultural issues. 
//…it's traditionally fed through parents, I think, so nursing's OK and 
teaching's OK, working in an abattoir is not. Applies to some extent to 
men, as well, but it doesn't seem to have been as determinative in 
influencing men's choices as it has been with women…//…individual 
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choice is obviously affected by socialisation… Women tend to choose 
occupations which involve, you know, human interaction … you look at the 
occupation, caring, childcare … teaching and social work, they all involve 
people issues. Helping people and children…//…It’s actually the jobs they 
are doing and to get any move in this, it is not about wage rates, it’s about 
broadening the scope of jobs that women take up…//…a sort of pastoral, 
caring sort of role has been seen as less than, less responsible or worthy of 
less pay than a job that males have taken up which may not involve the 
same level of responsibility and complexity…// 
This again connects into ‘Work value factors’ used by the commissions that has been 
discussed at length above. 
5.4.1.1 Nature and nurture reasons: social/cultural reasons:  
hire in own image 
Given the complex nature of the categories shown under ‘SOCIAL/CULTURAL 
REASONS’ a sub-set of Figure 24 is shown below as Figure 25 to illustrate the codes 
under the category ‘Hire in own image’. 
Figure 25 – Nature & Nurture Reasons: Social/Cultural Reasons:  
Hire in own image 











As interviewees pointed out, male-dominated management hire and promote staff, 
giving them the ability to limit women’s access to well paid jobs. This is particularly the 
case if they ‘Hire in own image’. (Note that this category is closely allied to the next 
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category of the ‘SOCIAL/CULTURAL REASONS’: ‘social power’ and in particular the 
code ‘management’.) A commissioner explained that, in his perception, management 
were more likely to relate to men (with families at home) than (single) women.  
The commissioner said: 
…men are the people who control at the management level and identify 
better with the person who says I’ve got a wife and kid at home. And the 
female says I‘ve got no home, I’ve got no family, I live in a flat somewhere 
and look after myself. Well, you’re the only one affected. (Interview with 
Commissioner B) 
An employer representative brought in social values when he claimed that: 
…the industrial relations system can’t actually fix the difference. What 
needs to be looked at is how come females don’t get jobs in the higher paid 
occupations… (Interview with employer representative E) 
This perception was coded as ‘it’s women’s access and choices’. The employer 
representative pointed out that the industrial relations system had failed to deal with pay 
inequality so far and he saw the causes to be social, rather than industrial, with the 
solutions being in ensuring better access for women to higher paid jobs. He saw this as 
coming through equal employment opportunity (legislation and practice) and through 
trying to re-orientate girls in the education system towards the new economy and higher 
paying, previously male-dominated, jobs.  
Related to ‘Hire in own image’ were miners’ perceptions reported by an interviewee 
(Interview with union official O) that ‘women [were] not good enough’ to work in 
mining – that they should stay in the office instead. Men at a mine had resisted women 
learning how to drive dump trucks and other machinery. As the union official O said “it 
was a real struggle to get them to…recognise the fact that the girls could actually drive 
the trucks”. This attitude may now be changing with a mining employer making it clear 
that women are treated equally by his company: 
…we offer the same opportunities…for females who drive trucks…There’s 
certainly some old fashioned views in mining because we have been so 
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heavily male-dominated for years but they’re eroding. (Interview with 
manager E)  
In comments coded under ‘Promotion’ a commissioner pointed out that the issue was 
not just about women getting into management jobs, but that having them there may 
change the firm’s values about how much they pay people in traditionally sex-
differentiated jobs. 
In my experience, obstacles to women in promotion positions and senior 
levels of companies are a major problem. Until senior positions are 
equally shared by men and women and a fundamental change in the 
culture of many workplaces and the range of needs and values of workers 
are fully considered in decision making which impacts on employees, then 
the differential outcomes between male and female wages will continue. 
(Interview with Commissioner A) 
Other comments related to specific examples where women’s promotion had been and 
may still be blocked. For example a union official said: 
[T]here’s issues like the glass ceiling…When I first started as a teacher 
the only way you could get promotion was to go to the country and for 
women with families that just wasn’t an option. And the men did though 
because the women went with them. So that is just a clear plain indicator 
of inability to go up the ladder and even today that situation hasn’t been 
largely redressed. (Interview with union official G) 
A manager explained how women are further disadvantaged in promotion by the 
common organisational habit of valuing volume and process, or being present, rather 
than quality and getting the work done. 
[I]t’s what you value, there’s a perception of how much you do, as 
opposed to the reality of what you’re actually doing, exactly what that’s 
worth. I think some people value volume and process. You know, you’re 
here from 9 to 5 so you must be doing a good job. As opposed to hey, if 
you’re the primary carer for your kids and you’re out of here at 4 o’clock 
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each day and I can’t find you at 4.30 when I really need you, you’re not 
prepared to stay, well you’re not worth it. (Interview with manager B) 
5.4.1.2 Nature and nurture reasons: social/cultural reasons: social 
power 
The last category coded under major category ‘SOCIAL/CULTURAL REASONS’ is 
‘Social power’. As shown in Figure 26 below, codes grouped under ‘Social power’ are: 
‘management’, ‘higher paid jobs male no matter what’, ‘male dominance of unions’, 
‘male dominance of WAIRC’ and ‘individuals’ personal values affect results’. 
















In the perception of the interviewees (both male and female) men wield power in society 
that overrides that of women. A male union official talked about power: 
…there is this power relationship running that deeply conditions the way 
you look at the world and I would say that, it’s certainly my experience 
that women come off second best when you get down to that. It’s not 
something that is [overt]…even if you look at this data it wouldn’t surprise 
me if I would raise that, say with senior union officials, they’d probably, 
wouldn’t believe it initially. (Interview with union official C)  
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An employer representative (E) talked about ‘higher paid jobs being male no matter 
what’, as men had better access to these than women. Another interviewee appeared to 
identify the reason for this continued better access to and control of, higher paid jobs. 
When asked if there were any other reasons why women were paid less, the male union 
official responded: 
Pure and simple, prejudice and discrimination, pursuit of self interest and 
greed…by people who are doing alright, thank you very much. (Interview 
with union official R) 
This ability to pursue self-interest is supported, whether consciously or not, by the ‘male 
dominance’ of management, unions and the Western Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission mentioned by interviewees. As already shown above, interviewees see 
‘management’ as male-dominated: 
//…men are the people who control at the management level 
…//…management teams…on training and their recruitment processes, 
although maybe not consciously but sub-consciously, actually favoured 
one sex over the other...//…3 out of 19 CEOs… [in the public sector] are 
female, [yet] 60 per cent of our workforce is female…//…even in the public 
sector, there’s still that glass ceiling…//…embedded within the whole 
system…is a culture…where people have views etc. which, it’s a bit 
intangible, an invisible barrier, but that does in fact exist…// 
The last two comments tie back to ‘Promotion’ and the glass ceiling that can exist for 
women trying to get into management. 
As explained above, under the ‘INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REASONS’ category of 
‘UNIONS’, historically unions were male-dominated and this is only changing slowly as 
union officials pointed out. Interviewees talked about the ‘male dominance of the 
WAIRC’ but not the AIRC. Union official A talked about “Western Australia where the 
commissioners are largely men”. However, the AIRC is also predominantly male, 
particularly at higher levels. In 2003, the AIRC had one female head of tribunal out of 
six (AIRC 2003:21). 
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Greatly connected to the issue of ‘male dominance…’ in unions, commissions and 
amongst management and employers is: ‘individuals’ personal values affect results’. 
This is an important category where interviewees give their perceptions of the effect 
individuals – commissioners, union officials and employers - can have on wages and 
industrial relations commissions’ processes, such as minimum rates adjustment. As 
discussed by a commissioner this is how personal values come to affect women’s wages. 
Someone gives you a perspective of the way you should go and you either 
modify that, accept that, or reject that. But, in accepting it you usually, I 
suppose, add your own values to it…But, I suppose I bring to those 
exercises the value judgments of a male, who had lived in full employment 
when he left school. Who’s never…experienced a depression. Who had 
heard about recessions but has never been directly affected by them. And, 
who, if he had known what neurosurgery was when he left school, could 
have been a neurosurgeon, because…he could have gone to university 
…done anything he liked. So, you know, I have had…a dream run and 
have inherited a set of values that were based on a society which was 
male-dominated in the 40s and 50s. And I suppose they’re the things I 
have to guard against, but also, intuitively, probably go back to. 
(Interview with Commissioner B). 
Another commissioner demonstrated the effect of individuals on the system when 
discussing perceptions of a previous President of the AIRC: 
Maddern, of course, had been an employer advocate and…had been 
appointed by, I think, a Coalition government, but was well respected… 
And he was concerned about a lot of these issues and the MRA was a 
grand design which I think the ACTU came up with but was adopted with 
some enthusiasm by him. But he and Kelty fell out…I think it was over the 
push to enterprise bargaining and the National Wage Case and the… 
Labor Government…supported the ACTU and said this is the way it’s 
going to go in the future and Maddern said he didn’t think they were 
ready. And, then Kelty publicly called the decision a heap of vomit, abused 
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him and that sort of thing, which meant that a very productive creative 
kind of focus was lost as a consequence. (Interview with Commissioner D) 
When you then tie together, as shown in Figure 26 ‘male dominance’ of industrial 
relations commissions, unions and management and how ‘individuals’ personal values 
affect results’, it is clear that women must deal with a lack of ‘Social power’ that affects 
results for them in the industrial relations system. Interviewees believed social power to 
be tilted in favour of men within the labour market. 
Underlining the issue of male power, particularly amongst managers or employers 
whom interviewees perceived as more likely to be male, are the results of examining 
interviewees’ views on key categories by gender and type of stakeholder (union 
representative, employer etc.). These results are detailed in Appendix 3. These show that 
employers’ representatives interviewed were far less likely than any other group 
interviewed to realise that the gap between women and men’s wages was higher in 
Western Australia. This was despite the employers’ representatives interviewed being 
principally from Western Australia (only one interviewed was based elsewhere), unlike 
union officials and commissioners. Employers’ representatives interviewed were also 
less likely to perceive any social explanations for the wage gap and therefore may be 
have been more resistant to any action in this area. Given that the balance of power 
shifted during the period under study towards employers (as the system became less 
centralised and more deregulated – also discussed in Section 5.5 on ‘CHANGE’), this is 
not likely to have encouraged change and may have exacerbated the persistence of 
unequal pay between men and women. 
Comments under ‘individuals’ personal values affect results’ are also linked to another 
major category under super category ‘NATURE AND NURTURE REASONS’ – 
‘PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES’ which are discussed in 5.4.3 below. 
5.4.2 Nature and Nurture Reasons: Biological Attributes 
Figure 27 shows the categories grouped under ‘‘NATURE AND NURTURE 
REASONS’ – ‘BIOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES’. It should be noted that many social and 
cultural values that limit women are almost inextricably linked with the biology of 
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having children. Similarly the ‘PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES’ discussed in 
Section 5.4.3 connect with issues reflecting both biological and social influences.  
First, a general comment that demonstrates all these connections and a connection to 
economics. A commissioner brought in, not just social and psychological, but biological 
issues, yet did so through the language of an economist. 
…those things feed in through the supply side. Women for 
social/psychological reasons supply their services in different ways to the 
way men supply them. Now if you ask the question why is it that women 
are the people who interrupt their careers rather than men, apart from the 
obvious biological explanations, sociological factors are powerfully 
important. (Interview with Commissioner C) 
‘BIOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES’ were raised by many other interviewees and these 
were further categorized, as seen in Figure 27 below, into ‘Having children’, ‘physical 
attributes’ and ‘biology in personal choice’. Various codes were gathered together under 
the heading ‘Having children’ which was definitely viewed as a disadvantage for 
women, but not men, when it came to pay. This is mirrored in the econometric studies 
discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1 and relates to the discussion under ‘DIFFERENT 
LABOUR MARKET BEHAVIOUR’ - ‘family responsibilities’ in Section 5.2.4. 
Interviewees talked about employers saying ‘women will [fall pregnant and] leave the 
workforce’ even if women had other intentions. For example a union official said: 
…generally there’s a perception that they are not going to hang around in 
the workplace, so there’s no point…the old cliché that they are going to 
get pregnant and leave…[employers think] if you get pregnant and leave… 
I’ve got to train someone else to do your job…and what do I do with that 
person when you come back? Because you might only be back for two 
years and go and do it all over again. Now that’s discriminatory, but 
nevertheless you’re not going to stop people thinking that way. (Interview 
with union official O) 
Interviewees’ perception that ‘women [are] going to leave the workforce’ (which an 
economist would class as statistical discrimination) is related to ‘Employers’ attitudes 
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and beliefs’ (discussed in 5.4.3 below), because this is clearly an employer attitude that 
is being discussed.  
















Interviewees talked about how historically, ‘women’s place was in the home’, as 
discussed above under ‘SOCIAL/CULTURAL REASONS’. Interviewees felt this view 
may still have contemporary repercussions and is clearly related to women’s biological 
attributes for having children. Interviewees felt that the ‘career interruption’ caused by 
‘Having children’ affected women’s careers as it reduced their experience, or more 
importantly, opportunities.  
Researcher: So you’re saying women’s lower work experience also 
contributes to the fact… Interviewee: Not necessarily lower work 
experience, but the fact that they go out of the workplace and that they 
may, for a year or two years miss the opportunities…People are going to 
get upset if they come back in and get, you know, the senior position that 
they didn’t otherwise work towards or whatever else. (Interview with 
employer representative D) 
A union official pointed out another aspect to a career break for women: 
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Even women who have been out of the workforce for 3 or 4 years have 
enormous disadvantages because of technology, computers and things of 
that nature. And therefore their access to range of work is much more 
limited so I think that’s another factor. (Interview with union official G) 
Children, an interviewee felt, contributed to ‘geographic mobility’ restrictions as parents 
have problems with access to child care (or indeed schools). 
[M]en are particularly advantaged because they have the mobility to go 
where the work is. I remember there was a woman who was working down 
at Bunbury and she had a young child. It was virtually impossible for her 
to work on one of these big jobs to get the better money because of child 
care arrangements. (Interview with union official G) 
Generally having children meant, in the opinion of an interviewee that women have ‘less 
opportunities’. These opportunities are for jobs in the first place, for training on the job 
and thus for promotion. For example: 
…there’s not as much opportunity for women because obviously women 
with children and family commitments isn’t seen by employers as an 
employable option because they’ll have a lot of extended family leave. 
(Interview with union official Q) 
The physical limitations of being biologically female were discussed by interviewees 
and coded under ‘physical attributes’. However, it was generally agreed that these 
limitations were now being bypassed by using suitable equipment and technological 
advances had only increased this process. 
//…Researcher: Why weren’t they [women] allowed to [be casting 
inspectors]? Interviewee: Oh, they just never…well I suppose the excuse 
was because it was heavy…//…they have avoided areas that command 
higher pay. There are 2 kinds. One is areas that are extremely exacting in 
terms of professional requirements and post-training experience…And the 
other is occupations that…entail severe demands on manual effort and 
application, of which an obvious example is building…// 
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An employer’s representative took the biological dimension further than physical 
attributes and children. In discussing why women choose to work in (less well paid) 
occupations, or what is coded as ‘Biology in personal choice’, he said: 
…there must be, also, some sort of biological basis to a lot of those 
choices. I don’t know what it is, but, you look at a lot of the biological 
studies and there’s huge literature studies of the way men and women 
behave differently…it’s crucially important to individual choice. Women 
tend to choose occupations which involve…human interaction…caring, 
child care and teaching and social work, they all involve people issues; 
helping people and children. (Interview with employer representative A) 
5.4.3 Nature and Nurture Reasons: Psychological Attributes 
The major category ‘PSYCHOLGICAL ATTRIBUTES’ brings together categories on 
‘Women’s attitudes, beliefs and values’ and on ‘Employers’ attitudes, beliefs and 
values’ as shown below in Figure 28. 
The first code and important connector under the category ‘Women’s attitudes, beliefs 
and values’ is ‘personal choice in occupation’, which is related to the ‘BIOLOGICAL 
ATTRIBUTE’ code, ‘biology in personal choice’.  
//…I would…never like to see my two children…feel that they have to go 
into home economics type of industries or arts industries simply because 
they are female. I would like them to think that…if they want to be a pilot 
of an airplane or they want to go and work in a mine then… [they will 
have] every opportunity to do that…//…women find some work 
unattractive. You find very few women choosing to go into engineering… 
[or] onto building sites and partly that's because they think they will be the 
subject of informal discrimination. And they're probably right…//…why do 
people go into different occupations? You know, obviously there is a high 
degree of socialisation. There’s also personal choice. People choose… 
things that interest them…as a group, not as individuals, males and 
females seem to show more interest in different types of work. Have always 
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Figure 28 - Nature and Nurture Reasons: Psychological Attributes 
 
 
An employer representative brought in a counter-view to the thought that women’s 
occupational choices might be restricted: 
…there’s always other occupations. I mean…there’s no monopoly, they’re 
not forced into any type of work…there are…a range of choices that 
people make. (Interview with employer representative A) 
Yet this was the same employer representative who talked about biology determining 
occupational choice. Given a chance to see the above comment in context28, the 
interviewee further explained: 
It is possible, after all, to reconcile biology influencing choice, even 
strongly influencing it and individuals choosing what biology may give 
them a predisposition to want to do by way of an occupation, assuming 
that the evidence discloses such a predisposition. (Interview with 
employer representative A) 
Thus the employer representative is saying biology can both restrict and become part of 
personal choice. A union official saw this differently, seeing women’s choice of 
occupation as more restricted than men’s choice by social factors and responsibilities 
associated with biology or sex type. 
…women may be the primary care givers if they have children, or if they 
have elderly parents that they look after; and that may dictate where they 
can work, how many hours they can work and what sort of hours they can 
work. So…the choices are more difficult for many women who have to 
work. (Interview with union official E) 
An interviewee gave her perceptions of the different ‘personal choices in occupation’ or 
industry made by women and men: 
[T]he main factor is that differential between women’s work and men’s 
work, different industries being worth more. Researcher: How do you think 
women end up working in different industries? Interviewee: I guess it 
really starts from the educational aspect and where they’re encouraged to 
                                                 
28 As part of the methodology explained in Chapter 2 all comments used in published/publishable material 
were fed back to interviewees to give them a chance to see them used in context and make any changes 
they felt necessary. 
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go into. I presume that’s where it comes from…I don’t imagine women 
automatically think of a career as an engineer. I think the educational 
streaming pushes them into valuing what they can do using their feminine 
skills and that pushes them towards careers like; childcare, nursing, you 
know caring professions, those sorts of areas. Researcher: Is it the 
conditions that bring people in, or? Interviewee: Because the barriers 
aren’t there, you know. Other reasons, I mean school teaching is seen as 
an attractive thing because when you are a parent yourself you can take 
all the school holidays when you’re a teacher. I think women take those 
sort of caring responsibilities and…caring skills into account. Whereas a 
man probably just looks at the money available, chooses a career that 
way. So I think it probably starts at a very early age, society really 
streaming people one way or the other. (Interview with union official F) 
This is a complicated but valuable discussion. It suggests that women “are encouraged 
to go into” certain types of education. Encouragement comes from society (presumably 
family, teachers and friends) “streaming people one way or the other” according to 
gender. For women male-dominated jobs become less valued and money less important 
than using feminine caring skills. However, women are also choosing these occupations 
because they take on the major burden of family responsibilities, so therefore choose 
jobs that fit in with those responsibilities. 
Is this then real choice? Are women in fact being treated differently to men, not just by 
employers, but by their families, teachers and friends, because of what society views as 
the ‘right’ thing for women to do? Do not women constrain their own choices by 
anticipating different treatment if they were to do male-dominated jobs? This last point 
was discussed by a senior male commissioner: 
… women find some work unattractive. You find very few women choosing 
to go into…engineering. Very few women choosing to go onto building 
sites and partly that's because they think they will be the subject of 
informal discrimination. And they're probably right. (Interview with 
Commissioner C) 
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Not surprisingly ‘Personal choice in occupations’ is shown in Figure 28 as connecting 
up to “It’s the occupations” in the same way that the choices made about which 
occupations to work in are, in the opinion of interviewees, strongly connected to why 
women are paid less. 
A female manager said women are less assertive and suffer ‘lack of confidence’: 
…I think women generally undervalue themselves, so they’re probably not 
as assertive as males in saying I think I deserve more and I want more and 
I’m prepared to take a walk if I don’t get more, basically. (Interview with 
manager B) 
Another manager talked about women lacking the confidence to apply for management 
positions in teaching as they though they lacked the skills to do so. He pointed out that 
male teachers aspired to management roles from the beginning of their careers and were 
far less likely to downplay their skills in this way. 
Maybe men grow up believing that they’re meant to assume these roles and 
they don’t have the same reluctance. So it doesn’t come down to one’s 
ability, it comes down to, maybe, what people look for…what sort of career 
people have in mind when they initially start out. Certainly in teaching … 
not many men [who] went into…primary teaching saw themselves as just 
remaining in the classroom. Most of them aspired to becoming a deputy or a 
principal. (Interview with manager F) 
Women were perceived as being ‘closer to clients’ than men and having sympathy with 
clients’ position as this comment shows:  
I think it’s about the psyche of women generally, you know. No, they don’t 
want to cause trouble…they’re in caring industries often, service 
industries, those sorts of things and that would disrupt the service to the 
client, to the children, to the aged carers. (Interview with union official B) 
Similarly women were perceived to be ‘closer to their employers’ than men. The 
primary example given here is the clerk or secretary in a small business. She (and they 
mainly are female) tends to develop a personal relationship with her boss and would be 
much less likely to join a union or take action against her employer: 
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They may have a very individual relationship with their employer as 
opposed to an organised union collective relationship with their employer 
…//…We visited every…[business] and picked up hundreds of 
underpayments and irregularities. We wrote to the staff in the area and 
said join and we’ll fix these for you. All they did was give the letter to their 
boss and he’d fix their pay… what it boils down to is small business, close 
working relationship …// 
A female union official raised the issue of ‘women don’t work just for the money’: 
I think that women see work differently to men. I know it’s a fairly 
sweeping statement, but men work largely because they have to work to 
earn the money. Whereas…obviously women need the money, but they also 
like to have a job that they enjoy. And I know women who are happy to 
pick mushrooms for $10 an hour because, you know, that’s a social thing 
for them as well as a job. (Interview with union official G) 
Interviewees talked about a related perception that women dislike some jobs because of 
the conditions. An employer representative talked about one of his client’s businesses.  
Where they are hot and dirty, difficult conditions to work in, for whatever 
reason; they have difficulty in recruiting women … some sort of metal 
manufacturing process where you had to be in front of a furnace, wear 
leathers and all the rest of it. You get paid quite well. He managed to 
recruit two women, one left and then within 12 months the woman [left] 
said, look I’d rather take a pay drop and work in the office. (Interview 
with employer representative D) 
Of course, what is perceived to be an unpleasant working condition is a personal and 
psychological issue that may also be tied to social values and gender.  
‘Militancy’ is shown as a connector as it relates to ‘union density’ already mentioned as 
an aspect of  “DIFFERENT LABOUR MARKET BEHAVIOUR” in Section 5.2.4 and 
“Union membership” in Section 5.3.1. It is interesting to note that, while increasing 
union membership might be thought a solution to pay inequality by some (Interview 
with government official A), high ‘union density’ did not necessarily result in higher 
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relative pay outcomes, or ‘militancy’ for the occupations studied. The primary example 
of where this operated was in the public sector. While the public sector had the highest 
union membership or density of all Australian industries (detailed in Appendix 4, Table 
A-7), it was only the very occasional public sector agency that exhibited any 
‘militancy’29. To add to this is the fact that, over the 13 year period, observed public 
sector wage increases in the selected classifications were the lowest those studied.  
Yet the role of ‘militancy’ and ‘union density’ in supporting wage outcomes was 
sustained by interviewees. For example, a government official pointed out that there was 
“a fairly reasonable differential between unionised and non-unionised employees” with 
the former gaining higher wage rates, particularly under enterprise bargaining. Employer 
representative F described building trades labourer’s rates as “obscene” in comparison to 
the rates paid to teachers and nurses and put this down to the extreme ‘militancy’ or 
“…anarchy, thuggery” of building workers and their union.  
Interviewees expressed the view that the employees in the male-dominated Western 
Australian Main Roads Department, who received higher wage increases for some of the 
period under study were far more likely to be militant than employees in the female-
dominated Western Australian Health Department who received lower wage increases. 
Now we had a number of battles up at Main Roads and…I’ve addressed a 
number of stop work meetings out in the car park there and members came 
and they let their voices be heard and they stood up for themselves…you 
call a meeting of members in the Health Department, you’re lucky to get 
five people there. And you do the walk throughs, you try and get the 
delegates, you try and get a structure there and they didn’t have that 
identity with a union culture in the same way. Now when you go to an 
employer in those different circumstances, you have a different bargaining 
base and that’s the reality of our life. (Interview with union official N) 
Interviewees generally felt women were less likely to be militant. 
                                                 
29 ABS (2000) indicates that the, mostly public sector, education and health industries are far less likely 
to lose working days to strike action than the construction, manufacturing and mining industries, thus 
indicating militancy is low even in public service areas with skill shortages. Clerical and administrative 
public servants were seen by interviewees (Interviews with union officials N& P) as even less likely to 
take industrial action than those in skills shortage areas. 
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…women generally…don’t want to cause trouble…they’re in caring 
industries often, service industries, those sorts of things and that would 
disrupt the service to the client, to the children… (Interview with union 
official B) 
Another union official supported this view, saying women were less militant because 
they worked in jobs where they were closer to their clients. 
…when people are dealing directly with a customer, you know a client 
they’re not going to be as militant as when you’re dealing with an order 
book or something like that. So the guys in the warehouse, they don’t have 
any relationship with the clients and therefore they don’t care, they’re 
happy to stand them up. (Interview with union official H) 
An employer representative in the retail area found the above view interesting but was 
uncertain that it was correct. 
That’s an interesting perspective. I don’t know that no contact with clients 
means greater militancy, but certainly a large group of employees in one 
spot…Researcher: You get that in a big shop, a retail shop. Interviewee: 
Just thinking about, you know, “smoko” time in the warehouse, it is 
almost a down tools kind of thing, a regular gathering of people. 
(Interview with employer representative B) 
Thus ‘militancy’ may also be affected by the workforce’s ability to gather together on 
regular occasions. Workers doing shifts and/or working part-time, as many women do, 
are less likely to be able to gather together. 
Union official H went on to talk about the nature of the work in warehousing causing 
‘militancy’. 
I think it’s more the nature of the work. You know, working in a warehouse 
is a bugger of a job, you know shift work, night work, working to very 
strict, very intense pick rates, all these sorts of things, it’s very, very 
difficult work. Handling enormously expensive equipment, it’s a bugger of 
a job. Equally the companies need the supply because the value-add by the 
warehouse is enormous. Therefore it’s a choke point, you know. 
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In other words, the strategic nature of the job also helps to create ‘militancy’, or power, 
in bargaining. The strategic jobs identified in the employment areas studied were all 
male-dominated jobs, the building trades’ labourer who as a ‘grano’ worker can hold up 
a concrete pour on a tower block and the warehouse worker. 
The next category under major category ‘PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES’ is 
‘Employers’ attitudes, beliefs and values’. An interviewee talked about employers’ 
perceptions about ‘men [being] better at stressful jobs’. This was related to management 
jobs as well as working in industrial relations and resolving disputes with unions. 
[T]here is definitely the issue of, a culture which suggested that dispute 
resolution was a difficult and often a fairly stressful process where that 
tended to be the domain of men. (Interview with union official C) 
While ‘training’ has been discussed above under both ‘ECONOMIC REASONS’ and 
’BIOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES’, employers also have beliefs and attitudes towards 
women and the possibility that they might leave the workforce to have children, that 
appear to restrict employers’ offers of training to women. Under ‘ECONOMIC 
REASONS’, the amount of training made available by employers to women was 
discussed as being affected by statistical discrimination, or the perception that what 
might pertain to one woman, e.g. leaving the workforce to have children, is true of all 
women the employer might hire. The econometric literature reviewed in Chapter 3 
showed that training has an important positive effect on pay, as higher wages are 
generally associated with more training. However, the econometric literature (Preston 
1997 & 2001) shows the effect is not as great for women as for men and this may be due 
to the ‘NATURE AND NURTURE REASONS’ discussed above. 
The other category shown in Figure 28 under the area of ‘PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ATTRIBUTES’ is termed ‘Value and Values’. This is a major connecting category or 
concept emerging from the analysis done so far. The connections are so deep and 
complex – connecting up ‘NATURE AND NURTURE REASONS’ with 
‘INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS…’ and ‘ECONOMIC REASONS’ that this can now be 
termed a theoretical construct. The description of the theoretical constructs that emerged 
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from the data described here is dealt with in the next chapter where these are compared 
to the literature and their final forms develop. 
5.4.4 Nature and Nurture Reasons: Summary 
‘NATURE AND NURTURE REASONS’, the less quantifiable of all the issues 
involved in the gender wage gap, are clearly seen by interviewees as key reasons for the 
existence and persistence of the gap. This confirms a trend seen in the seminal literature 
(from Webb (1891) to Fenstermaker and West (2002)) reviewed in Chapter 3, Section 
3.1, towards analysis of the social and cultural issues involved. It is the exploration of 
these more qualitative aspects of interviewees’ perceptions on the existence of the 
gender wage gap that distinguishes this study from others. Interviewees perceive that 
social/cultural factors relating to biological and psychological attributes affect the 
quantifiable ‘facts’ of women’s qualifications and the training and experience offered to 
them. They believe that commissioners’ judgments are affected by their social and 
cultural backgrounds, as are the actions of all the players – union officials, employer 
representatives and workers themselves. 
5.5 CHANGE 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, one super category, ‘CHANGE’ 
provides not so much a reason for the gender pay gap, as the context within which it 
occurs. Many interviewees discussed change. Generally, they characterized economic 
factors as changing faster than industrial relations processes and quite a bit faster than 
social and cultural values and other ‘NATURE AND NURTURE REASONS’.  
This is depicted in Figure 29 below with the elongated triangle showing a continuum of 
interviewees’ comments on change from: ‘FASTER CHANGE’ ‘change in jobs’, 
‘change in the labour market’; to slightly less rapid: ‘change in legislation’, ‘change in 
government’; to less rapid again ‘change in unions’; and ‘SLOWER CHANGE’: 
“structures don’t change as fast”, ‘change in cultural values’ and ‘WA slow to change’. 
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‘Change in the labour market’ was probably the most profound change remarked on: 
//…The other things that would have been going then would have been a 
dramatic increase in part-time and casual employment. I know that was 
particularly pronounced in the late ‘70s onwards…//… 20 years ago, 10 per 
cent of the top graduates went into teaching. Now, 95 per cent of the lowest 
graduates go into teaching. It’s just changed so dramatically…//…because it 
has changed so rapidly and I think there are a lot of people who actually 
aren’t aware for example of how work patterns…and…workforce 
participation rates have changed. And also too…the increase in casual 
employment…// 
Accompanying this is ‘change in jobs’. Interviewees noted that changes in technology 
had changed jobs very rapidly, sometimes to the disadvantage and sometimes advantage 
of women and that women were moving into traditionally male jobs: 
//… Even women who have been out of the workforce for 3 or 4 years have 
enormous disadvantages because of technology, computers and things of 
that nature…//…One of the changes …was because of…the increasing 
impact of mechanical equipment in the warehouses; they were becoming 
much more feminised. And equally the change in the nature of the workforce 
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also meant that there are a larger number of men in service roles. When I 
first started with the union there would not have been a single service 
assistant in K-Mart who was a bloke, but if you go into a K-Mart store now 
you’re as likely to find a guy serving you as a woman…//…More women are 
getting into more leadership positions and more women are getting into a 
broader range of jobs that were solely the province of men in the past…//… 
A lot of traditional jobs have gone and others surfaced. Some of the new 
ones seem to be dominated by men. They’re the ones where the market rates 
drive them up, computers, IT …there’s something about computers that 
makes them more attractive to men…// 
Interviewees’ comments on ‘change in government’ included those already discussed 
above with other comments under ‘UNIONS’ about union officials losing skills while 
operating in a system of centralised bargaining during the long-term Labor government 
period, from the mid 1980s to 1993 (Western Australia) and 1996 (federally). Other 
comments are about how change in government meant a ‘change in legislation’ and 
thus wage fixing processes: 
//…it’s [1992 when the gender wage gap in WA sharply increased] just at 
the time when we were beginning to decentralise but hadn’t yet deregulated 
the labour market if you make that distinction. We had moved away from 
CPI indexation in the mid-80s to award restructuring and enterprise 
bargaining. You can see it as a progressive decentralisation. But we still 
had significant union and third-party involvement; the commission was the 
mechanism through which those things were done. Which clearly was not 
the emphasis of the…previous state Coalition government or the Howard 
government since ’96; who have been much more about deregulating rather 
than… in the sense of removing third party intervention…rather than 
decentralising…//…From an employer’s perspective we had a looming 
change of government and we had had what we believed were reasonable 
industrial relations with unions. Unions were obviously very nervous about 
the impending change of government. We didn’t want to give them reason to 
believe that we were going to jump out of the existing industrial relations 
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system into the others. We didn’t necessarily, as a company, support all of 
the values that were being articulated by the then Liberal opposition…// 
These changes in industrial relations legislation towards both decentralisation and 
deregulation are also outlined in Chapter 2 and Section 5.3.5. 
Comments made about ‘change in unions’, as discussed above and shown by the arrow 
between these codes in Figure 29, are related to ‘change in government’. Other changes 
discussed by interviewees were about the decline in union power and membership and 
the increasing feminisation of peak union bodies (although as noted above most unions 
remain male-dominated). 
//…the reality is the unions are really not necessarily part of current and 
future society as they were in the past … The reality is that, in the old days, 
60 per cent of the work force or so were union covered, so people would 
grow up with someone in the family being a union member and all of what 
that meant. The reality now is that if you take the public service bias out of 
the union members, one in 10 families…//… the industrial scene has 
changed so much, hasn’t it? The ACTU is not the power it was…//… The … 
participation of women, back in 1972 it was a male movement…Now some 
of that changed because of demographic change in the union movement, 
particularly in the 1980s with the affiliation to Council of the…teachers and 
…the CPSU as it is today…and the ANF…// 
Interviewees’ comments about ‘structures don’t change as fast’ were about how the 
commission and its outcomes – awards and agreements’ classification structures - had 
not been very responsive to the more rapid change in the labour market and in jobs.  
//…The part-time, casual, labour-hire…arrangements…basically the labour 
market is changing more rapidly than the institutions that attempt to 
regulate it …//…I think we have institutions that take time to change and we 
have a very structured IR system…[with] structural impediments or periods 
of time it takes to get the debate in the industrial commissions up to speed 
with the debate in the community…for example, if you run reclassification 
arguments based on gender equity issues most of the commissioners 
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wouldn’t probably know what you were talking about…//…women, up until 
relatively recently, haven’t been seen as breadwinners and have tended to 
go into occupations to supplement the family income rather than be the main 
source of the family income. Now I think that has changed considerably in 
recent times. But I don’t think culturally and I think the structures that have 
actually arisen over the time haven’t changed to accommodate that…the 
award structures for example…I think they reflect what has been 
traditionally a male culture in terms of unions and employers…// 
‘Change in cultural values’ was seen by many as being slow: 
//…I think the double shift aspect of women’s lives is very important and so 
it has not been easy for those who want to make change to actually get a 
groundswell of opinion to have that change…//…in areas that are 
traditionally female-dominated that have been undervalued by society they 
are still looked upon in child care, in teaching, in nursing…[as] 
handmaidens to someone, not in a disparaging or pejorative way but that 
was a role they were happy to adopt and fulfill the stereotype that men 
imposed upon them. Quite a bit of change is happening and I don’t know 
that it has been a revolution, but it will be a slow revolution…// 
Other interviewees saw cultural change as not happening at all: 
//…There would still be a very strong attitude in schools that a part time 
deputy …or a part time principal isn’t the done thing. So, I think there is 
still a lot of cultural change that hasn’t happened yet…//… the value of work 
in, say cleaning and security…has never been assessed, never. These are 
low paid workers because they’ve got no market force…and I don’t think it’s 
ever going to change…//… I just know what the culture is like out in schools 
and … it just simply hasn’t changed. I mean the levels of resentment about 
any measures that you put in place to encourage increased promotion rates 
for women…I …won’t…even begin to tell you some of the comments we got 
because we put paid maternity leave in our last agreement…// 
201 
When commenting on the larger (than any other state or territory) gender wage gap in 
Western Australia, an interviewee claimed that state was slower to change its 
social/cultural values than any other state and to become less male-dominated. 
…things contributing…more conservative values in WA…the preponderance 
of male commissioners in WA…the preponderance of male union officials. 
Researcher: And you think that's not the same in the rest of Australia? 
Interviewee: WA's been slower to change. (Interview with union official A) 
Another interviewee, as already discussed above under ‘SOCIAL/CULTURAL 
REASONS’ code ‘cultural reasons’, saw these more conservative values as having been 
reinforced by waves of migrants into Australia, particularly Western Australia, who held 
more traditional values about women’s place in society: 
…what you tend to have is a lot of economic migrants to Australia …with 
each wave of economic migration to this country, you are finding that 
people are coming to us whose social and cultural norms are different to 
what we would view western norms as being…the role of the woman in the 
family or the female in the family is viewed differently to what the standard 
western norm is. (Interview with manager A) 
Examining interviewees’ views on the pace of change in different aspects of the 
industrial relations system provides a useful context to the study. It is clear interviewees’ 
reasons for poor female earnings have a geographic or spatial component as the system 
is viewed as continually adapting to change in economic, industrial relations and 
political, labour market and social and cultural factors and as adapting differently at 
different times and in different geographical regions. 
5.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the field data collected for this study and the categories and 
codes that fit, work and have theoretical relevance (Glaser 1978:56). Four super-
categories of: economic, industrial relations and nature and nurture reasons are 
perceived by the interviewees to relate to differences in wages between men and women. 
Changes over time in Australia underlying these have been identified. Categories and 
codes that make up these super-categories have been detailed.   
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It is clear that interviewees perceive that, as discussed in some of the literature reviewed 
in Chapter 3, it is not just economic and industrial relations factors that are important, 
but also social and cultural factors related to psychological and biological attributes.  
Interviewees also perceive these social and cultural factors to be slower to change than 
the other factors. The next chapter compares emerging theoretical constructs from this 
analysis with the literature already reviewed and some new sources, in order to identify 
theories on why and how interviewees perceived gender wage inequality persisted in 
Australia (and worsened in Western Australia), over the period 1990 to 2003. 
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CHAPTER 6 – THEORY EMERGING AND 
ILLUSTRATED 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the emergence of theoretical constructs from the data analysis 
reported in Chapter 5. Categories and codes are integrated into theoretical concepts 
or constructs that explain both why wage inequality has persisted during the study 
period (1990 to 2003) in Australia and how this happened. These are further 
illustrated by details from two of the employment areas studied: qualified child care 
givers and private clerical workers. Literature findings are also compared to these 
theoretical constructs in order to identify points where these reinforce each other (or 
otherwise). 
6.1 BRINGING ALL THE CATEGORIES TOGETHER – WHY 
DOES GENDER WAGE INEQUALITY PERSIST? 
From the discussion in Chapter 5 on the ‘NATURE AND NURTURE REASONS’ 
influencing wage equality, the interviewees were clearly ascribing an important 
position to social and cultural values and biological attributes and how these feed 
into individual psychology. Interviewees agreed with the literature reviewed in 
Chapter 3, that economic and industrial relations factors also influence wage 
equality, but their comments demonstrated that interviewees felt key economics and 
industrial relations factors responded to influences outside the boundaries of the paid 
labour market, being social and cultural issues. 
The economic literature and interviewees’ comments on economic and industrial 
relations factors illuminate two aspects of the gender wage gap, the existence of what 
the economists term:  
• adverse treatment for identical characteristics e.g. failure to hire/promote 
women candidates with the same qualifications as male candidates; and, 
• apparently adverse treatment  for identical characteristics e.g. men and 
women having the same qualifications, at the aggregate level, but adverse 
treatment of women in the labour market because the type of degrees held by 
women mean that they are qualified to work in the caring job area, which is 
not rewarded equally to a degree in a non-caring job.  
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 Figure 30 – Connections: Why Women are Paid Inequitably – Value and Values 
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The employer’s assumption that women will leave to have children, with its effects on 
job and training offers, is an example of adverse treatment for identical characteristics. 
The phenomenon of rising relative educational levels for women compared to men at an 
aggregate level, yet continued lower wages, is an example of apparent adverse treatment. 
Both result in lower wages for women. However, what nature and nurture or 
social/cultural reasons do, according to interviewees, is explain why these events occur. 
Using grounded theory’s constant comparison method to find connections in 
interviewees’ perceptions of why, on average, women are paid less than men; it became 
clear that the categories and codes that connect between major and super categories (or 
those with dotted borders in the figures) held part of the answer. The most significant of 
these connecting categories are shown in Figure 30 above, illustrating the first stage of 
the emergence of the concept Value and Values. Of particular note is the group of 
categories directly connected to ‘women’s work is undervalued’.  
On re-analysing the connectors in Figure 30 and distilling this further, it is apparent that 
emerging from the main connectors between these categories and codes is a central 
concept that is about ‘Value and Values’. The categories involved are 
‘SOCIAL/CULTURAL REASONS’ (or what is now termed social/cultural values), 
‘Personal choice in occupation’, ‘IT’S THE INDUSTRY’ (which is now characterised 
as the concept ‘Different labour markets’ being the different labour market segments 
experienced by men and women), ‘HUMAN CAPITAL’ or ‘Work value factors’, 
‘women’s work is under-valued’ and ‘Individuals’ personal values affect results’.  The 
concept of Value and Values is shown as fully emergent below in Figure 31.  
As these factors interconnect with each other, they are shown in a circle rather than a 
hierarchy, with two-way arrows connecting to the centre indicating that the central 
issues, identified by interviewees when considering why and how women are paid less 
are in fact about value and values in the labour market. These main connectors, or what 
are now called concepts30, are explored a little more below.  
                                                 
30 The descriptor conventions laid out at the beginning of Chapter 5 for categories – font, capitalisation 
and quotation marks etc. - are no longer used here as categories become concepts or theoretical constructs. 
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Moving anti-clockwise around Figure 31, in the direction of the arrows from top left, 
first, as interviewees have pointed out, there are social or cultural values that affect 
individuals (and their reference group – family, peers and teachers) and their personal 
choice of study area/occupation. This choice affects the human capital (education, 
training and experience) individuals accumulate. In turn interviewees indicate that the 
type and amount of education affects which industries and occupations people end up in. 
That is, once in the market, interviewees point out men and women face different 
labour markets or market segments as many industries and jobs are segmented by 
gender.  
































As discussed above, where people work is felt by interviewees to be a prime reason for 
why the gender wage gap exists. Interviewees say they believe economic factors – 
industry, the market (demand and supply), profitability and human capital (education, 
training and experience), as shown in Figures 30 and 31, affect wages offered in 
particular jobs and industries. Which occupation people work in was seen to affect the 
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amount and type of training received both on- and off-the-job. Training offered by 
employers to women was also thought to be constrained by social and cultural attitudes, 
beliefs and values, particularly those to do with family responsibilities and having 
children. In the industrial relations system education or qualifications, training and 
experience needed to perform a job are work value factors used to measure the 
monetary value of occupations, both in the industrial relations commissions and in job 
evaluation schemes within industry. 
Those making the decisions (three out of four commissioners), as well as other 
stakeholders interviewed who put up submissions to the commissioners, felt that cases 
determining wages in industrial relations commissions can be and have been affected by 
their own and other stakeholders’ personal values. Interviewees also believed 
individuals’ personal values affect results in the industrial relations system. According 
to interviewees, while the role of the commissions is to reflect the views of the parties, 
in assessing work value, subjective judgments are made. The reason why the personal 
values of individuals affect results is because they have social power and as our 
interviewees have claimed, this social power rests with the predominantly male 
management, male commissioners and male union representatives in the industrial 
relations system. This social power is exercised both in the commissions and in the firm. 
Thus interviewees felt this male social power results in predominantly women’s work 
being undervalued. In an invidious way this undervaluing of predominantly women’s 
work in monetary terms feeds back into social and cultural values about what work is 
most appropriate for women and men.  
Most interviewees discussed how they thought women’s work was undervalued (or 
others’ claims that it was undervalued) by society and thus also in the industrial relations 
system. For example, a peak union official said, on being asked why women and men 
are paid differently: 
I think it’s about the value of work. That the work women do is valued less. 
Regardless of where they work, what they do and at what level they work. 
Researcher: Why? Interviewee: Oh, I just think it’s an inherent bias, you 
know…You know, when men do things it seems more serious, more 
important and therefore more valuable. Researcher: Do you think this is 
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something psychological, or economic, or social? Interviewee: Probably 
social, you know social structure of society, patriarchal nature of society. 
(Interview with union official K) 
An employer representative agreed. 
I think a lot of it has to do with industries that women either…want to 
work in or find themselves working in and the value of that work 
according to the market and according to the perception…And I 
personally think that the work of our educators and nurses are 
undervalued. I personally think the work of certain tradespeople are 
totally overvalued, but that’s just really my personal values rather than it 
coming from any statistics or experience in the job. (Interview with 
employer representative B) 
An industrial relations commissioner also talked about women’s work being 
undervalued: 
…women have been employed, I suppose, as everyone keeps saying, in 
areas that are traditionally female-dominated that have been undervalued 
by society. They are still looked upon in child care, in teaching, in nursing, 
those sorts of areas [as] handmaidens to someone, not in a disparaging or 
pejorative way but that was a role they were happy to adopt and fulfill the 
stereotype that men imposed upon them. Quite a bit of change is 
happening and I don’t know that it has been a revolution, but it will be a 
slow revolution. (Interview with Commissioner B) 
Thus, as shown in Figure 32 below by the boxes within the circle, interviewees believe 
women’s pay is assigned a value (or monetary worth) by the circumstances of the 
relevant labour market (demand and supply) for their industry or occupation, by 
proceedings in the industrial relations commissions and/or by decisions of employers 
and managers in the enterprise. The activity, or lack of activity, of unions, as one of the 
actors in a particular labour market context and in the commissions, also affects earnings 
outcomes or value.  
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Figure 32 – Values Affect the Economic Value of Women’s Work –  
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The value boxes are shaded to indicate that interviewees believe value is affected by the 
values (including attitudes and beliefs) of women and men who are: family members 
and friends, employers, managers, union officials, commissioners and co-workers in 
both the formal and informal parts of the industrial relations system. These interested 
parties are labeled around the outer circle in Figure 32 representing values, attitudes and 
beliefs. As, in the opinion of interviewees, these values are slower to change than labour 
markets and industrial relations legislation, this results in a persistent gender wage gap. 
The process of theoretical categorising led to a more specific focus to the research than 
the original research question. In answers to direct questions about why women and men 
are paid differently in Australia, interviewees gave opinions and perceptions that could 
be used to explain both why and how gender wage inequality persists, despite many 




6.1.1 Comparing Interviewees’ Views with the Literature 
6.1.1.1 Economic and industrial relations theory 
It is clear, from the literature already covered in Chapter 3, that while the seminal 
literature tends to concentrate on economic and industrial explanations, many theorists 
had at least hinted at the role that social and cultural forces play in wage determination. 
In the economic theory literature reviewed in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1, Webb (1891) 
talked about custom or public opinion affecting wages. Becker’s (1957) discrimination 
theory was also based on the tastes of employers and employees that, in his opinion, 
lacked objectivity in not determining wages “on considerations of productivity alone” 
(Becker 1971:39). Arrow’s (1972) theory of statistical discrimination found one 
explanation for employers’ apparent taste for white men versus black men and women – 
that employers’ information was poor so that they used their average expectations (of 
unreliability) about women and black people to determine their hiring practices. The 
institutional economists (Doeringer & Piore 1971) agreed that individual firms screened 
their potential employees in this way, leaving the disadvantaged (including women) out 
of their high skill, high wage internal labour markets and in the more competitive, low 
skill, low wage market outside. 
Dunlop (1958:9) talked about the context to the industrial relations system as involving 
the technological, and financial environment as well as the “locus and distribution of 
power in the larger society”, thus not explicitly including social forces, but hinting at 
them through a reference to power. Dabscheck and Niland (1981:25-29) provide a 
summary of the critique and development of Dunlop’s theory. In relation to 
social/cultural values identified, it is useful to concentrate on two of these critiques. 
Hyman (1975), while presenting a Marxist approach to the theory of industrial relations, 
argued in part for “totality” in industrial relations theory. By this he meant: “…the fact 
that different social phenomena are interrelated and that no area of social life can 
therefore be satisfactorily analysed in isolation” (Hyman 1975:4). Dunlop (1958:5) 
appeared to agree with this sentiment when he said: 
An industrial relations system is to be viewed as an analytical sub-system 
of an industrial society on the same logical plane as an economic system, 
regarded as another analytical sub-system.  
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However, he did not make any explicit mention of social or cultural forces in his 
analysis of the industrial relations system.  
Dufty and Fells (1989:1), building on Dunlop’s (1956) system, agreed more with Hyman 
(1975) than Dunlop (1958) and indicated that the “employment relationship between 
employer and employee is central to what we term ‘industrial relations’”. They put this 
relationship in a wider context of the industrial capitalist society with three dimensions 
of society – economic, legal and social. Dufty and Fells (1989:2) believed that: 
The nature of work, together with the effect of the legal framework of 
society, influences the way in which employment relationships are 
established. Once established these continue to be influenced by the 
economic and legal dimensions but are also influenced by the social aspect 
of work activity....  
Dufty and Fells (1989:13) make this implication of a wider role for social forces more 
explicit when describing the factors influencing an individual’s approach to work. 
Again, they illustrate this with a figure, which is reproduced as Figure 33. 
As Dufty and Fells (1989:12) put it: 
… an individual’s approach to work is the product of a range of non-work 
factors as shown in Figure 1.3 [Figure 33 here]. Individuals enter work 
from a society which is structured on the basis of an unequal distribution 
of resources and who themselves have differing resources (cash, skills, 
etc.) and motivations (Watson, 1980:63-4). Individuals’ choices and 
opportunities differ widely. 
As can be seen in Figure 33, Dufty and Fells’ “non-work factors” and factors that “an 
individual approaches work with” have some parallels to this thesis’s nature and nurture 
factors. Interviewees talked about the influence of family, race, gender and peers (but 
not media) on women’s pre-market choices. 
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(Source: Dufty and Fells 1989:13) 
 
Dufty and Fells’ (1989:13) resources of “knowledge and physique, motives, 
expectations, interests and aspirations” are very similar to interviewees’ ‘nature and 
nurture’ factors – social values affected by individual psychological and biological 
attributes discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.4. What Dufty and Fells (1989:13) said an 
“individual encounters” at work (occupational structure, labour market and legal 
framework), is very similar to the economic and industrial relations factors identified by 
interviewees discussed in Chapter 5, Sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
More recently, industrial relations research (Ellem 2003, 2004) has been carried out 
applying the concepts of human geography and space. This research shows how 
geography, capital and labour intersect and are affected by and affect social relations at a 
particular time and place. The research is about “the importance of space to 
understanding connections between unions, work and community in specific geographic 
sites.” (Ellem 2004:112). Ellem’s work focuses on how, in the Pilbara in Western 
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Australia, union revival had to come, not from the workplace, but from the community 
into the workplace. In other words, Ellem demonstrates how industrial relations, or work 
practices such as fly in fly out (FIFO) and local community values, affect each other. In 
the Pilbara, for example, with the advent of FIFO, populations plummeted and social 
clubs and other community support disappeared. It was therefore in the interests of the 
community to support the reintroduction of unions, who hoped to restrict FIFO. 
Thus, there is support in the general economic and industrial relations literature for the 
perceptions of interviewees reported in the last chapter that social forces affect the 
operations and outcomes of the industrial relations system through the individuals who 
operate within it and vice versa.  
6.1.1.2 Feminist theory 
The work of feminist economists and sociologists reported in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.7 
(Macdonald 1995; Bergmann (1974); Trieman & Hartmann 1981; England 1992) all 
refer to the effects of socialisation on employers’ expectations of women’s reliability, 
the jobs they should be working in and on the choices of women and girls in and out of 
the labour market. Fenstermaker and West (2002) go further and show how gender is 
daily contructed by both ourselves and others of our society. 
Interviewees said little about employers’ tastes beyond commenting on employers’ 
assumptions about women’s propensity to leave to have children (and the effects this has 
on training and promotions offered to women), but did discuss women’s tastes or 
“choices” in occupations in terms of their socialisation from childhood to the workplace.  
Some felt this was changing: 
//…I would like them to think that …if …[my daughters] want to be a pilot 
of an airplane or they want to go and work in a mine then…[they will 
have] every opportunity to do that…//… it’s the way kids are brought up 
right from when they are born.  We try and…[counter] gender bias…We 
start right here [at child care] at 6 months old.  We let the boys play with 
the dolls and the girls play with the trucks and cars and things like that…// 
Others had different explanations: 
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//…women find some work unattractive. You find very few women 
choosing to go into engineering…[or] onto building sites and partly that's 
because they think they will be the subject of informal discrimination. And 
they're probably right…//…why do people go into different occupations? 
You know, obviously there is a high degree of socialisation. There’s also 
personal choice. People choose…things that interest them… // 
As Silvera (2000:161) puts it, factors that operate before joining the labour force and 
outside it are used to justify pay discrimination. 
These factors are grounded in gender relations and also hark back to the 
division of roles within the family sphere, including differential access to 
education and training, unequal sharing of domestic work, existence of a 
“male breadwinner wage” supposed to cover the needs of the household, 
and conversely, consideration of women's earnings as secondary… 
Similarly again, England (1992:18) claims the different job choices of men and women: 
… are sustained by lifelong socialization that leads men and women to 
find different jobs interesting, respectable, of value, or consistent with 
their gendered identities. … Preferences for certain kinds of work entail 
preferences for exercising certain kinds of skills. The socialization that 
forms these proclivities begins in childhood and continues throughout 
adulthood. It operates through reinforcement patterns, role models, 
cognitive learning, sex-segregated networks of peers, and other processes.  
This is what the union official referred to when she talked about family and “educational 
streaming [pushing women]… into valuing what they can do using their feminine skills” 
(Interview with union official F).  
6.1.1.3 Real or socially constructed differences? 
As explained in Chapter 5, employer representative (A), however, appeared to believe 
that people had some kind of real, unconstrained, personal choice or preference for 
certain types of work. He said “…there’s always other occupations. I mean, you know, 
there’s no monopoly, they’re not forced into any type of work. You know, there are 
choices, a range of choices that people make” (Interview with employer representative 
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A). Yet employer representative A (elsewhere in the same interview) also acknowledged 
the importance of social influences in occupational choice, saying: “individual choice is 
obviously affected by socialisation, but it’s not just socialisation.” What he was referring 
to was the possibility of biological determination, he said: “The biological basis of some 
male/female behaviour is one of the reasons why the choice of different occupations.” 
(Interview with employer representative A) 
Recent literature from biologists on sex differences claims that indeed there are 
biological differences between men and women that affect behaviour. For example 
Lytton (2000:153) said: “The same hormonal mechanisms that develop neural structures 
responsible for differentiated sex organs also underlie the development of gendertyped 
behavior.” Girls exposed to extra androgen in the womb (Lytton 2000:153) “were more 
tomboyish and aggressive than unaffected girls, they chose more typically masculine 
toys, and their spatial abilities were also more enhanced.” (Lytton 2000:153) Higher 
level mathematical ability also appeared to be affected (Lytton 2000:153). 
However, these effects from androgen are debated. As Alexander and Hines (2002:468-
9) point out: 
… influences of hormones on human play behavior are not universally 
accepted. Phenotypic masculinization, which occurs to variable degrees in 
girls exposed to androgenic hormones prenatally, could alter the social 
environment (e.g., parents may expect or encourage androgenized girls to 
play in more masculine-typical ways) (Fausto-Sterling, 1992). In addition, 
hormone exposure could alter cognitive development related to gender 
(e.g., androgenized girls may develop a less firm identification as female) 
rather than directly influencing neural processes related to play.  
Lytton (2000:171) also talks about the interaction between environment or culture and 
biology. He makes it quite clear that while gender can make a difference within cultural 
groups (e.g. boys score better on various mathematical high level tests than girls), it is 
environment that makes the greater difference between these groups (Chinese American 
children of both sexes do better at mathematics than non-Chinese American children).  
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In a similar vein, Grumbach (2004:16), reviewing the recent upsurge of literature in the 
area of biological sex differences, concludes: “It is the interaction of genes and sex 
hormones (nature) with the environment and experience (nurture) that is critical in 
gender identity and sex-typed behavior but none by itself is deterministic.” Thus, there is 
some support for the perception that behaviour in certain areas, such as aggression and 
high level mathematics, is more male than female due to hormonal differences, but 
biologists make it evident that they believe it is also nurtured by social and cultural 
environmental factors.  
However, this begs the question of whether men’s skills in aggression and high level 
mathematics are really worth more than women’s, also fairly well documented, skills in 
co-operation and caring? This determination depends on the perceptions of the people 
making decisions about wages.  
Interviewees also commented on the “caring” occupations and industries of women. 
//…they’re in caring industries…//…female-dominated workforces like 
nursing, caring, education …//…Women tend to choose occupations which 
involve…human interaction …caring, child care and teaching and social 
work, they all involve people issues. Helping people and children …// 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.7, Guy and Newman (2004) contend that 
relational or emotional labour is absent from the lists of knowledge, skills and abilities 
required in the descriptions for these jobs, except in the form of “interpersonal skills”. 
They (Guy & Newman 2004:293) claim that “care is a natural activity that neither 
deserves nor requires remuneration.”  
In other words, these skills are too close to skills used in non-market, unpaid situations 
to be recognised within the market and valued in money terms. In a similar way, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, an interviewee talked about some women’s jobs having been 
“voluntary work previously” (Interview with union official L) and that this affected the 
way they were valued in the paid labour market. These skills become invisible when 
they are possessed by women, except when they are absent (Guy & Newman 2004: 
293).  
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How do firms manage to devalue these productive skills? Women are segregated (as 
noted by interviewees and discussed above) into certain (usually caring) jobs and 
industries where their (caring) skills become invisible and not paid for (Guy & Newman 
2004; Pierce 1999; and Fletcher 1999). England (1992) puts it slightly differently, as 
jobs using caring skills suffering a wage penalty.  
6.1.1.4 Intra-occupational inequality 
The focus so far has been on interviewees’ perceptions of what is sometimes termed 
horizontal wage inequality, or unequal pay for work of equal value in different types of 
jobs. However, there is a wealth of literature on vertical inequality or intra-occupational 
discrimination, as already discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4. Interviewees’ 
perceptions were consistent with some of this literature.  
In the theoretical literature, the firm was highlighted by institutional economists (Kerr 
1950 & 1954; Dunlop 1957; Doeringer & Piore 1971) as creating a different type of 
segmentation in the labour market – one that exists inside the firm. As pointed out by 
Russell (2003) the problems within the firm and occupation begin with different men’s 
and women’s treatment and perceptions of this. A male union official interviewed felt 
that men were not aware of the different treatment of women in the workplace. 
I don’t think men generally take…this on board. Because what they would 
say is, well, the award, in effect applies to both men and women, but then 
they don’t see the…intangible issues that will determine why men get 
promotion and why women don’t get promotion. [T]he view that…women 
are not going to be as strong participants in the workforce because they 
are going to have kids, those sorts of things; deeply still condition the way 
in which these issues are determined and…it’s a hidden factor in the way 
these issues are unfolding. (Interview with union official C) 
A male union official talked about how women were treated in his previous 
organisation. 
…certain classifications which afforded more, or a better, career 
advancement were generally male-dominated and not that open to women. 
(Interview with union official C) 
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Commissioner C explained how women faced a hostile culture in male-dominated work, 
putting it initially in terms of women not liking the work. He said: 
…women find some work unattractive. You find very few women choosing 
to go into engineering. Very few women choosing to go onto building sites, 
and partly that's because they think they will be the subject of informal 
discrimination. And they're probably right.  
Much of this hostility would appear to be caused by what Tharenou (1997) explains as a 
tendency for people, already inside an organisation, to hire in their own image. 
Commissioner B agreed that male management tended to identify with the men who 
worked for them: “…men are the people who control at the management level and 
identify better with the person who says I’ve got a wife and kid at home.” A manager 
talked about “management teams…on training and their recruitment processes, 
although maybe not consciously but sub-consciously, actually favoured one sex over the 
other. (Interview with Manager A) 
Interviewees saw education as an historical problem for women and a possibly 
continuing one. 
//…in many families it was seen as inappropriate to educate girls to the 
same level as boys…//…Access to qualifications is another one. Those 
people who can afford the time to go and undertake additional 
qualifications…will gain some advantage…// 
The literature in fact shows women are increasingly more educated than men in 
Australia. According to the 2001 ABS Census, “across all employees, there were more 
female than male degree holders. Just under one-fifth (19.4%) of all employees were 
graduates, 54 per cent of whom were women” (Preston & Burgess 2003:502). However, 
the problem may not be so much with the level of education held by women, but the 
type of education (e.g. an arts or social work degree compared to a science or 
engineering degree). As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1, Langford’s (1995) study 
illustrates that, if regression equations on earnings also include tertiary field of study, 
field of study has explanatory power and the gender wage gap reduces from that 
normally found. 
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Interviewees agreed with Wernick (1994) in that they felt management restricted access 
to training either directly, or through not providing family-friendly practices and 
unconscious biases. Interviewees talked about: 
//…the focus by companies and management teams were on training and 
their recruitment processes, although maybe not consciously but sub-
consciously, actually favoured one sex over the other…//… lack of, or 
restricted access, to either, family-friendly practices in the workplaces to 
allow access to training, or reduced access to training because of family 
commitments …// 
Interviewees also felt that women lose opportunities for this type of experience or 
developmental opportunities through career breaks caused by having children. 
//…the fact that they go out of the workplace…and they miss the 
opportunities…//…I think the major one for me is the probable 
interruption to the career structure and the career stream for family 
responsibilities…//…women…going into family life…don’t have the same 
degree of experience to move higher up the corporate ladder…// 
An interviewee pointed out that if an organisation values presence more than product, 
this can have a major effect on how women’s performance is assessed. 
[I]t’s what you value, there’s a perception of how much you do, as 
opposed to the reality of what you’re actually doing, exactly what that’s 
worth. I think some people value volume and process. You know, you’re 
here from 9 to 5 or whatever so you must be doing a good job. As opposed 
to hey, if you’re the primary carer for your kids, and you’re out of here at 
4 o’clock each day and I can’t find you at 4.30 when I really need you, 
you’re not prepared to stay, well you’re not worth it. (Interview with 
manager B) 
Simpson’s (1998) research on presenteeism, or the pressure of being seen to be at work 
in order to gain promotion or retain a job, supports this view. 
There was a perception amongst interviewees that women’s family responsibilities are 
the reason why women do not go on to become managers. They said: 
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//…women probably remove themselves out of the higher paid type of 
career path options going into family life…//…the probable interruption to 
the career structure and the career stream for family responsibilities. I 
think that has a big impact…//…they are trying to balance family and 
work commitments and that makes it really difficult…to make…decisions 
about whether they are going to be a career person or…a parent…// 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4, research studies (Tharenou 1995, 1997 & 
1998) have examined whether the family roles of Australian senior female managers 
have affected their advancement and concluded that this is not strictly true. Instead, 
consistent with interviewees’ views already reported, she finds family tends to limit the 
opportunities such as for training and experience that lead to management jobs. 
Interviewees also talked about job evaluation, which is seen in the literature as a more 
general source of pay inequality in the firm, not restricted to the management area, but 
often encountered on the way to it. A union official talked about how, when employers 
argued for using a job evaluation system in a pay equity order case, the union “brought 
in as evidence all the critiques of those systems” (Interview with union official K). 
Another union official who was involved in public sector job evaluation said: 
[T]hey use the Cullen Egan Dell type, Hay type [job evaluation] systems. 
Which I think is entirely subjective myself. But I’m told not, and I’m told 
the parties to the contracts with those organisations are thoroughly 
convinced that they are all objective. (Interview with union official F) 
The literature (Equal Opportunities Commission not dated; Burton, Hag & Thompson 
1987; Short 1992; Figart 2000; Cox & Leonard 1991) supports this assessment of 
subjectivity and shows that job evaluation is affected by the perceptions of employers, 
employees and job raters, which can adversely affect women’s experiences and pay. 
The literature has supported interviewees’ perceptions that, within the firm, when 
managers are hiring staff, their actions may be affected by social/cultural values about 
the family responsibilities of women. The literature agrees with interviewees that, in the 
firm, job evaluation, promotion and human capital formation (through training and 
experience or developmental opportunities) can be affected by values related to gender. 
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Women, according to the literature and interviewees, tend to be hired into less skilled 
occupations/on an initially lower wage, often associated with devalued nurturing skills, 
and find it harder to acquire/are less likely to be offered the training and experience 
needed to rise up to management levels. Women’s opportunities (the boxes on the right 
of Figure 34) are constrained by their social/cultural values, family responsibilities, 
biological and psychological attributes, personal values and employer attitudes and 
beliefs (the boxes on the left of Figure 34). This also means women tend to work in less 
well-paid and female-dominated jobs. 
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Figure 34 maps this section and summary, showing women’s experiences within, rather 
than before the labour market, as in Figure 32. Figure 34 shows how values relating to 
gender affect the firm. The boxes on the rim of the circle indicate that social/cultural 
values about women’s psychological and biological attributes affect personal values and 
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employers’ attitudes and beliefs. This all influences the economic or monetary value 
offered within the labour market segment, the work value as defined in the industrial 
tribunals and the productivity perceived by employers and managers in the firm. Values 
relating to gender affect initial hiring decisions, training, promotion, job evaluation and 
development opportunities offered or experience, and thus pay. 
6.1.2 Conclusions on Why Gender Wage Inequality Persisted 
From the literature and interviewees’ comments discussed above it is clear that the 
values, or nature and nurture factors, shown as emerging from interviewees’ comments 
at detailed in Chapter 5 are, in fact, values related to gender which are learnt through 
socialisation and are reinforced within daily life, including in the workplace. These 
values are seen to affect social expectations about male and female roles and thus which 
occupations are believed to be suitable for men and women. The biological and 
psychological attributes of women affect the expectations of individuals and their 
parents about which skills will be paid for in the market and thus educational choices 
before the market.  
Educational choice and gender role expectations affect occupational choice. In turn, the 
level of human capital (education, training and experience) possessed by an individual 
and the occupations available to that person are affected by their gender and employers’ 
attitudes and beliefs. Gender stereotyping about what is appropriate for women to do 
results in women predominantly working in the service industry sector, where skills used 
are more likely to be caring or emotional and to be invisible because of their association 
with the female gender role in unpaid or voluntary work outside the market. Emotional 
or caring skills used by women are seen as natural and innate and therefore to lack 
economic worth in the marketplace.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3, in the Australian industrial relations tribunals, 
work value is dependent on human capital associated with an occupation and less 
quantifiable factors such as job content (e.g. caring as compared to technical work), 
responsibility and working conditions. According to interviewees, work value 
assessments made by the tribunals are affected by participants’ personal values relating 
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to gender. A comment from a commissioner about how the work value of nurses (a 
predominantly female occupation) was assessed illustrates this process: 
…it was comparison with other occupations requiring similar formal 
qualifications…experience, and …responsibility. Researcher: What…did 
you see as similar responsibility…Interviewee: …school teachers having 
responsibility for children and nurses having responsibility for patients, 
it’s very, very subjective. Researcher: So you’re saying that the process of 
working out the work value for that occupation at least was a subjective 
process? Interviewee: Yes, yes. (Interview with Commissioner C) 
Finally, the literature discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2 (Bergmann 1974; Blau & 
Ferber 1992; Fenstermaker & West 2002) indicates, as did the interviewees, that it is 
values relating to gender that ensure a segmented labour market in Australia (Pocock & 
Alexander 1999; Wooden 1999), where many women and men work in occupations, 
levels within occupations and industries that are dominated by one gender.  
Figure 35 below brings back some categories from Chapter 5 into Figure 32 (shown at 
the beginning of this chapter) in order to illustrate this summary. The circle represents 
society, or the social system, and the colouring or shading represents social/cultural 
values pervading educational and industry choice and then the wage or value set in the 
labour market for that particular labour market segment, as well as the work value set in 
the industrial relations tribunals.  
Social/cultural values and personal values associated with biological and psychological 
attributes, affect choices before the market. These also affect employers’ attitudes and 
beliefs, which result in stereotyping (women will leave to have babies; women should be 
nurses, teachers or secretaries). These values and attitudes also tend to influence 
women’s choice to work in service industry occupations that were often voluntary in the 
past. Feedback loops show how discrimination in the labour market is anticipated in 
educational choice. All of this then acts to reduce the monetary value of occupations 
predominantly held by women. 
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Figure 35 – The Effect of Values Relating to Gender 
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Thus the economic literature reviewed in Chapter 3 found evidence of women being 
treated differently for the same characteristics of men and this section has demonstrated 
interviewees’ views form a theoretical concept explaining why this occurs. Interviewees 
also had perceptions relating to how these different treatments occur, some of which is 
shown in the next section.  
6.2 PERCEPTIONS OF HOW WAGE INEQUALITY PERSISTED 
As indicated by the boxes within the values circle in Figure 32, the factors discussed by 
interviewees that appear to explain how pay inequality occurs in an Australian industrial 
relations system are those grouped under economic and industrial relations factors. 
Interviewees depicted the industrial relations system as a sub-set of Australian society, 
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pervaded by the same beliefs and values as the rest of society. These values are seen to 
be translated into the individual psychology and beliefs of industrial relations 
participants or actors. They are, in the opinion of the interviewees, reflected in the 
processes and outcomes of the industrial relations system and in the way the institutions 
and actors of the industrial relations system operate.  
Figure 36’s theoretical sub-construct (subordinate to the main one on values and value 
setting in the industrial system shown in Figure 32) shows how gender wage inequality 
persisted from 1990 to 2003 for two of the classifications studied in Western Australia: 
Qualified Child Care Giver and Clerk Level 2 (both private sector). Some historical 
context is also given, as this contributed the situation for these occupations in 1990.   
The focus in this section is on the way the commissions and other stakeholders 
implemented industrial relations legislation, including factors such as employers’ 
strategies, union amalgamation, inter-union strife and militancy and union density or 
bargaining power for these two occupations. Market factors such as finance, human 
capital and product differentiation are also mentioned where relevant.  
The review of the experience of these occupations is also focused on how personal 
values affected results in commission decisions for child care and clerical work in 
Western Australia and thus how, the literature and interviewees confirm, gender 
construction is integral to these occupations and the low wages paid to those working in 
them. These occupations are used as, in both jurisdictions, but particularly Western 
Australia, they experienced the most problems relating to gender wage inequality of the 
nine occupations studied. They also illustrate central concepts for how gender wage 
inequality persisted in all of the female-dominated occupations studied. In particular the 
occupations provide evidence from interviewees’ perceptions, supporting the economic 
literature on the importance of such factors as education and work experience, but also, 
unlike the equal pay literature to date, illustrate how these enter into the decisions on 
wages made in the industrial relations commissions and by employers. 
As indicated in Figure 36, this section is presented firstly in a timeline following 
industrial relations legal changes, from the literature and interviewees’ comments on the 
AIRC Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value Decision in 1972 (127 CAR 1142), when the 
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formal system was centralised at the commission and peak body level, to those on 
enterprise bargaining and individualisation in 2003, when the formal Australian 
industrial relations system had become much more decentralised and deregulated. Figure 
36 indicates relationships between these processes and some of the (again mostly 
connector31) categories that were used in Chapter 5. The oblique triangle depicting 
change in Figure 36 also signifies the decreasing centralisation of the Australian formal 
industrial relation system. Other categories of interviewees’ comments from Chapter 5 
are shown below this timeline, in roughly the order they apply to each case.  
Figure 36 – How Gender Wage Inequality Persisted in Two Western Australian 
Occupations  
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31 This time the categories and codes depicted are those that were shown as connectors to ‘work value 
factors’ in Chapter 5 that connected with codes in all super categories (but mostly across economic and 
industrial relations reasons) and related major categories. 
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The beginning of the timeline shown in Figure 36 is outside the main focus of this study 
(1972 compared to 1990 when this study begins). Nevertheless interviewees’ comments 
on the implementation of the 1972 equal pay for equal value case are included because 
they form a context for women’s wages in 1990, in that interviewees felt the effects of 
only partially implementing that decision were still evident in 1990. 
Some of the concepts in the bottom half of Figure 36: women’s work undervalued (an 
outcome of the 1972 equal pay case); different labour markets; and starting from a low 
base; also give an historical context to what was happening to child care and clerical 
wages in 1990. Other codes fit more neatly into the time period under study, some 
applying to both cases, such as union and employer strategies, the role of the 
commission, personal values and work value factors; others are more specific e.g. union 
amalgamation and intra-union strife apply only to clerical work in WA and financial 
factors to child care. All theoretical concepts shown contributed to how female 
dominated occupations’ wages were reduced relative to those of male dominated 
occupations studied over the period 1990 to 2003. 
6.2.1 Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2 and Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4, in 1972 the AIRC 
granted female workers the right to equal pay for work of equal value (1972 Equal Pay 
Case (1972) 147 CAR 172). The main problem for child care and to some extent clerical 
workers, particularly those working in the 1970s and ‘80s, was how equal value would 
be determined in the commissions. As Short (1986:321) asked, “equal to what?” It is 
important to note that both of these occupations were very female-dominated 
(particularly child care workers). According to the Job Outlook section of Job Search 
(2004), as at May 2003, 78.5 per cent of general clerks (clerks, receptionists and 
secretaries) and 95.9 per cent of child care workers were female. Clerks were also, as 
with all of the occupations studied, much more female-dominated at entry level, which is 
the classification level studied for clerks (and shop assistants, teachers and public service 
clerical and administrative employees). This meant that, in the 1970s and 1980s when 
equal pay for work of equal value was being implemented, there were very few or no 
men working alongside the women in these classifications. 
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Short (1986) looked at all the cases in the Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
emanating from the equal pay for work of equal value decision and found only cases 
involving public sector clerks rather than those working in the private sector. Short 
(1986:319-20) describes the experience of typists in the Commonwealth Public Service: 
A traditional nexus with clerical assistants was re-established, providing a 
comparative wage justice element. A work value adjustment, for changes 
to their work since the last work value assessment, brought the typist’s 
wage up further to about the level of a Grade 2 clerical assistant. In this 
way typists gained a 6 per cent wage raise for equal pay work value but 
they were compared only with another mainly female and less skilled 
classification – clerical assistant (Commonwealth Public Service 
Arbitration Report 53:235).   
Similarly Short (1986:325) reported the experience of secretaries in local government: 
There appears to have been no attempt to compare dissimilar work in 
equal pay cases at the federal level. Even though secretaries were involved 
in all the municipal officers’ cases, the approach taken by the union was 
usually to arrange with the employer to add secretaries into existing (male) 
clerical administrative divisions and raise their pay accordingly. There 
appeared to be no attempt to actually assess the work value of secretaries 
or typists relative to that of other workers, which, given the almost 
complete female domination of the occupation and thus lack of males 
doing similar work, would have necessitated a comparison of essentially 
dissimilar work. Typing was simply assumed to be inferior to clerical 
work and typists were added onto the bottom of the clerical range, despite 
the fact that typists require a specific skill (typing) in addition to the ability 
to carry out clerical work. 
In the 1970s professional child care workers would have been far fewer in total numbers 
and even more female-dominated. There were no applications made for equal pay for 
child carers in the Western Australian and federal commissions between 1972 and 1984 
(Short 1985). 
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6.2.2    Awards, Structural Efficiency and Minimum Rate Adjustment 
As explained in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1 and Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4, the next 
opportunity for combating pay inequality was during the structural efficiency (National 
Wage Case August 1988 (1988) 25 IR 170) and minimum rate adjustment (MRA) (1989 
National Wage Case AIRC Print H9100:11-13) processes used to change awards before 
enterprise bargaining was introduced. Both private clerks and child carers in Western 
Australia suffered significant problems in trying to apply these processes to their 
occupations. In the discussion below, changes in and comparisons between the awards 
used from Western Australian and Australian Industrial Relations Commissions between 
1990 and 2003 are also explained where relevant.  
6.2.2.1 Clerical workers and restructuring 
The Western Australian award used for private sector clerks is the Clerks (Commercial, 
Social and Professional Services) Award for the whole period 1990-2003. The Victorian 
awards used are the Industrial Relations Commission of Victoria-registered Clerical and 
Administrative Employees Award (Victorian) from 1990 to 1993, and then the federally-
registered awards, the Clerical and Administrative Employees Award (Victoria) 1995 
and 1999 (C1128/AW773032) after the Victorian state industrial relations system was 
handed over to the AIRC. In each case, the award recommended by the Australian 
Services Union (ASU) as covering the most private sector clerical workers in each state 
was used (Interviews with union representatives E and C).  
As Table A-22 in Appendix 4, Section A4.4.4, shows, Western Australian private sector 
clerks were paid between $12 and $28 per week less than Victorian clerks for the whole 
period 1990 to 2003. This difference was widest and most consistent, ranging from $18 
to $28, during the period February 1991 to July 1993. The end of this period coincided 
with Western Australia gaining a minimum rate adjustment for its clerks.  
Compounding this disadvantage for Western Australian clerks, the structural efficiency 
reclassification exercise that preceded minimum rate adjustment of the Victorian award 
resulted in a six-grade structure, whereas Western Australia’s reclassification resulted in 
only three grades. These were equivalent to Victoria’s base grades 1-3. This illustrates 
how location can affect wage inequality. 
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This problem with career structures was widespread in Western Australian clerical 
awards. Other clerical awards were even worse, as they paid by age rather than skill, 
something that was illegal under anti-discrimination laws. The Western Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission website (WAIRC 2002-2005) showed that, of fifteen 
private clerical awards current in Western Australia in 2004, only three (the Clerks’ 
(Commercial, Social and Professional Services), the Clerks (Grain Handling) and the 
Clerks (RAC Control Room Officers) Awards) had a restructured award with 
classifications based on skills. The other eight awards, including Clerks (Hotels and 
Motels), Clerks (Taxi Services), Clerks (Accounting Employees), had an age-based 
classification structure with wages going up by year of age, even for adult employees32. 
This structure usually ended at age 25. The Clerks (RAC Control Room Officers) award 
had a four-level skills structure.  
Nearly all the federally–registered clerical awards (like the Victorian award used here 
which became federally-registered in 1996) listed on the Commonwealth Government 
data bases of AIRC decisions (OSIRIS 1990 to 2002, WageNet 2002-2005) used the six-
level skill-based classification structure developed in Victoria. The only clerical award 
with this type of structure in Western Australia was the Clerks (Grain Handling) Award 
which went up to seven levels, but covered very few people.  
The federally-registered clerical awards researched (OSIRIS 2000-2002, WageNet 2003-
2004) included a fairly large number of Victorian awards, and awards applying to South 
Australia, the Northern Territory, New South Wales and the Australian Capital 
Territory. Most of these awards used the same six-level skills-based classification 
system. Only two of the Victorian awards, which appeared to be superseded as they had 
not been kept up to date, used an age-based structure. An ASU official from Victoria 
also pointed out that, in 2002, most Victorian clerical workers were paid at Grades 3 and 
4 (Interview with union official E). At that stage, Grade 4 did not exist for most Western 
Australian clerical workers. 
                                                 
32 On 30 July 2005 the WAIRC website showed these Western Australian awards continued to have age-
based classifications contrary to the Industrial Relations Act 2001 (WA), Section 40D and the Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 (WA). 
 231
Overall, this meant that, not only were Western Australian private sector clerks Grade 1, 
2nd year of experience, being paid an average of $17 less per week than their Victorian 
counterparts over the period, but they also had less career structure available and thus 
less likelihood of higher future wages. Furthermore, a number of other private clerks in 
Western Australia still had awards with discriminatory wage structures based on age. 
It is worth explaining in some detail why the structural efficiency exercise on the 
Western Australian clerks’ main award, the Clerks (Commercial, Social and 
Professional) Award, stopped at three grades, instead of the six grade structure achieved 
in most other Australian states. In particular it illustrates the WAIRC’s attitude at the 
time towards the skills of clerical workers and problems with union amalgamation that 
affected both restructuring and enterprise bargaining. An employer representative 
involved said the six grade structure: 
…didn’t happen for two reasons, actually probably three. There were 
union issues at the time in terms of their level of activity and capacity to 
pursue that application. It took them a very long time to gather it all 
together, there were very protracted proceedings in WA, we didn’t like that 
structure and there were many counter-proposals and alternatives put. It 
ultimately ended up in arbitration…They didn’t want to arbitrate because 
quite frankly I believe one of the commissioners at the time just couldn’t 
even…what were his comments: “How technical it is to operate a 
photocopier.” It’s like…it was a condescending kind of remark to put down 
value of the work or he just actually couldn’t do a photocopy. So having 
had that decision for the first 3 grades… (Interview with employer 
representative B) 
The other concern the employer representative raised was that going to six grades 
extended the coverage of the then Federated Clerks Union (FCU) into the managerial 
and administrative area and their constitution did not allow for that. According to 
employer representative B, it was because the FCU’s constitution did not cover the more 
highly skilled clerical workers: 
Our position is…for the Clerks Union to be maintained under their rules 
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…not to go beyond that…under the federal rules they can cover the CEO, 
under state laws they cannot. (Interview with employer representative B) 
However, in a later interview in 2002 the union representative said…what I’ve done is… 
progressed a claim to extend the constitutional rules. (Interview with union official C) 
The union officials interviewed talked about the difficulties of trying to convince the 
Western Australian Industrial Commission (WAIRC) that clerks did work at the skill 
levels described in the new structure. The WAIRC and the employers seemed to think 
that clerks in Western Australia were less skilled than elsewhere.  
I think they had a fairly… jaundiced view, the Commission in Court Session 
about, really, the extent of the skills…on the basis of that a decision was 
handed down in 1993 which said, we‘ll give you the three levels but we 
won’t extend it to the six levels. (Interview with union official C) 
The WAIRC did a survey that, according to the union, was not favourable to the 
workers: 
…he did site inspections but he only looked at a selection of the workforce… 
I don’t quite know what happened but, generally when I’ve been involved in 
site inspections your main aim is to direct the commissioner to, obviously, 
the people you want him to talk to, to ensure that he gets, or you get, the best 
scenario of this case that you can then develop. It…didn’t seem as though 
that happened. (Interview with union official C) 
The WAIRC granted just a three grade structure and basically told the parties to go away 
and sort out the next three grades amongst themselves:  
…their view was that it could, but that the parties needed to go away and 
develop the claim and then come back to…make another application and 
then add on to the existing three levels. (Interview with union official C) 
The employers resisted because, according to the union: 
…it was really just a costing issue. I think they saw the possibility of a 
Grade 6 employee, I can’t recall what the figures were, but say it was $30 
odd thousand dollars whereas their argument was along the lines that the 
market rate at the moment was only paying $25,000. So it’s going to result 
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in people losing jobs… (Interview with union official J) 
Then, union amalgamations began to occur. The FCU was amalgamated with the Social 
Workers’ Union, and the Municipal Officers Association creating the new Australian 
Services Union (ASU). At the same time the deregulated industrial relations 
environment began to have its effect, causing scarce resources to be removed from the 
relatively low membership female-dominated area of clerks and relocated to the higher 
membership, more male-dominated, local government area.  
…a large proportion of our membership is in local government. We’ve 
pursued enterprise bargaining claims in those areas and really that’s where 
our resources go. Now, if you think about the traditional work value case 
that you mounted…in the 80s, this requires a huge amount of work in terms 
of getting together the evidence and getting together the…witnesses you 
need to start developing a claim. (Interview with union official C) 
From that time until around 2002/3, the union would occasionally review the situation 
and decide that their resources did not allow them to run what would be an expensive 
work value case under industrial regulations unfavourable to their case.  
…there wasn’t the ability to or the resources to actually mount a proper 
campaign…we got some external consultant help…he looked into the matter 
and his advice at the time was along the lines of, “You’re better off putting 
your resources into striking agreements at the enterprise level rather than 
going through the commission process of trying to arbitrate additional 
levels.”. (Interview with union official J) 
However, enterprise agreements were only rarely struck in the private clerical area. 
Recently, the union saw the industrial climate as again being more favourable to such 
restructuring/work value cases in Western Australia (with a change to a Western 
Australian Labor Government) and after negotiations with the Western Australian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry the extra grades were finally inserted on 1 July 
2004 (84 WAIG 2196). This was eleven years later than the last award restructuring 
exercise in the male-dominated awards studied. 
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It should be noted that employers in Western Australia felt that clerks operating at the 
missing higher skills levels were not being paid less than the Victorian rates (Interviews 
with employer representative B and employer B). For example: 
… if you ask those people, are you paying at least these rates, of people 
doing similar work in Victoria to this category that is not covered in WA, not 
in my experience, or anything that I see in the market, would say that we 
would be paying less than those rates. I work with a number of labour hire 
companies that do clerical work only, they pay some pretty good money and 
it’s not just the basic female clerk type roles which are covered by the 
award. (Interview with employer representative B) 
Even though these higher-skilled areas were award-free in Western Australia, the 
employer representative believed market pressures would ensure reasonable wages. An 
operator of a clerical employment agency interviewed confirmed that they certainly paid 
at least Victorian rates for that level of skill.  
We’re an agency, of course, so we send temps out, so there are times we do 
just pay the award, but generally it is above the award. And that’s well 
above the minimum award which would be the Clerks Social… (Interview 
with employer B)  
However, as pointed out by the proprietor of the clerical agency and an employer 
representative, this labour hire part of the market for clerks would also represent the 
upper reach of skills and productivity amongst clerical workers, so would also command 
the best pay.  
In our industry you know, we can only place people who are above average 
in abilities. So we would certainly not want to get a reputation of paying a 
minimum award or anything like that… (Interview with employer B)  
As already mentioned, the clerical employer representative B supported this view.  
However, there is still ample reason to suspect the classification structure difference led 
to lower wages for women in Western Australia. The Victorian branch of the ASU 
pointed out that: “the majority of our members would be Grade 3 or Grade 4.” 
(Interview with union official E) and Grade 4 is non-existent in the Western Australian 
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award. The Victorian official interviewed also said that when they had moved to the new 
six-grade structure they had many fights with employers who wanted to put all clerks 
not in training into Grade 2, regardless of skill.  
[I]t was a big issue at the time; negotiating with employers when the new 
skill structure came in to actually properly place people within the grades. 
You know they wanted to go for the lowest common denominator… 
(Interview with union official E)  
Thus, while clerical employment agencies may be forced by their greater exposure to 
market forces in the casual employment market to pay good wages, this still does not 
mean the average small firm using a highly skilled clerical worker always pays them 
according to their skill level, even where the classification exists to cover them. 
However, the employer representative interviewed felt employers generally paid over 
the award in Western Australia: “…really when you go through the Clerks Award they 
are complying with that and pay them more.” (Interview with employer 
representative B) 
It should also be noted that the Western Australian MRA case (of which the above 
structural efficiency exercise was a necessary precursor) resulted in a wage decrease for 
Grade 1 (1st year) clerks in Western Australia. For clerks in their first (not 2nd year as 
used in Appendix 4) year of experience, wages went down from $361.10 granted in 
October 1991 to $358.80 in 1993, when the MRA was set at 86 per cent of the 
tradesperson (Short 2001:24). This was the only time a wage decreased through MRA in 
the awards studied here and indeed, on asking Western Australian union officials and 
employer representatives, they could not remember any other example. The relevant 
employer representative said the decrease in entry level pay:  
… would have to be based on an age average because it was all based on 
age before. Researcher: Right, so they averaged out the pay. Interviewee: 
Yes, if you were 16 this is the rate you go up to… it went up to 25. This is the 
rate you got; it didn’t matter what you did. (Interview with employer 
representative B) 
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Thus the decrease was caused by a calculation of the average age of the clerks in 
Western Australia (the previous classification structure paid by age) resulting in a lower 
average age than elsewhere in Australia, which meant employers asked for a slightly 
lower rate of starting pay (Interview with employer representative B). 
6.2.2.2 Child care workers and MRA 
The awards used for child care are the Children’s Services (Private) Award for Western 
Australia and for the Victorian/AIRC equivalent: the Day Child Care Workers Award 
(registered in the Victorian state tribunal until 1995/6) and Children's Services (Victoria) 
Award (1995 /1998 C0772/AW772675) registered in the AIRC when the Victorian state 
industrial relations system was handed over to the AIRC. The relevant wage data are 
listed in Appendix 4, Section A4.4.2, in Table A-9. The classification used is a Qualified 
Child Care Giver (which requires a Certificate IV). The union uses this classification to 
compare across all states and territories. Child care registration requirements (both for 
the individual and organisation) vary across Australia (Bennett 1991:31; Interviews with 
union officials B and Q) so it is important to use a classification accepted as being 
common between the jurisdictions. 
As can be seen in Table A-9, child care was one of the few Western Australian 
occupations studied that was paid more than their equivalent in Victoria. This was 
particularly so after the Western Australian branch achieved an apparently favourable 
MRA phased in by 1994. Western Australian qualified child carers received around $15 
to $33 more per week than their Victorian counterparts in 2003. 
Unfortunately there was nothing published about MRA in the Victorian awards during 
the study period. From the comparison of wage rates, it is likely that adjustments made 
followed the Australian Capital and Northern Territory MRA test case run by the ACTU 
and the Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union (FMWU) and brought down in 1990. 
In this case the Full Bench (AIRC Print J4316:6) aligned qualified child care givers at 
level three (as used in this study) with the metal tradesperson’s rate: 
In order to conform with the National Wage Case guidelines, the parties 
adopted as a basis for comparison the training experience which the two 
classifications of worker must undertake. It has been shown that both must 
 237
have work experience to complement their academic studies and both are 
taught a range of skills which must be applied in circumstances calling for 
the exercise of responsibility. The evidence showed also that the student in 
child care studies will have had approximately twice the number of hours 
of academic training as will the student pursuing the trade certificate 
course in the metal and engineering industry. 
The Full Bench (AIRC Print J4316:6) conducting the case referred more than once to 
not applying the standard work value comparison methods: 
…the parties did not suggest that the vocation of Child Care Worker could 
be compared with that of the Tradesperson in the usual way that 
comparisons are made. It is apparent that the decision in the National 
Wage Case August 1989 did not require that direct comparisons of skill, 
responsibility and work conditions had to be found before relativities 
could be approved; if this was required, very few categories of worker in 
awards other than the trades awards would qualify.  
The result was that, despite the AIRC’s finding that qualified child care workers training 
was in excess of that required for a metal tradesperson (i.e. equivalent to an Associate 
Diploma or Certificate IV), they were aligned with a Certificate III or tradesperson rate. 
This would appear to be based on the Full Bench’s perception that tradespeople had 
more responsibility and/or worse working conditions than child carers.  
Child care was chosen as a study area for this thesis because of the way MRA was 
carried out for private child care workers in Western Australia. While child care workers 
in Western Australia received more from MRA compared to Victorian child care 
workers, union officials in Western Australia felt even more could have been achieved if 
a less discriminatory approach had been used. For example, a union official said: 
…in the child care case the commission forced, actually forced an interim 
decision to compare female-dominated workers with [a] female-dominated 
workforce. Which in itself, came out with a suppressed outcome, rather than, 
what the union had intended to do, which was compare child care workers as 
a female-dominated workforce, traditionally suppressed, with metal workers, 
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who were setting the standard... (Interview with union official A) 
The commissioner judging the case (unlike those on the Federal Full Bench case 
mentioned earlier) did appear to have trouble with using the traditional comparison in 
MRA cases – metal tradesperson. As the commissioner said, when being interviewed:  
…how you undertake the cerebral exercise of aligning a child care worker 
with a metal tradesman evaded me. So I said, you know, I just can’t do it 
that way, so we went back and looked at teachers and saw them, the child 
care worker, as part of the teaching process and aligned rates with 
teacher’s rates of pay. [emphasis added] (Interview with Commissioner X) 
When writing up the case for the Industrial Gazette, the commissioner put it a little more 
formally, saying: 
I have considerable difficulty in aligning a trained child care worker with 
the classification in the Metal Trades Industry Award on the basis of 
relative skill, responsibility and the conditions under which work is 
normally performed in each industry. (73 WAIG 101 at 109) 
In the decision the commissioner pointed out that “the Metal Trades Associate Diploma 
courses were being re-written and that the final competency level…has yet to be 
determined” (73 WAIG 101 at 109). He went on to say:  
 [t]he points I have referred to demonstrate the difficulty which I have 
encountered in translating the work value of a Trained Child Care Worker 
to a metal trades engineering framework” (73 WAIG 101 at 109) 
The commissioner went on to explain the teacher comparison. 
The skill, training, responsibility and conditions under which work is 
normally performed by a trained child care worker is more readily 
assessable within the framework of pre-primary education. That is not to 
say that the two are identical. Clearly they are not. However, I consider 
that an environment which is substantially structured around the formal 
education of pre-primary aged children is more relevant to the 
consideration of a Key Minimum Classification rate for those involved in 
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quality child care and developmental learning than is the metal trades 
workshop. (73 WAIG 101 at 110) 
On being interviewed it was clear that the commissioner did not understand the union’s 
objections to this process. 
Now I would have thought that in the area of teaching, where male and 
female professionals, have, I know, got equal status in terms of the number 
of principals, deputy principals and administrators, and certainly in terms 
of the wage rates, female teachers don’t get less than male teachers, so by 
this alignment, I would have thought we had completed an exercise that 
recognised the worth of a child care worker, not because it was a female-
dominated industry, almost exclusively female-dominated, but because it 
was recognised for the worth it provided to society and to the value for the 
people who were paying, not only the parents, but also the government 
through subsidy. (Interview with Commissioner X) 
He felt that, because there was no direct evidence of pay inequality in teaching as male 
and female teachers got the same pay, then this was a correctly valued occupation that 
could be used in a MRA case. However, the issue is not about direct discrimination, but 
about indirect discrimination. The fact that child care workers and teachers both use 
skills that are seen as caring skills (feminine skills that are often given away for free in 
non-market situations) could and as suggested above, did, affect their pay. Thus, as the 
union official stated above, it would seem that the WAIRC was using an undervalued 
occupation (teaching) to set the value of another (traditionally undervalued) occupation. 
The independent teachers’ award used for comparison had also not been properly 
minimum rate adjusted. The commissioner referred to the independent teachers’ award 
used as being a minimum rate award (73 WAIG 101 at 114), yet it was paying the same 
national benchmark (of $38,000) as the government teachers’ award that was still a paid 
rates award. He also said, of the adoption of the national benchmark in the independent 
teachers’ award: “[t]hat determination under the Special Case Principle effectively 
initiated the Minimum Rates Adjustment in the teaching profession in this state.” Yet, if 
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this benchmark was set under the special case principle, it was not achieved using the 
MRA process of comparing to the metal or building trades rate.  
While the commissions have used occupations as comparators in MRA cases that were 
not the metal trades rate, interviewees reported that the occupations used were, as far as 
they knew, already minimum rate adjusted. It seems therefore, that using teachers as the 
comparator in an MRA case was inappropriate and certainly the LHMU in Western 
Australia (as at early 2004 – conversation with LHMU official) was seeking to reopen 
the case on that basis. It should be noted that these problems around MRA are far from 
unique in female-dominated occupations. The pay equity inquiries in New South Wales 
(Glynn 1998) and Queensland (Fisher 2001) found similar problems. 
6.2.3 Enterprise Bargaining  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3 and Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4, the introduction 
of enterprise bargaining and decentralisation to the workplace led to a widening of the 
wage gap between the male and female-dominated occupations studied. This was due to 
the difficulties experienced in gaining enterprise bargaining agreements (EBAs) in 
female-dominated occupations. Both child care and private clerical work in Western 
Australia provide good examples of this process. As explained in Chapter 2, Sections 
2.3.1 and 2.3.3 and Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4, with enterprise-level bargaining for 
productivity-related wage increases, unions could gain higher increases than through 
safety net adjustments to awards.   
This negative finding for the gender pay gap under enterprise bargaining was also 
reflected more generally in Australia. Heiler, Arsovska and Hall (1999:108&113) show 
this using data from the then Commonwealth Department of Employment, Workplace 
Relations and Small Business Workplace Agreements Database (WAD) and the then 
Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training Agreements Database 
and Monitor (ADAM). The WAD data (Heiler, Arsovska & Hall 1999:108) indicate that 
women gained lower average annual wage increases (AAWIs) than men under the 
workplace agreements monitored in 1995, 1997 and 1998 (but not in 1994 when it was 
equal). Their analysis of ADAM information used a proxy for gender, “feminisation” or 
proportion of women in each industry, as many agreements did not provide an accurate 
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breakdown of employees covered by gender (Heiler, Arsovska & Hall 1999:106). This 
found that only the male-dominated industries of construction and manufacturing 
provided above (all industry) average annual wage increases between 1996 and 1998.  In 
addition, Heiler, Arsovska & Hall (1999:112) note: 
Those industries that provided wage increases well below average over 
these years included mining, public administration, health services, 
hospitality and recreational and personal services. All of these industries 
had annualised wage increases below average for the three consecutive 
years.  Each of these industries, with the exception of mining33, are either 
heavily female-dominated or cover a large number of women. 
Unlike this study, WAD and ADAM also only look at wage outcomes for enterprise 
bargaining agreements actually achieved, not at the wage outcomes for women who 
could not achieve EBAs in their workplace. As becomes evident when looking at child 
care and clerical work, as well as the relevant ABS (2003) data, female-dominated 
occupations rely on awards rather than EBAs, creating a major problem for these 
occupations and automatically lower wage outcomes. 
6.2.3.1  EBAs and private clerks 
Consistent with the previous discussion, enterprise bargaining agreements were said to 
be fairly rare for clerks in Victoria and Western Australia (Interviews with union 
officials C and E). However, the Victorian branch of the ASU had been able to negotiate 
agreements with large national firms, such as Myer Grace Brothers and John Sands, 
whose agreements are used for the wage data listed in Appendix 4. Sometimes these 
types of agreements went across state borders, but the ones used here are specific to 
Victoria. Many Victorian clerical EBAs were gained in concert with other unions, such 
as the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU) and the National Union of 
                                                 
33 This result for mining is contrary to the figures shown in this thesis for miners in Appendix 4. However, 
it should be remembered that the miner in this study was paid under Western Australian Workplace 
Agreements which greatly increased outcomes for miners when compared to the award and other 
occupations covered (miners gained a 280 per cent increase in their wages between 1990 and 2003, 
compared to increases of around 100 per cent for other male-dominated occupations studied and around 
50 per cent for female-dominated occupations studied).  Interviewees consulted (Interviews with manager 
E, employer representative G and union official O) said most miners were paid on individualised 
agreements and not on the collective agreements that would have been included in WAD or ADAM. 
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Workers (OSIRIS 2000-2002; WageNet 2002-2004). The first Johns Sands’ agreement 
in Appendix 4, Table A-13 is an example.  
The Western Australian branch of the ASU had problems in negotiating EBAs and only 
three existed that were connected to this particular award over the period 1990 to 2003 
(Interview with union officials C and J; 74 to 83 WAIGs). Of these, one, for the 
Australian Red Cross (Western Australian Branch), became a s.170LK (not involving 
unions as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.7) agreement during the period under 
study. The last agreement listed in Table A-13 for Australian Red Cross (Western 
Australian Branch) is this federally-registered LK enterprise bargaining agreement. 
When asked why the ASU were not involved, the manager said: “Lack of membership 
numbers, not worth it…That’s what they told the staff”(Interview with manager B). In 
the John Sands EBAs the first year of experience classification had to be used as there 
was only one level in the grade. This is compared to Grade 1, 2nd year of experience, for 
the Australian Red Cross EBAs, yet, as can be seen in Table A-13, John Sands’ wage 
rates were higher. 
The apparent monetary return to Western Australian employees on EBAs at Red Cross 
was also very small compared to the award. A five per cent increase on the award 
appeared to be the best they obtained compared to John Sands Victorian employees’ best 
increase of 17 per cent. The words “apparent return” are used because Red Cross 
employees were also able to salary package (which reduces tax liabilities) as employees 
of a charity. According to the organisation’s human resources manager, some fairly 
large increases could be gained through packaging: 
…if I took our average pay rate of $32,000 odd a year, if you package the 
total you’d go from a package of $36,000 by the time you get your loading, 
and your super and everything, up to $40,000. So … we always try to sell 
the package not the base rate, so it looks good. That’s what we try to do, 
but I just think it’s the not for profit sector that says I haven’t got a whole 
heap of money, I’m better off delivering services than paying salaries. 
(Interview with manager B) 
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An employer representative also pointed out that the ASU had relinquished other 
enterprise bargaining agreements involving clerks: 
Woolworths have got their clerks covered in their agreement, but that took 
a long time and almost despite the ASU they got an agreement up. The 
union was involved initially but [the] employer…ended up doing their own 
LK agreement for their clerks and that was in the distribution area, and … 
their own main office. (Interview with employer representative B) 
The same employer representative and two officials from the union indicated the source 
of the problem for the ASU Western Australian Branch. For example, while discussing 
the likelihood of the union going to arbitration over Western Australian clerks’ missing 
classification levels, the employer representative said: 
I think they are poorly organised and I think there is less benefit in terms of 
membership. From a business perspective…the work that’s involved in 
arbitration of that kind they would get very little response in terms of 
dollars to them. The SDA [Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees’ 
Association] is an example of a union that sees it as a business, they 
haven’t dealt with small employers; they’ve gone to the boardroom, done a 
deal and got membership as a result of it. Little effort, big result and 
membership…the ASU would have to look at huge effort for little return… 
(Interview with employer representative B) 
In other words, most private clerks worked in small businesses and they were very hard 
to organise. Negotiating enterprise bargaining agreements for all these businesses would 
have been extremely expensive in terms of union resources and consequently, the union 
only tried in larger businesses, if at all.  
As already mentioned, the ASU absorbed the FCU in the early 1990s. Union officials in 
Western Australia pointed out that this amalgamation had not assisted clerks and 
enterprise bargaining, as their resources had gone to other sections of the ASU: 
//…I don’t think in general the amalgamation process of the union worked. 
And there was a perception from the old Clerks’ side of things that we were 
being starved…// … that used to be a separate union, merged with other 
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unions…and there is still an ongoing major internal debate in that union 
about the allocation of resources as between the different divisions…//  
From seven or eight staff in the old Clerks Union, the clerical division of the ASU came 
down to just two staff members.  
We had, I think, probably two industrial officers, a state secretary and four 
or five organisers. So it was a bit different then…People got sacked, 
people weren’t replaced, people were transferred into…the local 
government side of things…another division of the ASU. (Interview with 
union official J) 
A current official confirmed the emphasis on other sections of the membership created 
problems with changing the clerks’ award: 
 [T]here was a series of amalgamations that started from 1994…as a 
result…the organisation started to broaden its…membership base…a large 
proportion of our membership is in local government. We’ve pursued 
enterprise bargaining claims in those areas and really that’s where our 
resources go. (Interview with union official C) 
Table 22 below compares the Western Australian and Victorian female-dominated 
clerical award rates to the male-dominated metal trades’ standard (long used in the 
AIRC as a standard for changing federal wage rates e.g. in National Wage Cases) in both 
jurisdictions. The metal trades rates are those paid under the award until 1996 and then 
EBAs, as denoted by the shading in the table. 
The comparison is made between metal industry EBAs and clerical awards, rather than 
clerical EBAs and metals EBAs in later years, because each instrument used appears to 
be closer to what is actually used. An employer representative interviewed said that the 
majority of clerical employers paid slightly over rates relating to the award rates rather 
than negotiate EBAs or even individual workplace agreements: “a lot of the agreements 
were over-award arrangements just in a letter of offer, a contract. More common than 
any form of regulated EBA” (Interview with employer representative B). The industrial 
instruments likely to have most impact on metal tradespersons’ actual pay were 
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negotiated EBAs (Interview with employer representative C), so this is the comparison 
used in Tables 22 and 23. 
Table 22 - Comparing Clerical and Metal Tradesperson Rates 
Year Occupation $ WA $ Vic % Trades WA % Trades Vic 
1990 Grade 1 clerk 341.40 363.60 87.05 91.38 
  Metal tradesperson 392.20 397.90 100.00 100.00 
1993 Grade 1 clerk 372.60 392.40 89.31 92.29 
  Metal tradesperson 417.20 425.20 100.00 100.00 
1996 Grade 1 clerk 396.60 392.40 73.43 80.77 
  Metal tradesperson 540.10 485.80 100.00 100.00 
1999 Grade 1 clerk 432.60 444.40 71.77 79.36 
  Metal tradesperson 675.82 559.95 100.00 100.00 
2003 Grade 1 clerk 495.60 507.40 64.00 70.04 
  Metal tradesperson 774.41 724.42 100.00 100.00 
(Sources: WAIGs; www.wairc.wa.gov.au; IRCV; AIRC - Osiris/WageNet; Shading indicates the use of agreements instead of 
awards.) 
As with all the other female-dominated wage areas studied, clerks lost considerable 
ground compared to metal tradespersons in both Western Australia (dropping from 87 
per cent of the Western Australian metal trades’ rate in 1990 to 64 per cent in 2003) and 
Victoria (dropping from 91 per cent of the Victorian metal trades’ rate to 70 per cent) as 
the EBA wages increases for the metal tradesperson outstripped safety net increases to 
the clerical awards. The Western Australian clerks not only started lower, but also lost a 
little more relative to the Western Australian tradesperson than their Victorian 
counterparts over the 13 years, 1990 to 2003. 
6.2.3.2 Child care workers and EBAs 
In both states, enterprise bargaining was found to be almost non-existent in child care 
(WAIGs 74-83; WageNet 2003-5). Only very union-friendly organisations such as the 
University of Western Australia had negotiated enterprise bargaining agreements and 
then only very recently (2001) because the employer had wanted an EBA (Interview 
with union official B). A Western Australian union official explained: 
[i]t’s very hard to enterprise bargain in child care. You’ve got a myriad of 
very small employers. They’re often not industrially aware and not 
inclined to enterprise bargain…it’s just extremely time-consuming, 
resource intensive, and almost impossible to negotiate with the whole 350 
odd employers that you would have to do enterprise bargaining 
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agreements with. Particularly given that they’re not inclined that way 
anyway. So basically, we just have maintained getting the award safety net 
pay rises…in that award, since, probably, the early 90’s, since we did our 
minimum rates adjustment. (Interview with union official B) 
As shown in Table 23, child care workers on awards lost ground relative to metal 
tradespersons on EBAs in both states over the 13 years studied and in roughly the same 
proportion. Child care workers in Western Australia lost around 25 percentage points 
and those in Victoria around 22 percentage points.  
However, the two occupations’ (metal tradesperson and qualified child care giver) wage 
rates are closer than the metals and clerks rates as qualifications are required in both. As 
already discussed, Qualified Child Care Givers must hold a Certificate IV or Associate 
Diploma and metal tradespersons, a Trades Certificate or Certificate III (only advanced 
tradespersons need a Certificate IV) (JobSearch 2004). Yet, as can be seen in Table 23, 
child care workers in both states on awards earn 18-19 per cent less than metal 
tradespeople on enterprise bargaining agreements. 
Table 23 – Child Care Givers Compared to Metal Tradespersons 1990-2003 
Year Occupation $ WA $ Vic/Fed % Trades WA 
% Trades 
Vic/Fed 
1990 Qualified child care giver 414.29 412.30 105.63 103.62 
  Metal tradesperson 392.20 397.90 100.00 100.00 
1993 Qualified child care giver 472.45 468.40 113.24 110.16 
  Metal tradesperson 417.20 425.20 100.00 100.00 
1996 Qualified child care giver 525.10 484.40 97.18 99.71 
  Metal tradesperson 540.36 485.80 100.00 100.00 
1999 Qualified child care giver 561.10 526.40 83.03 94.01 
  Metal tradesperson 675.82 559.95 100.00 100.00 
2003 Qualified child care giver 624.10 591.40 80.59 81.64 
  Metal tradesperson 774.41 724.42 100.00 100.00 
(Sources: WAIGs; www.wairc.wa.gov.au; IRCV; AIRC - Osiris/WageNet; Shading indicates the use of agreements instead of 
awards.) 
6.2.4 Individualisation 
As raised in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2, interviewees felt individualisation, or the move to 
individual contracts that occurred in Western Australia between 1993 and 2001 (as 
discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4), had led to lower pay for women. A Western 
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Australian union representative felt that state’s lower relative pay for women was 
caused by individual contracts: 
…that’s one of those consequences…of…that whole bringing in of 
workplace agreements to get people off awards, to get people…out of any 
sort of centralised bargaining process. Because whereas I still think there 
are problems with the centralised bargaining process, I think that women 
tend to do better under those processes than they do under…individual 
contracts. (Interview with union official S) 
The literature agreed that women were likely to fare worse under individual contracts. 
Bailey and Horstman (1999:6), analysing data from the Western Australian 
Commissioner of Workplace Agreements, found that individual agreements covering 
female workers were 50 per cent more likely to contain under-award rates. Heiler, 
Arsovska and Hall (1999:141) pointed out that: 
Two states pursuing individual bargaining prior to 1996 (Western 
Australia and Tasmania) have a wage gap which is significantly higher 
than that of New South Wales (the collectivist system). The results thus 
suggest that as more jurisdictions pursue regulatory systems based on 
individualism, we are likely to see continued erosion of the relative pay 
position of women in Australia. 
Yet, the move to formally-registered individual contracts seemed to have had little effect 
on the Western Australian clerical or child care workers studied during the period 1990 
to 2003 and as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4, very few Western Australians (9.4 
per cent according to ABS 2003a) were covered by formally-registered individual 
agreements, even by May 2002. However, coverage by individual informal, or 
unregistered agreements was significant by 2002, with 39.4 per cent of Western 
Australian employees covered by this type of agreement. It is possible that the move to 
legislate for individual registered agreements may have also affected the number of 
unregistered agreements offered. As shown in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4, in 1990 only 
21.3 per cent of Western Australian employees were not covered by an award or 
registered agreement (in other words, had their own individualised unregistered 
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agreement). Thus, by 2002, it would seem another 18.1 per cent of Western Australians 
had this type of agreement (ABS 2003a)34.  
Todd, Caspersz and Sutherland (2004:525) interviewed 11 employers associations in 
Western Australia and concluded that Western Australian: 
…employers, in general, have rejected the government’s approach, 
preferring to retain both the high level of managerial control and reduced 
labour costs achieved under the previous regulatory framework. 
Thus, even though the law had changed to abolish Western Australian Workplace 
Agreements (WAWAs) in 2001 and only nine per cent of employees were covered by 
formally registered agreements, Todd, Casperz and Sutherland (2004:533) found: “The 
WPA [Workplace Agreement] Act …impacted on workplace regulatory arrangements 
beyond those workplaces that actually registered WPAs…” and employers continued to 
use individualised (informal) arrangements. The study areas most affected by individual 
agreements were clerical workers, shop assistants and miners. Interviewees (Interview 
with employer representative B) felt many clerks and shop assistants working for small 
employers were on individual unregistered, rather than registered, agreements. Miners 
were mainly employed on formally registered individual agreements (Interviews with 
manager E and employer representative G). 
Interviewees said clerical employers did not use formally-registered individual 
workplace agreements as “[t]here is not an impetus, a need, a demand for a structured 
agreement other than a common law contract that sits on top of the award” (Interview 
with employer representative B). However, one employer interviewed (Interview with 
employer B) said the clerical agency employers’ association she belonged to promoted 
WAWAs to members and suggested she formalise existing unregistered agreements. 
…the industry suggested that it would be a good idea to do so.  Some had 
always worked on workplace agreements. And it just sets out really terms 
                                                 
34 There is some possibility of categorisation error between the two ABS surveys (ABS 1990 and 2003a) 
that may have overstated this apparent move to individual unregistered agreements. Coverage 
arrangements that were previously seen as employees being covered by the awards may now be being 
categorized by the ABS as individual unregistered agreements. This is particularly the case where 
employers used the award as a reference and added a small amount on top for individual employees. 
(Wooden 2001) 
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and conditions really. We do have like a statement of terms and conditions 
but we never formalised it.  (Interview with employer B) 
The child care employers interviewed (Interviews with employers A & C) all used award 
rates and one said she would be reluctant to use WAWAs (which could have allowed her 
to pay below award rates) as their workers were already paid low wages: 
I guess I’m just happy to stick to the award rate so…it’s easier, 
probably…less time-consuming to set it up.  And I think childcare workers 
generally aren’t paid very high anyway.  So to pay them less, I’d feel a bit 
stingy. (Interview with employer A) 
6.2.5 Other Industrial and Economic Factors Affecting Child Care 
and Clerical Work  
6.2.5.1 Union density and militancy 
In Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3, interviewees’ perceptions of the role of ‘militancy’ and 
‘union density’ in supporting higher wage outcomes was discussed. For example, a 
government official pointed out that there was “a fairly reasonable differential between 
unionised and non-unionised employees” with the former gaining higher wage rates, 
particularly under enterprise bargaining, so it is important to discuss both union density 
and militancy, or propensity to take industrial action.  
There were no published union membership figures available for private clerks. There 
were ABS (2003a) figures available on a very broad basis for the occupation of 
intermediate clerk or advanced clerk, but these could include public service clerks and 
given that union membership is higher in the public than the private sector, the figures 
would not reflect the situation of the private sector. As employer representative B put it: 
“[a] clerk is not an industry in itself and there will be spatterings of clerical people 
across all industry groups.” This only makes organising clerks into unions harder and 
membership is expected to be low, even with union investment in membership 
resources.  
As shown above in the discussion on EBAs, the amalgamation of the (more female-
dominated membership) FCU with (more male-dominated membership) local 
government and airline industry unions to create the ASU, did not appear to have 
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assisted in the provision of services to clerks, particularly so in Western Australia. This 
must inevitably also have had an effect on union density. 
As already suggested, interviewees felt clerks were not normally active union members. 
They tended to work for small employers and work closely with their employers, so to 
join a union and move against their employer is not a normal experience for clerks. A 
union official in Western Australia commented: 
… they were very inactive, other than that airlines group and a couple of 
smaller patches. Although…[at] Red Cross and Armaguard, from what I recall 
there was maybe not big memberships, but at least there was a group of people 
who were willing to become involved and help strike agreements and those 
sorts of things. (Interview with union official J) 
Child care workers mainly worked in the health and community services industry which, 
on the face of it, had relatively high union membership at 30.7 per cent in 2002 (see 
Table A-7 in Appendix 4; ABS 2003a). However, it is very doubtful that this was 
reflected in private child care. The relatively high membership figure probably came 
from the public sector part of the health and community services industry. One of the 
two private sector child care employers who were interviewed had experienced union 
site visits: “they’ve often come round… but I’ve had excellent workplaces and I…hope I 
provide the same for these girls here.” (Interview with employer B), yet did not feel her 
workforce was unionised. 
Interviewees felt that child care workers were unlikely to be militant. Not only did they 
work for small organisations where industrial action was less likely, but they worked in 
an occupation where going on strike would badly and directly affect their clients – the 
children and parents involved. As a union official working in child care said: 
…women generally…don’t want to cause trouble…they’re in caring 
industries often, service industries, those sorts of things, and that would 





6.2.5.2 Market factors 
6.2.5.2.1 Demand and supply 
Child care workers were in the slightly anomalous position of having above average 
unemployment as of May 2003 (Job Search 2004), yet being listed in the National Skills 
Shortages List at the same time. However, the shortages appeared to be for qualified 
child care workers rather than other child care workers. The Job Outlook section of Job 
Search (2004) gave their occupational profile and it was clear that only around 20 per 
cent of workers had Certificate III or IV and were thus at this qualified level. The 
majority (some 70 per cent) had no post-school qualifications in 2003. 
Given that clerks work in so many different areas, it was hard to identify any specific 
product or finance market effects. Only the overall demand and supply for their services 
can be estimated, rather than that by industry. According to the ABS figures used in the 
Job Outlook section of Job Search (2004), in May 2003 unemployment was above 
average for clerks. Job Outlook also said, as with child care, that a large component of 
the workforce was unskilled, 58 per cent of clerks have no post school education. This 
meant that supply could easily expand and that there would be little market pressure on 
wage rates. 
6.2.5.2.2 Part-time work 
Both child care and clerical work have a large part-time workforce. According to the Job 
Outlook section of Job Search (2004), as at May 2003, 44.8 per cent of clerks and 50.7 
per cent of child care workers worked part-time.  Interviewees felt that not only does this 
limit the unions’ ability to organise child care workers and clerical workers and to get 
these workers to take industrial action, but it appears, as previously discussed in Chapter 
5, Section 5.2.4, the predominance of women in the occupation actually ensures that the 
work is organised as part-time rather than as (better paid) shift work. This point is made 
by Beechey and Perkins (1987:163-4) in their study of part-time work in the United 
Kingdom: 
We tried to identify features of the organization of the labour process 
which could account for the fact that certain jobs were part-time. But one 
thing which became absolutely clear is that these features only resulted in 
 252
jobs being organised on a part-time basis when women were employed. 
When men were employed, managements used other mechanisms for 
attaining flexibility. Two examples illustrated this point. Within the 
hospital sector there was 100 per cent occupational segregation between 
portering, done exclusively by men, and other manual work, done by 
women. Yet portering was done by men working on a three-shift system, 
while women’s manual work was all part-time.  
This led Beechey and Perkins (1987:164) to conclude that “…the demand for part-time 
labour is inextricably linked to the presence of occupational segregation.” The 
occupational segregation they refer to is, of course, by sex. Human Capital theorists, 
including the original theorist, Becker (1957) and economists Nevile and Tran Nam 
(1992), explain this occupational sex segregation as being the result of women choosing 
to enter occupations requiring low levels of investment, because they expect to have 
discontinuous participation in the labour force. They see this as a rational choice, not a 
result of both indirect and direct discrimination related to gender.  
Bergmann (1974), a feminist economist, suggests instead that women are systematically 
excluded from certain occupations by employers’ expectations of women’s roles. (As 
shown in Chapter 5, Section 5.4, interviewees also think most of society, including 
women themselves, continues to have expectations which limit women’s occupational 
choice.) This results in an artificially-expanded supply of labour and low wages in 
“crowded” occupations. “Attitudes concerning which occupations are ‘proper’ for 
women and blacks are part of the social system and are learned, and most employers 
have learned pretty much the same thing” (Bergmann 1974:313). The perceptions of 
employers (and others) are the determining factor in this theory, not some type of choice 
by women.  
As Rubery, Grimshaw and Figueiredo (2002:5-7) concluded on reviewing gender wage 
equality research, one of the questionable assumptions of researchers using Human 
Capital Theory is that individual characteristics such as education and work experience 
are the result of free choices by women and men. These free choices segregate women 
into part-time and low paid work. There is significant evidence of labour market 
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segregation by sex in Australia (Rimmer 1991; Pocock & Alexander 1999; Wooden 
1999; Watts 2003). This is reflected in the earlier reference, when discussing Figure 32, 
to the different or segmented labour markets facing women entering the Australian 
labour market. 
6.2.5.2.3 Financial factors 
As this comment by an employer representative indicates, child care has been an 
industry heavily dependent on government funding. 
But you see, in the child care industry, who’s going to pay for the wage 
increase? …unfortunately they don’t make a profit, they don’t generate any 
income, so it’s just going to come out of the public purse. You’ve got to 
take that public interest question into consideration as well…So…once 
they go up, all they can do to get their money back is to charge higher fees. 
(Interview with employer representative D) 
Of course the employer representative was wrong in saying that child care employers do 
not make a profit. Private child care employers definitely do (as those interviewed here 
made clear) and that is why they are in business. However, a private child care employer 
interviewed felt that parents could not afford to pay full fees. The interviewer and 
interviewee were talking about how child care had a market down-turn a year or so 
before the interview when government policy changed away from capital funding of 
community centres. The employer said: 
Yes, but the government has come good with its policy on child care and 
funds the parents through fee reduction …which helps to make owners of 
child care more successful these days. But it’s very much dependent on the 
government policy, I think, because parents couldn’t afford to pay the full 
fee without any assistance. (Interview with employer A) 
Child care is also a very complex market with many product/labour substitutions.  First, 
there is the possibility of care being provided by parents themselves, outside the paid 
labour market and then there is the possibility of voluntary labour by relatives and 
friends. Even within the paid labour market there is more than one form of care ranging 
from nannies providing in-home care, family day care workers providing (partially 
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government-regulated) care in their homes and then what is termed long day care 
centres. The centres also vary greatly in that they can be community-based and not-for-
profit, local government-run and private for-profit. Different regulations apply and 
different management structures.  (Bennett 1991:31-36)  
As there is a multitude of industries in which clerical work is performed, no specific 
financial or product factors can be identified that affect them. Financial factors are also 
significant for teachers, clerical administrative workers and construction, as raised in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1. 
6.3 SUMMARISING ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL FACTORS 
FOR CHILD CARE AND CLERICAL WORK 
In summary, private clerical workers appeared to have lost more than they had gained 
over the period 1990 to 2003 when compared to the male standard, the metal 
tradesperson classification. This was particularly true of Western Australian clerks who 
(for first year of experience) lost $2/week, even after a minimum rate adjustment 
exercise aimed at giving them a fair safety net award. In addition, the Western 
Australian clerks’ awards lacked the full range of classifications for ten years after they 
were gained in Victoria. An employer representative interviewed also thought the work 
of Western Australian clerks was undervalued: 
Clerical work is not highly regarded or paid well in my view and it is also 
one of the awards that took a very long time, lots of argument to establish 
that value or value of work. (Interview with employer representative B) 
Only where clerks work in industries like mining, or oil and gas, did employers 
interviewed claim they were paid good wages:  
//…our [clerical] wage rates are so far in advance of what those awards 
would pay, nobody bothers with them…//…a person employed in a mining 
industry office down here would be much more relevant to the prevailing 
market,   although I would’ve thought that it’s likely to be towards the higher 
end of the market, certainly if you look at oil and gas. Their salary rates for 
clerical and administrative people are bound to be at the top end of the 
market…// 
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The classification Clerk, Grade 1, may also have been an occupational area subject to 
oversupply as the skills required for entry were relatively low (just secondary school 
education) and unemployment was fairly high. This is also the case for the shop assistant 
classification studied. 
As stated in Short (2002a:19): 
 
It should also be borne in mind that clerical workers make up at least 
9.1 per cent of the WA female workforce and 79.3 per cent of clerical 
workers are female in WA (as of February 2002 – ABS Labour Force 
6130.0 unpublished). The existence of out-dated and/or age-related pay 
structures in clerical work may be helping to create the higher level of pay 
inequality shown in WA than the rest of Australia.  
Summarising the position of child care workers, this is an occupation that is in shortage 
only for qualified (Certificate III or IV) child care givers; otherwise there is quite high 
unemployment. Demand was growing for the product over the study period, but 
operators and users were heavily dependent on government subsidies. As the major 
component of business costs, wages were likely to be affected by the level of these 
subsidies. As noted in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2, monopsonisation by government may 
keep relative wages lower (when comparing those with the same qualifications). The 
same effect is evident with other occupations studied here, including teachers and 
clerical administrative public sector employees.  
The child care workers appeared to have little power, either in terms of being able to 
withdraw their labour without substitution, or in terms of solidarity. It is unlikely that 
child care workers in many different small businesses would support each other in 
industrial action. The majority of child care workers were part-time and this further 
affected the union’s ability to recruit them and for the workers to exercise industrial 
power. This situation is shared by many of three out of four female-dominated 
occupations studied: private clerical, retail and child care workers.  
Finally, it is interesting to note the conclusion of the NSW Department of Industrial 
Relations (2000:7) following their commissioned research into pay equity in children’s 
services for the NSW Industrial Relations Commission’s Pay Equity Inquiry: 
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Proprietors of long day care centres and pre-schools/kindergartens 
overwhelmingly considered that Child Care Workers were underpaid and 
that their skills and responsibilities were not adequately recognized in their 
rates of pay. 
Teachers and nurses were female-dominated occupations also seen by employees as 
being undervalued compared to male-dominated occupations such as building trades 
labourer and police officer: 
//…[W]hen you compare an entry level nurse, following a degree course, 
with an entry level policeman, following a 12 months diploma at the 
Academy, the wages are significantly different. $31,000 versus … I think 
$37,000 the policeman gets…//…a labourer, who is unskilled, gets 
$52,000 a year on a 38 hour week - no overtime - I find that outrageous 
compared to the training of nurses, teachers, policemen…// [emphasis 
added] 
6.4 GENDER CONSTRUCTION IN CHILD CARE AND 
CLERICAL WORK 
The factors discussed above illustrate how interviewees believed the values of the actors 
in the formal industrial relations system were translated into lower wage outcomes, or 
value, for workers in child care and clerical work and to some extent, why these values 
were formed and persist. It is useful now to complete the circle of value and values in 
the labour market and describe what the literature and interviewees say about how 
values and gender construction affect these two occupations and thus how their (lower 
relative) value is maintained. 
Cortis (2000) pointed to the heart of the problem with defining skills in these 
occupations within the formal industrial relations system in Australia, in a comment on 
the New South Wales Pay Equity Inquiry that investigated both child care and clerical 
work. Cortis (2000:53) said: 
… the Commission fell short of thoroughly exploring how the invisibility 
of certain tasks and roles, such as emotional labour, caring and nurturing, 
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contribute to low levels of remuneration in female-dominated human 
service work. 
Some might think this only applies to child care, but there is considerable evidence that 
clerical work, particularly that carried out by secretaries, also involves Guy and 
Newman’s (2004) ‘emotional labour’. As Pringle (1988:86-87) put it, the relationship 
between secretaries and their bosses: 
…is based on personal rapport, involves a degree of intimacy, day to day 
familiarity, and shared secrets unusual for any but lovers or close friends, 
and capable of generating intense feelings of loyalty, dependency and 
personal commitment. 
As pointed out by interviewees in this study, this type of loyalty and dependency also 
means workers in this type of occupation are very hard to organise into unions: 
//…They may have a very individual relationship with their employer as 
opposed to an organised union collective relationship with their 
employer…//…We visited every…[business, during a union membership 
drive] and picked up hundreds of underpayments and irregularities. We 
wrote to the staff in the area and said join and we’ll fix these for you. All 
they did was give the letter to their boss and he’d fix their pay… // 
It is also the element of emotional labour in secretarial work that ensures that it is almost 
now unthinkable for men to work in these areas. Women, as well as men, find it hard to 
envisage men working as child carers or as secretaries. Yet, the interesting fact about the 
secretarial occupation is that this was not always female-dominated occupation, but has 
changed sex over time. As Pringle (1988:156) noted: 
In the space of a few decades the secretarial workforce underwent a sex-
change. Until the late nineteenth century most secretaries were men; by 
1930 the majority were women and by the 1950s male secretaries were 
considered strange… 
Paraphrasing Pringle (1988:157) ‘feminisation’ in this occupation occurred in 
conjunction with a major shift in definition and status: changing from one ‘entrusted 
with private or secret matters; one whose office is to write for another’; to ‘a person 
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employed to help deal with correspondence typing, filing and similar routine work’. 
Definitions of jobs, as Burton, Hag and Thompson (1987) point out, are just as prone to 
gender bias and gender construction as any other part of the social structure. Secretaries, 
in a tertiary institution whose job evaluation system Burton, Hag and Thompson (1987) 
investigated, still worked on private or secret matters and wrote for their bosses; yet, the 
status of their work and pay was systematically downgraded by job description writers 
and job evaluation committees. Burton, Hag and Thompson 1987:100) point out 
“descriptions of secretarial work will mention typing and shorthand, but there may be no 
mention that logistical planning abilities are required by the job”. This is compounded 
by the fact that secretaries commonly have to use advanced skills in persuasion to get 
their jobs done, as they are unable to rely on job status to obtain compliance. 
As Bennett (1991:439) explained: 
This gender differentiation in the definition and recognition of skills has 
several implications for the process of award restructuring in traditionally 
male and female occupations. The jobs and skills of well organized and 
powerful groups of workers are usually very precisely defined, and linked 
to a formal training structure. These kinds of jobs are generally found in 
male dominated industries. Women, by contrast, tend to work in jobs that 
are not clearly defined, and are generally concentrated in a very narrow 
range of classifications, regardless of the skills they possess. 
Probert (1992:439) pointed out that male-dominated metal workers had more that 300 
classifications prior to award restructuring and that after that process had been brought 
down to 14 broad bands (with 13 being the tradesperson band). Private clerks merely 
had six bands in their restructured award (in most states, but three in Western Australia) 
although the Federated Clerks Union had hoped to make the bands go up to ten with the 
last corresponding to a degree qualification. 
Child care workers in Australia had similar problems with recognition of both 
qualifications and skills. Bennett (1991:22) explained the situation (which could also be 
applied to private clerks): 
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In the child-care industry women workers are enmeshed in a vicious circle 
typical of some areas of women’s work, which makes the enskilling for the 
industry extremely difficult. In this circle ineffective or non-existent 
organization impedes enskilling strategies, consequential lack of skill 
requirements for the work then allows for oversupply of labour, labour 
oversupply enables employers to structure work as low paid and dead-end 
and this produces high labour turnover, which in turn impedes 
organization. 
Child care workers in the private long day centres (such as those examined here) are at 
least partially unionised, yet “[t]he unionized sectors in the child-care industry face 
constant undercutting and undermining problems from the non-unionized outworkers” 
(Bennett 1991:23). These “outworkers” are government-organised family day care 
workers that care for up to four children in their own homes and have lower qualification 
requirements than those working in centres. Both types of child care workers are of 
course further undercut by informal paid arrangements organised by parents and by 
family members who care for children without any payment. As Bennett (1991:24) 
points out a “woman who cares for children in her own home for money is perceived not 
only as unskilled but almost as not working at all”. 
Cortis (2000:57) also makes the connection between skills or lack of them and work 
normally performed outside the paid labour market: 
Like hairdressing and nursing, childcare work is often characterized by its 
association with traditional domesticity and by the assumption that 
workers are motivated by ‘care’ and not remuneration. Indeed this dates 
back to the first state award made for kindergartens, in which the 
Commissioner was ‘not satisfied employees in this industry are completely 
dependent on the industry’, I believe many to be ‘motivated by the desire 
to make some contribution to the community’… 
In a related fashion, interviewees in this study also talked about women’s work 
previously having been voluntary: 
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I suppose in those…or female-dominated workforces like nursing, caring, 
education…traditionally a women’s role started off as a volunteer. 
Especially in school support…they actually formalised it in permanent 
positions, but even as late as…the late ‘80s…those women workers in the 
Education Department were way behind other women workers in other 
parts of the public service… (Interview with union official L) 
As the literature reviewed above confirmed, there are hurdles for wage equality within 
the firm and these are most obvious within clerical work. The clerical and child care 
career structures are both short (as discussed in Section 6.2.2 under award restructuring) 
and the former has considerable barriers to advancement for woman into managerial 
jobs. The experience of secretaries is probably the most extreme example for clerks in 
having barriers to advancement. As Pringle (1988:262) said “once you are labeled as 
being a secretary you have less chance than a filing clerk of getting on.” The reasons for 
this are grounded in the gender construction of this occupation – most bosses cannot 
envisage their secretaries or personal assistants becoming administrators. 
One of the other problems highlighted in the literature and by interviewees in this study 
is the concern child care workers have, not just for the children they look after, but their 
parents too.  Uttal and Tuominen (1999:766) explain: 
The very elements of paid child care work that make it meaningful to these 
women workers (i.e., the relational aspect of the work) lead to child care 
workers’ knowledge of family needs. This knowledge, in turn, frequently 
leads to a desire and response to help meet those needs (through the 
provision of lower waged care or unwaged services). 
This meant child care workers were less likely to take industrial action for higher pay: 
I think it’s about the psyche of women generally…they don’t want to cause 
trouble…they’re in caring industries often, service industries…and that 
would disrupt the service to the client, to the children, to the aged carers. 
(Interview with union official B) 
There is a tension between caring and payment for that caring that fits badly into 
classical economic theories of self-interest, as Uttal and Tuominen (1999:762) explain: 
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…traditional conceptualizations of labor are not easily applied to paid 
child care work because child care work is simultaneously labor 
exchanged for low wages and characterized by the seemingly 
immeasurable value of emotional caregiving… 
Parents and workers feel that if child care workers were actually paid for the value of 
that emotional caregiving then workers would not longer be doing it for love and thus 
might not care for their children as much. Thus Uttal and Tuominen’s (1999:777) 
suggestion: “that discussions about the economic value of paid child care are stalled by 
the gendered societal assumptions that caring is unwaged labor motivated by love.” This 
tension between providing care and receiving value, or impingement of social values on 
value in the labour market, is also a feature of teaching. Parents want teachers who have 
a vocation, who care about their pupils. 
The other female-dominated occupations studied here, retail workers and public sector 
clerical and administrative employees in front line roles, also have to display caring and 
the ability to manage their emotions. The ability to be consistently cheerful and polite is 
part of the job, if not the job description, but is not valued unless absent. 
This discussion of gender construction’s role in wage determination has illustrated, with 
the two occupations child carer and clerical worker, why interviewees believe economic 
characteristics identified in the literature, such as education and training, are treated 
differently by employers and are, in the case of work experience and training, less 
available to women than men. It also served to illustrate why women opt for choices in 
education, occupation and industry that lead to lower wage outcomes. 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
The feminist literature reviewed in Chapter 3, Sections 3.1.8, pointed out that gender 
itself is socially constructed; thus it is almost axiomatic that the ‘gender wage gap’ is 
also socially constructed. As Game and Pringle (1983:14) put it: “Gender is fundamental 
to the way work is organised; and work is central in the social construction of gender… 
Yet gender and work are rarely put together.” This study has shown that interviewees 
were doing just that. This chapter has shown how theoretical constructs about why and 
how pay inequality persists have emerged from the constant comparison of interviewees’ 
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views and those expressed in the literature. These constructs support the importance of 
economic variables such as education and experience, already quantified in the 
literature. However, the constructs also illustrate both why employers treat women’s 
education and experience differently and how non-market nature and nurture factors 
affect wage outcomes. The economic literature, particularly the feminist economic 
literature reviewed, supported the idea of non-market factors affecting what occurs 
within the market. The biology literature consulted, while finding real differences caused 
by sex hormones, said these are further enhanced through the environment or social and 
cultural values. The psychologists and organisational behaviourists reviewed showed 
how cultural values affect women’s choice of education and occupation and their 
chances of getting a job in the first place, of having the skills they use on the job valued 
and of attaining higher paid jobs such as management. 
Tharenou (1999:128) sums up her evidence (from the literature and her own studies) on 
how women fail to advance into management. “Gender differences arise in advancement 
to the top because women accrue fewer resources at critical stages and transitions. 
Women accrue less human capital and social capital for advancement than men.” 
Tharenou (1999) defines social capital as having a management style35 congruent with 
that of men, and having effective mentors and networks. Social capital was found to be 
more significant in management advancement than human capital (skills, knowledge, 
performance and experience in strategic jobs).  
Tharenou (1999:26) explains that “at each career transition, women are less likely than 
men to gain access to organisational and interpersonal resources and less likely to 
benefit from having them.” Interviewees’ comments on training and experience make it 
clear that interviewees also believe that women fall behind and acquire less of these 
important factors when they take time out for family responsibilities. For example, union 
official A spoke of: 
…lack of, or restricted access, to either, family-friendly practices in the 
workplaces to allow access to training or reduced access to training 
because of family commitments… (Interview with union official A) 
                                                 
35 This is consistent with the homophily, homosocial reproduction argument advanced earlier in this 
section. 
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All of this feeds back into the original educational choice and reinforces social values. 
For example, the literature and interviewees say women are presumed by employers to 
be more likely to leave to have and raise children, so they are likely to be hired into less 
skilled jobs, to receive less training on the job, and be paid less than men at every step of 
the way. This, in turn, de-motivates women, turning them away from acquiring relevant 
human capital and applying for well paid male-dominated jobs, in favour of traditional 
female jobs that are valued less in the workforce. This, in turn, reinforces society’s 
expectations and forms social values relating to gender. 
In conclusion, perhaps the only part missing from the diagram at the beginning of this 
chapter (Figure 32) is an acknowledgement that the values affecting women’s pay are 
gender-related values, which are socially constructed and which are a bundle of social 
expectations of women. Thus (as indicated by the shading of the oval shape in Figure 37 
and boxes within it) the values related to gender pervade the workplace and are the main 
cause of the persistent gender wage gap.  
These values affect the educational choices of girls and boys, and then their industry or 
occupational choice. Once having made these ‘choices’ men and particularly women, are 
limited by further factors in the market, both economic and industrial, which may 
already have had an effect on the ‘choices’ made. The result is a persistent pay gap 
which is constantly reinforced and reinvented as society seeks merely to reproduce what 
is still seen (if unconsciously) by both men and women, as normal in our society: 
women’s inferior position in society, in the family and in the workplace. 
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Figure 37 – Why and How Wage Inequality Persists in Australia in 2003:  
A Construct 
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter briefly reports the research findings and the model, or theoretical 
construct, which emerged from these findings. Conclusions are drawn from this 
construct, allowing some possible solutions to wage inequality to be developed. 
Finally, directions for further research are suggested.  
7.1 SUMMARISING THE PROBLEM AND FINDINGS  
Inequality of pay between men and women, an historical feature of the labour 
market, persisted into the 21st century in Australia. Despite a raft of historical 
industrial tribunal decisions relating to equal pay (outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.1), 
by 1990 there remained a significant and only very gradually closing gap between 
the average weekly ordinary time earnings of men and women and a widening gap in 
Western Australia. According to the literature (Short 1986; Glynn 1998; Fisher 2001; 
Hunter 2000; Todd & Eveline 2004) and interviewees, female-dominated jobs (such 
as child care, nursing and teaching) retained historical biases in the valuation of their 
occupations. As revealed in the economic literature (Kidd & Meng 1997; Wooden 
1999; Pocock & Alexander 1999; Le & Miller 2001) and interviewees’ comments, 
the problem was not just undervaluation or inter-occupational discrimination, but 
also intra-occupational discrimination, where women appeared to fail to gain 
promotion to management, while holding similar characteristics of experience and 
qualification as men. 
The initial research question, as discussed in Chapter 1, was: "Why does the 
Australian industrial relations system deliver different pay outcomes to women 
and men who are working full-time?"  
This question evolved during the process of qualitative research to bring the focus on 
how, as well as why and on the persistence of pay inequality. Thus, the question 
answered is now: "Why and how did gender wage inequality (for full-time 
workers) persist in Australia between 1990 and 2003?” From this question flowed 
the objectives for the thesis detailed below.  
Within the system of Australian industrial relations the objectives are to explore: 
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• the possibility of developing theoretical constructs (building on previous 
theory) for better (than current quantitative work) analysing gender wage 
determination; 
• gender-related differences between male and female pay outcomes; and, 
• how the gender wage gap between women and men is subject to variation; 
by examining the perceptions of industrial relations stakeholders and data from 
published documents. 
In order to answer these questions, a qualitative research strategy was used, 
involving both grounded research in depth interviews and wage data as triangulation. 
Previous studies of the gender wage gap in Australia had focused on aggregate 
statistics and quantitative research. This study was intended to explore the problem 
using a much narrower focus on key employment areas and qualitative techniques to 
investigate areas that the previous research had been unable to measure. 
The study is limited to thick study of only nine occupational areas, so is only 
indicative of the wider labour market, but particularly so of single gender-dominated 
jobs. As explained in Chapter 1, Section 1.4, the study is also limited to looking at 
effects on full-time wages or earnings, as this gives a larger sample and allows better 
comparison of like to like between the genders. Finally, while the literature and 
comments from the interviewees do give some insight into problems with the broader 
industrial relations system, the main focus is on the formal industrial relations system 
and how this delivers unequal earnings to full-time working women and men. 
Efforts aimed at closing the gender wage gap were, as explained in Chapter 2, 
historically focused on the formal industrial relations system of tribunals and 
commissions, on tribunal decisions and legislation. Thus key actors in the formal 
system, at federal and state levels and selected industrial relations participants from 
female- and male-dominated employment areas in Western Australia and Victoria, 
were interviewed in depth. Employees were not interviewed as they rarely appear 
before tribunals. Similarly it was found that most employers contacted had little 
understanding of the formal system because of their lack of participation within it. 
The interviews were given further context by thick description from relevant 
historical industrial relations decisions, legislative developments, statistics and 
literature. This included data on wage rates over the period 1990 to 2003, for the 
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same female- and male-dominated employment areas selected for interview 
purposes. 
Interviewees, as well as the literature (Hunter 2000; Glynn 1998; Fisher 2001; Todd 
& Eveline 2004) indicated that processes used historically within the formal 
industrial relations system had been only partially successful in achieving equal pay, 
affecting levels of women’s pay at the beginning of the study period and that this 
partial success continued during the study period. Award restructuring (introduced in 
1987 and implemented in the study period to 1992), the hope of some advocates 
(Hunter 2000) for opening up career and skill ladders for women, was either not 
achieved or only partially implemented in the female-dominated occupations studied. 
The minimum rate adjustment process introduced in 1989 was aimed at achieving a 
more equitable safety net of awards, yet the evidence gathered in the occupational 
areas studied made it clear that this process was not applied to all awards and in 
particular, not to large female-dominated occupations in the public sector. As 
illustrated in Chapters 5 and 6, decentralised workplace bargaining introduced in 
1987 made the relative wage position worse for the female-dominated areas studied. 
The interview analysis confirmed the direction of the theoretical literature reviewed 
in Chapter 3, Section 3.1, which was towards a greater focus on the effect of social 
forces, operating outside the paid labour market, on women’s wage outcomes. 
Interviewees perceived that why the gender wage gap persisted was related to ‘nature 
and nurture’, or social and cultural values relating to biological and psychological 
attributes. In the perception of the industrial relations stakeholders interviewed, how 
gender wage inequality persisted lies in the interaction of these values with the 
industrial relations and economic factors they identified. In particular, men were seen 
to have social power through their domination of key stakeholder positions in 
industrial relations (as managers, employers, industrial relations commissioners and 
union leaders). 
While each occupational area had its unique economic, or labour market segment and 
industrial relations issues, in the perception of many interviewees, female-dominated 
occupations were still undervalued when compared to the male-dominated 
occupations under study and women were note employed in higher paid jobs. 
Perhaps the most extreme example was an interviewee’s comparison of the wage 
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rates of building trades’ labourers in Western Australia and female-dominated 
occupations: 
I have to say that when I do my figures and I see that a general 
builder’s labourer…who is unskilled, gets $52,000 a year on a 38 hour 
week - no overtime - I find that outrageous compared to the training of 
nurses, teachers, policemen.  When you factor in a little bit of 
overtime…for a builder’s labourer, they are suddenly in the order of 
about $65,000 a year…I just cannot see the justification in it. 
(Interview with employer representative F) 
According to interviewees and the literature (Hunter 2000) female-dominated 
occupations were also less likely to be part of a career structure leading to 
management and when they were, as in the examples studied here in teaching and in 
the public service, interviewees pointed out women tended to be employed at the 
bottom, rather than the top of the structure. 
//…obstacles to women in promotion positions and senior levels of 
companies are a major problem…//…When I first started as a teacher 
the only way you could get promotion was to go to the country and for 
women with families that just wasn’t an option…even today that 
situation hasn’t been largely redressed…//…3 out of 19 CEOs…[in the 
public sector] are female, [yet] 60 per cent of our workforce is 
female…//…even in the public sector, there’s still that glass ceiling…// 
The wage data also demonstrated how much ground the selected female-dominated 
classifications had lost, relative to the selected male-dominated classifications, 
during a period of significant change involving the deregulation of the Australian 
industrial relations system. Between 1990 and 2003 the Western Australian female-
dominated classifications reviewed gained much lower increases in their wage rates 
(31 to 51 per cent), than the Western Australian male-dominated classifications used 
(90 to 228 per cent) (WAIGs 70-83, 1990-2003). Given that the employment areas 
studied included some very large female-dominated occupations (such as clerks, 
sales assistants and government teachers) and key male-dominated occupations used 
in most National and State Wage Cases (metal tradesperson, builders’ labourer, truck 
driver), this is an important result. It is clear that deregulation and decentralisation 
has only worsened the situation for women working in these areas. 
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Individualisation36, or the use of individual contracts, is now also increasing and 
appears likely to further depress women’s wages relative to those of men. 
In the literature and in the perceptions of interviewees, the persistence of gender 
wage inequality is grounded in gender, the social and cultural bundle of expectations 
around the sex type of the individual. The literature reviewed in Chapter 3 supported 
interviewees’ perceptions that the reason why the gender wage gap persists is 
through the influence of social and cultural values associated with gender on the 
industrial relations system as a sub-system of society. Interviewees’ comments, the 
circumstances surrounding the wage rates studied and the management literature 
reviewed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4, showed how the gender-related values of all 
concerned affected wage outcomes in the broad Australian industrial relations system 
and not just in the formal industrial relations commissions.  
Nevertheless, the most unique aspect of this study is its ability to explain the process 
by which gender-related values are applied within the formal system of industrial 
relations in Australia to construct the gender wage gap. This was demonstrated when 
interviewees talked about how their own and others’ views as commissioners, union 
officials and employer representatives were affected by values related to gender. 
Interviewees also viewed the position of women within organisations, without any 
assistance from the formal industrial relations system, as being created by: their own 
(lack of) ambition, or lack of ambition as perceived by employers; employers’ 
perceptions of women’s tendency to leave to have children; and (male) employers’ 
tendency to employ people like themselves (men). This was confirmed by the 
literature reviewed and seen as the product of gender being constructed daily within 
our society, meaning women are seen as the weaker (less able, less ambitious) sex, 
both outside and inside the paid labour market (Fenstermaker &West 2002). 
Figure 38 illustrates the theoretical construct of interviewees’ explanation of why 
and how wage inequality persists. It shows how interviewees believe values relating 
to gender pervade (as shown by the infusion of shading throughout Figure 38) the 
                                                 
36 At the time of finalising this chapter (November 2005) the Howard Coalition Government 
introduced the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 2005 (Cmth) into federal 
Parliament. As this seeks to simplify awards still further, remove no-disadvantage comparisons 
between agreements and awards, take over state systems of industrial relations and encourage 
individual bargaining, gender wage equality seems increasingly elusive in Australia and remedies in 
the formal industrial relations system are likely to be even more ineffective. 
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processes that ensure that women are still paid less than men for equivalent jobs in 
Australia.  
Figure 38 – Why and How Wage Inequality Persists in Australia in 2003 –  
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It is apparent that the processes envisaged by interviewees involved complex 
feedback to attitudes and decisions prior to workforce entry, as well as during 
employment and employment breaks. Gender-related values pervade educational 
choices by parents and individuals; education undertaken then affects the jobs 
offered to women within industry, as does potential employers’ and co-workers’ 
values and attitudes towards women’s family responsibilities. This affects the 
opportunities offered to and sought by women to do with training and developmental 
experience on the job. The economic value put on an occupation is, in turn, affected 
by the value put on human capital associated with that occupation by individuals, by 
employers and industrial relations commissioners in the industrial relations system. 
Socially constructed personal values held by these powerful (and mostly male) actors 
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are perceived by interviewees as affecting their assessment of that value. Societal and 
personal values also affect the monetary value put on skills, particularly those 
associated with being feminine, such as caring skills used in the service sector.  
This all feeds back into educational choice when individuals and their parents 
anticipate the different treatment of women in the labour market and channel women 
away from the more ‘difficult’ well-paid male jobs. These inter-relationships and 
feedback effects are shown in Figure 38 by double-headed arrows. 
7.2 CONCLUSIONS 
A theoretical construct has been identified that not only can be used to improve the 
analysis of gender wage determination, but also other aspects of wage determination, 
such as Indigenous wage determination and union membership. The model indicates 
how gender-related values, or gender construction, are important sources of 
differences between male and female wages. The study has also shown how the 
gender wage gap has been subject to variation over time and between different 
geographical areas of Australia. 
As McDowell and Pringle (1992:156) put it: 
Gender should not be seen as constructed at home and then taken out to 
work. It is becoming clear that gender is constructed in a number of 
different sites and that work is a crucial one. 
Therefore, as interviewees and the literature (e.g. Todd & Eveline 2004) suggest, 
there are no easy solutions to the persistence of wage inequality in Australia, or 
indeed elsewhere. Gender-related cultural and social values are not easily changed. 
Biology cannot be changed and the psychology of the individual has been shown to 
be related to both biology and social values. However, there were some possible 
policy implications signaled by interviewees and the literature.  
It is also notable that the wider gender wage gap in Western Australia is attributed by 
interviewees to slower social/cultural change, coupled with greater deregulation and 
individualisation of the industrial relations system and labour market than elsewhere 
in Australia. The Western Australian gender wage gap has continued to widen since 
2001, when the new Labor Government introduced legislation aimed at reversing 
such trends in the formal industrial relations system (as detailed in Chapter 2, Section 
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2.4). This carries portents for a federal system that is being increasingly deregulated 
and individualised. 
Interviewees from Western Australia gave policy suggestions for that state and also 
supported moves already underway in other, more progressive, states such as 
Queensland and New South Wales. These suggestions were, as with earlier attempts 
to gain pay equality, centred on the formal industrial relations system, for example 
changes in legislation governing that system and were supported in the literature 
(Todd & Eveline 2004).  
Yet, a unique feature of this thesis is that it has indicated quite clearly that key 
industrial relations system actors recognise that the formal industrial relations system 
itself reflects the wider society and is part of socially constructed wage 
determination. In this light, it is interesting that all previous pay equity reviews 
(Hunter 2000; Glynn 1998; Fisher 2001; Todd & Eveline 2004) relied on redress 
within that formal system, rather than in the workplace or society. As the formal 
system is reflective of socially constructed wage discrimination, redress has to be 
partial, at best, if relying on that system. Indeed, it could be said that, only when 
social and cultural values have changed enough in a society to value women’s worth 
in the paid labour market, will efforts to achieve reform in a formal industrial 
relations system fully succeed. Thus, enterprise level reform is essential. 
However, this is not to say that the efforts to reform the formal system are in vain – 
just that one cannot expect these to be fully effective. This is even more the case in 
an industrial relations system which is increasingly being individualised, rather than 
centralised. The main recent equal pay strategy of the unions, conducting work value 
comparisons for pay equity orders in AIRC awards and agreements, can have little 
relevance when all or most wages are individualised. Nevertheless this study has 
shown the continued importance of awards, particularly as reference points for 
informal agreements in small businesses, so gender wage equality must still be 
sought in awards for these female-dominated occupations. 
However, in the longer term, if women’s skills and work are to be recognised, social 
and cultural values must change. The task of changing social values must come 
through educating, not only current stakeholders in the industrial relations system 
about gender wage equality issues, as suggested by the literature and interviewees 
(Interview with union official A; Todd & Eveline 2004), but also educating future 
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participants and the wider society into recognising the value of skills that 
traditionally have been regarded as female (England 1992:295-307; Graycar & 
Morgan 2002:160-163; Scutt 1990:109-111). This also involves recognising these 
skills as contributing to good management and recognising their relationship to 
women’s ability as managers, as well as their use in all, or most, traditionally female-
dominated occupations. 
7.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Some interviewees appeared to think that little was needed in the way of direct 
action, as things had already begun to change. A male union official felt that social 
perceptions were slowly changing:  
[T]here are clearly discriminatory issues and discriminatory 
employment practices that lead to…gender segmentation and the sort 
of narrow-minded attitudes to hiring that…keep women out of some, or 
reduce the incidence of women being in some areas. Perceptions of 
ability, all those sorts of things, but…they are slowly being overcome. 
(Interview with union official H) 
A male employer representative felt that problems for women had decreased and that 
affirmative action in the public service was working to their advantage, even, 
possibly, against men. 
… probably now it’s working the other way…because they are trying 
to get women into higher paid senior positions than there was before. I 
think now if there’s two people that are equal for the job, more likely 
than not…they will seek to put the female in there. It’s just to fix that 
problem. And I think the government’s been quite open about that … 
(Interview with employer representative E) 
However, he still acknowledged that problems existed. He felt access was being 
fixed through equal employment opportunity (EEO) legislation and suggested further 
intervention through the education system in order to change women’s field of study 
choices. 
Note, however, that the economic literature reviewed found that the EEO and 
affirmative action legislation, while aimed at the problematic area of intra-
occupational differences, had little effect on women’s wages (Kidd & Meng 1997). 
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The employer representative also suggested that women were about to have a 
comparative advantage in new jobs and that this could fix the pay equality problem. 
…Where women have a comparative advantage in my view is their 
interpersonal skills, communication skills, creativity-type skills… 
occupations where they are seen as critical are the occupations that 
will be paid more in the future. Not…necessarily the engineer, or the 
maths person or even doctors or whatever. It’s marketing, advertising 
…communications…IT, they’re the industries where the money’s going 
to be in the future…That’s what will fix the pay gap between male and 
female and not the award system or the commission or agreements. 
(Interview with employer representative E) 
However, this type of minimal approach and waiting for evolutionary change has not 
worked very well in the past. Even when overt moves have been made to increase 
gender wage equality within the then centralised industrial relations system in 
Australia, these have only partially succeeded (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1; Short 
1986; Hunter 2000). The current, much more decentralised, system makes this 
approach even less likely to succeed. 
Interviewees, supported by some commentators (Glynn 1998; Fisher 2001, Todd & 
Eveline 2004), suggested a more interventionist approach tailored to achieving 
change in the tribunal level of the system, as well as the level of the firm. A union 
official felt the need to change legislation in Western Australia, saying the current 
rules did not allow unions to apply for pay equity: 
… the state wage fixing principles as they currently stand, in fact stand 
nationally, do not allow or facilitate the running of a pay equity case. 
I’d love the Act to be amended. (Interview with union official A) 
The union official wanted “to put in a provision like Queensland has”, [fearing that 
otherwise] “we are going to get the barrier that was created in New South Wales out 
of the pay equity principle”. The way ‘remuneration” is defined under the New 
South Wales pay equity provision meant only awards can be changed for pay equity 
and not agreements that pay over the award. Queensland provisions sought to cover 
all situations where women work, even where formal industrial instruments do not 
exist (Todd & Eveline 2004:32-33) and thus provide greater reach for pay equity 
orders. 
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However, the interviewee felt that change was unlikely in Western Australia in the 
short term; action would only be likely from the current Labor Government if it was 
re-elected. Speaking in late 2003, a union official said: “Controversial issues, if the 
government gets elected again we may get it up in the first term of…[a] re-elected 
Labor Government.” (Interview with union official A)37.
The Queensland Government also funded industrial parties to a maximum of $50,000 
per case to investigate the history of awards and agreements and identify where 
mistakes were made in the past (Hall 2004:7-8). Todd and Eveline (2004), who were 
commissioned by the Western Australian Government to review the Western 
Australian gender wage gap, like the interviewee above, recommend that Western 
Australia emulate the progress in Queensland. The review also involved consultation 
with peak industrial relations stakeholders in Western Australia38 and Todd and 
Eveline (2004) mirror much of interviewees’ views reported here.  
As an employer representative pointed out, there are problems associated with 
seeking to raise the value of predominantly female work, making improving access 
by women to higher paid male jobs a more attractive option, particularly to 
employers.  
[I]f you think that females are predominantly in the low paid, unskilled 
occupations and you think therefore you need to increase the rates of 
pay in that, all that would happen then is that the other industries, the 
higher skilled, will seek to re-establish their relativity based on skill 
and nothing else and all you are doing is increasing the labour costs to 
industry, without, in the long term, fixing the problem. (Interview with 
employer representative E) 
However, the equal remuneration legislation does take this problem into account. It 
seeks to corral equal remuneration cases and prevent flow-ons. Queensland’s equal 
remuneration principle, for example, says “[t]here shall be no wage leapfrogging as a 
result of any changes in wage relativities arising from any adjustments under this 
principle.” (Queensland Council of Unions and Others and Queensland Chamber of 
                                                 
37 The WA Government was re-elected and went on to implement some of Todd and Eveline’s (2004) 
recommendations. 
38 Their research was conducted after this study and also used publications on preliminary thesis 
findings (Short 1986, 2001, 2002b, 2004) and public submissions. This author was interviewed by 
the Review’s authors as were some of this thesis’s interviewees. 
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Commerce and Industry Limited, Industrial Organisation of Employers and Others, 
No. B450 of 2002, s11). Regular pay equality reviews by the AIRC and state 
industrial relations commissions alert to this problem could also prevent this 
possibility. 
Given that the employment areas studied have shown that many female-dominated 
work areas are less unionised, even Queensland does not have the full remedy. As in 
the case of the clerks studied here, unions are unlikely to be motivated to undertake 
long and expensive39 equal remuneration cases where female membership is low and 
hard to organise. Other organisations, such as the Working Women’s Centres, 
industrial relations and equal opportunity commissions and pay equity coalitions, are 
alternative vehicles that could be empowered to seek funding (with or without related 
unions) to do work on equal remuneration orders. Todd and Eveline (2004) perhaps 
constrained by their terms of reference, only recommended funding for industrial 
parties. 
The interviewees pointed out that industrial relations commissioners lack training in 
discrimination and job evaluation techniques. Todd and Eveline (2004:62 & 83) also 
recommend training for all commissioners conducting equal remuneration inquiries. 
It cannot be assumed that commissioners have picked up these skills before coming 
to the bench; one commissioner interviewed was very clear on lack of skill in that 
area. Commissioner D said “I don’t pretend to have any expertise in those [job 
evaluation] methods. Which, given the job, is quite surprising.” 
A commissioner spoke of wanting to eliminate personal tendencies to reproduce 
current or historical social and cultural values. 
I have had, sort of a dream run and have inherited a set of values that 
were based on a society which was male-dominated in the 40s and 50s. 
And I suppose they’re the things I have to guard against, but also, 
intuitively, probably go back to…So I’m aware of my limitations, but 
and I suppose I have to try and be more creative and more aware of 
the skills people have, not just females, that people have and the re-
evaluation that society is making, constantly. (Interview with 
Commissioner B) 
                                                 
39 Legal costs in a case involving librarians in NSW were in excess of $100,000 (Hall 2004:7) 
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This is very hard to do, without some assistance. Training can provide that 
assistance. 
Todd and Eveline (2004) also proposed some tools should be developed (with 
government funding and support) to assist industrial relations commissioners, 
employers and unions to make more equitable decisions on both awards and 
agreements. A pay equity audit tool is envisaged, similar to guides developed for 
implementing diversity and equal opportunity. Todd and Eveline (2004:55-56) 
suggest basing this on a pay equity review process developed by the United 
Kingdom Equal Opportunity Commission. This would require adaptation to fit into 
the Australian industrial relations system. This approach is also attractive in that it 
can be used at the workplace level and affect individual and collective agreements 
offered. It could also affect the more informal unregistered arrangements of small 
business if carefully focused. A pay equity audit tool is also something that can be 
used to address both inter-occupational and intra-occupational discrimination. The 
latter is important given the literature (Kidd & Meng 1997; Wooden 1999; Pocock & 
Alexander 1999; Le & Miller 2001) that says intra-occupational discrimination is a 
major source of wage inequality in Australia.  
A recent contribution by the author to a report on pay equity and work/life balance in 
Australian public sectors for the Northern Territory Office of the Commissioner for 
Public Employment (OCPE 2004b), suggested that a pay equity audit include the 
following processes and is expanded on here. 
a. An analysis of pay at the occupational level (not just the broad-banded pay 
level) involving comparing female-dominated occupations or jobs with male-
dominated jobs with the aim of identifying any anomalies. Thorough analysis 
would involve regression analyses, such as those discussed in Chapter 3, if 
sufficient data is available, if not, surveys should be conducted to obtain data. 
Female and male-dominated occupations should be identified and discussed 
with committees involving employees and employers and their 
representatives. 
b. A comparison of any different pay systems within the public sector or firm 
including job evaluation systems used and different award classification 
structures for gender-dominated groups (e.g. technical, physical/blue collar; 
nurses; teachers, police). Principles underlying such a comparison would 
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include ensuring the same job evaluation points result in the same level of 
pay and that the same job evaluation system is used for all job groups (Short 
1992). (Note that this is related to process a.) 
c. An analysis of how pay increases have been delivered historically. Awards 
and agreements used would be submitted to historical investigation to see if 
equal pay for equal value, award restructuring and/or minimum rate 
adjustment was ever implemented or properly applied. Moves would then be 
made to address these problems. 
d. Identification and elimination of gender ghettos – areas where women are 
concentrated without any career ladder out. Having identified male and 
female-dominated areas, job redesign and classification restructuring should 
be used to ensure there can be lateral and/or vertical movement out of the 
occupation. 
e. Affirmative action – this is still needed to try and ensure women have the 
same promotional opportunities as men, thus action is required to assist 
women with training and experience within organisations. This includes 
ensuring training and experience is given to equal numbers of men and 
women within organisations and specific training is offered in areas where 
women lack skills. 
This type of approach is suitable at the level of the workplace or firm, or public 
service department.  
With some minor adaptations, the pay audit approach described immediately above 
could also be used as a checklist by the industrial relations commissions to ensure 
pay equality is being addressed when reviewing awards and enterprise bargaining 
agreements. This would be a much more thorough approach than the current one of 
merely asking the industrial parties to certify that they thought the agreement was 
equitable. 
It is clear from interviewees’ perceptions and the literature (Cox & Leonard 1991; 
Glynn 1998; Cortis 2000), that a central issue still left for female-dominated 
occupations in Australia is how the skills used in these occupations are made visible 
and valued. Thus, a review of job descriptions and then selection criteria should be 
added to this pay audit list to try to include women’s invisible skills – the emotional 
labour that Guy and Newman (2004:293) explain “generates perceptions of rapport, 
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supportiveness, congeniality, nurturance and empathy”. In a similar way, where 
organisations use job evaluation systems, the way these systems value such skills is 
important (Burton, Hag & Thompson 1987, Burton 1988, Cox & Leonard 1991, 
Kenna 1993, Short 1992 and Windsor 1991) and should be reviewed. 
Finally, Rapoport, Bailyn, Fletcher and Pruitt (2002) give an example of one 
research technique, the Dual Agenda technique, aimed at addressing problems 
associated with organisational cultural values relating to gender. Given that 
interviewees have ascribed the persistence of the gender wage gap primarily to 
enduring social and cultural values about gender, it seems appropriate to recommend 
the use of this action research technique to improve women’s situations within 
businesses. This technique was developed from a Ford Foundation project:  
…to look at organizational structures and culture of work practices – in 
order to shed light on the sources of the widespread conflict between 
work and personal life, which, despite well-intended policies, stubbornly 
persisted. (Rapoport et al 2002:xi)  
This Ford Foundation project involved organisations that were already at the cutting 
edge of work/life balance or work and family policies aimed at combating unequal 
offers or opportunities, yet still found change difficult to achieve. The technique 
relies on deep investigation in collaboration with the organisation, followed by a 
series of small changes or wins that are evaluated continually to maintain the 
equality focus and which build up to change the organisation’s culture. This is called 
the Dual Agenda technique, as it was found that “assumptions and norms that block 
gender equality in the workplace also undermine people’s productivity” (Rapoport et 
al. 2002:17), thus making this much easier to sell to management. The Dual Agenda 
technique is already being used in the public sector in Western Australia (Still & 
Mead 2003) and may assist in increasing women’s pay relative to that of men. 
These last two solutions are best suited to larger firms and public sector 
organisations, but it is in these organisations that the literature found the most 
unexplained differences between men and women (Kidd & Meng 1997; Wooden 
1999; Pocock & Alexander 1999). 
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7.4 DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This issue of changing social values deserves further, preferably grounded, research. 
A qualitative approach to studying how social values in this area change and can be 
changed would be of value when trying to achieve longer-term change. In this way 
educational programs can be more effective. More qualitative research into the 
mechanisms around occupational choice – the social, psychological, cultural and 
biological as well as economic aspects – could also add to understanding why and 
how women apparently choose to work in lower-paid work. The theoretical construct 
emerging from this research may have relevance to other issues in industrial 
relations, such as union density and union power or militancy as interviewees in this 
study clearly saw these as also being influenced by social and cultural values.  
Apart from these more theoretical considerations, in order to facilitate change in the 
short term, as already mentioned under pay equity audits, research needs to be 
carried out specific to industry and occupational areas where women predominate 
within each federal or state industrial relations system. Each area has its own history 
of wage fixation, lost opportunities and examples of bias and needs its own 
champion, not necessarily the relevant union, to take up equal remuneration cases on 
behalf of the women involved. Above all, the information gathered in this thesis 
suggests that industrial relations is not a science, it is not just about statistics 
reflecting market economics and industrial power, so consultation with stakeholders 
is vital to researching occupational wage differences. 
In conclusion, wage equality will never be an easy issue. This thesis has made it 
evident that there is a natural tendency to return to traditional values in Australian 
society (and probably most other societies). Without constant vigilance and repeated 
campaigns for pay equality, women’s earnings will slip backwards again relative to 
those of men. As the experience in Western Australia during 1993 to 2001 showed, 
should further deregulation occur in the formal system, gender wage inequality may 
increase in Australia. Our daughters and granddaughters will have to keep on 
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APPENDIX 1 – WAGES IN THE AUSTRALIAN STATES 
AND TERRITORIES 
 
In the states and territories, where some wages are determined by different state-based 
industrial relations systems, relative female to male earnings data were more varied, as 
demonstrated in Figure A-1.  
Figure A-1 shows that Australian Capital Territory female full-time average weekly 
ordinary time earnings (AWOTE) were the lowest in Australia relative to male wages in 
the late 1980s (at 75-76 per cent), but moved to be above the national average of 85 per 
cent in the early 1990s (86 per cent). This is very probably a result of the movement of 
female-dominated professional jobs into male-dominated professional wage structures in 
the federal public service discussed in Chapter 2, Sections 2.2 and 2.3.1.  
Victoria tended to mirror the Australian average except for a brief period from August 
1999 to February 2001 when its female relative full-time AWOTE were the highest in 
Australia at 87 to 89 per cent. Victoria was the centre of the ACTU/Australian 
Manufacturing Workers Union efforts (discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.8) to increase 
pay equity during the 1990s and perhaps this had a temporary effect. Also, as Appendix 
4 will show, Victorian female workers in clerical and retail work were more likely to be 
covered by enterprise bargaining agreements paying higher rates than their counterparts 
in Western Australia. 
As can be seen in Figure A-1, since February 1993, Western Australia has had the 
lowest full-time female AWOTE relative to male AWOTE in Australia. While 
Australian women in November 2004 earned 85 per cent of male full-time AWOTE, for 
Western Australian women this relativity was only 75 per cent. The gender wage gap in 
Western Australia had widened from 19 per cent in November 1984 to 25 per cent in 
November 2004. 
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Figure A-1 - Female as a Percentage of Male Full-time Average Weekly Ordinary Time 









































































































































To:  Ms Christine Short 
Cc:  Prof Margaret Nowak 
 
Confirmability of coding 
 
We reviewed coding applied to three interviews held in your NVivo file of 
transcriptions.  We examined the coding stripes and confirm that the codes appeared 
to have relevance to the highlighted text. In-depth description of the codes was not 
available and no attempt to second guess the researcher’s interpretation of the data 
was made. 
 
In our review we noted the following: 
1. The sense of the interview text implied the researcher’s role was one of a 
participant / observer. Whilst we have not read the methodology chapter we 
would anticipate that the implications of this stance are discussed. 
2. Since these files will be stored for 5 years and available for auditing, we 
recommend that all identities be concealed in the transcriptions. We 
recommend that interview titles be coded in some format which does not 
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APPENDIX 3 – INTERVIEWEES’ VIEWS BY GENDER  
AND ROLE 
 
Table A-1 – Differences in Interviewees’ Perceptions of Key Categories by 
Gender 
 
 Men Women 
Category No % No % 
Not aware WA diff 11 52.4 11 61.1
It’s the occupations 9 42.9 6 33.3
It’s the industry 8 38.1 5 27.8
Part-time & casual 5 23.8 5 27.8
Women’s work undervalued 9 42.9 12 66.7
Social/psychological explanations 7 33.3 12 66.7
Totals 21 100.0 18 100.0
 
As can be seen in Table A-1, there are differences between interviewees’ views when 
comparing them by gender. The most significant differences are that the women 
interviewed were quite a bit more likely than men to see the problem as being 
women’s work being undervalued and were twice as likely to give explanations in 
the social and psychological area. Women interviewed were also slightly less likely 
to give economic explanations, such as occupation or industry, than men were. 
 






 No % No % No % 
Not aware WA different 7 38.9 13 81.3 2 50.0
It’s the occupations 7 38.9 6 37.5 3 75.0
It’s the industry 7 38.9 5 31.3 1 25.0
Part-time & casual 5 27.8 3 18.8 1 25.0
Women’s work 
undervalued 11 61.1 5 31.3 4 100.0
Social/psychological  
explanations 10 55.6 5 31.3 4 100.0
Totals 18 100.0 16 100.0 4 100.0
 
Responses by type of interviewees: union officials, employers/managers or employer 
representatives, or commissioners; are shown in Table A-2. Employers were much 
more likely than other groups not to know that WA had a wider wage gap between 
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men and women than Australia (despite all but one employer being from WA, 
whereas five union officials came from outside WA). Commissioners interviewed all 
mentioned the problem of women’s work being undervalued and union officials were 
much more likely to discuss women’s work being undervalued than employers. 
Commissioners again all discussed social or psychological explanations. Union 
officials were more likely than employers to give social and psychological 
explanations for wage differences. The percentage of interviewees giving economic 
explanations such as occupation or industry were fairly similar, except that 
commissioners were much more likely to state that it was the occupations women 
worked in that caused lower pay for women. 
While these results may be of some interest to the reader, they add little to our 
understanding of why and how gender wage inequality persists, except that 
employers clearly are less likely to recognise the problem (in WA), or to accept 
social explanations and therefore may be more resistant to change. Given that the 
balance of power has shifted during the period under study towards employers (as the 
system became less centralised and more deregulated), this is not likely to encourage 









Table A-3 – Proportion Female/Male in Occupational Areas Studied – 2003 
 







Metal Fitters 99.3 
Child Care Givers (qualified & 
unqualified) 
95.9 Truck Driver  98.6 
Shop Assistants  70.3 Building Trades Labourer  97.6 
General Clerks 78.5 Miner  99.2 
More mixed – more female  More mixed – more male  
Public Service overall - Fed 
Public Service overall - WA 
APS AO2 







(APS AO6  





Health Dept. WA 
Health & Ageing Fed. 
77.0 
72.0 
Main Roads Dept. WA 
Transport Dept. Fed. 
79.0 
64.0 









Table A-4 – Selected Wage Classifications 1990 & 2003 – Effects of Decentralisation 
 
Female-dominated Classifications Male-dominated Classifications 
 $ per week 
% change since 
1990  $ per week 
% change since 
1990 
 June 1990  WA  VIC/Fed  WA  VIC/Fed  June 1990 WA Fed WA Fed 
Level 2.3 teacher 711.92 674.65     Level 6 public servant 843.39 n.a.  
Level 2 public servant 495.90 432.95   Dump truck operator/miner 412.90 n.a.  
Qualified child care giver 414.29 412.30   Metal tradesperson 392.20 397.90   
Shop assistant 342.80 358.00     Building trades labourer 392.70 400.60     
Grade 1 clerk 341.40 363.60   Grade 2 driver>45tn 344.50 359.10     
December 2003   December 2003   
Level 2.3 teacher 1074.10 1073.62 50.9 59.1 Health L6/ASO6 1156.67 1028.24 37.2 n.a
Health L2/ASO2 688.74 714.25 38.9 65.0 Main RdsL6/TransportASO6 1129.02 976.49 33.9 n.a
Main 
RdsL2/TransportASO2 650.56 638.16 31.2 47.4 Dump truck operator/miner 1354.35 n.a. 228.0 n.a.
Qualified child care giver 624.10 591.40 50.6 43.4 Metal tradesperson 774.41 724.42 97.5  82.1
Shop assistant 523.00 542.30 52.6 51.5 Building trades labourer 774.44 884.26 97.2 120.7
Grade 1 clerk 495.60 507.40 45.2 39.6 Grade 2 driver>45tn 663.43 700.39 92.6 95.0
(Sources: AIRC; AEU VIC; AMWU WA; VIRC; WAIGs; www.osiris.gov.au; www.wagenet.gov.au; shading denotes the use of agreement, rather 








Table A-5 – Selected Classifications 1990 and 1993 – the Effects of Award Restructuring & Minimum Rate 
Adjustment 
 
Female-dominated Classifications Male-dominated Classifications 
 $ per week 
% change since 
1990  $ per week 
% change since 
1990 
 June 1990  WA  VIC/Fed  WA  VIC/Fed  June 1990 WA Fed WA Fed 
Level 2.3 teacher 711.92 674.65     Level 6 public servant 843.39 n.a.   
Level 2 public servant 495.90 432.95   Dump truck operator/miner 412.90 n.a.   
Qualified child care giver 414.29 412.30   Metal tradesperson 392.20 397.90   
Shop assistant 342.80 358.00     Building trades labourer 392.70 400.60     
Grade 1 clerk 341.40 363.60   Grade 2 driver>45tn 344.50 359.10     
December 1993   December 1993    
Level 2.3 teacher 749.04 749.04 5.21 11.03 Level 6 public servant 864.48 867.81 2.50 n.a 
Level 2 public servant 508.30 443.77 2.50 2.50 Dump truck operator/miner 466.50 n.a. 12.98 n.a. 
Qualified child care giver 472.45 468.40 14.04 13.61 Metal tradesperson 417.20 425.20  6.37  6.86 
Shop assistant 385.00 384.40 12.31 7.37 Building trades labourer 418.50 418.50 22.08 16.90 
Grade 1 clerk 372.60 392.40 9.14 7.92 Grade 2 driver>45tn 374.50 382.50 8.71 6.52 
(Sources: AIRC; AEU VIC; AMWU WA; VIRC; WAIGs; www.osiris.gov.au; www.wagenet.gov.au; shading indicates the use of agreement, rather 





Table A-6 – Selected Wage Classifications 1994, 1996 & 2003 – the Effects of Enterprise Bargaining 
 
Female-dominated Classifications Male-dominated Classifications
 $ per week % change  since 1994  $ per week 
% change 
since 1994 
 June 1994 WA VIC/Fed WA VIC/Fed June 1994 WA Fed WA Fed 
Level 2.3 teacher 757.06 757.04     Level 6 public servant 864.48 712.41  
Level 2 public servant 508.30 465.86   Dump truck operator/miner 840.00   
Qualified child care giver 476.90 468.40   Metal tradesperson 491.00 457.49   
Shop assistant 393.00 392.40     Building trades labourer 418.50 447.26     
Grade 1 clerk 380.60 392.40   Grade 2 driver>45tn 476.67 390.50     
June 1996   June 1996   
Level 2.3 teacher 813.85 839.94 7.50 10.95 Health L6/ASO6 915.67 767.82 5.92 7.78
Health L2/ASO2 545.25 502.09 7.27 7.78 Main RdsL6/TransportASO6 942.72 767.82 9.05 7.78
Main RdsL2/TransportASO2 554.31 502.09 9.05 7.78 Dump truck operator/miner 940.25  11.93 
Qualified child care giver 525.10 484.40 10.11 3.42 Metal tradesperson 540.10 485.80 10.00 6.19
Shop assistant 409.00 392.40 4.07 0.00 Building trades labourer 507.30 n.p. 21.22 n.a.
Grade 1 clerk 396.60 392.40 4.20 0.00 Grade 2 driver>45tn 510.04 550.24 7.00 40.91
December 2003   December 2003   
Level 2.3 teacher 1074.10 1073.62 31.98 27.82 Health L6/ASO6 1156.67 1028.24 33.80 44.33
Health L2/ASO2 688.74 714.25 26.32 42.26 Main RdsL6/TransportASO6 1129.02 976.49 30.60 37.07
Main RdsL2/TransportASO2 650.56 638.16 27.99 36.99 Dump truck operator/miner 1354.35  61.23 
Qualified child care giver 624.10 591.40 18.85 22.09 Metal tradesperson 774.41 724.42 57.72 58.35
Shop assistant 523.00 542.30 27.87 38.20 Building trades labourer 774.44 884.26 85.05 n.a.
Grade 1 clerk 495.60 507.40 24.96 29.31 Grade 2 driver>45tn 663.43 700.39 39.18 79.36
 (Sources: AIRC; AEU VIC; AMWU WA; VIRC; WAIGs; www.osiris.gov.au; www.wagenet.gov.au; shading indicates the use of agreement, rather 





Table A-7 - Trade Union Membership by Industry 1993-2002 
 
Industry August 1993 August 1995 August 1997 August 1999 August 2002 
 % % % % % 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 10.1 9.9 7.1 4.7 5.0 
Mining 55.2 46.1 43.9 35.4 28.7 
Manufacturing 43.5 39.4 36.6 32.8 27.3 
Electricity, gas & water supply 71.5 65.1 65.9 50.1 47.7 
Construction 35.1 30.6 33.5 25.7 27.7 
Wholesale trade 16.5 15.0 12.7 9.6 7.1 
Retail trade 22.3 22.6 22.3 17.4 16.5 
Accommodation, cafes & restaurants 21.2 18.4 15.5 10.1 11.8 
Transport & storage 58.6 49.6 47.5 38.7 36.6 
Communication services 73.8 73.8 59.8 48.3 32.9 
Finance and insurance 44.8 37.2 35.5 27.5 17.6 
Property & Business services 18.8 16.0 10.0 9.7 6.6 
Government administration & defence 56.4 50.0 43.5 41.2 37.9 
Education 56.3 49.3 49.3 45.8 42.3 
Health and community services 38.7 35.0 34.6 30.7 30.7 
Cultural and recreational services 31.7 26.8 23.8 15.7 12.9 
Personal and other services 38.8 25.3 27.7 30.5 26.9 




Table A-8 - Government Teachers' Salaries - VIC and WA Compared 1990-2003
 
(Awards and Enterprise Bargaining Agreements) 
 
     Starting Salary Top of Range
 REFERENCE Operative Date WA 1.5 VIC-WA WA 2.3 VIC-WA
   $ $ $ $
 AEU VIC 18-Jun-90 25382 35082 
 70WAIG3458 12-Jul-90 25128 254 37020 -1938
 AEU VIC 12-Aug-90 25890 762 35784 -1236
 72WAIG 925 3-Jan-91 25794 96 38000 -2216
 AEU VIC 1-Jul-91 26718 924 38000 0
 72WAIG 913 9-Jul-92 26439 279 38950 -950
 AEU VIC* 1-Jan-93 27580 1141 38950 0
 AEU VIC 7-Dec-94 27966 1527 39366 0
 75WAIG1028 13-Dec-94 26856 1110 39367 -1
 *AEU VIC 29-Jun-95 28412 1556 39782 415
 AEU VIC 16-Oct-95 28923 2067 40498 1131
 75WAIG1842 1-Jan-96 28870 53 42320 -1822
 AEU VIC 4-Mar-96 30135 1265 43677 1357
 75WAIG1842 1-Jan-97 31035 -900 45493 -1816
 AEU VIC 4-Mar-97 31039 4 44987 -506
 AEU VIC 9-Jan-98 31970 935 46337 844
 AIRC G0844 24-Mar-98 31966 4 46858 -521
 AEU VIC 1-Feb-99 34626 2660 47727 869
 AIRC G0844 24-Mar-99 32925 1701 48264 -537
 AEU VIC 4-Oct-99 35665 2740 49159 895
 AG806074(WA) 1-Dec-00 34702 963 50869 -1710
 PR900361(VIC) 01-Jan-01 37505 2803 51890 1021
 AG804806 (VIC) 1-Apr-01 38630 3928 52623 1754
 AG806074(WA) 1-Aug-01 35743 2887 53495 -872
 AG804806(VIC) 1-Apr-02 39789 4046 54202 707
 AG806074(WA) 1-Aug-02 37173 2616 54491 -289
 AG804806(VIC) 1-Apr-03 40983 3810 55828 1337
 AG806074(WA) 31-Jul-03 38102 2881 55853 -25
 (Sources: WAIGs; www.wairc.wa.gov.au; AEU VIC; AIRC - Osiris/WageNet) 
*The shaded cells indicate that they are agreement rather than award rates. 
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Table A-9 - Award Comparison - Child Care, Victoria and  
Western Australia, 1990-2003 
 
 Reference Operative Date $/hr $/wk Reason VIC-WA 
 70WAIG 3591 6-Sep-90 10.90 414.29 New award   
 IRVNo2of1990 16-Nov-90 10.85 412.30   -1.99 
 71WAIG2080 1-Jul-91 11.17 424.33 1st MRA -12.03 
 IRVNo.1of1991 5-Sep-91 11.29 428.90   4.57 
 IRVNo.2of1991 1-Dec-91 11.45 435.10   10.77 
 72WAIG293 17-Dec-91 11.45 434.91 MRA 0.19 
 IRVNo.1of1992 1-Aug-92 11.99 455.70   20.79 
 IRVNo1.of1993 1-Mar-93 12.33 468.40   33.49 
 73WAIG1807 10-May-93 12.43 472.45 MRA -4.05 
 74WAIG 917 31-Jan-94 12.55 476.90 MRA -8.50 
 74WAIG 917 10-May-94 13.02 494.60 MRA -26.20 
 IRV No.1 of 1995 29-Mar-95 12.54 476.40   -18.20 
 75WAIG2566 25-May-95 13.61 517.10 SNA1&2 -40.70 
 AIRC N2598 20-May-96 12.75 484.40 SNA3 -32.70 
 76WAIG2398 12-Jun-96 13.82 525.10 SNA3 -40.70 
 AIRC P1064 16-May-97 13.22 502.40 SNA4 -22.70 
 77WAIG3122 14-Nov-97 14.08 535.10 SNA4 -32.70 
 AIRC Q2505 10-Jun-98 13.59 516.40 SNA5 -18.70 
 79WAIG 73 17-Jul-98 14.45 549.10 SNA5 -32.70 
 AIRC R6049 10-Jun-99 13.85 526.40 SNA6 22.70 
 79WAIG1847 1-Aug-99 14.77 561.10 SNA6 -34.70 
 AIRC S7741 10-Jun-00 14.25 541.40 SNA7 -19.70 
 80WAIG3478 1-Aug-00 15.11 574.10 SNA7 -32.70 
 AIRC PR905692 10-Jun-01 14.64 556.40 SNA8 -17.70 
 81WAIG1825 1-Aug-01 15.50 589.10 SNA8 -32.70 
 AIRC PR919434 25-Jun-02 15.12 574.40 SNA9 -14.70 
 82WAIG1485 1-Aug-02 15.98 607.10 SNA9 -32.70 
 AIRC PR932620 10-Jun-03 15.56 591.40 SNA10 -15.70 
 83WAIG2066 01-Aug-03 16.42 624.10 SNA10 -32.70 





Table A-10 - Award Comparison - VIC to WA Shop Assistant 1990-2003 
 
Ref./Print No. Operative Date $/hr $/wk Reason VIC-WA 
69 WAIG80 1-Dec-89 9.02 342.80   
IRCV1of1990 1-Feb-90 9.09 345.56     
IRCV5of1990 5-Jul-90 9.42 358.00     
70WAIG3732 10-Aug-90 9.35 355.30 MRA1 0.07 
70WAIG3732 1-Oct-90 9.48 360.30 MRA 2 -2.30 
IRCV6of1990 30-Nov-90 9.53 362.30 MRA 2.00 
70WAIG3732 1-Apr-91 9.61 365.30 MRA 3 -3.00 
IRCV3of1991 2-Aug-91 9.72 369.40 MRA 4.10 
IRCV4of1991 30-Aug-91 10.08 383.00 MRA 17.70 
71WAIG2593 1-Oct-91 9.98 379.20 MRA 4 3.80 
IRCV6of1991 30-Nov-91 10.12 384.40 MRA 5.20 
74WAIG 968 21-Mar-94 10.34 393.00 SNA1 -8.60 
AIRCS0583 30-Mar-94 10.33 392.40 SNA1 -0.60 
75WAIG1934 17-Apr-95 10.55 401.00 SNA 2 -8.60 
76WAIG2005 23-May-96 10.76 409.00 SNA 3 -16.60 
77WAIG3122 14-Nov-97 11.03 419.00 SNA4 -26.00 
AIRCP9517 28-Jan-98 11.01 418.38 SNA4(+2&3) -0.62 
78WAIG4368 23-Oct-98 11.39 433.00 SNA 5 -14.62 
79WAIG 1847 1-Aug-99 11.71 445.00 SNA6 -26.62 
AIRCR9974 10-Sep-99 11.70 444.60 SNA5(&6) -0.40 
80WAIG3925 1-Aug-00 12.11 460.00 SNA7 -15.40 
AIRCT044 13-Sep-00 12.09 459.42 SNA7 -0.58 
81WAIG2313 1-Aug-01 12.45 473.00 SNA8 -13.58 
AIRCPR907895 17-Aug-01 12.43 472.34 SNA8 -0.66 
82WAIG1919 1-Aug-02 12.92 491.00 SNA9 -18.66 
AIRCPR921176 7-Aug-02 12.90 490.20 SNA9 -0.80 
AIRCPR9235228 25-Jul-03 13.35 507.30 SNA10 16.30 
83WAIG2611 01-Aug-03 13.37 508.00 SNA10 -0.70 
(Sources: WAIGs; www.wairc.wa.gov.au; IRCV; AIRC - Osiris/WageNet) 
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Table A-11 - Shop Assistant EBAs Compared - WA with Victoria 
 
Action Food Barns Safeways Supermarkets  















  1-May-98 435.95 4.05 (Not published 1995/6 agreement) 
  1-Nov-98 444.68 2.70 S2285 
01-Aug-
98 471.40 12.67 
  1-May-99 453.55 4.75   01-Jan-99 478.50 7.62 
  1-Nov-99 462.60 3.96   01-Jul-99 484.70 9.02 
AG807054 1-Nov-00 485.00 5.43   01-Jan-00 493.90 11.09 
  1-May-01 490.50 6.03   01-Jul-00 501.30 12.75 
  1-Nov-01 498.60 5.41   01-Jan-01 511.30 11.29 
  1-May-02 506.70 7.12   01-Jul-01 520.30 13.25 
  1-Nov-02 514.80 4.85   01-Jan-02 528.30 11.85 
  1-May-03 523.00 6.52  01-Jul-02 535.30 13.33 





Table A-12 - Award Comparison - Clerks, Victoria and Western Australia, 
1990-2003 
 
Reference Date WA $ VIC $ VIC-WA$ Reason 
IRCV1 of 1990 20-Apr-90 363.60   
70WAIG 2242 18-Jun-90 341.40 22.20   
71WAIG 944 30-Jan-91 356.40 7.20   
IRCV4 of 1990 1-Feb-91 375.00 18.60 SE 3 grades
IRCV3of1991 8-Feb-91 384.00 27.60 SE 6 grades
73WAIG 233 10-Oct-91 365.30 18.70   
73WAIG 233 1-Jun-93 372.60 11.40 MRA 86% tradesp.
IRCV1of1993 19-Jan-94 392.40 19.80 SNA1 
74WAIG 1269 13-Apr-94 380.60 11.80 SNA1 
75WAIG 2159 26-May-95 388.60 3.80 SNA2 
76WAIG 2403 24-Jun-96 396.60 -4.20 SNA3 
AIRC N5094 17-Sep-96 408.40 11.80 SNA 3 
AIRC P1174 16-May-97 418.40 21.80 SNA4 
77 WAIG 3122 14-Nov-97 406.60 11.80 SNA4 
AIRC Q2397 2-Jun-98 432.40 25.80 SNA5 
78 WAIG 3498 29-Jul-98 420.60 11.80 SNA5 
AIRC M8184 2-Jun-99 444.40 23.80 SNA6 
AIRC C1128 1-Jul-99 459.40 38.80 Consolidation
79 WAIG 1847 1-Aug-99 432.60 26.80 SNA6 
AIRC S8765 2-Jun-00 459.90 27.30 SNA7 
80 WAIG 3494 1-Aug-00 447.60 12.30 SNA7 
AIRC PR905722 2-Jul-01 472.40 24.80 SNA8 
81 WAIG 1825 1-Aug-01 460.60 11.80 SNA8 
AIRC PR919422 2-Jul-02 490.40 29.80 SNA9 
82 WAIG 1500 1-Aug-02 478.60 11.80 SNA9 
AIRC PR932692 2-Jul-03 507.40 28.80 SNA10 
83 WAIG 2085 01-Aug-03 495.60 11.80 SNA10 




Table A-13 - Comparing Rare Clerical EBAs – WA and Victoria 
 




















on award  
77 WAIG 
1665 04-Jul-96 396.60 0.00 J0147 01-Dec-93 plus 3% 
with NUW 
& PKIU1  
  18-Nov-96 412.46 4.00   01-Dec-94 plus 3%    
  18-Nov-97 424.84 4.49 J0430 Agreement not published.   
  01-Jan-98 443.48 5.44 J0444 01-Jul-97 454.20 8.56  
  01-Jan-99 452.35 4.57   01-Jul-98 467.10 8.02  
AG820782 09-Jan-03 502.35 4.96   01-Jul-99 481.90 8.44  
        J0687 01-Mar-00 493.90 7.51  
          01-Sep-00 503.80 9.55  
          01-Mar-01 516.40 12.29  
          01-Sep-01 526.80 11.52  
          01-Mar-02 539.90 14.29  
        AG825044 01-Sep-02 550.70 12.30  
          01-Mar-03 572.73 16.79  
        Grade 1 as no graduation by year in classifications 




                                                 
1 NUW is the National Union of Workers, PKIU – Printing & Kindred Industries Union. 
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Table A-14 - Award Comparison - Metal Tradesperson Federal and WA  
1990-2003 
 
Reference Operative Date $/hr $/wk Reason FED-WA$ 
70 WAIG 1376 10-Jan-90 9.80 372.30 Struc Eff   
AIRC J2043 20-Mar-90 10.09 383.40 MRA1 11.10 
70 WAIG 2603 11-Apr-90 10.32 392.20 MRA 1 -8.80 
AIRC J3454 1-Jul-90 10.47 397.90 MRA2 5.70 
AIRC J6229 1-Jan-91 10.59 402.40 MRA3 SE4 10.20 
71 WAIG 416 9-Jan-91 10.45 397.10 MRA 2 5.30 
71WAIG 1255 19-Apr-91 10.58 402.00 MRA 3 0.40 
71WAIG 2780 21-Apr-91 10.84 412.00 MRA 4 -9.60 
AIRC J9467 7-Aug-91 10.98 417.20 MRA4 5.20 
73 WAIG 141 19-Nov-92 10.98 417.20 
No reason 
given 0.00 
AIRC L0280 1-Dec-93 11.19 425.20 SNA1 8.00 
74 WAIG 621 9-Mar-94 11.19 425.20 SNA 1 0.00 
75 WAIG 1645 4-Apr-95 11.40 433.20 SNA 2 -8.00 
AIRC M1568 30-Apr-95 11.40 433.20 SNA2 0.00 
AIRC N3256 8-May-96 11.61 441.20 SNA3 8.00 
76 WAIG 1990 15-May-96 11.61 441.20 SNA3 0.00 
77 WAIG 3122 14-Nov-97 11.87 451.20 SNA4 -10.00 
AIRC Q1020 1-Jul-98 12.24 465.20 SNA4?&5 14.00 
78 WAIG 3543 7-Aug-98 12.24 465.20 SNA5 0.00 
AIRC R5307 1-Jun-99 12.56 477.20 SAN6 12.00 
79 WAIG 1847 1-Aug-99 12.56 477.20 SNA6 0.00 
AIRC S8605 27-Jul-00 12.95 492.20 SNA7 15.00 
80 WAIG 3767 1-Aug-00 12.95 492.20 SNA7 0.00 
AIRC PR9043632 23-May-01 13.35 507.20 SNA8 15.00 
81 WAIG 2149 1-Aug-01 13.35 507.20 SNA8 0.00 
AIRC PR918271 20-May-02 13.82 525.20 SNA9 18.00 
82 WAIG 1769 1-Aug-02 13.82 525.20 SNA9 0.00 
AIRC PR932048 3-Jun-03 14.27 542.20 SNA10 17.00 
83 WAIG 2417 01-Aug-03 14.27 542.20 SNA10 0.00 
(Sources: WAIGs; www.wairc.wa.gov.au; AIRC - Osiris/WageNet) 
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Table A-15 – Metals EBAs Compared – WA with Victoria 
 













  20-Oct-94 464.22 9.18 73 WAIG 1795 
Private to 
parties     
  20-Apr-95 471.06 8.74   
based on next 
agreement 491.00 17.69 
R0540 13-May-96 485.80 10.11 74 WAIG 2097 17-Aug-94 515.55 21.25 
  Nov 96? 509.63 15.51   18-Aug-95 540.10 24.68 
  13-May-97 519.64 not avail 76 WAIG 3847 17-Aug-96 589.42 36.06 
  13-Nov-97 534.95 not avail   18-Aug-97 618.89 40.27 
R0931 14-May-98 559.95 20.37 78 WAIG 4562 17-Aug-98 649.83 36.69 
R1215 01-Jan-00 571.00 19.66   18-Aug-99 675.82 41.62 
  01-Mar-00 605.62 23.04   Aug 00? 696.09   
  01-Jan-01 617.53 25.46 A6 of 2001 24-May-01 703.70 42.97 
  01-Jul-01 629.67 24.15 Bassendeen 26-Nov-01 725.97 43.13 
  01-Jan-02 642.05 26.59 ent. award 25-Nov-02 751.85 43.16 
  01-Jul-02 667.32 27.06 AMWU figs 25-Nov-03 774.41 42.83 
AG831337 11-Aug-03 724.42 33.61 Inghams Maintenance EBAs 
    76 WAIG 1847 15-Dec-95 452.69 4.50 
      1-Mar-96 461.75 6.59 
      15-Dec-96 475.60 7.80 
      15-Jul-97 489.87 11.03 
    78 WAIG 906 15-Dec-97 516.81 14.54 
      15-Dec-98 545.24 17.20 
    
1999-2001 agreement not registered 
  
    AG815760 14-Jan-02 722.50 42.45 
      14-Jun-02 782.71 49.03 
      14-Jan-03 858.86 62.58 
(Sources: WAIGs 1990-2005; OSIRIS 2000-2; WageNet 2003-5) 
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Table A-16 - Award Comparison - Driver, Federal and WA 1990 to 2003 
 
Reference Operative Date $/wk Reason FED-WA 
70 WAIG 1909 1-Jan-90 344.50 SE   
AIRC J4608 8-Jun-90 359.10 SE 14.60 
71 WAIG 1869 18-Sep-90 364.80 SE MRA1 -5.70 
AIRC J9392 13-Aug-91 372.30 SE 7.50 
72 WAIG 563 24-Jan-92 374.50 MRA234 -2.20 
AIRC K1674 3-Feb-92 372.60 SE? -1.90 
AIRC L1214 2-Dec-93 382.50 SNA1 8.00 
74 WAIG 647 15-Feb-94 382.50 SNA1 0.00 
AIRC L8454 28-Oct-94 390.50 SNA2 8.00 
75 WAIG 3297 25-Oct-95 390.50 SNA2 0.00 
AIRC N2513 28-Apr-96 398.50 SNA3 8.00 
76 WAIG 5001 1-Nov-96 398.50 SNA3 0.00 
AIRC P2215 12-Jun-97 408.50 SNA4 10.00 
77 WAIG 3177 14-Nov-97 408.50 SNA4 0.00 
AIRC Q2993 5-Jun-98 422.50 SNA5 14.00 
78 WAIG 4381 3-Nov-98 422.50 SNA5 0.00 
AIRC R7613 27-Jul-99 434.50 SNA6 12.00 
79 WAIG 1847 1-Aug-99 434.50 SNA6 0.00 
AIRC S7796 27-Jul-00 449.50 SNA7 15.00 
80 WAIG 3992 1-Aug-00 449.50 SNA7 0.00 
AIRC PR907774 30-Jun-01 462.50 SNA8 13.00 
81 WAIG 2387 1-Aug-01 462.50 SNA8 0.00 
AIRC PR919693 27-Jul-02 480.50 SNA9 18.00 
82 WAIG 1982 1-Aug-02 480.50 SNA9 0.00 
AIRC PR934640 27-Jul-03 497.50 SNA10 17.00 
83 WAIG 2691 01-Aug-03 497.50 SNA10 0.00 
(Sources: WAIGs; www.wairc.wa.gov.au; IRCV; AIRC - Osiris/WageNet) 
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Table A-17 – EBA Comparison - Transport  
 
Pioneer Concrete EBAs Herne Hill/Red Hill 
CSR Readymix (Vic) Raw Materials 
Transport 












  curr rate 93 412.70 10.20 C0737 20-Jan-95 524.02 34.19 
73WAIG 2962 27-Oct-93 433.34 15.71 C1495 20-Jan-96 550.24 40.91 
75WAIG 1892 28-Oct-94 476.67 24.62   01-Sep-96 563.92 41.51 
77 WAIG 391 1-Aug-96 510.04 30.61 C2846 30-Sep-97 586.48 43.57 
  1-Aug-97 533.87 33.97   01-Jun-98 604.07 42.98 
79 WAIG 788 5-Aug-98 557.00 36.35   01-Feb-99 622.19 47.26 
  4-Aug-99 581.04 33.73 C5732 30-Sep-99 622.19 43.20 
81 WAIG 167 4-Oct-00 610.09 35.73  01-Feb-00 640.86 47.49 
  3-Oct-01 628.39 35.87   01-Feb-01 660.08 46.85 
  2-Oct-02 645.36 34.31 AG819461 01-Feb-02 686.48 48.43 
  1-Oct-03 663.43 33.35 AG831650 01-Feb-03 700.39 45.76 
Peters/PB Foods EBA Grade 2 Driver (WA) Bonlac Foods Limited Grade 2 Driver (VIC) 
74 WAIG 1518 29-Mar-94 397.60 3.95 ‘92 agmt in  01-Jun-92 + 2.5%   
  29-Mar-95 405.55 6.03 ’94 one 01-Sep-92 + 2%   
  29-Mar-96 413.66 5.93 B0368 01-Jan-94 + 3%   
78 WAIG 1278 29-Mar-97 466.75 17.13   01-Nov-94 + 3%   
  29-Mar-98 480.75 17.69 B0636 01-Aug-95 440.90 12.91 
  29-Mar-99 495.18 17.20   01-Aug-96 458.50 15.06 
AG223 of 2001 1-Jul-00 544.59 25.34 B1255 01-Aug-97 472.24 15.60 
  1-Jan-01 552.76 22.97   01-Mar-98 486.00 18.97 
 1-Jul-01 561.05 24.82   01-Aug-98 499.75 18.28 
  1-Jan-02 564.92 22.15   01-Mar-99 511.22 21.00 
  1-Jul-02 573.40 23.98 B2310 01-Aug-99 531.71 22.37 
  1-Jan-03 582.00 21.12   01-Aug-00 557.03 23.92 
  Plus 1 to 2% on KPIs    01-Aug-01 582.35 25.91 
        AG819462 01-Aug-02 605.64 26.04 
          01-Aug-03 629.87 26.61 
(Sources: WAIGs; www.wairc.wa.gov.au; IRCV; AIRC - Osiris/WageNet) 
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Table A-18 - Award Comparison - Building Trades Labourer, Federal and WA 
1990-2003 
 
Reference Operative Date $/hr $/wk Reasons FED-WA 
70 WAIG 1403 23-Mar-90 10.33 392.70 MRA&SE2   
AIRC J4733 13-Aug-90 10.54 400.60 New award 7.90 
AIRC J8959 19-Jul-91 10.80 410.50 SE 17.80 
71 WAIG 2831 17-Oct-91 10.80 410.50   0.00 
AIRC L1467 13-Dec-93 11.01 418.50 SE? 8.00 
74 WAIG 904 24-Dec-93 11.01 418.50 SNA1 0.00 
AIRC M4541 23-Mar-95 11.23 426.80 SNA2&IndAll 8.30 
75 WAIG 2154 28-Sep-95 11.23 426.80 SNA2&IndAll 0.00 
AIRC N0524 23-Mar-96 11.45 435.10 SNA3&IndAll 8.30 
76 WAIG 2802 2-Jul-96 11.46 435.40 Ind. All -0.30 
AIRC N9866 27-Mar-97 11.46 435.40 Ind. All 0.00 
AIRC P1289 15-May-97 11.73 445.80 SNA4&IndAll 10.40 
77 WAIG 3177 14-Nov-97 11.72 445.40 SNA4GO 0.40 
AIRC Q2216 25-May-98 12.11 460.30 SNA5&IndAll 14.90 
78 WAIG 3770 31-Jul-98 12.10 459.90 SNA5&IndAll 0.40 
AIRC R6427 25-May-99 12.44 472.80 SNA6&IndAll 12.90 
79 WAIG 1843 1-Aug-99 12.42 471.90 SNA6GO 0.90 
80 WAIG 3032 19-Nov-99 12.43 472.30 Ind.All. 0.50 
N0122 Var113 25-May-00 12.85 488.40 SNA7 16.10 
80 WAIG 3440 1-Aug-00 12.96 492.30 SNA7 -3.90 
AIRC PR905211 25-May-01 13.21 502.00 SNA8 9.70 
81 WAIG 1776 1-Aug-01 13.19 501.40 SNA8 0.60 
AIRC PR918338 28-May-02 13.70 520.70 SNA9 19.30 
82 WAIG 1432 1-Aug-02 13.68 520.00 SNA9 0.70 
AIRC PR932055 26-May-03 14.17 538.30 SNA10 18.30 
83 WAIG 1994 01-Aug-03 14.15 537.70 SNA10 0.60 
(Sources: WAIGs; www.wairc.wa.gov.au; AIRC - Osiris/WageNet) 
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Table A-19 – Building EBAs Compared – WA with Victoria 
 
GN/G & N Conform/Con-form EBAs (WA) Multiplex Constructions (Victoria) Pty Ltd 
Labourer Group 3 
    
% 





awd Reference Operative date $/wk on award 
76WAIG2552 1-Aug-95 490.96 17.31 M0648 21-Apr-94 447.26 6.87 
(4 employees) 1-Feb-96 507.30 18.86   01-Jan-95 467.02 11.59 
  1-Aug-96 523.26 22.60 M1125? 
not on Wage 
net     
  1-Feb-97 539.60 23.93     
AG203of1977 1-Aug-97 555.94 27.68 M1943 01-Nov-97 570.76 28.03 
  1-Feb-98 571.90 28.40   01-Jul-98 581.78 26.39 
  1-Aug-98 588.24 27.91   01-Nov-98 619.02 34.48 
  1-Feb-99 604.22 31.38   01-Nov-99 637.64 34.86 
  1-Aug-99 612.56 29.81 AG809662 01-Mar-01 825.74 69.07 
80WAIG 
1126 1-Nov-99 643.34 36.21   01-Mar-02 857.28 70.77 
  1-Nov-00 675.64 37.24 AG823853 01-Mar-03 884.26 69.82 
  1-Nov-01 709.84 41.57         
CFMEU 1-Nov-02 744.80 43.23         
Not registered 1-Nov-03 774.44 43.87         







Table A-20 – A Mining Company’s Award and Workplace Agreement Rates Compared 
 
A Mining Company award A Mining Company (actual agreement rates paid supplied by co.) 
AWU Mineworkers/Mine Production Level 3 Range 1D - 70% (roughly equiv. To Level 3 truck driver/dump truck operator) 
Reference 
Operative 
date $/hr $/wk Reason for change 
Operative 
date $/hr $/wk $/yr Reason for change 
% inc on 
awd 
70WAIG 1475 21-Jan-90 10.87 412.90 SE             
71WAIG 387 14-Dec-90 11.16 424.20 SE             
71WAIG 3243 20-Oct-91 11.44 434.80               
72WAIG 2791 27-Nov-92 11.96 454.40 
(+4.5% for major SE 
employer applied)             
73WAIG 1307 5-Apr-93 12.28 466.50 (restructure of class.) 5-Nov-93 20.00 840.00 43680.00   62.92 
75WAIG 1644 7-Nov-94 12.49 474.50 SNA1 1-Apr-95 21.74 913.25 47489.00 Restructured bands 71.25 
75WAIG 2178 7-May-95 12.70 482.50 SNA2 1-Apr-96 22.39 940.25 48893.00   73.44 
76WAIG 2824 7-May-96 12.91 490.50 SNA3 
31-Mar-
97 22.39 940.25 48893.00 Restructured bands 73.44 
79WAIG 1709 27-Apr-99 13.54 514.50 SNA4&5 1-Apr-97 22.93 963.00 50076.00   77.63 
79WAIG 1847 1-Aug-99 13.86 526.50 SNA6GO$12 1-Apr-98 23.51 987.50 51350.00 Base Plus: 82.15 
80WAIG3719 1-Aug-00 14.20 539.50 SNA7 1-Jan-99 25.79 1083.35 56334.00 
Market alignment plus 
$1500 performance 99.83 
81WAIG2098 1-Aug-01 14.59 554.50 SNA8 1-Apr-99 26.87 1128.46 58680.00 
plus $2000 
performance 108.15 
82WAIG1728 1-Aug-02 15.07 572.50 SNA9 1-Apr-00 25.95 1090.00 56680.00 base only 87.31 
83WAIG2362 01-Aug-03 15.51 589.50 SNA10 1-Apr-01 30.73 1290.58 67110.00 
plus $8376 
performance 139.22 
          1-Apr-02 29.11 1222.48 63569.00 
plus $3262 
performance 120.47 
          1-Apr-03 32.25 1354.35 70426.20 
plus $5850 
performance 136.57 
(Sources: WAIGs; www.wairc.wa.gov.au; IRCV; AIRC - Osiris/WageNet; shading denotes the use of agreement, rather than award rates)
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Table A-21 – Public Service Awards and Agreements Compared -  
Western Australian and Federal 
 
Public Service Salaries Agreement/Award [WA] 
Reference 
Operative 






70WAIG2196 2-Apr-90 25886 495.90 44025 843.39 SE2 
73WAIG302 1-Dec-92 26533 508.30 45126 864.48 
New 
award 
75WAIG712 9-Jan-95 26950 516.28 45543 872.47 SNA1 
75WAIG2396 10-Jul-95 27367 524.27 45960 880.46 SNA2 
76WAIG2767 12-Jul-96 27784 532.26 46377 888.45 SNA3 
77WAIG3177 14-Nov-97 28306 542.26 46899 898.45 SNA4  
78WAIG3841 7-Aug-98 29036 556.25 47421 908.45 SNA5 
79WAIG1843 1-Aug-99 29662 568.24 48047 920.44 SNA6 
80WAIG3875 1-Aug-00 30445 583.24 48726 933.45 SNA7 
81WAIG2264 1-Aug-01 31225 598.18 49613 950.44 SNA8 
82WAIG1873 1-Aug-02 32183 616.53 50552 968.43 SNA9 
83WAIG2553 01-Aug-03 33070 633.52 51334 983.41 SNA10 
Improving Productivity, Jobs & Pay in the Australian Public Services Agreement 1992-4 
Print No. 
Operative 
date ASO2 2/wk ASO6 
6/wk  
I0089 17-Dec-92 23165.00 443.77 35424.00 678.62  
 11-Mar-93 23628.00 452.64 36132.00 692.18  
 10-Mar-94 24318.00 465.86 37188.00 712.41  
Interim Framework Agreement (IFA) Australian Public Service 
I0187 03-Dec-94 24318.00 465.86 37188.00 712.41  
 02-Jan-95 24804.00 475.17 37932.00 726.67  
Continuous Improvement in the Australian Public Service Enterprise Agreement 1995-6 
C0993 29-Jun-95 25290.00 484.48 38675.00 740.90  
 13-Jul-95 25796.00 494.18 39449.00 755.73  
 07-Mar-96 26209.00 502.09 40080.00 767.82  
 17-Oct-96 26733.00 512.13 40882.00 783.18  
(Sources: WAIGs; www.wairc.wa.gov.au; IRCV; AIRC - Osiris/WageNet) 
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Table A-22 – WA and Australian Public Service EBAs in Female and  
Male-dominated Agencies 
 
Health Department of WA EBAs 
Reference 
Operative 
date L2/yr L2/wk L6/yr L6/wk L2/hr L6/hr 
76WAIG2202 26-Feb-96 28462.00 545.25 47798.00 915.67 14.35 24.10 
  31-Aug-96 29031.00 556.15 48754.00 933.98 14.64 24.58 
  28-Feb-97 29321.00 561.70 49242.00 943.33 14.78 24.82 
79WAIG3308 15-Oct-99 30754.00 589.16 51649.00 989.44 15.50 26.04 
                
PSAAG24 of 
2002 1-Jul-01 33388.00 639.62 56071.00 1074.16 16.83 28.27 
  1-Jan-02 34389.00 658.79 57753.00 1106.38 17.34 29.12 
  1-Jan-03 35952.00 688.74 60378.00 1156.67 18.12 30.44 
                
Commonwealth Department of Health & Ageing EBAs 
People Leadership and Performance Improvement Agreements 1998-2004 
Ref. Date ASO2.1 2/wk ASO6.1 6/wk L2/hr L6/hr 
P1142 01-Aug-98 28183.00 539.90 43100.00 825.67 14.40 22.02 
P1742 12-May-00 29169.00 558.79 44609.00 854.58 14.90 22.79 
  01-Oct-00 29898.00 572.76 45724.00 875.94 15.27 23.36 
  01-Oct-01 30645.00 587.07 46867.00 897.84 15.66 23.94 
  before cert. 34489.00 660.71 46867.00 897.84 17.62 23.94 
AG819414 04-Nov-02 35869.00 687.15 48742.00 933.75 18.32 24.90 
  01-Apr-03 36023.00 690.10 51859.00 993.47 18.40 26.49 
  01-Oct-03 37284.00 714.25 53674.00 1028.24 19.05 27.42 
        
Main Roads WA EBA (Parent award GOSAC but same rates PSA) 
    L2 L2/wk L6/yr L6/wk L2/hr L6/hr 
75 WAIG586 20-Feb-95 27064.00 518.47 46949.58 899.42 13.64 23.67 
77WAIG1184 3-May-96 28935.00 554.31 49210.00 942.72 14.59 24.81 
77WAIG1434 20-Mar-97 31916.00 611.42 55366.00 1060.65 15.29 26.52 
  1-Jul-98 33959.00 650.56 58935.00 1129.02 16.26 28.23 
PSAAG24 of 
2002 1-Jan-02 
Rates stay same but 
hrs change 0.00 17.35 30.11 
        
Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services EBAs 
Print No. 
Operative 
date ASO2 2/wk ASO6 6/wk L2/hr L6/hr 
  before cert. 28732.00 550.42 43695.00 837.07 14.68 22.32 
PC5854 01-Nov-99 29307.00 561.44 44844.00 859.08 14.97 22.91 
  01-Nov-00 29893.00 572.66 45741.00 876.26 15.27 23.37 
  01-Jul-01 30192.00 578.39 46199.00 885.04 15.42 23.60 
AG816335 01-Jul-02 32342.00 619.58 49488.00 948.05 16.52 25.28 
  01-Jul-03 33312.00 638.16 50973.00 976.49 17.02 26.04 
(Sources: WAIGs; www.wairc.wa.gov.au; IRCV; AIRC - Osiris/WageNet) 
 
